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Abstract 
This work concerns presupposition in natural language, which is here understood as a 
mechanism whereby features of an utterance indicate that the speaker assumes certain 
facts as common knowledge. The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part intro-
duces the basic concepts (assuming some at least good undergraduate level knowledge 
of syntax, semantics and logic, but no specific knowledge of presupposition theory), 
and critically reviews previous theories of presupposition. Various of the approaches 
discussed appeal to scope ambiguity (e.g. Russell), to Gricean argumentation (e.g. At-
las, Gazdar, Kempson, van der Sandt and Wilson), to partiality and trivalence (e.g. 
Burton-Roberts, Strawson, Seuren and Link), to an extra presuppositional dimension 
of evaluation (e.g. Herzberger and Karttunen and Peters), to a mechanism allowing 
presuppositions to be canceled (e.g. Gazdar, Mercer and van der Sandt), to sentence in-
ternal dynamics (e.g. Karttunen, Heim, van der Sandt, Zeevat), and to accommodation, 
the process whereby linguistic contexts are augmented to ensure that presuppositions 
are accepted (e.g. in theories of Heim, van der Sandt, Fauconnier and Zeevat). The 
application of these methods is discussed in detail. 
In the second part of the thesis, the Context Change Potential (CCP) model of pre-
supposition, due primarily to Karttunen and Heim, is formally elaborated and modified 
within a propositional dynamic logic, a quantificational dynamic logic, and within three 
sorted type theory. It is shown that the definitions of connectives and quantifiers can 
be motivated independently of the phenomenon of presupposition by consideration of 
the semantics of anaphora and epistemic modality, and that these independently mo-
tivated definitions provide a solution to the projection problem for presupposition. It 
is argued that with regard to the interaction between presupposition and quantification 
the solution is empirically superior to those in competing accounts. A semantics which 
integrates dynamic treatments of quantification, anaphora, modality and presupposition 
is then specified for a fragment of English. The semantics is compositional, and follows 
the spirit of Montague's approach although it differs considerably with respect to the 
details of his analysis. A formal model of global accommodation is proposed which is 
essentially dependent on world-knowledge and common sense reasoning. It is shown to 
provide both a general solution to the problem of the informativeness of presupposi-
tions, and a specific solution to a problem within the CCP model, namely its tendency 
to yield inappropriately weak conditionalised presuppositions. It argued that the model 
provides superior predictions to any purely semantic theory of presupposition, and to 
any existing theory of accommodation or cancellation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Russell once commented [Ru46, p.2121 that all the significant advances in philosophy 
have been made in the teeth of opposition from the disciples of Aristotle. The introduc-
tion of the notion of presupposition is no exception: 
"For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is 
ill', 'Socrates is not ill' is true, and the other false. This is likewise the case if 
he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, and to 
say that he is not ill is true." (From Aristotle's Categories [Ar50, Ch.10:13b 
pp. 27-35]) 
"That the name 'Kepler' denotes something is just as much a presupposition 
for the assertion 'Kepler died in misery' as for the contrary assertion." (From 
Frege's On Sense and Meaning [Fr84b, p.168]) 
Russell, who clearly enjoyed being in the right, in one respect had helped engineer the 
truth of his own observation. After his criticism in [Ru05] of Frege's radical departure 
from Aristotelian dogma, presupposition seems to have been largely forgotten, and when, 
a half a century later, Strawson rediscovered the notion, Russell was once more on 
hand to fight a rearguard action.' That this action, although fairly successful, did not 
'It has been suggested by Larry Horn that the mediaeval philosopher Petrus Hisparius (possibly the 
only logician ever to have become pope) should be credited with the first introduction of a notion of 
presupposition. Horn (noting that the reference differs from an erroneous citation in [Horn85]) pointed 
out to me the following passage from around line 100 of Petrus Hispanus' Tractatus Exponibilium, 
this tract being found in translation (and original) in [Mu145]: "Prima est quod diction reduplicativa 
praesupponit aliquod praedicatum mess aliqui subiecto et denotat quod illud super quod adit immediate 
sit causa inhaerentiae illius." The praesupponit/denotat distinction made here does not, however, appear 
to play a central role in Petrus' philosophy. A big topic of research three quarters of a millennium 
ago concerned what was called suppositio, but despite the superficial morphological similarity, this 
field has no obvious connection with the study of presupposition. Suppositio is related to suppo mere, 
meaning to substitute, and this medieval field is more closely connected with paradoxes and problems of 
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completely halt the further development of the theory of presupposition is attested by 
Sag and Prince's collected bibliography of works dealing with presupposition in [O&iD79], 
which contains more than three hundred items. 
1.1 	Overview of Part I 
In the fifteen years since the Sag and Prince bibliography was collated, work on presup-
position has continued apace, so that the discussion in this thesis does not and could 
not provide a comprehensive survey of the voluminous existing literature. But the five 
chapters in Part 1 of this thesis are devoted to a critical examination of at least a sig-
nificant part of that literature. It is to be hoped that this part of the thesis will at 
least provide the mathematically inclined reader with a grasp of empirical and linguistic 
issues, and the linguistically inclined reader with a grasp of relevant formal methods and 
logical issues: the aim is thus not to summarise the existing literature, but to make it 
more accessible to logicians and linguists alike.2 
The first chapter in Part I is largely introductory, tackling the basic concepts and 
setting the methodological scenes. In the four chapters thereafter some of the more 
influential formal attempts to explain presupposition related inferences are outlined and 
discussed. The grouping of proposals cannot in any sense be standard, because it is 
not obvious whether there is any standard taxonomy of different theories. The division 
of theories across chapters 3-6 does not reflect the philosophical interpretation which 
the original progenitors advocated, but is fixed by my own perspective on the technical 
apparatus underlying the proposals. The division loosely represents four different ways 
in which the dynamics of the interpretation process is used to explain presupposition 
projection. Here is a summary (some of the technical terms mentioned in the summary 
have not yet been introduced): 
Chapter 2: "Presuppositions and How to Spot Them" Basic concepts and meth-
ods are introduced, and some of the underlying assumptions of presupposition 
theories are discussed. 
substitutivity and intensionality. Moving back to the twentieth century, and Russell's part in maintaining 
Aristotelian dogma, it is only fair to point out that although Russell defended bivalence in cases of 
reference failure, he was at the time advocating a move away from another aspect of Aristotle's doctrine, 
namely the assumption that sentences can be analysed into subject-predicate form. 
2The reader is also pointed to a number of excellent previous surveys: Levinson [Le83] provides a 
gentle introduction to the important issues. Soames [So89J has provided an excellent overview article, 
whilst van der Sandt's discussion in [vdS88, pp.1-154] is not only insightful but also unsurpassed for 
breadth of coverage. More recently a couple of shorter overview articles have appeared, by Horn [Horn94] 
and Seuren [Seu91] (in German). Contemporary PhD theses are of course a mine of information: see 
for instance the literature overviews in Bridges' [Br91] and Marcu's [Ma94], both of which are strong 
concerning the more computationally oriented accounts of presupposition, and especially Geurts' [Geu95] 
and Schöter's [Schö:MS]. 
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Chapter 3: "Multivalence and Partiality" In this chapter models are presented 
in which the dynamics of the interpretation process plays no role at all. In these 
purely static theories the possibility of presupposition failure is tied to the presence 
of extra truth values in a multivalent (or partial) semantics. 
Chapter 4: "Cancellation and Filtering" Here we discuss models in which the con-
text of evaluation influences which presuppositions are projected. Such models can 
involve an inter-sentential dynamics or dynamic pragmatics since the context of 
evaluation is modified with each successive utterance, although this intersentential 
dynamics is generally relatively simple and involves only incrementation with new 
propositions. 
Chapter 5: "Dynamic Semantics" In these models presuppositions constrain the 
local contexts in which a presupposition trigger is admissible. These theories 
involve not only incrementation of context with successive sentences, but also sen-
tence internal dynamics. For a given context of evaluation for a complex sentence 
the dynamics of the interpretation process determines what the local contexts of 
evaluation will be for the parts of the sentence, and given that the parts are only 
admissible in certain contexts, this in turn determines whether the sentence as a 
whole is admissible. 
Chapter 6: "Accommodation" Accommodation based theories of presupposition 
allow for a much more sophisticated dynamic pragmatics than in the earlier chap-
ters. This dynamics manifests itself in a process of accommodation. This allows 
repair or modification of contexts of evaluation so that presuppositions are jus-
tified, but the thus modified contexts may be local contexts of evaluation rather 
than the global context in which the sentence as a whole is interpreted. 
1.2 	Overview of Part II 
In ordinary talk, we presuppose a great deal. That is, we take certain things for granted, 
assuming that the other conversational participants share our knowledge of them. This 
can make communication efficient in two ways. Firstly, we can limit our conversational 
goals to communicating only things we do not believe are already shared knowledge. 
Secondly, when attempting to meet those goals, we can use the knowledge that we take 
to be shared in order to help us express what we want to say in a concentrated form. 
In this thesis I will follow the many of the researchers whose work is discussed in Part 
One of this thesis by accepting that the structure of language reflects this difference 
between what we take for granted and what we actually intend to communicate. On 
this view there are lexical items and syntactic structures which either as part of their 
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communicative function, or in order to achieve their communicative function, signal 
that certain propositions have been presupposed by the speaker. In the second part of 
the thesis I will study how this view should be realised in a formal model of utterance 
interpretation. I will limit myself to assertive speech acts, and do not make any formal 
proposals about the interpretation of other types of utterance, such as questions or 
imperatives.3 Given this simplifying restriction, utterance meaning may be broken down 
into two parts, the presupposition and the assertion. The question then arises as to how 
this dichotomy, between information which a speaker takes as shared and information 
which a speaker intends to communicate, should be integrated into a theory of meaning. 
The last few years have seen a shift of emphasis in the study of semantics. The 
traditional job of the natural language semanticist involved relating sentences to truth 
conditions, or to functions from certain contextual parameters to truth conditions. How-
ever, much recent work has concentrated on how the process of understanding itself helps 
to determine the relevant contextual parameters, and thus to determine the truth condi-
tions. To some researchers, truth conditions have become secondary, the primary object 
of study being the way in which context changes during language processing. In other 
words, there has been a shift from a static conception of meaning, through a contextually 
sensitive but still essentially static conception, leading (finally?) to a radically dynamic 
view. At the same time as this philosophical shift has occurred, there has also been a 
tendency for semanticists to import formal approaches to modeling dynamics from the 
discipline of theoretical computer science. 
Heim's Context Change Potential (CCP) model of presupposition, which develops 
ideas of Stalnaker and Karttunen, is a dynamic account of meaning par excellence, 
but its genesis preceded recent technical advances in dynamic semantics. In Part Two 
of the thesis, I will elaborate and defend the CCP model. I will show that by taking 
advantage of recent technical developments, most of the outstanding problems with that 
model can be overcome, and I will propose a way in which the CCP account of sentence 
presupposition may be formally combined with an account of the inferential processes 
which hearers use when determining the assumptions of the speaker. Furthermore, 
dynamic theories of presupposition, anaphora, quantification and epistemic modality will 
be integrated into a single compositional grammar fragment. The reason for attempting 
this integration is twofold. Firstly it is worth providing an integrated theory with wide 
empirical coverage just to show that this can be done, and thus that the various theories 
are compatible. Without such integration, the community of researchers in dynamic 
semantics would be open to the accusation that they shared only an allegiance to jargon, 
and no deeper common view on the nature of meaning. Secondly, the essential details of 
'However, in Chapter 11 there will be some discussion of extensions of the formal model which would 
apply to presuppositional phenomena occurring in speech acts of denial 
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the theory of information underlying the CCP model can be motivated independently 
of the study of presupposition, and this can only be demonstrated within an integrated 
theory that incorporates both presupposition and various other dynamic phenomena. 
The formal developments will take place within the general framework of dynamic 
semantics which has been laid out by such researchers as van Benthem, Dekker, Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof, and Veltman. In a dynamic semantic account, sentences of formal 
and natural languages are understood as providing a means of updating the information 
state of some agent, or as instructions for an agent to use in order to update. Given a 
simplified formal model of an information state, it is possible to specify exactly which 
sentences of a precisely defined formal language correspond to which instructions. A 
notion of logical consequence can then be defined not in terms of truth or falsity of sen-
tences in a model, but in terms of the information which sentences can provide an agent. 
The relevance of such notions of consequence to natural language may be demonstrated 
by providing dynamic semantic interpretations for formal languages which form signifi-
cant fragments of natural language, and showing that the consequence relation accords 
with empirical data concerning implications between sentences of natural language. This 
is essentially the path taken in the first four of the six chapters comprising Part II of 
the thesis, with the remaining two chapters serving to draw some formal and empirical 
comparisons with the approaches to presupposition discussed in Part One. Here is a 
summary of what is to come: 
Chapter 7: "Two Birds and One Stone" Some simple (purely propositional) dy-
namic systems are presented. It is shown how the context sensitivity of epistemic 
modality can be modeled in a propositional dynamic logic, and how this same 
system can be adapted to account for presupposition data. 
Chapter 8: "A Bit Like English" A dynamic semantics for predication, quantifica-
tion and anaphora within a first-order language, ABLE, is developed. 
Chapter 9: "Presupposition and Modality" The ABLE semantics is further re-
fined. The refinement is shown to solve some difficult problems occurring in the 
interaction between quantification and modality on the one hand, and quantifica-
tion and presupposition on the other. 
Chapter 10: "Lets Get Real" It is shown how the semantics developed for ABLE 
can be used as the basis of a compositional analysis of English, within a system I 
refer to as Kinematic Montague Grammar (KMG). It is then demonstrated that 
an adequate treatment of presupposition accommodation must involve a complex 
interaction between world knowledge and compositionally derived meaning. A 
formal model of global accommodation based on an extension to KMG is devel- 
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oped, and it is shown that this model has the potential to account for empirical 
observations which are problematic for other theories of presupposition. 
Chapter 11: "Connections and Directions" Some technical connections are made 
between the theory developed here and some of those theories described in Part 
One of the thesis. These connections are shown to open up some promising direc-
tions for further research, suggesting solutions to problems both within the theory 
developed here and within pre-existing theories of presupposition. 
Chapter 12: "Conclusion" Coverage of the model proposed here, as compared with 
that of other models, is summarised, and a final assertion is made. 
Part I 
The Presupposition: A Critical 
Review of Presupposition Theory 
15 
Chapter 2 
Presuppositions and How to 
Spot Them 
The non-technical sense of the word presupposition serves as a good basis for under-
standing many of the various technical definitions which have been given. Certainly this 
is true of the notion of presupposition introduced by Frege, according to whom presup-
positions are special conditions that must be met in order for a linguistic expression 
to have a denotation. He maintained that presuppositions constitute an unfortunate 
imperfection of natural language, since in an ideal language every well-formed string 
would denote something. The possibility of what we would now call presupposition fail-
ure, which in a Fregean picture would mean cases when a well-formed expression failed 
to denote, was repugnant to him. He cites, as well as the 'Kepler' sentence quoted earlier, 
the following examples (all from Frege [Fr84a]) 
El 	Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery. 
E2 	After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quar- 
relled. 
For Frege, the propositions, respectively, that the name 'Kepler' designates some-
thing, that somebody discovered the elliptic forms of the planetary orbits, and that 
Schleswig-Holstein was once separated from Denmark, are not part of the "thoughts ex-
pressed" by the above examples, but are presupposed by them. An important aspect of 
Frege's separation of sense and reference is his contention that linguistic expressions may 
have a sense, yet lack a reference. This aspect of the Fregean scheme is often ignored, 
and, for instance, is absent from Richard Montague's otherwise essentially Fregean PTQ 
[Mo74b].' Thus for Frege noun-phrases like those underlined in E1—E2 could have failed 
11t is not obvious why Montague chose against fully implementing this part of F'rege's theory. The 
possibility of propositional formulae having sense but no reference would have complicated the (already 
16 
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to have any reference, at least if the world had been different and there had not been 
any relevant entities to which they could refer. In this case the sentences containing the 
noun phrases would themselves have had a sense but no reference, which, given that 
the Fregean reference of a sentence is the True or the False, would have meant that the 
sentences did not have a truth value. 
Most authors follow the Fregean line of relating presuppositions to assumptions 
that have been made, thus as concerning either the way in which utterances signal 
assumptions, or, conversely, the way in which utterances depend upon assumptions 
to be meaningful. However, some words of caution are in order. It is not the case 
that all technical uses of the term presupposition involve reference to assumptions. 
Indeed, if by assumptions we mean the assumptions of some agent, then the notion of 
an assumption is essentially a pragmatic one, whereas for some theorists presupposition 
is a purely semantic relation. Thus phenomena that one theorist explains in terms 
of what is assumed, another may explain without essential 'reference to assumptions, 
and yet both theorists may use the term presupposition. It is not even the case that all 
proponents of pragmatic accounts of presupposition take assumption as a central notion. 
For instance, Gazdar's influential theory of presupposition [Gaz79a, Gaz79b] does not 
involve a commitment to presuppositions being in any sense assumed. 
Having mentioned the terms semantic and pragmatic, I must warn the reader that 
they are bandied about rather freely, and indeed confusingly, in the presupposition 
literature: I will attempt to clarify. 
In a semantic theory presupposition is usually defined as a binary relation between 
pairs of sentences of a language. What makes this relation semantical is that it is defined 
or explicated solely in terms of the semantic valuation of the sentences, or in terms of 
semantical entailment. Thus a definition in terms of semantic valuation might, following 
one interpretation of Strawson's work, say that one sentence (semantically) presupposes 
another if the truth of the second is a condition for the semantic value of the first to be 
true or false. Other such notions will be explored in Chapter 3 below. 
In pragmatic theories the analysis of presupposition involves the attitudes and knowl-
edge of language users. In extreme cases such as Stalnaker's [St74] account, presuppo-
sition is defined without any reference to linguistic form: Stalnaker talks not of the 
presuppositions of a sentence, but of the speaker's presuppositions, these being just 
messy) logic of IL: a natural method of implementation might involve making Montague's cup operator 
(which maps senses onto references) into a partial function. Yet partialising PTQ requires care: see 
Muskens' [Mus89]. Less formally detailed proposals for partialising PTQ, intended specifically for the 
inclusion of presupposition data, were made some years earlier by Hausser [Ha76] and von Kutschera 
[FvK75]. A system presented by Karttunen and Peters [KP79], which will be discussed in the next 
chapter, can be construed as providing yet another means of encoding a Fregean theory of presupposition 
into Montague Grammar, although the authors do not intend the systems they present to be thought 
of in this way. 
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those propositions which are taken for granted by a speaker on a given occasion. Other 
pragmatic theories are less radical, in that linguistic form still plays an essential role 
in the theory. The majority of well-developed pragmatic theories concern the presup-
positions not of a sentence (as in semantic theories) or of a speaker (as in Stalnaker's 
theory) but of an utterance. In some theories, utterances are explicated as pairs con-
sisting of a sentence and a linguistic context, and as a result presupposition becomes a 
ternary relation, holding between two sentences and a context.2 In other theories, the 
presuppositions of a sentence are seen as conditions that contexts must obey in order 
for an utterance of the sentence to be felicitous in that context.3  
The post-Fregean philosophical study of presupposition has been dominated by an 
assumption-based conception, but, given the range of linguistic and philosophical theo-
ries which have been formulated during the last twenty years, such a characterisation is 
no longer apt. 
Furthermore, saying that presuppositions are not part of what is asserted but of what 
is assumed does not in itself provide any practical method of identifying presuppositional 
constructions in language, or even of showing that there are any such constructions. If 
one theorist argues that a definite description asserts the existence of a (unique) object 
satisfying the description, and another theorist maintains that the existence of a relevant 
object is not asserted but presupposed, how are we to tell who is right? This issue was 
at the heart of the famous Russell-Strawson debate. Neither party could offer a solid 
empirical justification of his position, since the debate appeared to hinge on whether 
a simple sentence containing an unsatisfied description was false, as Russell claimed, 
or meaningless, as Strawson, taking his lead from Frege, maintained. Judgements on 
whether sentences are meaningless or false are typically hazy - indeed, it is hard even 
to know how to pose to a naive informant the question of whether a given sentence is 
meaningless or false - and the debate arguably never reached a satisfactory conclusion.4 
So what is the defining characteristic of the recent linguistic study of presupposition? 
We will see that a large class of lexical items and grammatical constructions, including 
those identified as presuppositional by philosophers such as Frege and Strawson, produce 
2Strawson's account can be seen as the first such theory, although the Frege's sparse remarks on 
presupposition are already suggestive. See [St50] and the reconstruction in [So89]. Chapter 4 introduces 
a number of such theories, and it is there suggested that (the second version of) the theory in [Kar73] 
is the first in which a definition of utterance presupposition is formally realised. 
3Keenan [Kee7l, p.  49] defines pragmatic presupposition as follows: "A sentence pragmatically 
presupposes that its context is appropriate." On the other hand Karttunen writes: "Strictly speaking, 
it would be meaningless to talk about the pragmatic presuppositions of a sentence. Such locutions are, 
however, justified in a secondary sense. A phrase like "the sentence A pragmatically presupposes B" can 
be understood as an abbreviation for "whenever A is uttered sincerely, the speaker of A presupposes B" 
(i.e. assumes B and believes-that his audience assumes B as well.)" [Kar73, pp.169-170] 
4The main references for this debate are Strawson's [St50, St64], and Russell's [Ru05, Ru57]. Note 
that the 1964 Strawson paper is quite conciliatory. 
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distinctive patterns of inference. It is difficult to find any common strand to current 
analyses of presupposition, save that they all concern (various parts of) this class.' 
2.1 Projection/Heritability 
Taking = for the moment to be classical semantic entailment (also termed necessitation 
or consequence), it does not follow from = i' that -q = , and, for an arbitrary choice 
of x, it does not follow that q -p x 1= '. Neither does it follow that 00 = b, where 
is a classical modal possibility operator. These properties of classical entailment mirror 
the standardly recognised properties of inference between sentences of natural language. 
For example, Frege's El, repeated below 6, has E3 as one of its implications, and it is no 
surprise that E3 does not follow from any of E4-E6. 
El' 	Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery 
E3 	Somebody died in misery. 
E4 	Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits did not die in misery. 
E5 	If whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery, he should 
have kept his mouth shut. 
E6 	Perhaps whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery. 
However, consider E7, which Frege claims to be presupposed by El. Strikingly, E7 
seems to be implied by El, but also by all of E4-E6. We may say that one implication 
5The following list contains many of the constructions that are commonly identified as presupposi-
tional: 
Definite Noun Phrases 









Sortally Restricted Predicates 
Questions 
6When repeating examples I will follow a convention of adding an apostrophe to the original num-
bering, so that e.g. El becomes El'. 
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of El is inherited or projected such that it also becomes an implication carried by the 
complex sentences in E4—E6, whereas another implication of El is not inherited in this 
way. 
E7 	Somebody discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits. 
This takes us to the curse and the blessing of modern presupposition theory. Certain 
implications of sentences are inherited more freely to become implications of complex 
sentences containing the simple sentences than are other implications, and such implica-
tions are called presuppositions. In its guise as curse this observation is called (following 
Langendoen and Savin [LS71] the presupposition projection problem. The problem is 
twofold. Firstly we must say exactly when presuppositions are inherited, and secondly 
we must say why. But the observation is also a blessing, because it provides an objective 
basis for the claim that there is a distinct presuppositional component to meaning, and 
a way of identifying presuppositional constructions, a linguistic test for presupposition 
on a methodological par with, for instance, standard linguistic constituency tests. 
To find the presuppositions of a given grammatical construction or lexical item, one 
must observe which implications of simple sentences are also implications of sentences 
in which the simple sentence is embedded under negation, under an operator of modal 
possibility or in the antecedent of a conditional. To be sure, there is nothing sacred about 
this list of embeddings from which presuppositions tend to be projected, and the list 
is certainly not exhaustive. The linguist might equally well choose to consider different 
connectives, such as in E8, or non-assertive speech acts, as with the question in E9 - 
questions having been considered as test-embeddings for presuppositions by Karttunen 
- or the imperative in E10.7 E9 is not a question about whether anybody discovered 
elliptic form of the planetary orbits, and ElO does not act as a request to guarantee that 
somebody has discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits. Rather, we would take 
it that an utterer of either of these sentences already held the existence of a discoverer of 
the elliptic form of the planetary orbits to be beyond doubt. Thus the sentences could 
be used as evidence that E7 is presupposed by the simple assertive sentences from which 
E9 and ElO are derived.8  
7The behaviour of presuppositions in imperatives is discussed by Searle {Sea:69, p.  1621. 
8Burton-Roberts suggests the following generalisation of the standard negation test for presupposi-
tions: "Any formula equivalent to a formula that entails either p or its negation, and the negation of any 
such formula, will inherit the presuppositions of p." [Bu89b, p.102] Such a generalisation seems prob-
lematic. For if we allow that a contradiction entails any sentence, then it follows that a contradiétion 
presupposes everything. But any tautology is standardly equivalent to the negation of a contradiction, 
so all tautologies must presuppose everything. Further, if a tautology is entailed by any other sen-
tence, it immediately follows that every pair of sentences stands in the relation of presupposition. I fear 
Burton-Roberts presupposes too much. 
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E8 	Unless whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery, he 
was punished in the afterlife. 
E9 	Did whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits die in misery? 
ElO 	Ensure that whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits dies in misery! 
Returning to projection qua problem rather than qua test, it is often forgotten that, 
from a semantic perspective, the projection problem for presuppositions fits quite natu-
rally into a larger Fregean picture of how language should be analysed. The projection 
problem for presuppositions is the task of stating and explaining the presuppositions of 
complex sentences in terms of the presuppositions of their parts. The larger problem, 
which strictly contains the presupposition projection problem, could naturally be called 
"the projection problem for meanings", i.e. the problem of finding the meanings of com-
plex sentences in terms of the meanings of their parts. Of course, this larger problem is 
conventionally referred to as the problem of compositionality. 
2.2 Cancellation/Defeasibility 
The projection test is dependent upon a source of data which has been central to seman-
tical enquiry since Aristotle, namely our intuitions concerning which pairs of sentences 
stand in the relation of implication. But the notion of implication is not always one we 
can take for granted, especially when presuppositions are involved. 
In the first place, and specifically with regard to examples E9 and ElO, we must be 
careful when talking about the implications of a non-assertoric speech act. But if we 
say that 'A implies B' means that any utterance of A indicates that the speaker believes 
B, then it is safe to say that both E9 and ElO imply E7, but do not imply E3. 
A more serious problem is that many of the inferences on which we base the iden-
tification of a presupposition have an worryingly will-o-the-wisp character: if you look 
hard at them, they sometimes disappear. Suppose that we wished to back up Strawson's 
position in his debate with Russell by showing that there was an identifiable presuppo-
sitional component to the meaning of a sentence containing a definite description, and 
that this component behaved quite differently from ordinary assertions. We might begin 
by considering embedding under negation of a simple sentence, e.g. the locus classicus 
of presupposition theory Eli: 
Eli The King of France is bald. 
E12 The King of France is not bald. 
E13 Somebody is bald. 
Presuppositions and How to Spot Them 	 22 
E14 There is a king of France. 
Asking naive informants whether E14 follows from E12 produces a mixture of be-
mused looks, positive and negative replies. Such a result is hard to interpret: it seems 
plausible the world knowledge of the informants, the fact that they know there is no 
King of France, is affecting the way the informants answer. To factor out the effect 
of world knowledge, one may follow Gazdar [Gaz79a} and replace France' with an un-
familiar country name, such as Buganda', before re-asking the question. This has a 
quantitive rather than qualitative effect, increasing the proportion of respondents who 
will attest that (the Bugand-ised version of) E14 follows from (the Bugand-ised version 
of) E12. It would be a brave scientist who, on the strength of such results, would assert 
that the negative sentence entails the existence of an object satisfying the definite de-
scription. Even more problematically for one who wished to assert the presence of such 
an entailment, it is easy to invent contexts where a Bugand-ised version of E12 might 
be uttered without any commitment to the existence of a Bugandan king: 
E15 A: The King of Buganda is bald. 
B: Come now A, Buganda is not even a monarchy. 
A: OK, I was wrong then. The King of Buganda is not bald. 
Perhaps it was the president I was thinking of? 
Many presupposition theorists argue that cases like E15 are somehow deviant or 
exceptional. For instance, it has often been claimed that there are not one, but two 
negations in English (and presumably other languages), and thus that the occurrence 
of E12 in the discourse E15 involves a different negation to the more everyday truth 
conditional negation. Others argue for E15 being exceptional on the basis of its highly 
marked intonation contours. If E15 is highly marked, then even without explaining why 
speaker A need not be committed to E14 after E15, it might still be possible to maintain 
that utterances of E12 with neutral stress (e.g. no deaccenting, no mid-sentence focal 
stress) imply the existence of an appropriate king. 
Others, especially since Kempson [Kem75] and Wilson [Wi75], have taken the defea-
sibility or eancellability of presuppositions to be one of their defining characteristics. But 
rather than being disturbed by the tendency of presuppositional implications to disap-
pear in certain contexts, some theorists would regard such behaviour as grist to the mill 
of one trying to defend the existence of a distinct presuppositional realm of meaning. 
Presuppositional implications are defeasible, they argue, whereas ordinary entailments 
are not. This is certainly a justifiable position when one considers in detail the data 
on which the identification of presuppositions is based, for occasional disappearance of 
claimed presuppositional implications is not restricted to sentences involving negation. 
Given any characteristically presuppositional implication, that is, an implication of a 
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sentence which appears to remain as an implication in various embeddings, it is usually 
possible to find contexts in which utterance of the complex embedding does not yield 
the purported presupposition as an implication. For example, the first of the two fol-
lowing monologues contains an embedding of 'the King of Buganda' in the antecedent of 
a conditional, and the second contains the same definite noun phrase in a question, and 
yet in neither case would we think that an utterer of the monologue was committed to 
the existence of a king: 
E16 I don't know for sure whether the King of Buganda is alive, although I've heard it 
rumoured that he is 90 and completely bald. I have only one comment on the issue. If 
the King of Buganda is bald, then that must be somebody else inspecting the troops. 
E17 You maintain that Buganda has a king, and that he's a recent ex of yours. Well, as it 
happens I saw the Bugandan head of state opening parliament. I'll ask you just one 
question about him, and if you can answer correctly and without hesitation, I'll grant 
that you're right. Is the King of Buganda bald? 
All of the following examples may be viewed as cases where a presupposition is 
canceled: 
E18 If Mary's married then her husband must be very tolerant. 
E19 If Jack has children, then all of Jack's children are bald. 
[Kar73] 
E20 You say that somebody in this room loves Mary. Well, it isn't John who loves Mary, 
and it certainly isn't Sandy who loves her, (and so on, everybody in the room being 
enumerated). So, nobody in the room loves Mary! 
Example adapted from [Kee7l] 
E21 If I realise that I was wrong I'll tell everybody. 
Example adapted from [Kar7l] 
E22 (Teacher to Pupil) I wasn't aware that you were allowed to smoke behind the bicycle 
sheds! 
E23 If the King of France is bald, then I'm a Dutchman: there is no King of France. 
E24 If Kennedy knows the war is over, the war is over! 
[Gaz79aJ 
E25 Nobody has yet discovered that protons are influencedby the CIA! 
[Gaz79a] 
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E26 (A man is seen in the park crawling around the bushes and whistling.) If he's lost 
his dog, that would explain his strange behaviour. 
Example adapted from [Kay92] 
E27 (Same situation.) He's either lost his dog or he's lost his mind! 
E28 (Same situation.) Perhaps he's lost his dog? 
Even if the occasional disappearance of claimed presuppositional implications does 
not force us to give up analysing various implicational properties of language in terms 
of presuppositions, it at least forces us to be careful when defining tests for presupposi-
tional constructions. It will not do simply to say "a sentence S has a presuppositional 
implication P if any utterance of S or of various (listable) complex sentences containing 
S shows that the speaker believes P". It is not easy to give a simple restatement of 
the identification conditions for presuppositions, one which allows for defeasibility. A 
rough and ready reformulation might run along the lines of "... utterances of S or of 
various (listable) complex sentences containing S where the linguistic context provides 
no relevant information about the speakers attitude towards P, provide evidence that 
the speaker believes P" 
2.3 	Application and Interpretation of Presupposition Tests 
There are many grammatical constructions which cannot easily be embedded as the 
tests demand. For example, texts consisting of several sentences cannot be embedded 
under negation, in the antecedent of a conditional or under a modality. Do we want 
to conclude from this that texts do not have presuppositions? It seems more natural 
to remain agnostic, accepting that we cannot directly obtain data about the presuppo-
sitions of texts and thus that the consequences of any particular theory regarding the 
presuppositions of texts are untestable. Similar remarks apply to non-assertoric speech 
acts. It is sometimes suggested that a wh-question presupposes the existence of an ob-
ject satisfying the properties predicated of the wh-element, yet such a claim is difficult 
to test: what is the negation of a question? ('What is not the negation of a question?' 
?) 
For another example, consider presupposing polarity items (discussed by van der 
Sandt in his thesis): sentences containing the positive polarity item (PPI) still are hard 
to negate (at least without the feeling of denial, which is just what we want to avoid), 
and on the other hand a sentence containing the negative polarity item (NPI) any more 
normally is negative, so that further negation is highly marked.9 
91n broad terms, an NFl is a word or phrase that tends to occur only in non-positive contexts (e.g. 
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The following are all cases where a naive application of presupposition tests yields 
bogus presuppositions. The (a) sentence of E29, for example implicates the (c) sentence, 
that Mary did not eat one of the two bananas, which is also entailed by the negation of 
(a), in (b). The remaining triples are all based on scalar implicatures. 
E29 a. Mary ate one of the two bananas 
	
b. 	Mary didn't eat one of the two bananas 
C. 	(Mary didn't eat one of the two bananas) 
E30 a. 	Mary's total assets are worth $10. 
b. 	Mary's total assets are not worth $10. 
C. 	Mary's total assets are not worth $11. 
E31 a. 	Jane submitted one abstract in her entire academic life. 
b. 	Jane did not submit one abstract in her entire academic life. 
C. 	Jane did not submit two abstracts in her entire academic life. 
E32 a. 	It is possible that Bill is happy. 
b. 	It is not possible that Bill is happy. 
C. 	Bill is not necessarily happy. 
E33 a. 	I think Bill is happy. 
b. 	I don't think Bill is happy. 
C. 	I don't know Bill is happy. 
So called scalar imp licatures are thought of as being generated in the presence of a 
linguistic scale. Such a scale is found whenever two expressions have similar distribu-
tional properties, but a simple sentence involving the first is logically stronger than the 
sentence with the second expression substituted for the first. For instance, 'know' might 
be analysed as higher on a scale than 'believe' (which may be notated 'know'>'believe') 
since E33a is strictly entailed by 'I know Bill is happy'. Generally, given a scale such that 
A< B then if S contains A, S implicates the negation of S with A replaced by B, which 
we may write 'Not S[A\B]"°, and 'Not 5' also carries this entailment. Therefore, one 
embedded in the antecedent of a conditional), or, in some cases, only in a clearly negative context (e.g. 
within the scope of the quantifier nobody). Correspondingly, a PPI tends to occur felicitously only in 
positive contexts (such as simple un-negated sentences). 
10Here, and in future, expressions of the form 'Not A' are used to denote the negation of A, it being 
assumed irrelevant how that negation is realised unless specifically indicated to the contrary. 
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standard presupposition test indicates that for any such B > A and S containing A, S 
presupposes 'Not S[A\B]'." 
As a final type of case where tests indicate what might be seen as a bogus presup-
position, consider parentheticals, as in the following example drawn from the Guardian 
newspaper: 
E34 Sweden may export synthetic wolf urine - sprayed along roads to keep elk away 
to Kuwait for use against camels. - AP 
Syntactically, the parenthetical sprayed along roads to keep elk away' appears within 
the scope of the modal operator 'may': presumably it could be analysed as an attributive 
relative clause acting as adjunct to the NP 'synthetic wolf urine'. One would infer both 
from a non-modal version of the example (e.g. with 'may export' replaced by 'is export-
ing'), and from the example as it stands that synthetic wolf urine is sprayed along roads 
to keep elk away. Thus, according to the embedding-under-modals test (and others can 
be applied with the same result) this inference should be designated as presuppositional. 
But many theories associate presuppositions with information which is in the common 
ground between interlocutors, or assumed by the speaker to be in this common ground. 
On such an account the anti-elk application of synthetic wolf urine would not appropri-
ately be termed presuppositional, since the writer of the text very likely does not expect 
readers to have any previous knowledge of the subject. 12  This is not to say that in this 
case presupposition tests are definitely wrong. Rather, there is no pre-theoretical right 
and wrong in the matter, and a theoretician has to choose which subsets of phenomena 
that tests indicate are presuppositional are given a unitary explanation in terms of a 
theoretical notion of presupposition. Karttunen and Peters [KP77, KP79] have argued 
that the set of phenomena which tests identify as presuppositional is in fact highly het-
erogeneous, and indeed that no single sub-group of these phenomena even merits the 
name presupposition. 
2.4 Formal Models of Projection 
this will suggest . . . the appearance of wonderful new 'logical' connec-
tives, and of rules of 'deduction' resembling the prescriptions to be read in 
The Key of Solomon. Since no one expects that standard logic texts shall 
ever read like witches' grimoires, this inclines one to dismiss the technical 
study of presuppositions as a mathematical parlor game." [vF69] 
'1Gazdar [Gaz79a, p.108] attributes this type of example to Andrea Howard. 
12 Tests for presupposition might be understood to indicate that footnotes, which can be seen as a 
notation for parantheticals, are presupposed. For the negation of a sentence containing a footnote 
reference would usually suggest the author's belief in the footnote just as much as the corresponding 
positive sentence would. But I would hesitate to say that this footnote (or any other) is presupposed. 
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For a first glimpse of what is to be expected of a formal presupposition theory, it 
should be observed that there are some prima facie difficulties involved in attempting 
to explain presupposition related inferences in terms of classical logic. For instance, a 
purely semantic characterisation of presupposition may begin with the idea that presup-
positions can follow both from a formula and its negation. Indeed, this is often taken 
as the basis of a formal definition of a presupposition relation between sets of formulae: 
presupposes 7P if 0 	and -'q = . But classically we have that if q 1= 0 and 
-' 	= ', then = ,b. In other words, the above definition together with classically valid 
patterns of argumentation would yield the unwelcome consequence that only tautologies 
could be presupposed. 
To give another example, since presuppositions are commonly taken to project from 
the antecedents of conditionals, it might be suggested that if 0 presupposes 'q, then 
X j= b (for arbitrary x). If this were allowed, then, on natural assumptions about 
the presuppositions of definite descriptions, we would have 'If the King of France has a 
bald head then the King of France has a head' entailing that 'There is a King of France.' 
Now, it seems reasonable to insist that whatever logic is employed should support an 
inference from 'The King of France has a bald head' to 'The King of France has a head'. 
However, a consequence of the logician's beloved deduction theorem is that from 0 H 
we can conclude H 0 -p • But then If the King of France has a bald head then the 
King of France has a head' is a tautology, and from this a fortiori 'There is a King of 
France' must also become a tautology. This is an unpalatable consequence. Should we 
be prepared to accept, for example, the loss of the deduction theorem as one way of 
breaking down this argument? 
Apparent defeasibility of presuppositions suggests abandonment of other classically 
valid inference patterns. Right monotonicity allows derivation from 0 H 0 that 0, x H 
(for arbitrary x). Projection of presuppositions from negated contexts means that 'The 
King of Buganda is not bald' should normally licence an inference to 'There is a King of 
Buganda'. However, 'The King of Buganda is not bald. There is no King of Buganda.' 
apparently does not licence this inference, so maybe right monotonicity should not be 
valid in a logic for presuppositions. 13 
The philosopher's traditional, intentionally oversimplified picture of interpretation 
13 Note that Gazdar's solution to the projection problem, the best known theory which takes defea-
sibility as its basis, preserves right monotonicity, but effectively removes left monotonicity: if previous 
sentences contradict the presuppositions of a sentence, the presuppositions are not added to the context. 
Note also that all the above examples concern meta-logical rules of inference, inferences from the validity 
of one argument pattern to the validity of another, such as are found in Gentzen Sequent systems. There 
has been little systematic study of how presupposition in particular bears on general properties of proof 
systems. The only discussion I am aware of is in [vF75]. But van Fraassen makes no attempt to connect 
the systems he presents with natural language. On the other hand Thomason [Th72, Th79] does apply 
a variant on van Fraassen's supervaluation approach to natural language, but there the discussion lacks 
the (perhaps excessively rarified) generality of van Fraassen's work. 
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involves mapping sentences of natural language into similar sentences of classical logic. 
The above observations suggest that a formal model of presupposition projection prob-
lem requires a significant departure from such a picture. There are several different 
strategies for effecting this departure: 
Changing the interpretation of Logical form (see e.g. the theories in Chapter 3) 
Complicating the relation between surface structure and logical form (this is the 
basis of the neo-Russellian account discussed immediately below) 
Adding pragmatic mechanisms to act in parallel with semantic interpretation (e.g. 
the theories in Chapter 4 
Many of the theories that will he described in the coming pages could not be said to 
adopt just one of these, but are hybrids combining several. In particular, the approach 
which will be introduced in the second part of this thesis is a hybrid of strategies 1 and 
3. 
2.5 Are Presuppositions Conventional? 
We have seen that theories differ as to whether presuppositions are viewed semantically 
or pragmatically. Another dimension of variation along which theories can in principle 
differ concerns whether presuppositions are understood to be conventional or not. By 
a theory of conventional presupposition I mean one in which the grammar explicitly 
encodes that a certain subset of constructions are presuppositional, and determines for 
each such construction with what presuppositions it is associated. These constructions 
are known as presupposition triggers. Many accounts involve a difference between the 
presuppositions attached to utterances and those attached conventionally (and indepen-
dently of utterance context) to the trigger, and this may be reflected terminologically, 
typically by referring to the presuppositions associated with triggers as elementary, 
primitive or potential presuppositions. When referring to theories of conventional pre-
supposition, I include such accounts: although in some cases it might be argued that it 
is inappropriate to call the utterance presupposition itself conventional, the utterance 
presupposition still originates from a conventional stipulation in the grammar. 
A conventional specification of elementary presuppositions is fundamental to all of 
the formal theories of projection to be discussed in detail in the coming chapters of this 
thesis. Before ploughing into description and inter-comparison of these theories it is as 
well to put them into some perspective by asking just how solid their basic foundation 
is. Must presuppositions be conventionally marked in the grammar? I will now present 
some accounts which appear to provide, and in some cases perhaps really do provide, 
the basis of a negative answer to this question. 
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Scope Ambiguity 
Although Russell did not find the concept of presupposition to be useful, his theory 
of definite descriptions (as well as the updated and extended version of that theory in 
[Ne901) provides a serious candidate for a treatment of some phenomena taken by others 
to be presuppositional in nature. It would be a mistake to overlook Russell's simple and 
elegant account for the sake of philosophical dogma. Furthermore, in §6.8.2 it will be 
shown that the Russellian analysis of definites is not so distant from current presupposi-
tion theory as some might imagine, so that it is well worth taking the trouble to see how 
Russell's ideas extend to other phenomena usually taken to be presuppositional. Others 
have proposed how Russell's program might be extended to account for the problems 
of modern presupposition theory, including Delacruz [De176], Cresswell [Cr73, pp.168-
169] and Grice [Gr81], and the extension I will propose is perhaps most like the first of 
these. 14 
A radically Russellian theory of presupposition might be based around the following 
tenets: 
The logical form (LF) of language is homogeneous, in the sense that there are no 
semantically distinct presuppositional and assertional components. 
The LF of a sentence may differ markedly from its surface form, since certain 
expressions can take semantic scope which is very unconstrained with respect to 
the syntactic domain in which they are realised at surface structure. Call these 
expressions the free scopers. 
Call whatever is entailed by all formulae having such an operator at wide scope, 
the basic assertions of the operator (e.g. the existence of a king should be a basic 
assertion of the operator corresponding to the noun-phrase the king'.) To say that 
a presupposition is canceled is to say that the embedding at LF of the operator 
introduced by the presupposition is such that the basic assertion of that operator 
is not entailed by the LF, and to say that a presupposition is projected is just to 
say that the basic assertion is entailed. 
In general a complex sentence will have a large number of Us. The claim that 
"presuppositions tend to project" must be explained as a pragmatic preference 
across alternative Us, such that one LF will be preferred over another if ceteris 
paribus a free scoping operator has wide scope over a non-free scoping operator in 
the first LF, but not in the second. 
14 Recently, Heim, in [Hei92], has also suggested that scope ambiguity might have a role to play 
in explaining projection facts, postulating that this might provide the explanation of projection from 
attitude contexts. 
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Given that t is the Russellian description operator there is one and only one, the 
reader will probably recall that according to Russell E12 is subject to a scope ambiguity15  
Its meaning can correspond to either of two logical forms: 
E35 	tx[king-of-france(x)] : -'(bald (x)) 
E36 -i(tx[king-of-france(x)] : bald(x)) 
The first of these readings entails the existence of a unique French King, and is 
thus comparable to the reading derived in a presuppositional theory where the definite 
description remains embedded under the negation at LF but where some semantic or 
pragmatic mechanism allows the presupposed existence of a unique French king to be 
inherited as a presupposition of the whole sentence. The second reading, in which 
the definite remains embedded under the negation, of course corresponds to what in a 
presuppositional theory would be a case of presupposition cancellation. 
Given that these two readings are approximately those commonly discussed in the 
presupposition literature, what is wrong with Russell's theory? One point of weakness 
is Russell's uniqueness restriction. At the very least, it is clear that there are some uses 
of definites which do not entail that there is a unique satisfier of the description: 
E37 At the Françaises-celebres masquerade Napoleon gets a cheap laugh by offering his 
hat to one of the Kings of France, of whom several are present. The King of France 
is bald, and soon loses his head. 
Russells account fails to allow for anaphoricity of presuppositional expressions such 
as definites. Whether Russell's uniqueness constraint could be defended against such 
examples, perhaps by separating anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses of definites, unique-
ness effects are far from straightforward, and there is no competing theory which fully 
accounts for them.16 More to the point, we are interested in whether Russell's account of 
definites can serve as the basis of a more general theory of phenomena treated elsewhere 
as presuppositional. Uniqueness effects are peculiar to a limited set of constructions 
(definites and clefts), and would presumably not figure as part of the more general the-
ory. On the other hand, there is another idea in Russell's analysis, that of justifying the 
presence both of projection and cancellation readings in terms of an underlying scope 
ambiguity, which could conceivably be of general applicability. 
15The Russellian need not be committed to analysing definites as introducing a scope bearing operator. 
Instead, a term forming version of the t may be defined. This is the option preferred, for example, by 
Grice in [Gr81]. However, I assume an operator treatment. 
16See e.g. Kadmon's [Kad90] and McCawley's [McC79] for discussion of uniqueness. Anaphoricity of 
presuppositional expressions other than definites is discussed in §5.5, below. 
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For instance, suppose that we worked in a semantic universe sufficiently rich to allow 
variables to range over propositions (or over individual correlates of propositions). We 
might then define a language with expressions [x - ](), where this has meaning 
holds, and under the assignment of x to the individual correlate of q, 0 holds. Then 
we might analyse sentences containing a factive verb along the lines of the following 
examples17: 
E38 	• Pooh realises that Eeyore is sad. 
[x - sad(e)](realises(p, x)) 
E39 	• Pooh doesn't realise that Eeyore is sad. 
[x - sad(e)](-irealises(p,x)) 
-1( [sad (e)](realises(p,x)) ) 
Once again, both cancellation and projection readings are found for the negative 
case. Where then, might the weaknesses of such an analysis lie? Most importantly, our 
neo-Russellian theory cannot be easily stated without introducing a class of presuppo-
sitional constructions, even if by another name.18 For given that presuppositions can 
project from much more deeply embedded constructions than are found in the above 
examples, and given that projection is to be explained as wide scope, presuppositional 
constructions will have to be interpreted as a class of operators which can take extra-
clausal (and perhaps completely unbounded) scope. Thus in the following example, the 
factive complement of 'realise' (and also the definite description 'the forest') must be 
allowed to take extra-clausal scope, which appears to be forbidden for the scope bearing 
quantificational NP 'every animal': 
E40 If every animal in the forest realises that Eeyore is sad, they will organise a party. 
Of course, there are other operators which are less constrained as to their possible 
scope than the bulk of quantificational NPs. For instance, neither indefinite NPs nor 
17 The structure in E38 is somewhat reminiscent of the type of syntactic analysis suggested by the 
Kiparsky's [KK70]. Kempson [Kem75, pp.130-135] provides a similar semantic analysis of factives to 
that here, tracing her equivalent to the [x - q] (v') construction back to Reichenbach's fact functions 
[Reic47]. 
18Grice [Gr81, p.280] also comes to the conclusion that, at least for some constructions, it will be 
difficult to explain the data without postulating conventional marking of presuppositions: "I do not see 
that it is going to be particularly easy to represent the implication in the case of regret as being one of 
a conversational kind. It does not look as attractive as the Russellian case." Here by the "Russellian 
case" he refers to the Russellian treatment of definite descriptions. Grice then proceeds to suggest 
marking certain presuppositional expressions using special brackets, and suggests a rewriting operation 
on logical forms which effectively gives the presuppositions wide scope. He later describes this as "a 
minimal strengthening of a Russellian pattern of analysis by the addition of a purely syntactical scope 
device... ." 
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sentential connectives are subject to a constraint on extra-clausal scope. What would 
make the analysis of presuppositional constructions unusual is that they would have to 
be given wide scope as a default, for it is well known that the cancellation (i.e. narrow 
scope) readings only occur in very specialised circumstances, such as when consequences 
of the wide scope reading are explicitly contradicted. It is not obvious how the preference 
for wide scope could be explained, but it is at least clear that the explanation would 
have to make clear why this preference applied to presuppositional constructions and not 
other scope bearing elements, and thus that some class of presuppositional constructions 
would have to be distinguishable in the theory. 
One final observation on the neo-Russellian theory. If presupposition triggers were a 
special sort of scope bearing element, then there would presumably often be other read-
ings than just wide and narrow scope with respect to all other operators. For example, 
E40 should be expected to have a reading where the sadness of Eeyore outscopes 'every 
animal' but remains within the conditional (i.e. 'If Eeyore is sad and every animal realises 
it, then they will have a party'). Such readings will be discussed later in the context of 
what at first might appear to be a quite different style of presupposition theory: see 
§6.8.2. 
Underspecification 
Atlas [At 77], Kempson [Kem75] and Wilson [Wi75] have all presented theories of pre-
suppositional phenomena which, like the neo-Russellian account above, do not involve 
the postulation of a semantic division between presuppositions and assertions. Further, 
these authors were amongst the first to show that sentences involving a factive verb (or 
definite description) under a negation do not always implicate the truth of the factive 
complement (or existence of an object satisfying the description), demonstrating that in 
some contexts of utterance the implication is lacking. Yet all three authors objected to 
the postulation of Russellian scope ambiguities as an explanation for this instability. In-
deed, all three argue that negation in standard (for English) VP-modifier position bears 
fixed, wide scope semantically. Thus for them 'Jane realises that Bill is happy' simply 
entails that Bill is happy, and the negation of this sentence 'Jane does not realise that Bill 
is happy' entails that its not the case both that Bill is happy and that Jane realises it: 
the negative sentence does not entail that Bill is happy. The occasional surfacing of pre-
suppositional inferences, in this case the inference that Bill is happy, is to be explained 
not in terms of semantic entailment, but in terms of Gricean argumentation, utilising 
general principles such as informativeness and relevance. 
The three authors differ considerably in the details of their pragmatic analyses. 
Kempson seems to suggest that definite descriptions are in some sense (syntactically) 
more complex than indefinites, this complexity consisting in an extra "[+ def]" feature. 
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She constructs an argument to the effect that when a speaker chooses to use a definite 
over an indefinite a generalised conversational implicature is generated, the hearer having 
to explain what extra information is signalled by the choice of a definite. But since 
"the definite article can only be construed as offering extra information if it is used 
to convey the same information as its obligatory (anaphoric) use" [Kem75, p.178], the 
hearer concludes that the speaker is using the definite as if it were anaphoric on some 
previously introduced entity, and the existence of an appropriate entity is inferred.19 
Although Kempson does not invoke any principles of analysis specific to presupposition, 
and terms the inference to the truth of a presupposition a conversational implicature, 
her theory nonetheless counts as a theory of conventional presupposition on the rather 
broad definition which I have provided, for what is the [+ def] feature if not a means of 
conventionally marking presuppositions? In the case of definite descriptions the presence 
of the special feature can be independently justified as signalling a preference for an 
anaphoric use, but this explanation does not seem appropriate in the case of other 
presuppositional classes, such as aspectual verbs and factives. Furthermore, it is not 
obvious that there would be any descriptive difference between Kempson's theory and 
a version of that theory where the [+ def] marked constructions directly triggered a 
conventional implicature. This is essentially the idea of the cancellation theories of 
presupposition to be considered in Chapter 4, of which Kempson's account can be seen 
as a forerunner. 
Wilson's analysis, in [Wi75], by contrast seems not to be a theory of conventional 
presupposition. 20  I will exemplify the account with her treatment of negative sentences 
involving factive verbs (on pp.99-100). This analysis depends on listing a certain set of 
cases in which the sentence would be semantically correct, and then providing arguments 
why in various of these cases the sentence would be pragmatically inappropriate. For 
instance, if 'Jane does not realise that Bill is happy' is uttered and the field of alternatives 
has been narrowed down to the case where Bill is not happy (which she argues entails 
that Jane is not in the state of realising that Bill is happy), and the case where Bill is 
happy but Jane does not realise it, then the first case can be ruled out. If the speaker 
knew that Bill was not happy, then simply uttering 'Bill is not happy' would be more 
perspicuous. The analysis depends heavily on selecting the right cases: the hidden 
19Kempson applies the same analysis to factive verbs, assuming, as mentioned, that at deep structure 
the propositional complement of a factive verb also involves a [+ def] feature. However, the argument 
seems to me rather weaker than in the case of definite descriptions, for there the analysis apparently 
rests on the speaker having the choice of either using a definite or an indefinite. So to construct the 
same argument for factive verbs one would need choices of semantically similar predicates which lacked 
the [+ def] feature. In general, such choices appear to be lacking. 
200n the other hand, Wilson's joint account with Sperber [WS79] does involve conventional stipulation, 
but this stipulation is (a) much finer grained than the standard presupposing/non-presupposing contrast, 
and (b) not in general attached to specific lexical items but to different grammatical constructions and 
stress patternings. 
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premise seems to be that the speaker has complete knowledge of the situation being 
described, and is not, for instance, in a state of knowing that either the first or second 
of the above cases holds, but not knowing which. 
For Atlas, presuppositional inferences arise in order that negative sentences may be 
informative, and in order that they may tie in with entities and topics already under 
discussion in a discourse. Witness the following from [At 77]: "The presuppositional 
understanding of a negative sentence will be logically stronger and more informative 
than the non-presuppositional one." [p.150]; "The presuppositional understandings of 
sentences are logically stronger than the non-presuppositional understandings. Claims 
about the world are more informative when singular terms designate, predicates have 
non-null extensions, modifiers are modifiers of something. . . "[p.152]. I wish to draw 
out one theme from this analysis which seems relevant to any theory of presupposition: 
the fact that presuppositions tend to project might be explained in terms of a general 
preference for logically stronger, interpretations over weaker ones. 21 This approach to 
ordering interpretations I will term "the Atlas method", it being appropriate that a thus-
named scholar should, have formulated a preference for brute strength over ignorance. 
Whereas for Atlas this strengthening is a matter of further specifying a single weak 
logical form, for the neo-Russellian the strengthening would be a matter of picking 
the logically stronger of the available readings. The fact that tx[king-of-france(x)] 
-'(bald(x)) entails -'(tx[king-of-france(x)] : bald(x)), but not vice versa, would justify 
choosing the first reading over the second. The first, the wide scope definite reading, of 
course corresponds to what others would term projection of the definite's presupposition. 
I leave it to the reader to consider examples where the alternative scope readings are not 
ordered by logical entailment, and to establish whether there is indeed any preference 
for the projection readings in these cases. 
The program of showing that there is no need for presuppositions to be conven-
tionally marked in the grammar is perhaps carried to its furthest extent in Atlas and 
Levinson's joint work [AL81]. But even here, where the range of presuppositional con-
structions dealt with is not large, and where there is attention to formal precision, the 
difficulty of executing the general program satisfactorily is manifest. The main difficulty 
is that whilst the cornerstone of the program must be essentially Gricean, formalisation 
of Gricean argumentation is notoriously problematic. Not only are we lacking any gen-
erally accepted statement of the Gricean maxims, we are also lacking any generally 
accepted logic which is able not just to encode those maxims, but also to support the 
21This is not to say that any evidence has been presented here, or by Atlas for that matter, that there 
is such a general preference. But it is at least an interesting and not implausible hypothesis that such a 
preference exists. The possible relevance of logical strength to the ordering of interpretations in a theory 
of presupposition was pointed out to me by Henk Zeevat, who suggested that it would be an alternative 
basis for ordering the readings available in van der Sandt's theory. 
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sort of reasoning that would be required. If an anti-presuppositionalist claims to have 
completely eliminated the need for presupposition, but that claim rests on a Gricean 
account of pragmatics which is still not adequately formalised, then the claim must 
remain, in part, mere whistling in the wind. 
There is no a priori reason to introduce a notion of presupposition into grammar. 
If a grammar can be developed in which the class of constructions which have been 
called presuppositional are not distinguished in any special way, but the combination 
of this grammar and a general theory of utterance interpretation can predict the type 
of inferences which are commonly thought of as presuppositional, then the notion of 
presupposition, conceived of as something to be encoded explicitly in grammar, will 
have been rendered superfluous. However, seen in this way, at least two of the theories 
considered in this section, Kempson's theory and the neo-Russellian theory, do not take 
us any nearer this goal. For these two can be seen as presuppositional theories, in that 
the class of constructions commonly identified as presuppositional must be distinguished 
in the grammar.22 But if Gricean theory could be adequately formalised, and it could 
be demonstrated that presuppositional inferences arose as mere side effects, that would 
surely count as a tremendous success. Furthermore, such an explanatory success might 
not necessarily conflict with the presuppositionalist's program. For even if conversa-
tional principles can explain presuppositional inferences, the possibility remains that 
what were once conversational inferences have become conventionalised. Thus Geurts 
[Geu95] discusses the possibility that "what started off as a pragmatic regularity has 
been encoded in the grammar", and Grice himself [Gr81, p.  282] says of his own ac-
count that it could be "regarded as a conventional regimentation of a particular kind of 
non-conventional implicature." So it is at least possible that the type of argumentation 
developed by Wilson, Atlas and Levinson could be interpreted not as replacing presup-
positional theories, but as supplementing them, as providing an account of how linguistic 
presuppositions came in to being in the first place and providing an interpretation for 
whatever formal apparatus the presuppositionalist proposes. 
As I have indicated, all the remaining theories to be discussed involve presuppositions 
(occasionally under another name) being conventionally marked in the grammar, some 
function being utilised which maps simple positive sentences onto a set of propositions 
called the presuppositions (or elementary/primitive/potential presuppositions) of the 
sentence.23 This is not to say that conventional stipulation of presuppositions has been 
22 As I have indicated, Kempson distinguishes presuppositional constructions with a [+ def] feature, 
and the neo-Russellian seems forced to distinguish a class of free-s copers. 
23 One might think that the definition of this function would be the central part of presupposition 
theory. But in fact most authors either assume such a function, or only define it for a small subset 
of constructions. Geurts' thesis [Geu95] contains an illuminating discussion concerning the difficulty of 
defining a function from simple sentences to their elementary presuppositions. 
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validated, but it has not been invalidated either. 
Chapter 3 
Multivalence and Partiality 
This chapter concerns a subset of approaches to presupposition which follow the first 
of the options mentioned in §2.4, namely modifying not the logical form itself, but 
the interpretation of that logical form. In general this refinement may concern the 
interpretation of objects of any syntactic category, but I will concentrate on the meaning 
of sentence level units, or, when looking at artificial languages, on the interpretation of 
formulae rather than of terms. The subset of approaches now to be discussed are those 
in which the interpretation of a formula defines not only a set of worlds such that when 
interpreted relative to one of these worlds the formula is true (call this set 7), and a set 
where it is false (F), but also a set where its presuppositions are satisfied (P) and a set 
where they are not (Al).' 
There are three standard ways in which this redefinition is achieved. Firstly, there is 
trivalent semantics in which the Boolean domain of truth values {t, f} may be extended 
to include a third value *, such that the T, F and N worlds are those where the formula 
has the value t, f and * respectively, and P = TUF. Secondly, there is partial semantics. 
Here the domain of truth values is allowed to remain Boolean, but the interpretation 
function is partialised, such that for a given formula T is the set relative to which the 
valuation produces t, F is that against which the valuation produces f, P is still the 
union of T and F, but now the set N is not a set relative to which the formula is given 
some particular valuation or valuations, but rather it is the set of worlds against which 
the valuation function is not defined for the formula. Thirdly there are two dimensional 
systems, where the valuation is split into two parts, or dimensions, each of the two 
sub-valuations being boolean. There is some variation in how the split is made, but the 
approaches I will describe make a split between a presuppositional and an assertional 
sub-valuation. For the assertional sub-valuation T is the set of worlds where the formula 
has value t, and F is the remaining set where the formula has the value f, and for the 
might prefer to read models where I write worlds. 
37 
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presuppositional sub-valuation, P is the set of worlds where the formula has value t, 
and N is the remaining set where the formula has the value f. 
If the trivalent, partial and two-dimensional accounts differ as to the precise refine-
ment from classical interpretation which they utilise, they none the less share a basic 
approach to presupposition projection: 
Presuppositions are constraints on the range of worlds/models against which we are 
able to evaluate the truth or falsity of predications and other semantic operations, 
or against which this evaluation is legitimate. 
If these constraints are not met, semantic undefinedness, or illegitemacy of the 
truth-value, results. 
Presupposition projection facts associated with a given operator are explained 
compositionally, in terms of the relation between the definedness/legitimacy of 
that operator and the definedness/legitimacy of its arguments in some model, and 
this relation is recoverable from the semantics of the operator alone. 
For the purposes of the following discussion, partial and trivalent semantics will be 
collapsed. This is possible because the discussion is restricted to systems where the 
connectives are defined truth functionally. Truth functionality is taken to mean that, 
for any compound formula the only information needed for evaluation relative to some 
world is (1) the semantics of the head connective, and (2) for each argument whether 
there is a valuation in the given world, and, if so, what that valuation that is. Given such 
a restriction, from a technical point of view all systems which are presented as trivalent 
could be presented as partial, and vice versa, whilst maintaining extensionally identical 
relations of consequence and presupposition.2 I will firstly consider trivalent systems, 
2This restriction to truth functional systems does exclude one important method of supplying partial 
interpretations, namely the supervaluation semantics developed by van Fraassen. See [vF69, vF75, Th72, 
Th79]. One advantage of the supervaluation approach is that it allows a logic, say classical first order 
logic, to be partialised such that logical validities remain intact. (Note that classical validities are also 
maintained in the two dimensional approaches which are discussed below.) I was once horrified to hear a 
group of presupposition theorists arguing bitterly about whether the treatment of presupposition should 
use a partial or a trivalent logic. There may be philosophical significance to the decision between partial 
and trivalent systems, and it may be that there are applications (like the treatment of the semantical 
paradoxes) where it really makes a difference whether the semantical universe contains only two values 
for the extension of a proposition or is in some wayricher. But it seems unlikely that the decision to use 
a partial or trivalent logic has significant empirical consequences regarding presupposition projection. In 
general, relevant aspects of a model of presupposition projection presented in terms of either a trivalent 
logic or a partial logic are straightforwardly reformulable in terms of the other with no consequences 
for the treatment of presupposition data. See, for example, Karttunen's discussion of van Fraassen in 
[Kar73]. However, in saying this I am possibly taking for granted what I take to be the conventional use 
of the term partial logic by logicians (see e.g. [Blam89]), whereby, for instance, versions of both Kleene's 
strong and weak systems are sometimes referred to as partial logics. Seuren [Seu85, Seu90a] offers an 
alternative characterisation whereby only Kleene's weak system (Bochvar's internal system) would count 
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then two dimensional systems, and then discuss some of the general advantages and 
disadvantages, showing why most contemporary proponents of such approaches accept 
that presuppositional data cannot be explained in purely semantic terms, but require 
some additional pragmatic component. 
3.1 Trivalent Accounts 
In a trivalent logic, where the semantic valuation of a formula 0 with respect to a model 
M (here written 	M) may take any of the three semantic values, typically thought of 
as true, false and undefined (t, f, *), presupposition may be defined as follows: 
Definition Dl (Strawsonian Presupposition) 0 presupposes 0 if for for all models 
M, if M e{t,f} then M _ — t. 
Let us assume, for the moment, a Tarskian notion of logical consequence as preservation 
of truth ( = if for all models M, if M = t then MM t) Let us further assume 
that a negation -, is available in the formal language which is interpreted classically with 
respect to classically valued argument formulae, mapping true to false and vice versa, 
but which preserves undefinedness. This defines a so-called choice negation having the 
following truth table: 
Given these notions of consequence and negation, it is easily shown that the above 
definition of presupposition is equivalent to one mentioned earlier 
Definition D2 (Presupposition Via Negation) 4 presupposes 0 iffq = ,b and ' 
These, then, are the standard approaches to defining presupposition in three-valued 
logics. One author who offers a significant deviation from these definitions is Burton-
Roberts [Bu89a]. He defines two separate notions of logical consequence, weak conse-
quence, which is just the notion = above, and strong consequence, which will here be 
as a gapped/partial logic. This is because he implicitly limits consideration to systems which are truth 
functional in a stronger sense than is given above, such that a compound formula can only have a value 
defined if the valuation of all the arguments is defined. On the other hand, Burton-Roberts [Bu89a] 
offers a system which he claims to have the only true gapped bivalent semantics, and which just happens 
to contain exactly the connectives in Kleene's strong system! Given this lack of consensus among such 
forceful rhetoricians as Seuren and Burton-Roberts, it is perhaps unwise to stick one's neck out. 
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denoted 	and is defined by: 0 = j' if (1) 0 = b, and (2) for all models M, if 
IOL = f then 	M = f. Thus for one proposition to strongly entail another, the truth 
of the first must guarantee the truth of the second, and the falsity of the second must 
guarantee the falsity of the first.' Burton-Roberts then suggests that presuppositions 
are weak consequences which are not strong consequences: 
Definition D3 (Burton-Roberts Presupposition) 0 presupposes if 0 = and 
8 
This seems an attractive definition, and is certainly not equivalent to the standard 
definitions above. However, it has some rather odd properties. For example, assuming 
this definition of presupposition and Burton-Roberts' quite standard notion of conjunc-
tion, it turns out that if q presupposes 0, then 0 presupposes 1' A 0. Let us assume 
that The King of France is bald' presupposes There is a King of France'. According to 
Burton-Roberts' definition it must also presuppose There is a King of France and he 
is bald', which seems completely unintuitive. More generally, if q5 presupposes 0 then 
according to this definition it must also presuppose the conjunction of 0 with any strong 
consequence of 0.4  I see no reason why we should accept a definition of presupposition 
with this property. 
Moving back to the standard definitions, we can examine the presupposition pro-
jection behaviour of various three-valued logics. A simple picture of presupposition 
3Wilson [Wi75] took a definition of consequence like 	as fundamental, and used it as part of her 
argument against semantic theories of presupposition. In a more technically rigorous discussion, Blarney 
[B1am89] also suggests that the strong notion should be the basic one. 
4Burton-Robert's system uses Kleene's strong falsity preserving conjunction, whereby a conjunction 
is true if and only if both conjuncts are true, and false if and only if at least one conjunct is false. The 
following argument then shows that a proposition must presuppose any conjunction of a presupposition 
and a strong entailment: 
Suppose 0 presupposes in Burton-Roberts system 
Then (a) c/=,b, and (b) q5 8 
From 2, M = I and ]M f for some model M 
Suppose 
By definition of , we have that 0 = x 
By 2(b), 5 and definitions of A, =, it follows that 4 = A x 
Relative to the same model M, where 0 is false, falsity preservation of A tells us that b A x is 
false 
Since there is a model (M) where 4 is not false and its weak entailment 0 A x is false, it follows 
that 0 K, 0 A x 
Hence 0 must presuppose 0 A x in Burton-Roberts system. Q.E.D. 
It should be mentioned that the above is not the only definition of presupposition that Burton-Roberts 
offers: it seems to be intended as a definition of the elementary presuppositions of a simple positive 
sentence. Presuppositions of compound sentences are given by a relation of Generalised Presupposition, 
which I will not discuss here. 
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projection is what is known as the cumulative hypothesis according to which the set of 
presuppositions of a complex sentence consists of every single elementary presupposition 
belonging to any subsentence.5 As far as the projection behaviour of the logical connec-
tives is concerned, such a theory of projection would be modelled by a trivalent logic 
in which if any of the arguments of a connective has the value *, then the value of the 
whole is also *. Assuming that combinations of classical values are still to yield their 
classical result, this yields the so-called internal Bochvar or weak Kleene connectives: 
Definition D4 (The Weak Kleene or Internal Bochvar Connectives) 
t 	f 	 0 —*O t f * 
t t f * 	t t f * 
f f f * f t t * 
* * * * 	* * * * 
v' t f * 
t t t * 	 t f 
f 	t 	* ft 
* * * * 	* * 
A naive version of the cumulative hypothesis, such as is embodied in the definition 
of Bochvar's internal connectives, is not tenable, in that there are many examples of 
presuppositions not being projected. Let us consider firstly how this is dealt with in 
the case that has generated the most controversy over the years, that of negation.6 In a 
trivalent semantics, the existence of cases where presuppositions of sentences embedded 
under a negation are not projected, is normally explained in terms of the existence of 
5The cumulative hypothesis is commonly attributed to Langendoen and Savin. However, their view 
appears to have been more sophisticated than some have suggested. Regarding examples where a 
presupposition of the consequent of a conditional does not become an implication of the conditional as 
a whole, they comment [LS71}pp.58: "A conditional sentence has the property that its presupposition 
is presupposed in a (possibly imaginary) world in which its antecedent is true. . . and no mechanism for 
suspending presuppositions is required." Although the informality of their proposal makes it difficult 
to evaluate, it is clear that Langendoen and Savin were aware of cases where presuppositions of an 
embedded sentence are not implications of the whole and did not see them as counterexamples to their 
theory. Indeed, on a charitable reading (where it is read as a generic about a property holding of 
worlds which satisfy the antecedent of a conditional) the above quote seems to prefigure the inheritance 
properties that Karttimen later attributed to conditionals. 
611orn's article [Horn85]) provides an excellent overview of treatments of negation and considers cases 
of presupposition denial at length. For a longer read, his [Horn89} is recommended. Extensive discussion 
of negation within the context of contemporary trivalent accounts of presupposition is found in the 
work of Seuren [Seu85, Seu881, and Burton-Roberts [Bu89c, Bu89a]. These latter publications produced 
considerable debate, to a degree surprising given that Burton-Roberts, though innovative, presents what 
is essentially a reworking of a quite well worn approach to presupposition. This refreshingly vehement 
debate provides the definitive modern statements of the alternative positions on negation within trivalent 
systems: see Horn's [Horn9O] and Burton-Roberts' reply [Bu89b], Seuren's [Seu90a] and Burton-Roberts' 
reply [Bu90], and Seuren and Turner's reviews [Seu90b, Th92]. 
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a denial operator (here ) such that when 	M = IthM = t. Typically the following 




Since there apparently exist both cases where a negation acts, in Karttunen's ter-
minology, as a hole to presuppositions (allowing projection) and cases where it acts as 
what Karttunen called a plug (preventing projection), the defender of a trivalent ac-
count of presupposition appears not to have the luxury of choosing between the two 
negations given above, but seems forced to postulate that negation in natural language 
is ambiguous between them. Unfortunately, convincing independent evidence for such 
an ambiguity is lacking, although there may at least be intonational features which 
mark occurrences of denial negation from other uses, and thus potentially allow the 
development of a theory as to which of the two meanings a given occurrence of negation 
corresponds.7  
There is a frequently overlooked alternative to postulating a lexical ambiguity, dating 
back as far as Bochvar's original papers. Bochvar suggested that apart from the normal 
mode of assertion there was a second mode which we might term meta-assertion. The 
meta-assertion of 0, AO, is the proposition that 4 is true: AM = t if 	M = t and 
A M = f otherwise. Bochvar showed how within the combined system consisting of 
the internal connectives and this assertion operator a second set of external connectives 
could be defined: for instance the external conjunction of two formulae is just the internal 
conjunction of the meta-assertion of the two formulae (i.e. OAextO =def A(c5)AintA('i,b)), 
and the external negation of a formula is just the exclusion negation given above, and 
defined in the extended Bochvar system by N=def  A().8 Thus whilst the possibility 
of declaring natural language negation to be ambiguous between -i and 0 exists within 
71f the raison d 'etre of a trivalent denial operator is to be yield truth when predicated of a non-
true and non-false proposition, then in principle some choice remains as to how it should behave when 
predicated of a simply false proposition. Thus the denial operator need not necessarily have the semantics 
of the exclusion negation, although, to my knowledge, only Seuren has been brave enough to suggest 
an alternative. Seuren's preferred vehicle for denial is an operator which maps only * onto t, and maps 
both t and f onto  f. Seuren has also marshalled considerable empirical evidence that negation is in fact 
ambiguous, although his main justification for his choice of denial operator is, I think, philosophical. 
8External negation, given that it can be defined as -A(0) where A is a sort of truth-operator, has 
often been taken to model the English paraphrases it is not true that' and it is not the case that'. 
Although it may be that occurrence of these extraposed negations is high in cases of presupposition 
denial 	I am not aware of any serious research on the empirical side of this matter - it is certainly 
neither the case that the construction is used in all instances of presupposition denial, nor that all uses of 
the construction prevent projection of embedded presuppositions. Thus the use of the term external for 
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Bochvar's extended system, another possibility would be to translate natural language 
negation uniformly using -i, but then allow that sometimes the proposition under the 
negation is itself clad in the meta-assertoric armour of the A-operator. 
There is no technical reason why the Bochvarian meta-assertion operator should be 
restricted in its occurrence to propositions directly under a negation. Link [Li86] has 
proposed a model in which in principle any presupposition can be co-asserted, where 
coassertion, if I understand correctly, essentially amounts to embedding under the A-
operator. Let us term a theory where all occurrences of cancellation are explained away 
in these terms a floating-A theory. Such a theory is flexible, since it leaves the same 
logical possibilities open as in a system with an enormous multiplicity of connectives: for 
instance if the A operator can freely occur in any position around a disjunction, then the 
effects of having the following four disjunctions are available: 0 V 0, A(q5 V ), A() V 
and 0 V A(). It is then necessary to explain why presuppositions only fail to project in 
certain special cases. Link indicates that pragmatic factors will induce an ordering over 
the various readings, although he does not formalise this part of the theory. Presumably 
a default must be invoked that the A operator Only occurs when incoherence would 
result otherwise, and then with narrowest possible scope. The term incoherence must 
then be explicated: perhaps it can be understood as semantic undefinedness in the set 
-of models corresponding to our assumptions about the world. At base then, a floating-A 
theory consists of a semantic component generating multiple meanings encoding varying 
degrees of presupposition projection, and a pragmatic component selecting between these 
meanings. This selection could, for instance, be based on the Atlas method, the principle 
of preference for logically stronger readings - see §2.5. In §3.3 we will see that, given an 
argument in essence due to Soames, the defender of a trivalent account of presupposition. 
might be forced into some version of a floating-A theory. For the moment let us merely 
observe that in a floating-A theory the lexical ambiguity of negation which is common in 
trivalent theories is replaced by an essentially structural ambiguity, and in this respect 
is comparable with the Russellian scope-based explanation of projection facts.' 
So far we have only considered cases where presuppositions of each argument are 
either definitely projected to become presuppositions of the whole, or definitely not 
projected. Fittingly, in the land of the included middle, there is a third possibility. The 
presupposition may, in effect, be modified as it is projected. Such modification occurs 
with all the binary connectives in Kleene's strong logic: 
the weak negation operator, and the corresponding use of the term internal for the strong, is misleading, 
and does not reflect a well established link with different linguistic expressions of negation. 
9{Horn85, p.1251 provides a similar explication to that above of the relation between theories postu-
lating alternative 3-valued negations and theories involving a Russellian scope ambiguity. See [BK:MSJ 
for further discussion of a floating-A theory. 
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Definition D5 (The Strong Kleene Connectives) 
	
q5A?15 t f * 	 t f * 
t t f * t t f * 
f f f f 	 f t 	t 
* * f * * t * * 
qV' t f * 
t t t t 	 t f 
f 	t 	* ft 
* t * * 	 * * 
To see that under this definition it is not in general the case that if q presupposes ir 
then b -*q5presupposes ir, we need only observe that if JiM = f then 	- IM = t 
regardless of the valuation of ç. Presuppositions of the consequent are weakened, in the 
sense that in a subset of models, those where the antecedent is false, undefinedness - 
read presupposition failure - of the consequent is irrelevant to the definedñess of the 
whole. However, in those models where the antecedent is not false, the presuppositions 
of the consequent are significant, so that presupposition failure of the consequent is 
sufficient to produce presupposition failure of the whole. The presuppositional properties 
of the strong Kleene logic may be determined in full by inspection of the truth tables, 
and may be summed up as follows: 
Fact Fl Under the strong Kleene interpretation, if ç5>> 7r then: 
 
 A5 >> b —*ir 
 OAO >> 0-*7r 
 >> ()—ir 
 —*q5 >> —7r 
 OVO >> (-')—ir 
 OVO >> (-')---ir 
If models are restricted to those where is bivalent, these are maximal presuppositions, 
in the sense that the right hand side represents the logically strongest presupposition, all 
other presuppositions being entailed by it. 
The occurrence of conditionalised presuppositions can be argued for on the basis of 
examples like the following: 
E41 	If Jane is married, then her husband is not here. 
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Given that the consequent of E41 carries the presupposition that Jane has a husband, 
the implication as a whole is predicted to carry the presupposition that if Jane is married 
then she has a husband. If we restrict our attention to models in which this natural 
- one is tempted to say analytic - condition is satisfied, the (logical rendering of 
the) sentence will always have a classical truth valuation. Thus, appropriately in this 
case, the presupposition of the consequent is weakened to the point of triviality, and 
the sentence does not presuppose (nor entail) that Jane is married. We will return to 
conditionalised presuppositions, which occur in some two dimensional accounts as well 
as in Strong Kleene, below. 
3.2 Two Dimensions 
There are no obvious empirical reasons for using more than three truth values in the 
treatment of presupposition, and thus Occam's razor commonly makes trivalent se-
mantics the preferred basis for a multivalent treatment of presupposition. 10 However, 
quite apart from the fact that four valued logics are sometimes thought to be techni-
cally more elegant than their three valued cousins, the use of four truth values affords 
theorists the space to pursue a divide and conquer strategy, separating issues of presup-
position from those of classical truth and entailment. The idea was developed indepen-
dently, but in rather different forms, by Herzberger [Her73] and Karttunen and Peters 
[KP79], Herzberger's formulation having been further developed by Martin [Ma77] and 
Bergmann [Ber8l]. The semantic domain is considered as consisting of two two-valued 
coordinates (dimensions), which I will call assertion and presupposition.' 1 Thus, if the 
four values are represented using a pair of binary digits, with the first representing the 
assertion, and the second the presupposition, then, for instance, (0, 1) will mean that 
the assertion is not satisfied, although the presupposition is. 
Treating a four valued semantics as consisting of two boolean coordinates allows 
for a straightforward introduction of the tools of classical logic to study an essentially 
non-classical system, and this enabled Karttunen and Peters to provide compositionally 
derived two-dimensional interpretations for a fragment of English using the classical IL of 
Montague (familiarity with which I assume). To illustrate the approach, let us suppose 
"Cooper [Co83] presents an interesting empirical justification for the use of a fourth value, suggesting 
that whilst the third value is used to represent presupposition failure, a fourth value is required to signal 
acts of presupposition denial. This idea, which enables Cooper to give some explanation of cancellation 
effects without postulating an ambiguity of negation (or other operators) has not, to my knowledge, 
been taken up elsewhere. 
"What are here called assertion and presupposition are for Herzberger correspondence and bivalence, 
and for Karttunen and Peters entailment and conventional implicature. The theories differ considerably 
in philosophical motivation, in that whilst Herzberger's could be reasonably termed a semantic account, 
Karttunen and Peters' is not presented as such. However, the fact that Karttunen and Peters give a 
pragmatic explication of their second dimension of evaluation is irrelevant to most of the technicalities. 
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that expressions of English are associated with two translation functions, A, and P. A 
maps expressions to IL formulae representing its assertion, and P likewise maps to an IL 
representation of the presupposition. Given that the assertion and presupposition of an 
expression are assumed by Karttunen and Peters to have identical IL types, and that for 
English sentences this type is that of truth values, the two dimensional interpretation of 
a sentence S relative to an IL model M and assignment g will be (A(S)Mg 	(5)M,g) 
Now we might associate with conditionals, for instance, the following translation rule 
pair: 
A(If Si then S2) = A(Si) -* A(S2) 
P(If Si then S2) = P(S1) A P(S2) 
This particular rule pair, defines a notion of implication comparable with the Bochvar 
internal implication. If we associate the value (1, 1) with t, (0, 1) with f, and the 
remaining two values both with *, then a sentence If Si then S2' will take the value 
* just in case either Si or S2 takes this value, and otherwise will take the standard 
classical value. 12 
The same approach is extendible to other types. Let us suppose that a sentence of 
the form The guest Xs' involves the assertion of the existence of a guest with property 
X and presupposition of the uniqueness of the guest, and that a sentence of the form 
y curtsied' carries the assertion that y performed the appropriate physical movement, 
and the presupposition that y is female. Then assuming appropriate basic translations,. 
constants guest, curtsied and female, and meaning postulates guaranteeing that, for in-
stance, the constant curtsied stands in the correct relation to other constants relevant to 
the physical act of curtseying, part of the derivation of the meaning of the sentence The 
guest curtsied' might run 	departing somewhat from Karttunen and Peters' original 
system - as follows: 
12 This two dimensional version of Bochvar's internal implication is found in the first systems proposed 
in [Her73]. Note that the other Bochvar internal connectives can be defined similarly, such that in each 
case the assertion is defined entirely in terms of the assertion of the arguments, and the presupposition is 
defined entirely in terms of the presuppositions of the arguments. This yields what is termed (following 
Jankowski) a cross-product logic. However, both Herzberger and Karttunen and Peters also define 
operators for which this property does not hold. For instance, the two dimensional version of Bochvar's 
assertion operator considered by Herzberger, thought of as a semantics for the English it is the case 
that' locution, could be defined: 
A(it is the case that S) = A(S) A 2(S) 
P(it is the case that S) = T 
Here the assertion is defined in terms of both the assertion and presupposition of its argument. 







A(the guest curtsied) 
P(the guest curtsied) = 
= AX[yguest(y) A X(y)] 




AX[y[guest(y) A X(y)]](curtsied) 
y[guest(y) A curtsied(y)] 
P(the guest). P (curtsied) 
AX[3y[guest(y) A Vz[guest(z) -* x = z] A X(y)]](female) 
y[guest(y) A Vz[guest(z) -p x = z] A female(y)] 
Thus we derive the assertion that a guest curtsied, and the presupposition that there 
is exactly one guest and that guest is female. The approach seems quite general, but 
Karttunen and Peters observe, in a by now infamous footnote, that there is a problem 
associated with their interpretation of existentially quantified sentences. According to 
their theory, a sentence of the form An X Ys' carries the assertion that an individual in 
the assertional extension of X has the property given by the assertional component of 
Y. Further, the sentence carries the presuppositions (1) that some individual is in the 
presuppositional extension of X, and (2) that some individual in the assertional extension 
of X is in the presuppositional extension of Y. What might be referred to as the binding 
problem is that there is no link between the variables bound in the assertion and in the 
presupposition. In particular, there is no guarantee that any entity satisfies both the 
assertional and the presuppositional requirements. Let us see why this is problematic 







= ).X[yperson(y) A X(y)] 




)X[yperson(y) A X (y) ] (curtsied) 
y person(y) A curtsied(y) 
P(somebody) .P(curtsied) 
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= AX[yperson(y) A X(y)](female) 
= 	y person(y) A female(y) 
Thus the sentence is given the assertion that somebody performed the physical act 
of curtseying, and the presupposition that somebody is female. Crucially, this interpre-
tation fails to enforce the common-sensical constraint that the person who curtseyed is 
female. One possible fix would amount to making all presuppositions also assertions, 
which is standard in some of the accounts to be considered in the next chapter. In 
fact, as will be discussed there, there is a separate reason to make presuppositions also 
part of the asserted content, for without this one cannot easily explain why although 
presuppositions are commonly defeasible, presuppositions of simple positive sentences 
are not. If the presupposition is also part of the assertion, then the reason for this 
indefeasibility has nothing to do with the presuppositional dimension itself, but derives 
from the fact that one cannot ordinarily deny one's own assertions, or make assertions 
which one knows to be false. 
3.3 The Need for Pragmatics 
More effort has gone into the development of partial and multivalent solutions to the 
problems of presupposition theory than into any other general approach. It is thus 
striking that even the treatment of basic logical connectives in this paradigm remains 
troublesome. 
3.3.1 Negation 
In many multivalent and partial treatments multiple homophonous negations are posited, 
even though postulation of a lexical ambiguity of negation is, if defensible (see Seuren's 
[Seu85]), never the less controversial. Further, the problems associated with cancella-
tion in sentences involving negation are paralleled by cancellation cases involving other 
connectives. Witness the following example (related to one discussed in [Kem75, p.93]) 
which, although it involves no explicit negation, manifests cancellation behaviour which 
would be typical of a simple negative sentence: 
E23' If the King of France is bald, then I'm a Dutchman: there is no King of France! 
The theorist who explains cancellation in negative sentences by postulating multi-
ple negations would seem to be led by such examples in the unattractive direction of 
postulating multiple homophonous conditionals. A further difficulty with the multiple 
negations story is that if a cancellation negation is posited in some sentence, then all 
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presuppositions will be blocked, and not only those which the discourse explicitly de-
termines to be problematic. But it seems to me that in the following example, whilst 
the presupposition that there is a King of France is blocked, the presupposition that the 
addressee has a son is not: 
E42 The King of France didn't give your son the Royaume Medaille d'Honeur. France is 
not a monarchy, and there is no such award. 
Thus either of the following continuations seem natural, and in both cases the main 
NP ( 'he' or 'Johnny') can be understood as coreferential with the just mentioned son. 
E43 Besides, he's only three years old! 
E44 Besides, Johnny is only three years old! 
3.3.2 Disjunction 
Apart from negation, disjunction turns out to be particularly resistant to analysis in 
terms of multivalent semantics. Although disjunction is also problematic in other ap-
proaches, the difficulties are particularly clear cut for multivalent logics based on a 
standard semantic definition of presupposition. The trouble (c.f. [So79], on which the 
current discussion leans heavily) is that we can quite easily provide an exhaustive listing 
of all the connectives that manifest the basic logic of disjunction in a given system, and 
we can quite easily show that no single definition of the connective would predict all 
the cases of projection and cancellation which are found. I will consider the following 
examples from the point of view of a trivalent system13: 
E45 Either the King of Buganda is now opening parliament, or the Mayor of Nozdrovia 
hasn't arrived yet. 
E46 Either the King of Buganda is now opening parliament, or else the person who told 
me Buganda is a monarchy was wrong. 
E47 Either the person who told me Buganda is a monarchy was wrong, or else the King of 
Buganda is now opening parliament. 
E48 Either the King of Buganda is now opening parliament, or the President of Buganda 
is conducting the ceremony. 
13 One aspect of these examples which I will not consider in detail is the presence of the word either'. 
As Prince has pointed out [Pri78, p.372], the presence of this word is essential to the felicity of many 
examples where a presupposition triggered in a disjunction is canceled. Prince conjectures that the 
'either' acts as a signal to the hearer to "delay attribution" of information in the disjuncts, which she 
suggests may lead to the presuppositions not being regarded as beliefs of the speaker. 
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In E45 presuppositions of both disjuncts appear to project, and in a trivalent system 
with standard semantic definition of presupposition, this would naturally be explained 
by assuming that whenever either disjunct has the value *, the whole disjunction also 
has this value. However, it seems that in a case where the left disjunct of E46 has the 
value *, the whole disjunction will in fact be true, the truth of the right disjunct in such 
a case apparently being sufficient to guarantee this. A mirror argument can be applied 
in the case of E47, suggesting that whenever the left disjunct of a disjunction is true, 
the whole disjunction should be true. We are left with the following truth table, which 
is in fact Kleene's strong disjunction: 
4) 	t 	f 	* 
t t t t 
f 	t 	f 	* 
* t * * 
Although under this semantics it is not the case that presuppositions uniformly 
project, we are at least left with weakened presuppositions from both disjuncts. As 
mentioned above, if 4) presupposes 0, then 4) V  x presupposes 	-+ b, where "-p" is 
the strong Kleene implication, and similarly for the other disjunct. 
But now consider sentence E48, which is of a type first considered by Hausser 
[Ha76].14 Here the disjuncts carry conflicting presuppositions: if there is a King of 
Buganda, then there is no president, and vice versa. Let us accept that the Bugandan 
head of state is either a president or a King, and assume that opening parliament' is 
synonymous with conducting the ceremonies'. We can concentrate on two exclusive and 
exhaustive possibilities: (1) the head of state opened parliament, or (2) the head of 
state did not open parliament. In case (1), at least one of the disjuncts must be true, 
and since (under the above strong Kleene interpretation) truth of a disjunct guarantees 
truth of the disjunction, it must be that the disjunction as a whole is true. In case (2), 
it can be seen that one of the disjuncts must be false, and the other undefined. In this 
case the above table tells us that the disjunction as a whole must be undefined. We thus 
see that E48 can be either true (if the head of state opened parliament) or undefined (if 
the head of state did not open parliament), but not false. This seems rather odd. For 
we are then forced to say that the (standard, internal) negation of E48, perhaps E49 or 
E50, could never be true. This seems blatantly inappropriate. 15 
14 See also the discussion in [Gaz79a, p.95]. 
15Burton-Roberts [Bu89a, pp.169-170] seems to regard cases of conflicting presuppositions as being 
unproblematic in his system, which does assume a strong Kleene disjunction. He argues that a case 
like E48 is always given the values true or false, and is never undefined. But it seems to me that his 
argument is flawed. He assumes that the disjuncts have a common strong entailment, which is taken 
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E49 It is not the case that either the King of Buganda is now opening parliament or the 
President of Buganda is conducting the ceremony. 
E50 Neither is the King of Buganda now opening parliament, nor is the President of 
Buganda conducting the ceremony. 
3.3.3 Conditionals and Conditionalised Presuppositions 
Presuppositions of conditionals provide yet another battleground. In the strong Kleene 
system both the antecedent and consequent presuppositions can be said to be weakened 
in the course of projection. In Karttunen and Peter's system, with respect to which 
I have not yet discussed the treatment of conditionals, the antecedent presupposition 
projects unmodified, but the consequent presupposition is weakened just as in the Strong 
Kleene system. 
In the Strong Kleene system with a Strawsonian notion of presupposition, if 0 pre- 
supposes ir, then q - 	does not automatically presuppose 7r, but does presuppose 
(-) -.-+ 	I know of know empirical evidence in favour of this weakening of the an- 
tecedent presupposition in the Strong Kleene system, and am unable to construct any. It 
does seem odd that if the consequent is true in a model, then the implication as a whole 
is defined (and true) independently of the definedness of the antecedent. This might be 
felt to be a weak point of the Strong Kleene system qua logic for presupposition16, since 
truth of the consequent of a conditional is manifestly not sufficient for a conditional to 
to be bivalent, and in this case might be a proposition something like X = There is exactly one head 
of state and that head of state opened parliament'. Burton-Roberts begins, as above, by dividing into 
two cases (1) X is false, and (2) X is true. But with regard to case (1), Burton-Roberts diverges from 
the argument above. Since, by assumption, X is a strong entailment of both disjuncts, and since (by 
definition of strong entailment) if A strongly entails B and B is false then A is false, it follows that both 
disjuncts are false. From this it follows that if X is false, the disjunction as a whole is false, and not 
undefined as argued above. 
In this way Burton-Roberts avoids the disjunction as a whole from ever being undefined. But crucial 
to his argument is the premise that both disjuncts strongly entail X. By fiat he is thus declaring firstly 
that whenever the head of state did not open parliament, the proposition The king opened parliament' is 
false, irrespective of whether there is in fact a king, and secondly that 'The president opened parliament' 
is false irrespective of whether there is in fact a president. This seems completely unjustified to me. It 
could well be that the type of argumentation Burton-Roberts develops later in his book, concerning the 
question of when presupposition bearing elements are truth valueless, could be applied successfully to 
such cases, but the discussion on pp.169-170 does not settle the point. 
16 Kleene, like Lukasiewicz, did not motivate his semantics in terms of linguistic presupposition but in 
terms of certain issues in the foundations of mathematics. Bochvar's motivation at least concerned the 
philosophy of language. For him the third value signalled nonsense, but he used this notion to refer to 
the denotation of a paradoxical sentence, rather than one in which the presuppositions fall. The Strong 
Kleene connectives are the most commonly utilised by presuppositionalists, for instance being found in 
the systems of Hausser [Ha76], Seuren [Seu85] (who adds a negation), Burton-Roberts [Bu89a], and Link 
[Li86] (who uses Blau's system [B1au78], which contains the Kleene connectives as a subsystem). None of 
these authors, however, simply combine Strong Kleene with a Strawsonian definition of presupposition 
and no other pragmatic component. 
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be interpreted as felicitous: 
E51 	If the Pope's current obsession with water skiing is anything to judge by, then he hasn't 
much of a future in professional ice hockey. 
Here the consequent is true, but I would hesitate to judge the conditional as a whole 
as true. I certainly would not infer that if the pope has a future in professional ice 
hockey then he is obsessed with water skiing. However, I don't know that this is a 
knock down argument against the Strong Kleene treatment of presupposition per Se. 
The difficulty of understanding material implication as representing natural language 
conditionals are well known, and conditionals with known-to-be-true consequents are 
generally odd. Strong Kleene extends material implication to a third value so as to 
maintain what Kleene took to be the basic intuitions of the material implication itself. 
As Andreas Schöter (p.c.) has pointed out to me, that Strong Kleene predicts E51 
to be true independently of whether the pope is currently obsessed with water skiing 
might best be seen as a reflex of the non-presuppositional problems facing the material 
implication. 
Regarding the weakening of the consequent presupposition, there has been consid-
erably more controversy. Both the Strong Kleene system and Karttunen and Peters' 
system make the prediction that if 0 presupposes iv, then 0 -p does not automati-
cally presuppose iv, but does presuppose (-) - iv. The examples which have caused 
controversy are of two basic types, those where the antecedent seems unrelated to the 
presupposition of the consequent, and those where, under certain assumptions which 
may be taken to restrict the relevant models of evaluation, the antecedent entails the 
presupposition of the consequent. An example of the first type is the following: 
E52 If I go to London, my sister will pick me up at the airport. 
A hearer would be expected to infer from an utterance of this sentence that the 
speaker has a sister, but the Strong Kleene and Karttunen and Peters systems predict 
only a weaker conditionalised presupposition, namely that if the speaker goes to London 
then the speaker has a sister. Karttunen and Peters recognised this problem, and infor-
mally suggested a pragmatic line of solution. Although Gazdar [Gaz79a, p.115] suggests 
a number of examples where a superficial examination seems to indicate that Karttunen 
and Peters' solution does not work, and where, in Gazdar's words "remarkably zany 
predictions" result, all of these examples are dealt with by Soames [5o82, pp.  542-543]. 
I will not detail Karttunen and Peters' informal solution here, but point the reader to 
Soames discussion in [5o82] and to the more critical evaluation in Geurts' dissertation 
[Geu95]. However, later in this thesis, a formal solution will be given to the problem of 
conditional presuppositions in examples like E52. 
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Regarding the second type of example, those where the antecedent entails the pre-
supposition of the consequent, I am afraid the standard of argumentation in the litera-
ture has sometimes been disappointing. Otherwise excellent critiques of Karttunen and 
Peters' system by Gazdar [Gaz79a] and van der Sandt [vdS88] are marred by the presen-
tation of supposed counter-examples to conditionalised presuppositions, but examples 
in which the conditionalised presupposition is blatantly irrelevant. Consider Gazdar's 
E53 (which is not discussed by Soames) and van der Sandt's similar E54: 
E53 If John murdered his father, then he probably regrets killing him, but if he killed him 
accidentally, then he probably doesn't regret having killed him. 
E54 If John murdered his wife, he will be glad that she is dead, but if she took those pills 
herself 
A hearer of examples E53 and E54 would typically infer that a close relative of John 
(father or wife, respectively) is dead. Such a presupposition (or, in the first case, a 
slightly stronger presupposition) is triggered in the consequent of the first conditional in 
each example, but this presupposition is weakened in the Strong Kleene and Karttunen 
and Peters' systems to a trivial proposition that can be glossed 'If John murdered relative 
X then relative X is dead', and there is no prediction of any non-trivial presupposition. Are 
these counterexamples? Not at all. The inference to relative X being dead has absolutely 
nothing to do with the factive in the consequent of the respective conditionals. In the 
following examples the consequents have been replaced with non-presupposing clauses, 
but in each case the inference to relative X being dead seems just as clear as with the 
original cases: 
E55 If John murdered his father, then he'll go to prison, but if he killed him accidentally, 
then he could inherit a fortune. 
E56 If John murdered his wife, he will go to prison, but if she took those pills herself 
It is clear that the presupposition, if that is what it is, arises not in the consequent 
of the conditional, but in the antecedent. It is presumably linked with the contrastive 
stress that one would expect to find in an utterance of these examples. Further, I have 
nothing to say about the inference to X's death, except that it manifestly has nothing to 
do with the issue of conditionalised presuppositions, and that the reader who wishes to 
know where the inference does come from should look to an account of the interaction 
between presupposition and stress/topicality. The relevant literature stretches back to 
Strawson [St64], who suggested that reference failure only produced truth-valuelessness 
in case the presupposition was topical, and includes accounts (like Strawson's) of how 
topicality affects presupposition projection, accounts of the presuppositions generated 
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by sentence stress, and accounts which conflate presupposition and topicality. See, 
for instance, Wilson and Sperber's [WS79], Reinhart's [Rein82], Sgall Hajiová and 
Beneová's [SHB73], Sgall's [Sg:MS], or Horn's [Horn86].17 
Stress is quite obviously central to the analysis of another purported counterexample. 
Soames [So82, p.497] gives E57 as an example which backs up Karttunen and Peters' 
predictions. In this example, the cleft in the consequent carries a presupposition that 
the problem has been solved, but the weakened presupposition, that if someone at the 
conference solved the problem then the problem has been solved, is trivial. 
E57 If someone at the conference solved the problem, it was Julius who solved it. 
Van der Sandt has a different opinion. He maintains [vdS88, p.159] that E57 has 
an interpretation where the presupposition of the consequent is preserved unmodified, 
observing that "one way to achieve this [interpretation] is to read at the conference 
with contrastive stress", which he notates as in E58. Van der Sandt backs up his claim 
that the presupposition is preserved by noting that that the continuation in E59 "is 
completely natural, and clearly presupposition preserving": 
E58  If someone AT THE CONFERENCE solved the problem, it was Julius who solved it. 
E59 If someone AT THE CONFERENCE solved the problem, it was Julius who solved it, 
but if it was solved at the Nijmegen Institute of Technology, it certainly wasn't Julius. 
But why should we accept the legitimacy of adding stress? It seems to me that 
the stressed antecedent itself tends to produce an inference to the problem having been 
solved, whether one wants to call this presuppositional or not. As far as I can tell, 
E60 and E61 below, in which the cleft has been removed, are most plausibly uttered 
in situations where it has been established that the problem has been solved, and the 
only remaining questions are where it was solved and by who. These examples suggest 
that the problem has been solved to just the extent that E58 and E59 do, which shows 
that the conditionalisation of the consequent presupposition is, once again, completely 
irrelevant. 
E60 If someone AT THE CONFERENCE solved the problem, then JULIUS solved it. 
E61 If someone AT THE CONFERENCE solved the problem, then JULIUS solved it, but 
if it was solved at the Nijmegen Institute of Technology, it certainly wasn't Julius. 
17 What I have to say about the interaction between topicality and presupposition, which is more the 
statement of a problem than the suggestion of any formal solution, can be found in [Bea94b]. 
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Van der Sandt seems to assume that stress does not determine which interpretations 
are available, but merely helps us find readings which are there anyway. But why is it 
that in the following example, E62, I cannot find any 'interpretation' at all whereby it 
is established that the problem is solved? The simplest answer would be that in this 
example, unlike in E58, the antecedent does not itself carry a presupposition that the 
problem is solved, and the presupposition of the consequent is, as predicted in the Strong 
Kleene and Karttunen and Peters' models, weakened to the point of triviality. 
E62 If someone at the conference SOLVED/(FINALLY solved) the problem, it was Julius 
who solved it. 
Conditionalised presuppositions are problematic, but, I know of no convincing gen-
eral arguments against them. The discussion above, combined with the Soames discus-
sion in [So82], dispenses with all purported counterexamples with which I am familiar. 
In the Strong Kleene and Karttunen and Peters' systems, such presuppositions arise 
not only from conditionals themselves, but also from disjunction and conjunction. Dis-
junction is discussed above. Regarding weakening of presuppositions in conjunctions, I 
think that the weakening of presuppositions on the right hand side is appropriate, but I 
am sceptical about weakening of presuppositions on the left, this latter weakening being 
found in Strong Kleene, but not in Karttunen and Peters' system. In the following two 
examples another member of the family falls fowl of John. The question is whether 
in each case it is presupposed that John's mother is dead, this being, let us assume, 
triggered by the factive regrets: 
E63 John killed his mother but regrets that she's dead. 
E64 John regrets that his mother is dead, but he killed her. 
We can answer this question by embedding the sentences in the antecedent of a 
conditional, which produces the following pair: 
E65 If John killed his mother but regrets that she's dead, he'll give himself up. 
E66 If John regrets that his mother is dead, but he killed her, he'll give himself up. 
I believe that that E65 does not suggest (without stress on killed, c.f. the discussion 
above) that John's mother is dead, but that E66 does indicate this. If this is right, then 
the weakening of the left conjunct in Strong Kleene is incorrect, but the weakening of 
the right is justifiable.18 I will return to the issue of conditionalised presuppositions 
repeatedly throughout this dissertation. 
18We will see some more examples later where weakening of a presupposition on the right hand side 
of a conjunction seems appropriate, e.g. E107 in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
Cancellation and Filtering 
The theories to be discussed in this chapter have two things in common. Firstly, they are, 
in a sense, the only true projection theories: the set of presuppositions associated with 
the utterance of a complex sentence is a subset of the set of elementary presuppositions 
of that sentence. We can thus say that these theories define (relative to a context) a 
projection function which determines for each elementary presupposition whether it is 
projected or not. Secondly, this projection function is context sensitive. Thus whereas 
in the theories discussed in the previous chapter presupposition was understood as a 
binary relation between sentences (or formulae), the theories to be discussed now involve 
definitions of presupposition as a three place relation between a pair of sentence and a 
context of evaluation. Alternatively, if an utterance is defined as a pair of a sentence 
(or set of sentences) and a linguistic context, then presupposition becomes a two place 
relation between an utterance and a sentence. 
What are termed here cancellation and filtering are usually regarded as opposing 
approaches to the treatment of presupposition. However, the two are closely related 
variations on a single theme: 
The grammar and lexicon together encode a way of calculating for each simple 
sentence a set of potential presuppositions, each of which is a proposition. 
The set of presuppositions of a complex sentence is a subset of the union of the 
potential presupposition sets of the simple subsentences. Call this subset the 
projection set. 
The calculation of the projection set is sensitive to linguistic context (conceived of 
as a set of sentences), and relies on one or both of the following two strategies: 
Local filtering For each subsentence S consisting of an operator embedding fur-
ther subsentences as arguments, S not only carries its own potential presup- 
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positions, but also inherits a subset of the potential presuppositions of the 
arguments. 
Global cancellation Pragmatic principles determine a function from tuples con-
sisting of the context, the set of potential presuppositions, the assertive con-
tent of the sentence, and (except in the version in [vdS88]) a set of Gricean 
implicatures of the sentence, to that subset of the potential presuppositions 
which is projected. 
I will review the filtering theory of Karttunen, and then discuss the cancellation 
accounts of Gazdar, Mercer and van der Sandt. Finally it will be shown that although 
filtering and cancellation accounts can be combined into a theory which is descriptively 
superior to any of the individual filtering or cancellation accounts, there remain serious 
problems. 
4.1 Plugs, Holes and Filters 
Karttunen [Kar73] introduced the following taxonomy (pp.178): 
Plugs: predicates which block off all the presupposition of the complement 
sentence [examples include 'say', 'mention', 'tell, ask']; 
Holes: predicates which let all the presuppositions of the complement sen-
tence become presuppositions of the matrix sentence [examples include 
'know', 'regret', 'understand', 'be possible', 'not']; 
Filters: predicates which, under certain conditions, cancel some of the pre-
suppositions of the arguments [examples include if-then, 'either-or', 'and']. 
4.1.1 The First Version of Local Filtering 
Assume we are given a function 7r mapping simple sentences or complex constructions 
onto sets of potential presuppositions, and some taxonomic division of sentential predi-
cates (apart from conditionals , disjunctions and conjunctions) into the classes of plugs 
and holes. Representing the set of presuppositions associated with a sentence 'A' as 
P(A), the first version of Karttunen's filtering conditions in his 1973 paper may be 
stated recursively as follows: 
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Definition D6 (Karttunen '73, Sentence Presuppositions) 
P(S) = 7r(S) for simple sentences S. 
P(S') = P(S)U ir(S') where S' consists of a hole-predicate embedding a sentence 
S. 
P(S') = n(S") where 5' consists of a plug-predicate embedding embedding any fur-
ther sentence. 
If S is 'If A then B' or 'A and B' then F(S) = P(A)U{p E P(B) IA /=p}. 
Ifs is 'Either A or B' then P(S) = P(A) U {p e P(B) I -'A p}. 
Let us see how these definitions apply to an example. In E67, A, B and C are the 
substrings marked by the relevant brackets: 
E67 If [A  Jane and her husband are going on holiday], then [B  its possible that [c their 
neighbours don't realise that Jane and her husband are going on holiday]] 
Set D = 'their neighbours realise that Jane and her husband are going on holiday'. 
Now P(A) = ir(A) = { 'Jane has a husband'}, and P(D) = ir(D) = { 'Jane and her 
husband have neighbours', 'Jane and her husband are going on holiday'}. 
Since 'not' and 'its possible that' are both holes and introduce no further potential 
presuppositions, P(B) = P(C) = P(D). 
So P( 'if A then B') 	{ 'Jane has a husband'}U {peP(B)j 'Jane and her husband 
are going on holiday' Vz p} 	{ 'Jane has a husband', 'Jane and her husband have 
neighbours'}. 
Thus E67 is predicted to presuppose that Jane is married and that her and her husband 
have neighbours. The potential presupposition that Jane and her husband are going on 
holiday (triggered in the consequent) is filtered out. 
4.1.2 The Revised version of Local Filtering 
Karttunen notes the following counterexample to the first version of his filtering condi-
tions. Suppose that Fred thinks Mormons wear special 'holy underwear', and he suspects 
that Geraldine is a Mormon. One voyeuristic night Fred catches sight of Geraldine 
wearing an ordinary bra and panties, and exclaims: 
E68 Either [A  Geraldine is not a Mormon] or [B  she has given up wearing holy underwear]. 
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Karttunen maintains that the presupposition from the second disjunct (that Geraldine 
used to wear holy underwear) ought to be filtered out, but is not because it is not entailed 
by the negation of 'Geraldine is not a Mormon.' He suggests that the problem should be 
repaired by relaxing the filtering conditions to take into account the propositions holding 
in the context previous to the utterance. Thus rather than canceling presuppositions 
which are entailed by the negation of the first disjunct alone, he suggests canceling of 
presuppositions which are entailed by a combination of some set of propositions holding 
in the context of utterance and the negation of the first disjunct. Similar modifications 
for the other connectives result in the following revised filtering rule, where F is some 
possibly null set of "assumed facts" (a notion he never makes fully explicit): 
Definition D7 (Karttunen '73, Utterance Presuppositions) 
P(S) = ir(S) for simple sentences S. 
P(S') = P(S) U rr(S') where S' is a syntactic construction containing a hole-
predicate embedding a sentence S. 
P(S') = ir(S') where S' is a syntactic construction containing a plug-predicate 
embedding any further sentence; 
If S is 'If A then B' or 'A and B' then P(S) = P(A)U{p E P(B) I (FU {A}) p}. 
Ifs is 'Either A or B' then P(A) = P(A) U{p E P(B) I (F U {-iA}) p}. 
Here is how the new definition applies to E68: 
P(A) = 0, and P(B) = { 'Geraldine has worn holy underwear'}, 
Set the context 0 = { 'All Mormons have for some time worn holy underwear'}. 
Assuming that the negation of 'Geraldine is not a Mormon' is just 'Geraldine is a 
Mormon': 
P( 'either A or B') = 0 U {p EP(B)J{ 'All Mormons have for some time worn holy 
underwear', 'Geraldine is a Mormon'} p} = 0. Thus no presupposition is predicted. 
Karttunen's revised filtering conditions probably constitute the first formal defini-
tion of presupposition which concerns the presuppositions of utterances rather than 
sentences, although the philosophical remarks of Strawson (and arguably of Frege) had 
also pointed to the relevance of context. However in Karttunen's original formulation it 
is unclear whether the "(possibly null) set of assumed facts", is relative to some partic-
ular occasion of utterance or existentially quantified over all occasions. It seems natural 
to assume the former, especially in the light of Karttunen's later work [Kar74], which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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4.2 Global Cancellation 
The model presented by Gazdar in [Gaz79a], like Karttunen's revised filtering model, 
is context sensitive, provides an account of the presuppositions of utterances rather 
than sentences, and predicts the presuppositions of an utterance to be a subset of the 
potential presuppositions of the component sentences. Unlike Karttunen's model, the 
presuppositions are not calculated by bottom-up filtering but by a global cancellation 
mechanism. All the potential presuppositions of component sentences are collected to-
gether into one set, and from that set are removed any members which conflict with (1) 
propositions in the previous context, (2) the entailments of the utterance, (3) various 
implicatures associated with the utterance, or (4) each other. Those potential presup-
positions surviving this tough selection process go on to become full presuppositions of 
the utterance. 
The basic idea that something cannot be presupposed if that would conflict with 
implicatures of the utterance is already found in Stalnaker's discussion of Karttunen's 
full-factive/semi-factive distinction [St74, pp.207-210]. Further, Soames proposed inde-
pendently of Gazdar that defeat by implicature should be the central notion of a theory 
of presupposition projection: "A speaker who utters a truth-functional compound, ques-
tion or epistemic modal indicates that he is presupposing all of the presuppositions of its 
constituents unless he conversationally implicates (or explicitly states) otherwise." [So79, 
p.653]. Kempson [Kem75] and Wilson [Wi75] (as discussed earlier) had both recognised 
that conversational factors determine whether or not a presupposition is projected, al-
though their general strategy was of trying to find implicature-based explanations of 
all cases where presuppositions do project, rather than assuming by default that they 
project and only seeking implicature-based explanations of cases where presuppositions 
are canceled. 
Gazdar's theory of presupposition, however, provides the first formalisation of this 
type of account. It is set within a dynamic model of meaning, in which discourse 
contexts 	sets of propositions - are progressively updated with the information in 
succeeding utterances. Note that the dynamism is found only at the level of texts, and 
does not extend downwards to the interpretation of the constituents of sentences. In 
this respect Gazdar's model contrasts with the accounts of presupposition proposed by 
Karttunen [Kar74] and Heim [Hei83a], as well as with the accounts of anaphora proposed 
by Kamp [Kam8l], Heim [Hei82, Hei83b] and Groenendijk and Stokhof [GS91a], all of 
which employ dynamic interpretation at the subsentence level. 
Central to Gazdar's model is his notion of satisfiable incrementation. The satisfiable 
increment ation of a context X with a set Y of propositions is just the original context plus 
all those propositions in Y which cannot introduce inconsistency, where a proposition 
y cannot introduce inconsistency just in case all consistent subsets of X U Y are still 
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consistent after addition of y. The following definition (almost identical to Gazdar's) 
results: 
Definition D8 (Consistency, Satisfiable Incrementation) 
cons(X) if X 
XU!Y = Xu{yeYIVZc(XuY) (cons(Z)—*cons(Zu{y}))} 
For example, if X = {p, q} and Y = {- p, r, s, -s}, with all atomic formulae assumed 
logically independent, then XU!Y = {p, q, r}. The proposition -p cannot be added 
because it is inconsistent with X, s cannot be added because there are consistent subsets 
of X U Y (e.g. {p, q, -is}) which become inconsistent when .s is added to them, and 
similarly for -s. 
4.2.1 Cancellation without Implicatures 
Gazdar is concerned with reasoning about the hearer's knowledge of the speaker, and 
for that reason the propositions in a Gazdarian context are formulae of an epistemic 
logic, in fact Hintikka's logic of knowledge and belief [Hi62]. For the moment, let us 
simplify by ignoring implicatures. In that case updating a context a with the information 
conveyed by some utterance of a sentence S proceeds as follows: firstly the proposition 
that the speaker knows what is asserted by S to be true is added to the context, and the 
resulting context is satisfiably incremented with the potential presuppositions. Thus if 
the assertion is a, and the set of potential presuppositions of the sentence is ir (obtained 
by taking the union of the potential presuppositions of all the constituents), then the 
final context is just a' = (a U {K(a)})U!7r.1 All the potential presuppositions are 
also assumed to be prefaced with a K operator: we will have more to say about this 
assumption later. The actual presuppositions of the utterance are just those members 
of ir which survive in a'. Consider E69: 
E69 Mary doesn't KNOW that Bill is happy: he isn't. 
Suppose the initial context a = 0. Take the assertion a = (Km(happy(b)) A 
-'happy(b), and the set of potential presuppositions it = {K(happy(b))}. 
The update of a with E69 is given by: 
a U {K(a)})U!ir = {K(i(Km(happy(b)) A -'happy(b))}U!{K(happy(b))}. 
'Note that because Kçb = is valid in Hintikka's logic, the context o' will entail the assertion c, 
although this is not added explicitly. 
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3. Since the assertion a entails K(-ihappy(b)), and this is inconsistent with the only 
potential presupposition, the potential presupposition is not added, and is not a 
presupposition of E69 in this context (or, for that matter, in any other context). 
4.2.2 Adding Implicatures 
A striking aspect of Gazdar's theory is that the same mechanism is used for implicature 
as for presupposition, in both cases the notion of satisfiable incrementation being central. 
A sentence is associated with potential implicatures of various sorts, as well as potential 
presuppositions, and the actual implicatures of an utterance are just those potential 
implicatures which survive satisfiable incrementation. Crucially, the context is updated 
with the implicatures before the presuppositions, and this has the effect that implicatures 
can cancel presuppositions. I will not discuss implicature in general, and I will not distin-
guish between different types of implicature as Gazdar (following Grice) does. Rather I 
will focus on one type of conversational implicature, that arising from hypothetical state-
ments to the effect that the speaker does not know the hypothesis to be true and does not 
know it to be false. This type of implicature, arising from the presence of an embedded 
clause which is not entailed by the whole sentence, is known as a clausal implicature. For 
example, the sentence'if Mary is sleeping then Fred is boring' carries potential (conversa-
tional) implicatures {-'Ksleeping(rn), -K-,sleeping(m), -'K boring(f), -K- boring(f) }. 
Definition D9 (Gazdar's Context Incrementation) If sentence S has semantic con-
tent a, potential implicatures t, and potential presuppositions 7t, then the update of a 
context a with S is: 
a' = ((a U {K(a)})U!t)U!ir. 
Let us consider the treatment of an example: 
E70 If Mary is sleeping then Fred is annoyed that she is sleeping. 
Set the context or = 0, 
set the asserted content a = sleeping(m)) - annoyed(f, sleeping(m)), 
set the potential implicatures t = {-'Ksleeping(m), 
-'K-'sleeping(m), -'K annoyed(f, sleeping(m)), K- annoyed(f, sleeping(m) ) }, 
and set the potential presuppositions ir = {Ksleeping(m)}. 
All the potential implicatures survive satisfiable incrementation, so: 
(aU{K(a)})U!t = {K(a)}Ut. 
Since the only potential presupposition is inconsistent with the implicature 
-'Ksleeping(m), which has now been added to the context, the potential presup-
position does not survive satisfiable incrementation, and is predicted not to be a 
presupposition of E70 in this context. 
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4.3 Projecting By Default 
One might say that in Gazdar's model whilst Hintikka's logic of Knowledge and Belief 
plays centre stage, the performance is kept running smoothly only by considerable off-
stage direction. This is not to say that Gazdar's model is not thoroughly formalised: 
it is, but that formalisation is defined at a meta-level. For instance, the notions of 
incrementation and satisfiable incrementation, although well defined and linguistically 
motivated, are not expressed in any logical theory. This is not in itself problematic for 
the linguist, but a logician or computational linguist might find such devices technically 
ad hoc, and wonder if the notions which Gazdar utilises could be located in a more 
general (computational) framework, a general logic of information interchange. Part 
of the motivation for Mercer's theory of presupposition [Me87, Me92] seems to be to 
express within a logic some of the machinery that in Gazdar's theory is extra-logical. 
In particular, Mercer takes Gazdar's insight that presuppositions normally project, and 
are only canceled as a result of conflict with context or implicatures, and formalises 
that by explicitly encoding Gazdar's potential presuppositions as default inference rules 
within Reiter's Default Logic. Mercer assumes that such a rule is associated with each 
presupposition trigger, so for instance the rule associated with the lexical item regret' 
runs: 
-'(regret(x, )) A LF(regret(x, q')) : 
This can be glossed as: if a theory (a set of propositions closed under ordinary 
first order logical consequence) includes the proposition that x does not regret 0, and 
it includes the proposition that the Logical FOrm of an utterance contains (arbitrarily 
deeply embedded) the formula regret(x, q), and 0 is consistent with the theory, then, 
by default, the theory should be extended by addition of 0 (and further classical logical 
closure). 
By and large, Mercer's theory makes much the same predictions as Gazdar's. As 
in Gazdar's system, presuppositions triggered in the lexicon become integrated in a 
hearer's information state (i.e. projected) only by default, and, as in Gazdar's system, 
the main factors controlling that integration are consistency with asserted facts and con-
sistency with implicatures. One difference is that Mercer does not attempt to prioritise 
implicatures over presuppositions, presumably because Reiter's default logic does not 
allow for prioritisation of different defaults (although related non-monotonic logics do 
allow such prioritisation). As a result Mercer cannot treat conversational implicatures 
as defaults, since that would result in conversational implicatures and presuppositions 
mutually canceling each other, contrary to Gazdar's evidence that implicatures cancel 
presuppositions. Instead, Mercer treats implicatures not as being defaults, but as be- 
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ing indefeasible. This has the effect that they are able to cancel presuppositions, but, 
given that such implicatures clearly are defeasible2, this is not a desirable move. How-
ever, I take this as a purely technical problem, and not in itself reflective of any new 
philosophical considerations. A more serious objection to Mercer's theory is simply that 
the improvements over Gazdar's theory are quite marginal, and one certainly could not 
claim mathematical beauty as a justification for the introduction of default logic, given 
that its model theory can best be described as "work in progress", and its proof theory 
involves a computationally awkward fixed-point construction. 
In one respect Mercer's theory deviates significantly from Gazdar's. Karttunen, in 
[Kar74], describes one of the goals of his work as that of avoiding a theory of part-time 
presupposition. Yet Gazdar provided just that, in the sense that in his account un-
wanted presuppositions simply vanish. In a Mercer type account, on the other hand, 
presuppositions, which are default rules, could be allowed to remain in the context what-
ever other pragmatic or semantic information is available. Projection or cancellation do 
not correlate with maintenance or removal of the presuppositional rule, but with the 
logical validity or invalidity of certain inferences associated with the application of the 
rule. Mercer identifies a philosophical difference between his theory and Gazdar's, in 
that Mercer does not even see his account of the projection data as a theory of pro-
jection, but as a theory of certain types of inference. In essence this is an inference 
which allows a hearer to select, from amongst the set of models which satisfy an uttered 
sentence, a subset of models which are pragmatically preferred. In this respect Mercer's 
theory may be thought of as a proof-theoretic version of the less formalised theories of 
[Kem75, Wi75], except that Mercer does assume that presuppositional constructions are 
conventionally marked as presuppositional in the lexicon, whereas it is not clear that 
Wilson would wish to accept this.3  
A consequence of the fact that in Mercer's theory presuppositional rules remain in the 
context is that presuppositional inferences which would be licensed by a one sentence text 
could be induced to disappear when additional text is added afterwards. For instance 
the first sentence of E71 in isolation would be predicted to licence an inference to the 
existence of a son, but the complete text does not licence this inference. 
2For instance, in a modus ponens argument and if 0 then i, so , a clausal implicature -KO is 
canceled. 
3Time permitting, I should have liked to discuss here some other recent and independently developed 
proposals due to Marcu [Ma94], Morreau [Morr95], Gervas [Ger95], and Schöter [Sch695, Schö:MS]. 
All of these accounts specifically target the defeasibility of presuppositions but have, to my taste, a 
clearer model theoretic interpretation than Mercer's, and as such perhaps capture the Kempson/ Wilson 
intuitions even better. However, all of these theories differ from Kempson's and Wilson's accounts 
significantly, in that Kempson and Wilson wish to find conversational principles which explain cases 
of projection, whereas all recent cancellationist theories take projection as the norm, and only try to 
explain away cases of cancellation. 
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E71 Jane definitely doesn't beat her son: she's not the violent type. Besides, I'm not even 
sure that she has a son. 
On the other hand in Gazdar's theory, where sentences are processed one at a time, a 
decision has to be reached at the end of processing the first sentence as to whether the 
proposition that Jane has a son should vanish into thin air, or be added irretrievably to 
the context. The theory predicts that the proposition will be added, so that the is text 
incorrectly predicted to be contradictory. This is not to say that this is a fatal flaw with 
Gazdar's theory. One could imagine modifying the theory such that speech acts rather 
than sentences were processed as units, and claiming that E71, although it consists of 
more than one sentence, comprises only a single speech act. On the other hand, one could 
also see the stability of presuppositional rules, and the instability of presuppositional 
inferences, in Mercer's theory as a disadvantage. For if a presuppositional inference 
follows from a sentence, it is very strange for the utterer to deny the conclusion of that 
inference a dozen sentences (or several speech turns) later. It seems that if you are 
going to deny the presuppositions of part of your utterance, you must do it as soon as 
reasonably possible. Clearly Mercer's theory would need some modification to account 
for this. 
4.4 The Pre- in Presupposition 
In what sense is Gazdar's theory an account of 'presupposition'? I do not mean to 
suggest that it does not provide an account of presuppositional data. I merely mean that 
the account does not bear any relation to the fairly intuitive notion of presuppositions 
as previous assumptions. Indeed, since presuppositions are the last things to be added 
in Gazdar's definition of update, perhaps it would be more natural to call them post-
suppositions.4  
My own predilection, as will hopefully become clear in the course of this thesis, 
is for a theory that takes the pre in presupposition seriously, and which in some way 
associates presuppositions specifically with the initial context in which a sentence is 
semantically interpreted, or with the initialisation of that context. To me, at least, the 
major achievement of the theory first presented in van der Sandt's thesis [vdS82], which 
only appeared in English somewhat later in [vdS88], is that it does succeed in reconciling 
ideas from Gazdar's cancellation account with what I take to be the intuitive notion of 
4Given the almost identical way in which presuppositions and implicatures are treated in Gazdar's 
model, one might think presuppositions could better be labeled as a subtype of implicature. This would 
be in tune with Karttunen and Peters' suggestion [KP77, KP79] that presuppositions in fact comprise 
an assortment of different implicatures, largely conventional implicatures. It is notable that Karttunen 
and Peters arguments have singularly failed to effect any general change in use of terminology, if such 
was their aim. 
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presupposition. I will term van der Sandt's 1982/87 account his cancellation theory, to 
distinguish it from his later DRT-based theory, to which we will turn shortly. 
One crucial but disarmingly simple insight could be said to drive van der Sandt's 
cancellation theory. Suppose a sentence S can be coherently uttered in a context a, and 
that one of the constituents of S carries a potential presupposition expressible using the 
sentence P. If in a the text made up of P followed by S is coherent, then utterances of 
S in a will carry the presupposition P, i.e. P is projected, and otherwise P is canceled 
(see [vdS88, pp.185-189]). For example, given a context of utterance which is neutral 
regarding Bugandan and Adnagubian politics, E72 presupposes that there is a King of 
Adnagub (since E73 is coherent), but not that there is a King of Buganda (since E74 is 
incoherent). 
E72 The King of Buganda is not balder than the King of Adnagub since Buganda has no 
King. 
E73 There is a King of Adnagub. The King of Buganda is not balder than the King of 
Adnagub since Buganda has no King. 
E74 * There is a King of Buganda. The King of Buganda is not balder than the King of 
Adnagub since Buganda has no King. 
Coherence of a sentence, what van der Sandt expresses as "acceptability in a con-
text", here comes down to the requirement that every clause is both consistent and 
informative. Van der Sandt's precise definition of acceptability, which is based upon a 
dynamic view of the interpretation of the logical connectives like that to be discussed 
in the following section, need not concern us here. So far as sentences containing log-
ical connectives are concerned, a good approximation, which appears adequate for the 
examples van der Sandt discusses, is to define acceptability of a sentence S in a con-
text a as the requirement that for each clause S' appearing in S (other than within a 
presuppositional expression) a neither entails 5' nor entails the contrary of S'. If this 
requirement is not met, then S will not be a maximally efficient (i.e. compact) way of 
communicating whatever information it conveys in that context. I simplify by taking a 
context to be a set of sentences, although van der Sandt allows for contexts to contain 
certain additional information. 
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Definition D10 (Presuppositions in van der Sandt's Cancellation Account) 
Given that all the potential presuppositions (or elementary presuppositions in van der 
Sandt's terminology) of S are collected in the set ir, the presuppositions of S in context 
o are those propositions 0 such that: 
1.çbE7r 
For any bEir, 	101 	± 
S is acceptable in the context a U {} 
Although there are problems associate with this definition5, the intuition is clear, as 
the treatment of as treatment of E70 (repeated below) should illustrate: 
E70' If Mary is sleeping then Fred is annoyed that she is sleeping. 
Suppose that the context is empty. For E70, ir is just the singleton set {Mary is 
sleeping}, the one potential presupposition being triggered by the factive 'annoyed'. We 
can test whether the potential presupposition is actually presupposed by adding it to the 
context and checking that all the subsentences in E70 not appearing in presuppositional 
expressions are neither entailed nor contradicted in the resulting context. Since the 
resulting context {Mary is sleeping} entails one of the subsentences, i.e. the antecedent 
of the conditional, we can conclude that the proposition that Mary is sleeping is not 
being presupposed, for if it were then E70 would be inefficient, and hence unacceptable. 
5The definition is essentially that given by van der Sandt as "D-7" [vdS88, p.203]. There appear 
to be two major errors. A first problem is that the second clause only checks for consistency of pairs 
of potential presuppositions. It is easy to manufacture an example where all pairs are consistent but 
the triples are not. Suppose the context a contains the proposition that exactly two people whistled, 
and that S= 'Sherlock has discovered that Watson whistled, or he's discovered that Mycroft whistled, or 
he's discovered that Moriaty whistled'. Now we might take ir to be the set { 'Watson whistled', 'Mycroft 
whistled', Moriaty whistled l. Any pair of elements of this set is consistent with or although, assuming 
non-identity of Watson, Mycroft and Moriaty, the three elements together are inconsistent with a. The 
above definition would incorrectly predict that all elements of ir become full presuppositions even in a 
context where their joint addition produces inconsistency. 
A similar problem ensues from the third clause, which checks that addition of each presupposition to 
a would not make S unacceptable, but does not ensure that if all the presuppositions are added to a the 
resulting context accepts S. Again we can manufacture a rather artificial example to illustrate the point. 
Suppose a is empty, and S = 'If John is an only child then he doesn't regret that he has no brothers and he 
doesn't regret that he has no sisters.' It seems plausible that ir should be the set {John has no brothers, 
John has no sisters}. Since these are consistent with each other, and since S is acceptable in either of 
the contexts produced by adding an element of ir to a, van der Sandt predicts that both members of 
ir become full presuppositions. This is inappropriate, since both elements of ir taken together entail 
that John is an only child, so that if both are being assumed then the antecedent of the conditional is 
uninformative. In a context to which those presuppositions have been added, S will convey only the 
same information as the sentence 'John doesn't regret that he has no brothers and he doesn't regret that 
he has no sisters.' 
Clearly the technical apparatus proposed by van der Sandt does not quite square up with what I take 
to be the intuition behind that apparatus, namely that in a context containing the presuppositions, S 
should be maximally efficient. See also Burton-Roberts review article, [Bu89c], for some quite different 
criticisms of van der Sandt's D-7. 
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4.5 Presupposition and Entailment 
Uncertainty is sometimes expressed about whether potential presuppositions of a simple 
sentence should also be considered as part of the asserted content (i.e. amongst the en-
tailments) of the sentence. Since in a traditional trivalent account of presupposition it is 
not even possible to define unentailed presuppositions, one naturally wonders whether 
the possibility of defining presuppositions which are not also assertions gives the can-
cellation account significant extra empirical coverage, or whether this possibility is just 
an artefact. The same issue arises with respect to two dimensional accounts such as 
Herzgerger's, or that of Karttunen and Peters, which also allow presuppositions not to 
be part of the asserted content. 
Let me digress to point out that although the question has been posed both with 
respect to different presuppositional constructions, and with respect to various different 
models of presupposition, it is not always the same question. In particular, whereas 
Gazdar's model involves presuppositions being epistemic statements, with content like 
'The speaker knows that there is a French King', this is not the case in most other models 
of presupposition, and the question of whether such an epistemic statement is entailed 
by 'The King of France is bald' is obviously different from the question of whether 'There 
is a King of France' is entailed. However, the epistemic aspect of Gazdar's potential pre-
suppositions could fairly easily be removed.6 Suppose that the potential presuppositions 
ir were just taken to be the standard expressions triggered by various lexical items etc., 
and not statements of the form K(), and that the asserted content of an utterance was 
added to the previous context simpliciter, also without embedding under a K operator. 
Thus the update of a context o would be given by ((oU{a})U!t)U!ir. As things stand this 
would prevent conversational implicatures, which are inherently epistemic statements, 
from interacting properly with presupposition, but this is easily rectified. We simply 
replace the definition of consistency with: cons(X) iff {K(x) I x e X} 	I. So this is 
just Gazdar's theory but with the Ks added at a later stage. It is not significant that the 
implicature expressions end up doubly embedded under K operators in the consistency 
'Both Blok [B1o93] and Horton [Hort87], in developing theories of presupposition along Gazdarian 
lines, have suggested refinements of the underlying epistemic logic. Presumably, then, they would 
disagree with the impression I have given that the epistemic nature of Gazdar's presuppositions is 
inessential. But here I should qualify my intentions. I do think that most (or all) of the data dealt with 
in [Gaz79a] could be handled without making presuppositions into intrinsically epistemic statements, 
but I accept firstly that there may be philosophical motivation for presuppositions being epistemic, and 
secondly that there may be further applications of the theory for which the epistemic operators are 
essential. With regard to the first point, it should be noted that in this thesis presuppositions will 
be given an epistemic interpretation (roughly as what the speaker believes, or acts as if he believes, is 
mutually known), although this epistemicity will not be explicit in the formal system. With regard to 
the second, both Blok and Horton model the beliefs of multiple agents in a dialogue setting, whereas 
Gazdar concentrates on just the beliefs of just one agent (the speaker). When providing a full account 
of the evolution of multiple sets of beliefs, it is natural to utilise explicit belief operators. 
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test, because of the validity of K-iKçb = -KO and KKq = KO in the modal logic 
which Gazdar uses (Hintikka's epistemic logic). 
To return from the digression, regarding Gazdar's account it is very easy to an-
swer the question of whether presuppositions should be part of the asserted content, at 
least for the majority of presuppositional expressions. Although presuppositions aris-
ing from triggers in embedded contexts produce defeasible presuppositional inferences, 
the corresponding inference connected with a trigger in a simple affirmative sentence is 
typically indefeasible. Gazdar [Gaz79a, pp.119-123] describes the inferences associated 
with factive verbs, definite descriptions, aspectual verbs, and clefts as being indefeasible 
in simple affirmative sentences. Since potential presuppositions are always defeasible in 
Gazdar's model, and since the only inferences which are indefeasible in his model are 
those associated with the asserted content, Gazdar is forced to claim that the potential 
presuppositions of these constructions are also entailments. 
Although Gazdar hedges with regard to the question of whether presuppositions 
should be part of the asserted content for other classes of presupposition trigger, he 
discusses at least one example where it is crucial to his analysis that the trigger does 
not entail the presupposition. The following, from [Gaz79a, p.150], is of a type discussed 
by Heinämäki [Hein72]: 
E75 Max died before he finished his autobiography. 
Standard projection tests indicate that the complement of a before clause is pre-
supposed. But in E75 the presupposition (that Max finished his autobiography) is 
apparently canceled, in spite of the fact that the before' clause occurs in a simple posi-
tive context. Gazdar's successful treatment of this example implicitly assumes that the 
presupposition is not entailed. Van der Sandt makes it clear [vdS88, pp.196-198] that 
he regards the flexibility of a theory in which presuppositions do not have to be entailed 
as a major boon. Apart from 'before' clauses, van der Sandt also suggests that three 
other types might be non-entailed. Firstly, Fillmore's [Fi71] verbs of judging, verbs like 
like 'accuse' and 'criticise': E76 is claimed to presuppose but not entail E77. Secondly, 
van der Sandt mentions emotive factives, like 'is glad', 'regrets', a class of verbs which 
Gazdar [Gaz79a, p.122-123] argues do entail their presuppositions. Gazdar's claim runs 
contra to earlier observations of Klein [K175], discussed by Gazdar, that utterances of 
sentences like E78 do not indicate the complement of 'regret' to be true. Thirdly is the 
particle 'even': E79 has been claimed (and this dates back as far as Horn's [Ho69]) to 
be truth conditionally synonymous with E80. 
E76 John criticised Harry for writing the letter. 
E77 Harry wrote the letter. 
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E78 Falsely believing that he had inflicted a fatal wound, Oedipus regretted killing the 
stranger on the road to Thebes. 
E79 Even John left. 
E80 John left. 
I do not accept that in any existing cancellation account a case has been made for al-
lowing non-entailed presuppositions. For making this move creates as many problems as 
it solves. Firstly, let us consider before'. According to cancellation accounts, presuppo-
sitions can be suspended if they contradict entailments or implicatures. Thus E81, where 
the presupposition that Max won is explicitly denied, and E82, where the first sentence 
carries an implicature that the speaker does not know whether Max won, should both 
be cases where the presupposition associated with the before clause is unproblematically 
canceled. Yet both examples are very odd. 
E81 ?Max trained assiduously before he won the race, and/but never did win it. 
E82 ?Perhaps Max won the race. He trained assiduously before he won the race. 
In cases where the presupposition of a 'before' clause is canceled, there is always some 
causal connection between the sentence which the 'before' clause modifies and the main 
clause. Thus in understanding E75 we are able to make a causal connection between 
the sentence 'Max died' and the 'before' complement 'Max finished his autobiography'. 
Perhaps we could say that there is a hypothetical causal chain which runs from a time 
just in advance of Max's death to a time when Max's autobiography is complete, but 
that this chain is interrupted by Max's death.7 Regarding instances of before in positive 
contexts, it appears crucial to the cancellation that the interruption to the relevant causal 
chain is announced by the main clause. This is not be reflected in current cancellation 
accounts, all of which allow a wide range of extraneous conflicting information to cancel 
the presupposition. 
An additional problem with postulating an unentailed presupposition occurs with 
embedding of the presuppositional construction in an intensional context: Sentence E83 
suggests E84. If the 'before' complement is not entailed, none of the cancellation accounts 
predict this inference.8  
7This suggestion that the presence of a causal chain is crucial is reminiscent of Moens and Steedman's 
analysis of the oddity of examples like When my car broke down, the sun set [MS88, p.23]. 
80n the other hand, assuming an entailed presupposition, whilst it would produce an inference from 
E83 to E84, would not predict defeasibility of such inferences. Thus Jane thinks Max died before he 
finished his autobiography.' does not suggest that Jane thinks Max finished his autobiography. So I am 
not saying we should conclude outright that the complement of before' is part of the asserted content, 
but that no current theory gets the data right whether or not this conclusion is accepted. Another 
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E83 John thinks Max trained assiduously before he won the race. 
E84 John thinks Max won the race. 
Regarding verbs of judging, postulation of an unentailed presupposition is once again 
problematic. Firstly, consider embedding in an intensional context: 
E85 Bill thinks John criticised Harry for writing the letter. 
E86 Bill thinks Harry wrote the letter. 
If E86 follows from E85, and I would say it follows at least as strongly as E76 
does, then this will be unexplained under a cancellation account which does not assume 
entailment of the presupposition. 
Secondly, observe that (on my intuitions at least) in each of the following two pairs 
of examples, the first does not suggest that Mary actually did whistle, but the second 
does: 
	
E87 a. 	John didn't criticise Mary for whistling, and didn't even indicate that she had 
whistled. 
b. 	John didn't realise that Mary whistled, and didn't even indicate that she had 
whistled. 
E88 a. 	If John indicated that Mary whistled, he criticised her for whistling. 
b. 	If John indicated that Mary whistled, he realised that she had whistled. 
If I am right about this data, then that might push us in favour of postulating a 
presupposition for 'X criticised Y for doing Z' other than 'Y did T. I am not convinced 
that 'X indicated that Y did Z' is presupposed, but it does not seem implausible that it 
is along the right lines, and that there is a further non-presuppositional inference step 
involved in reaching 'Y did Z'.9 
open problem is the licensing of negative polarity items in before' (but not after') clauses, as in Max 
died before finishing anything'. Explanations have been offered for this (see e.g. [SWZ941), no unitary 
explanation has been offered both for the negative polarity item and for the cancellation data. I am 
(unjustifiably) optimistic that one day, when we really find out what before' means, a clear link between 
the two phenomena will emerge. 
Note that X indicated that Y did Z' is certainly entailed - witness the oddity of 'John criticised Mary 
for whistling, but he never indicated that she had whistled'. It is not clear whether the sort of analysis I 
am proposing would apply to other verbs of judging. I have considered just one other - dislike'. For 
instance, it might be said that 'John disliked Mary for whistling' presupposed but did not entail 'Mary 
whistled.' Here I would propose the alternative presupposition 'John believed Mary whistled'. This is 
backed up by the fact that neither of the two cases 'John didn't dislike Mary for whistling, since he didn't 
believe she did whistle' and 'If John believed Mary whistled, then he disliked her for whistling' seem to 
suggest that Mary did whistle. Once again, we can show using parallel examples that it is not simply 
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The argument from embedding in an intensional context can again be applied in the 
case of emotive factives. If the emotive 'regret' presupposes its complement but does 
not entail it, then cancellation accounts will fail to predict that E90 follows from E89, 
although they will typically predict that E91 follows: 
E89 John thinks Mary regretted leaving. 
E90 John thinks Mary left. 
E91 Mary left. 
Moving to the case of 'even', here, I think, the argument that there is a non-entailed 
presupposition simply falls flat on its face. It may be attractive to analyse E79 as being 
truth-conditionally equivalent to E80, but I know of no good reason to doubt that the 
presupposition is entailed. Horn's original suggestion of truth conditional synonymity 
was not couched within a formal theory where it was possible to make a distinction 
between entailed and non-entailed presuppositions, and the evidence he presented in 
[Ho69] does not bear on the issue. It is natural to take the presupposition of E79 to be 
E92. But the negation of E92 is inconsistent with a simple positive assertion of E79, as 
witnessed by the oddity of E93. To account for this in a cancellation theory, the natural 
move, maybe the only move, would be simply to assume that the presupposition was 
also an entailment.10 
E92 People other than John left. 
E93 ?Even John left, but nobody else did. 
4.6 Combining Cancellation and Filtration 
The cancellation and filtering theories are largely complementary in terms of which 
data they get right. For instance, Karttunen's theory fails (without the introduction 
implicatures associated with 'John believed...' that are doing the canceling. Both 'If Bill believed Mary 
whistled, then John disliked her for whistling' and 'John didn't dislike Mary for whistling, since Bill didn't 
believe she did whistle' do seem to suggest (to me at least) that Mary whistled. 
The inference from 'John believed Mary whistled' to 'Mary whistled' of course would still need explaining, 
presumably as some sort of conversational implicature. If such an explanation could be found, then it 
might also apply in the case of emotive factives. For instance, we might say that 'John regretted that Mary 
whistled' presupposed not 'Mary whistled', but 'John believed Mary whistled'. Note also that Karttunen 
and Peters, in [KP77] argue that verbs of judging are not associated with a presupposition, but that 
the purported presupposition in fact results from a particularised conversational implicature. However, 
they admit that they are unable to explain why this implicature should arise when the verb of judging 
is embedded under negation. 
10Embedding 'even' in an intensional context does not appear to produce clear results. This may be 
because even is an anaphoric trigger, of the type discussed later in §6.8.3. 
Cancellation and Filtering 	 74 
of a second plug negation, as well as other plug connectives) on presupposition denial 
cases, whilst Gazdar's theory fails on a class of examples like the following (as discussed 
by Heim [Hei83a] and Soames [So82]): 
E94 If none of Mary's friends come to the party, she'll be surprised that her best friends 
aren't there. 
E95 If John is munching his way through a packet of biscuits, then Bill will be glad that 
John is eating something. 
These are cases where the antecedent of a conditional strictly entails a presupposition 
of the consequent, so that Karttunen, correctly I think, predicts cancellation. Thus I 
take it that a hearer would not infer from E94 that Mary's best friends will not be at the 
party, and would not infer from E95 that John is eating, although these presuppositions 
are triggered in the respective consequents of the conditionals.11 In each case, all of 
the cancellation accounts discussed predict projection of the presupposition. Earlier I 
discussed a case E70 where a presupposition triggered in the consequent of a conditional 
was canceled by a clausal implicature generated in the antecedent. But in E94 and E95 
the relevant implicature is not strong enough. For instance, in E95 a clausal implicature 
is generated that the speaker does not know whether John is munching his way through 
a packet of biscuits, but this implicature does not imply that the speaker does not know 
whether John is eating at all, and the presupposition remains unchecked. To put this in 
terms of van der Sandt's cancellation model, addition to the context of the elementary 
presupposition that John is eating something does not make the conditional inefficient 
(for believing that John is eating something does not determine whether or not he is 
munching his way through a packet of biscuits, and does not determine Bill's mental 
state), and so this presupposition is added.12 
"In E94, focal stress on surprised', especially combined with destressing of that her friends aren't 
there', does seem to encourage the presuppositional inference. Similar comments apply in the case of 
E95. A possible line of explanation for this type of phenomenon is developed in my [Bea94b]. 
12Landman [La81] proposed a solution to this problem, which essentially consisted of strengthening 
conversational implicatures so as to force cancellation of the problematic presuppositions. This may solve 
the immediate problem with presuppositional predictions, but in the process creates quite undesirable 
effects from the implicatures themselves. See Soames' discussion in [So82]. It should be noted that 
the problems faced by cancellation models with this type of example do not result from the if-then' 
construction specifically, since variants on the examples which do not use this construction are still 
problematic. In each of the following triples, the cancellation models predict a contrast between the (a) 
and (b) sentences. Specifically they predict that the presupposition glossed in (c) is canceled in the (a) 
case by a clausal implicature, but projected in the (b) case. I am unable to detect any such contrast. 
(a) Either Mary's best friends will come to the party, or she'll be surprised that her best friends aren't 
there. 
Either some of Mary's friends will come to the party, or shell be surprised that her best friends 
aren't there. 
Mary's best friends won't be at the party 
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To move to a different type of example which is discussed by van der Sandt in [vdS88], 
consider the following: 
E96 John claimed that the President of France is coming to dinner: the idiot doesn't realise 
that France is a monarchy! 
Karttunen identifies 'claim' as a plug, so that on his account the presupposition that 
France has a President vanishes, whilst the presupposition that France is a monarchy 
is projected. However, on Gazdar's or Mercer's cancellation accounts, the potential 
presuppositions that there is a President of France and that France is a monarchy 
conflict, so these accounts incorrectly predict that a hearer of this example would not 
infer that the speaker takes France to be a monarchy. 
There are, then, many cases where Karttunen correctly predicts that some presup-
position is filtered, but where various of the cancellation accounts incorrectly predict 
projection. On the other hand, there are numerous examples where the cancellation 
accounts correctly predict that some presupposition is canceled, but where Karttunen's 
filtering model incorrectly predicts projection. Witness, for instance, the following two 
examples repeated from above. In the first, the elementary presupposition that there is 
a King of France is canceled, and in the second the elementary presupposition that there 
is a King of Buganda is canceled. In both cases this is predicted by the cancellation 
models, but not by Karttunen's filtering model. 
E23' If the King of France is bald, then I'm a Dutchman: there is no King of France! 
E46' Either the King of Buganda is now opening parliament, or else the person who told 
me Buganda is a monarchy was wrong. 
Having observed the complementarity in coverage between Gazdar's theory and a 
later version of Karttunen's theory, Soames [So82] proposed a synthesis of the two ac-
counts. However, the later version of Karttunen's theory (to which we will turn shortly) 
is not a filtering theory in the sense defined above. The presuppositions that a complex 
sentence is predicted to have are not a subset of the potential presuppositions of its 
parts. This complicated the Soames attempt to unify the insights of the two account in 
a single theory. To give an idea of the difficulties faced, ask yourself this question: when 
looking for a synthesis between two accounts, where the first account makes all presup-
positions members of the set of potential presuppositions, and the second account does 
(a) Jane and Mary think Bill ate something, and they think he knows that they know that he ate 
something. 
Jane and Mary think Bill munched his way through a packet of biscuits, and they think he knows 
that they know that he ate something. 
John ate something. 
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not, should the resulting theory be expected to make all presuppositions members of 
the set of potential presuppositions? (Soames in fact answers in the negative.) A much 
simpler integrated theory, but one which still preserved Soames' central insight, could 
be formed by combining the Karttunen 1973 theory, as discussed above, with Gazdar's. 
The most obvious way to join the two theories so as to address both defeat of presuppo-
sitions by inconsistency and filtering of presuppositions which are locally entailed, would 
simply be to take the intersection of the set of presuppositions predicted by each of the 
two models. Such a joint Gazdar-Karttunen model would provide a formidable account 
of presupposition, combining relative simplicity with a clear improvement over any of 
the other models discussed in this section. But it would still face a number of problems 
common to all cancellation and filtration theories, and most of these problems remain 
unsolved in the combined account that Soames did in fact propose. 
4.7 Quantification in Cancellation and Filtering Models 
The cancellation and filtering models can be likened to the two dimensional theories 
discussed in the previous chapter in that meaning is divided into separate presuppo-
sitional and assertional components, although the method the models discussed in the 
current chapter use to calculate the presuppositional component is quite different from 
that in the two dimensional accounts. It was shown in the previous chapter that in a 
two dimensional theory such as that of Karttunen and Peters difficulties arise regarding 
the treatment of quantified presuppositions, i.e. cases where an elementary presuppo-
sition appears free in some variable, and that variable is bound by a quantifier. Those 
problems arise precisely because presuppositional and assertional components are sep-
arated, so that no variable binding can occur between them. Thus one should expect 
that similar problems will occur with cancellation and filtering theories. It is, indeed, 
notable that (to my knowledge) none of the cancellation and filtering models discussed 
in this chapter have been applied to the problem of quantified presuppositions. 
One thing that marks the cancellation theories apart from Karttunen and Peters' 
model is that for most triggers, cancellationists assume that the presupposition is also 
part of the asserted content. This assumption alleviates somewhat the problem of quan-
tified presuppositions. For instance, if 'curtsied' not only carried a presupposition that 
its argument is female, but also entailed it, then 'Somebody curtsied' would presumably 
entail that some female curtsied. But if examples like 'Somebody curtsied, and I was 
surprised to see that it was a man' lead us to postulate that the presupposition, by virtue 
of its cancellability in positive sentences, was not part of the asserted content, problems 
would ensue. For without the assumption of an asserted presupposition, 'Somebody 
curtsied' would, just as in the Karttunen and Peters model, presuppose that somebody 
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was female, and assert that somebody performed the act of curtseying, and not provide 
any implication that the performer of the curtseying act was female. 13 
Even if presuppositions are assumed to be asserted, problems arise. For instance, it 
seems reasonable to maintain that the following sentence cannot be true unless there is 
some watch-owning woman who realised that if her watch was slightly wrong she'd be 
in danger of shooting the wrong man: 
E97 Exactly one woman realised that if her watch was slightly wrong, she'd be in danger 
of shooting the wrong man. 
If 'her watch' is taken to have a presupposition of the form has-a-watch(x), an open 
proposition, then it is completely unclear what should be done with this proposition 
in a cancellation theory. Saying that the open proposition is presupposed (with the 
effect of universal quantification) is inadequate, because the presupposition is clearly 
only relevant to some salient set of women. On the other hand, the mere fact that 
has-a-watch(x) is asserted in its local context does not help, for the phrase 'her watch' 
occurs within a conditional. The assertion would be predicted to be something along 
the lines of 'exactly one woman came to believe that if she owned a watch and that watch 
was slightly wrong then she would be in danger of shooting some wrong man', but this 
would not enforce that it was a watch owning woman who had the relevant realisation. 
4.8 Conditional Presuppositions 
Consider the following stock examples (as in [Kar73, p.184], the general type and the 
second example being attributed by him to McCawley): 
E98 If LBJ appoints J. Edgar Hoover to the cabinet, he will regret having appointed a 
homosexual. 
E99 If Nixon Invites Angela Davis to the Whitehouse, then Nixon will regret having invited 
a black militant to his residence. 
In the consequent of E98 the elementary presupposition that LBJ has appointed a 
homosexual is triggered, and in the consequent of E99 the elementary presupposition 
13 This could be construed as yet another argument (c.f. §4.5) for not allowing non-asserted presup-
positions in the cancellation models, for allowing any non-asserted presupposition would present major 
problems as soon as quantification into presuppositions was allowed. Take the case of 'before'. If the 
presupposition (that what is described in the complement of 'before' actually took place) were not en-
tailed, then it is hard to see how any sensible interpretation could be given for a sentence like Everybody 
knocked before entering'. An assertion that everybody knocked and presupposition that everybody en-
tered, even if such a presupposition could be derived, would still fail to enforce the proper temporal 
relationship between each knocking event and the following entering event. 
Cancellation and Filtering 	 78 
that Nixon will have invited a black militant to his residence is triggered. In neither case 
would one expect a hearer to conclude that the elementary presupposition holds, so it 
is reasonable to claim, as Gazdar does with respect to a slight variant, that the presup-
position is simply canceled. Gazdar [Gaz79a, pp.151-152] suggests that his treatment 
of this type of example represents one of the strengths of his theory. I suggest the con-
trary, firstly because I believe examples like these do carry non-trivial presuppositions 
(albeit not the elementary presuppositions triggered in the consequents), and secondly 
because I do not accept the assumptions Gazdar makes in order to demonstrate that 
his system yields cancellation. Gazdar's argument as he applies it to a slight variant on 
E99 appears to run as follows: 
A clausal implicature is triggered of the form 'The speaker does not believe that 
Nixon invites Angela Davis.' 
The context contains the fact that Angela Davis is a black militant. 
The phrase 'a black militant' can be anaphoric on the NP 'Angela Davis', so that 
the potential presupposition can be given as 'The speaker believes Nixon invites 
Angela Davis.' 
The clausal implicature conflicts with the potential presupposition, and correctly 
prevents projection. 
My first objection stems from the fact that when somebody who (like me) has no 
knowledge of Angela Davis' skin colour or political tendencies is confronted with E99, 
they will tend to infer that she is a black militant. Thus the assumption that the context 
contains the fact that Davis is a black militant seems unjustified, and irrelevant to 
peoples' understanding of the example. Likewise, if somebody who has no presumptions 
about Hoover's sexual preferences is confronted with E98, I would suggest that they 
would tend to infer that Hoover is a homosexual. That such inferences occur can be 
seen as offering support for the claim that there are non trivial presuppositions. In 
the Strong Kleene and Karttunen and Peters accounts discussed earlier, in the hybrid 
model which Soames actually did propose in [So82], and in some of the dynamic semantic 
accounts to which I will shortly turn, conditionalised presuppositions are predicted for 
such exemples. These presuppositions can be glossed as follows: 
E100 If LBJ appoints Hoover he will have appointed a homosexual. 
E101 If Nixon invites Davis, he will have invited a black militant. 
As stated, these glosses do not strictly entail that Hoover is a homosexual or that 
Davis is a black militant, although the glosses are highly suggestive of these conclusions. 
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Some strengthening is needed, and an appropriate mechanism will be introduced later 
in the thesis, in Chapter 10. With or without explicit formalisation of a strengthening 
mechanism, prediction of a conditionalised presupposition seems to me closer to the 
mark than prediction of no presupposition. 14 
My second objection to Gazdar's analysis concerns his assumption that the indefinite 
NP in the consequent is anaphoric, which I will argue against. Before that, I wish to 
point out that even if anaphoricity were present in the original examples, it could not 
be used to explain away very similar variants. Consider the following: 
E102 If LBJ appoints J. Edgar Hoover to the cabinet, he will regret that his cabinet is no 
longer entirely made up of heterosexuals. 
E103 If Nixon invites Angela Davis to the Whitehouse, then Nixon will regret that his house 
is no longer devoid of black militants. 
I take it that hearers of E102 would not uniformly infer that LBJ's cabinet is no longer 
entirely made up of heterosexuals, so that Gazdar might wish to say that the potential 
presupposition is (or at least can be) canceled. Similarly, he would presumably want 
to say that in E103 the potential presupposition that Nixon's house is no longer devoid 
of black militants is canceled. But in this variant there is no expression which can act 
anaphorically on the NP Angela Davis', and the argumentation offered for the original 
examples would fail. Now we move on to consider whether there was any anaphoric link 
in the original examples. Consider the following: 
E104 If LBJ appoints J. Edgar Hoover to the cabinet, he will realise that he has appointed 
a homosexual. 
E105 If Nixon invites Angela Davis to the Whitehouse, then Nixon will realise that he has 
invited a black militant to his residence 
E106 If Nixon invites Angela Davis to the Whitehouse, then Nixon will realise that he has 
invited the black militant to his residence. 
Examples E104 and E105 are both examples where assuming the indefinite NP in 
the consequent was coreferential with the proper name in the antecedent would be 
disastrous. We would not want to say that E105 says only that if Nixon invites Davis 
then he will realise that he has done so. This is exactly the (peculiar) reading we would 
get in a truly anaphoric case such as E106, which has an interpretation such that even if 
14 Note that the conditionalised presupposition survives under embedding. For instance, Perhaps if 
Nixon invites Davis he will regret having invited a black militant' seems to imply If Nixon invites Davis, he 
will have invited a black militant.' 
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Nixon invites Davis, he does not necessarily realise that she is a black militant, although 
the speaker does realise this. Conclusion: the indefinite 'a black militant' in E105 is not 
anaphoric, at least not in the sense that in the LF of E105 'a black militant' acts as if 
it were merely a repeat of the NP 'Angela Davis', which is the type of assumption that 
would enable Gazdar's argument to go through. A similar conclusion can be drawn 
regarding E99. 
So, if we take it that 'a black militant' in E99 is non-anaphoric, or we consider 
examples like E103 or E105, what results does the cancellation model predict? This 
can be answered very easily. Whether or not the fact that Davis is a black militant is 
taken to be in the context, the clausal implicature that 'The speaker does not believe 
that Nixon invites Angela Davis' will not conflict with the potential presupposition 'The 
speaker believes that Nixon invites a black militant'. In fact, on any of the cancellation 
accounts, E99 should be expected to presuppose, incorrectly, that Nixon has invited 
a black militant (except in very special contexts, such as those already containing the 
negation of this proposition, or containing the assumption that Nixon invited at most 
one person). 
Both Karttunen's revised 1973 account and the joint Gazdar-Karttunen model pro-
posed above correctly predict filtering provided the proposition that Davis is a black 
militant is assumed to be in the initial context. But these models still fail to account for 
the fact that even hearers who are not aware Davis' skin colour and militancy will tend to 
infer it. A better model would be one which predicted a conditionalised presupposition 
as discussed above. 
If a sentence has the form 'If A then B' (meaning that B carries presupposition 
C), then the relevant conditionalised presupposition is 'If A then C'. As it happens, the 
relevant 'If A then C conditional is part of the asserted content for the cancellationist. 
This is because factives are assumed to carry their potential presuppositions as entail-
ments. For example, the assertion of the McCawley sentence E99 may be paraphrased 
'If Nixon invites Davis, he'll have invited a black activist and regret it', which classically 
entails 'If Nixon invites Davis, he'll have invited a black activist.' Thus if one sets up the 
initial context so as to force cancellation, then although cancellation models do not yield 
conditionalised presuppositions for the McCawley sentences, they do still predict that 
the speaker is committed to the relevant 'If A then C proposition. An example of such a 
context is that set up by the modal statement 'Perhaps Nixon will invite a black militant 
to the Whitehouse', where an implicature is triggered that the speaker does not know 
whether Nixon will in fact invite a black militant. 
It might then seem that there is hope for the cancellationist, if only the conditions 
for cancellation could be strengthened in these cases so that the elementary presuppo-
sition itself is cancelled as Gazdar claimed. Then what others might claim to be the 
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conditional presupposition of a McCawley sentence would be identified as part of the 
asserted content by the cancellationist. But this appearance of hope is illusory, for it is 
easy to find cases for which other theories would still predict a rather plausible condi-
tional presupposition, but where the cancellation model will not predict this conditional 
to be either a presupposition or an assertion: 
E107 If LBJ appoints J. Edgar Hoover to the cabinet and regrets having appointed a ho-
mosexual, he will try to fire him. 
E108 If Nixon invites Angela Davis to the Whitehouse and regrets having invited a black 
militant to his residence, then he will organise a cover-up. 
Strong Kleene, the theory of Karttunen and Peters, that of Soames, and the dynamic 
theories in the next chapter all predict the same conditional presuppositions for E107 
and E108 as for E98 and E99 respectively, and this prediction seems appropriate. But 
for the latter pair of examples there is no prospect of a cancellation theory reproducing 
the relevant conditional presupposition as an assertion. The cancellationist 's assertion 
for E108 could be glossed as'If Nixon invites Davis and has invited a black militant and 
regrets it, he will organise a cover-up.' Clearly this does not entail 'If Nixon invites Davis 
then he will have invited a black militant', which the other models mentioned would, cor-
rectly I think, predict as a presupposition. To summarise, not only is it the case that, as 
was shown in the previous chapter, there are no solid arguments against conditionalised 
presuppositions, it is also the case that cancellation and filtering theories are demon-
strably inadequate in their coverage of a range of cases where other models do predict 
a conditionalised presupposition, and where this presupposition seems appropriate. 
Chapter 5 
Dynamic Semantics 
All of the major contemporary theories of presupposition projection are in one way or 
another dynamic theories, making crucial use of the way in which the epistemic state 
of an agent changes as the interpretation process proceeds. We have already seen that 
the cancellation theories of Gazdar, van der Sandt and Mercer, although based on a 
classical static semantics, involve pragmatic mechanisms controlling the evolution of a 
set of accepted propositions. Another theory which combines a static (although non-
classical) semantics with a dynamic pragmatics is that of Seuren [Seu85]. In all these 
theories we may say that the static interpretation of a sentence acts as a middleman 
between the syntax of language and pragmatic processes controlling the changing state 
of the language user. In this chapter we will be concerned with theories which try to 
cut out this middleman, so that language is interpreted directly into a domain of state-
changing operations. The term dynamic semantics will be used to describe systems in 
which strings of sentential category are mapped onto a certain class of operations, and 
these operations act on the state of information of some agent to produce a new state. 
In general, the successful performance of an operation may require that certain 
preconditions are met. Open heart surgery requires a steady hand and a fair amount of 
equipment, and the operation of buttering toast also requires both a steady hand and a 
certain minimal set of ingredients. The central idea of the dynamic semantic approach 
to presupposition is that the operation of modifying an information state may require 
certain of the ingredients to be already present. For instance Oh no! I've dropped 
the knife.' may be understood as an operation to update a state which in some way 
determines a salient knife (the crucial ingredient) with the information that the object 
in question has been lost. This will lead to a formal model of presupposition which is 
intuitive in the sense that it accords closely with the everyday usage of the term as a 
proposition taken to be accepted in advance. The outline of the model runs as follows: 
. An information state is comparable to a partial model, with respect to which some 
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a first integrated dynamic model of presupposition and anaphora. In Heim's model of 
Presupposition information states are given an abstract formulation in terms of possible 
worlds. Information states can be thought of as mental representations, and much 
recent work on the dynamics of the interpretation process has concentrated on providing 
accounts of structured representations and how they are manipulated. Heim's model of 
interpretation was originally stated in this way, and Kamp's DRT [Kam81, KRe93], 
is another good example of this type of approach. Previously to the work of Heim 
and Kamp, linguistic context had typically been modelled as a set of parameters such 
as a speaker parameter, a hearer parameter, and/or a single world of evaluation. In 
a few accounts, principally those discussed in the last chapter, linguistic context had 
been given more structure, being defined as a set of propositions, and had been allowed 
to evolve in an interesting way in the course of a conversation. Both Heim's account 
and DRT, provide sophisticated notions, of linguistic context, as information states of 
agents, and such notions of context facilitate a type of treatment of presuppositions that 
might be termed anaphoric. In such a treatment, presupposition triggers may stand in 
a relation to previous linguistic material which is analogous to (or, according to van der 
Sandt, identical with) the relationship between an anaphoric pronoun and its antecedent. 
The last part of this chapter will be taken up with describing phenomena which motivate 
such an anaphoric account of presupposition, and showing how it may be realised in the 
frameworks set up by Heim and Kamp. 
5.1 From Projection to Satisfaction 
The second of Karttunen's two 1973 definitions of presupposition, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, involved a special contextual parameter for "a set of assumed facts", 
utterance presuppositions being calculated relative to such a set. However, it is not 
clear in this theory how the set of assumed facts and the set of (utterance) presupposi-
tions are to be understood, and what, from a philosophical perspective, is meant to be 
the relation between them. In [Kar74] Karttunen brilliantly resolved these difficulties, 
essentially by turning the projection problem, as then conceived, on its head. Instead 
of considering directly how the presuppositions of the parts of a sentence determine the 
presuppositions of the whole, he suggests we should first consider how the global context 
of utterance of a complex sentence determines the local linguistic context in which the 
parts of the sentence are interpreted, and derive from this a way of calculating which 
global contexts of utterance lead to local satisfaction of the presuppositions. He gives 
a formal definition of when a context satisfies-the-presuppositions-of - or admits - a 
formula. A simple sentence S will be admitted in a context cr (here written a S) if and 
only if the primitive presuppositions of S are satisfied in a. Here the logical form of a 
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sentence S is written in italics, S, a context is understood as a set of such logical forms, 
and the natural notion of contextual satisfaction is just classical entailment. When a 
complex sentence is evaluated in some context, however, presuppositions belonging to 
the parts of the sentence need not necessarily be satisfied in that context. For example, 
if a sentence S of the form S1 and S2' occurs in a context a, the conditions for S to be 
admitted in a are that Si  is admitted in a and 52  is admitted in a new context produced 
by adding the logical form of S1 to a. Note that essentially the same idea was indepen-
dently developed by Stalnaker, who comments [St73, p.455] in the case of conjunction: 
"If one asserts a proposition using a conjunctive sentence ... the presuppositions will 
change in the middle of the assertion. The first conjunct will be added to the initial pre-
suppositions before the second conjunct is asserted." In reading this quote it is perhaps 
illuminating to substitute information state for presuppositions, since Stalnaker's notion 
of presupposition is intended to capture something like the set of propositions assumed 
by the speaker to be in the common ground, and not any specific set of propositions 
attached to a sentence. Definition Dli, where the n-function is, as above, assumed to 
map a simple sentence to its presuppositions, collects Karttunen's admittance conditions 
for simple sentences and for the logical connectives: 
Definition Dli (Admittance in Karttunen 1974) 
 a 	S if a = ir(S) 	for any simple sentence S 
 aI 	not S if atS 
 a'S1 and S2  if aSi and aU{Si}S2  
 a F'ifS1 then S2  if a I> S1 and aU{Si} 	S2 
 a L S 	or S2  if a [> S and a U {not Si} I> S2  
Presupposition may be defined as follows: 
Definition D12 (Dynamic Presupposition) 
>>0 if Vaa a= 
The empirical motivation Karttunen presents for this theory is much the same as for 
his earlier theory. Let us consider an example: 
E109 If [A  Jane noticed that [B  Fido was hungry]], and [c she fed him], then [D  he'll be 
glad that she fed him]. 
1. The elementary presuppositions are given by ir(B) = n(C) = 0, ir(A) = B, and 
n(D) = C. 
Dynamic Semantics 
We want to know for which contexts a it is the case that a l' 'If A and C, then 
D'. From definition Dli, this will hold just in case: (i) a i' A, (ii) a U {A} L> C, 
and (iii) or U {A, C} r> D. 
From the first clause of Dli, and given that 7r (A) = B, we see that (i) only holds 
if a = B does. Since 7r(C) = 0, (ii) imposes no further constraint. And since 
7r (D) = C, (iii) will hold just in case a U {A, C} = C, which is trivial, so (iii) also 
imposes no constraint. 
So the example is admitted in any context which entails B. In other words E109 
presupposes that Fido was hungry (and all entailments of this sentence). 
This is similar to the result that would have obtained in the Karttunen '73 theories 
discussed earlier: the elementary presupposition in the antecedent of the conditional is 
projected, but the elementary presupposition in the consequent is effectively canceled. 
The "more or less" caveat is needed because whereas Karttunen as of 1974 would predict 
not only that B is presupposed, but also that all its entailments are presupposed, this 
is not the case with the [Kar73] models. This difference is revealing, for it shows that 
[Kar74] is not a filtering model at all, for the presuppositions of a, sentence are not 
in general a subset of the elementary presuppositions of its parts.' Furthermore, the 
difference is not just that entailments of presuppositions are predicted to be presupposed. 
More interestingly, we will see that there is a whole class of cases where Dli predicts a 
non-trivial presupposition which is not a member of the elementary presupposition set 
at all, when the earlier Karttunen model would predict no presupposition at all.2 Here 
is a summary of the presupposition projection properties arising from definitions Dli 
and D12: 
Fact F2 
If A presupposes B then: 
1. 'Not A', 'A and C', 'If A then C', 'A or C' all presuppose B. 
. 'C and A' and 'If C then A' both presuppose 'If C then A'. 
the condition that ir always mapped simple sentences onto logically closed sets of elementary 
presuppositions, the Karttunen '74 theory would of course also be a filtering theory. For that matter, 
so would the multivalent and partial accounts of Chapter 3. However, without this restriction, the 
Karttunen '74 model, and most of the accounts of Chapter 3 could not be described as filtering theories. 
One difference is that in filtering/cancellation accounts, tautologies will not normally be presupposed, 
whereas in all the accounts described formally in Chapter 3 and in Karttunen's '74 model, all tautolo-
gies are presupposed by every sentence. In Karttunen's '73 filtering account, a tautology will only be 
presupposed if it is an elementary presupposition of the leftmost subsentence. 
2A similar point concerning the difference between Karttunen's '73 and '74 models is made by Geurts 
in [Geu95]. 
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'C or A' presupposes 'Unless C then A' (i.e. 'If not C then A'). 
It can be seen that when a presupposition trigger is found on the right-hand side of 
a connective, a conditional presupposition results, although this conditional will not in 
general be one of the elementary presuppositions itself. Let us consider a concrete case 
where the predictions of the earlier and later Karttunen models vary (sticking to the 
earlier labelings for the subsentences) 
EllO If [B  Fido was hungry], ED  he'll be glad that [c  Jane fed him]] 
Let us make the assumption that B 	C. The first version of the '73 theory (that 
specified in D6) will simply predict projection of C, so that the sentence presupposes 
that Jane fed Fido. On the other hand, it can be seen from F2 that the '74 theory will 
predict a presupposition 'If B then C', i.e. that if Fido was hungry then Jane fed him. 
The second version of the '73 theory D7 presents an interesting halfway house: if the 
set of assumed facts associated with an utterance of the sentence entails 'If B then C' 
then there will be no presupposition, but otherwise C will be presupposed.3  
I have already discussed, in §3.3.3 and §4.8, structurally similar examples to EllO 
(conditionals with presupposition triggers in the consequent), and have argued in favour 
of If B then C'-type conditionalised presuppositions, which also arise in the Strong 
Kleene and Karttunen and Peters' systems. Of course, it is scarcely surprising that the 
Karttunen '74 and Karttunen and Peters' systems manifest the same behaviour, since 
the latter was developed from the former. Despite the Karttunen and Peters system 
being historically the more recent of the two, it is in a certain sense less radical than the 
Karttunen '74 theory, in that, from a technical perspective, the Karttunen and Peters' 
system is based on a multivalent but static semantics, whereas the Karttunen '74 system 
utilises a dynamic conception of the interpretation process. In Chapter 111 will discuss 
the insights (originally due to Peters, [Pe77]) which allowed a connection to be drawn 
between dynamic and multivalent systems. 
3Having observed that there are differences between the '73 and '74 theories, one might wonder what 
the relation between the models is. It is straightforward to formally define the Karttunen '74 notions of 
admittance and presupposition in terms of the '73 definition of utterance presupposition. I will write 'X 
73-presupposesF Y' if, on the Karttunen '73 model as defined in D7 in Chapter 4, Y is a presupposition 
of X relative to a set of assumed facts F. Then we have: 
a admits X if for any proposition Y such that X 73-presupposes, Y, or entails Y. 
X 74-presupposes Y if for any a, if there is no Z such that X 74-presupposes, Z, then a entails Y. 
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5.2 Context Change Potential 
Although Karttunen's 1974 model resolved the tension created by the simultaneous pres-
ence in his earlier work of distinct notions of assumption and utterance presupposition, 
it left unresolved one crucial issue: what is supposed to be the relationship between 
the definition of admittance for an expression and the semantics of that expression? 
Judging from the developments in Karttunen and Peters' later joint work, one might 
conclude that admittance conditions and semantics are separate and unrelated parts of 
a grammar, but some authors see this as a weakness of the theory. Gazdar [Gaz79b, pp. 
58-59], who does not distinguish between Karttunen's '73 and '74 accounts, caricatures 
Karttunen's justification for why presuppositions sometimes disappear as "Because those 
presuppositions have been filtered out by my filter conditions." Gazdar suggests that an 
explanatorily adequate model should not only stipulate filtering conditions, but provide 
independent motivation for why those conditions are as they are. Although it is diffi-
cult to give any definitive characterisation of exactly when a theory of presupposition is 
explanatorily adequate and Gazdar provides no such characterisation - it is at least 
clear that it would be desirable to justify a particular choice of filtering or admittance 
conditions. Heim [Hei83a] attempts to provide such a justification, and at the same time 
to clarify the relationship between admittance conditions and semantics. In particular, 
Heim provides a method of stating semantics, based on the approach developed in her 
earlier work [Hei82], in such a way that admittance conditions can be read off from 
the semantic definitions without having to be stipulated separately. Crucially, Heim's 
semantics involves a significant deviation from the classical Tarskian approach, in that 
rather than viewing meaning as a static relation holding between language and truth 
in the world, she takes the meaning of an expression to be a method of updating the 
information state of communicating agents. As will be seen in Chapter 7, Heim's claim 
of providing explanatory adequacy has proved difficult to establish, and a goal of this 
thesis is to bolster her position on the matter. 
Following Stalnaker [St79], Heim initially takes an information state, or context, to 
be a set of possible worlds, representing the set of alternative worlds compatible with an 
agent's knowledge. For a simple sentence, the admittance condition must be stipulated 
by the grammar, as in other approaches. Thus a simple sentence with a factive will be 
admitted in a context if and only if all the worlds in the context are worlds where the 
propositional complement of the factive is true. The Context Change Potential (CCP) 
of the sentence is a procedure for updating a context to provide a new context. In the 
case of a simple sentence 5, standard semantics must be taken to provide a set of worlds 
where S is true, call these the S-worlds. The CCP is an operation of intersection between 
the set of worlds in the old context, call it o, and the S-worlds, the result being denoted 
o+S. But this CCP should only be applied to a context in case the sentence is admitted 
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in that context, in which case the CCP will provide an update: 
Definition D13 (Admittance as Definedness of Update) 
0• + S is defined if t7 I> S 
In the case of simple, sentences, the admittance conditions must be defined by fiat, 
such that the sentence is only admitted in its local context if its presuppositions are 
satisfied in that context. Here the notion of satisfaction is different from that of Kart-
tunen, since the notion of context is different. A sentence S is satisfied in a Stalnakerian 
context just in case the context contains only S-worlds. The important innovation over 
Karttunen's approach is that for complex sentences the admittance conditions are not 
given directly, but are derived from the definitions of CCPs for complex sentences. She 
gives the following definitions of the CCPs for negative sentences and conditionals, where 
the slash denotes set subtraction: 
Definition D14 (Heimian Negation and Conditionals) 
o+ Not S = o\(o+S) 
r+IfAthenB = a\((o+A)\(o+A+B)) 
Thus to update a context with the negation of a sentence, find the result of updating 
with the sentence, and subtract the resulting set of worlds from the original context. 
To update with a conditional, find the set of worlds where the antecedent is true, take 
away those worlds where both the antecedent and consequent are true, and subtract the 
result from the original context. Admittance conditions are now definedness conditions 
on updating, so cr admits 'Not 5' just in case u\(a+S) is defined, which will be the case 
whenever u+S is defined. Thus the admittance conditions for S are identical to those for 
Not 5', just as in Karttunen's system above. Similarly, a context admits If A then B' 
just in case o+A and a+A+B are defined, so that o, must admit A, and o incremented 
with .A must admit B. Again, this yields the same admittance conditions as Karttunen 
gave. 
These CCPs for complex sentences are supposed to serve two purposes. Firstly, 
and as we just saw, they provide a means for predicting whether a complex sentence 
is admitted in a context in terms of admittance of the parts of the sentence in local 
contexts. Secondly, they provide an account of the new information conveyed by com-
plex sentences, encoding the normal truth conditional meaning in such a way that truth 
conditions can always be read off from a CCP.4 She says "I believe, without offering 
4Heim [Hei83a, p.118] provides the following definition for truth of a sentence in terms of its CCP: 
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justification here, that . . . a compositional assignment of CCPs to the sentences of a 
language can fully replace a compositional assignment of truth conditions of the sort 
normally envisaged by semanticists, without any loss of empirical coverage." As I indi-
cated in the introductory chapter, a principal goal of this thesis is to show in detail how 
such a compositional assignment of CCPs to the sentences of a language can be achieved, 
and to demonstrate not only that it can replace the classical paradigm of compositional 
assignment of truth conditions, but also that it can improve on the empirical coverage 
available in that paradigm. 
5.3 Quantification in the CCP model 
One of Heim's main claims in [Hei83a] is that the CCP model provides a way to deal 
with the presuppositions of open sentences - sentences which at LF might be expected 
to contain a free variable bound only externally to the sentence. Heim suggests that 
contexts should register not only factual information, information determining which 
world we are in, but also information about the values of variables. To achieve this she 
introduces the notion of a sequence, a mapping from indices (natural numbers) to the 
domain of individuals, and redefines contexts as sets of sequence-world pairs. Thus the 
CCP of a sentence 'Shei is happy', if she' is treated as a variable free in the sentence, 
becomes an intersective operation on this new type of context, mapping a set of world-
sequence pairs onto that subset containing only pairs (g, w) where the index i is mapped 
by the sequence g onto an individual that is happy in w. Heim then gives (essentially) 
the following CCP for universal sentences: 
Definition D15 (Heimian Universal) If g is an i-variant of g, differing only by 
mapping i to some a, an element of the domain of individuals V (it being assumed that 
V is constant across worlds), then: 
a+EveryA,B = {(g,w)EaVaEV,((g,w)ea+A—*(g,w)Ea+A+B)} 
Heim also places an additional requirement that i is a "new variable" in a, which 
she takes to mean that for any sequence-world pair (g, w) in a, and for any individual 
a, there is another sequence-world pair (g, w) in a. In other words, as far as a is 
concerned i could have any value at all in any world in the context.5 So, the definition 
"Suppose a is true (in w) and a admits S. Then S is true (in w) with respect to a if a+S is true (in w)." 
Adapting from her definition (18) which concerns contexts as sequence-world pairs rather than worlds, 
a context will be true in a world just in case the context contains that world. 
5Note that this requirement of i being unconstrained corresponds to what is enforced in semantics 
for programming languages by the operation of random assignment. In the recent spate of work on 
dynamic semantics initiated by [GS91a}, the requirement is normally made explicit in the semantics of 
the quantifier. 
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says that the update of a context a with a sentence Every, A, A is the set of sequence-
world pairs (g, w) in a such that all the i-variants of g that survive update with the 
restrictor also survive sequential update with the restrictor and then the scope. To 
what admittance conditions does this definition lead? The conditions are parallel with 
those for conditionals: the restrictor (A) must be admitted in the input context, and 
the scope (B) must be admitted in the context formed by updating the input context 
with the scope. Suppose A contains a presupposition that is itself free in the quantified 
variable, as in the following example from [Hei83a]: 
Elli Everyonei who serves his king will be rewarded 
On the relevant reading, the phrase his king' is understood to mean the king of 
the individual xi's country, and the presupposition is thus that xi has a king. The 
restrictor will be admitted in an input context a only if the proposition that xi has 
a king is satisfied in that context. But for that to be the case, it must be that every 
value onto which index i is mapped in a, by assumption every individual in the domain, 
must be established to have a king in a. Heim predicts (contra, for example, Karttunen 
and Peters [KP79], and contra the empirical survey in [Bea94a]) that in general bound 
presuppositions in a quantificational sentence become universal presuppositions of the 
whole sentence, and, in particular, that 5.3 presupposes that everybody has a king.6 
The problem seems more serious in connection with the treatment of indefinites. 
Witness the presuppositions assigned to the following example, again from [Hei83a]: 
E112 A fat man was pushing his bicycle. 
Heim, in common with Kamp [Kam81], assumes that indefinites carry no quantifi-
cational force of their own, but merely mark that their index represents a new variable. 
Taking i as the indefinite's index, updating a context a with E112 consists in firstly 
adding that xi is a horizontally challenged adult male to form an intermediary context 
a', and then updating with 'xi was pushing x% 's bike.' But this latter sentence is assumed 
only to be admitted in contexts which satisfy 'xi has a bike', so that in order for update 
to continue, every sequence-world pair in a' must map x2 onto a bike owner. Since in 
a' there are valuations mapping x2 onto each individual in each world such that the 
individual is a fat man in that world, the whole sentence is predicted to presuppose 
that every fat man owns a bicycle. This, of course, conflicts with intuition.7 In Chap-
ter 9 a solution to the problem of universal presuppositions from existential sentences, 
6 A Heim points out, a mechanism of local accommodation (to which we will turn shortly) could 
make these predictions no more than a default. 
7Heim does suggest a possible line of solution, utilising the mechanism of local accommodation to 
be discussed in the following chapter. To jump ahead, the solution involves locally accommodating 
the presupposition within the scope of the existential. I refer the reader to Soames discussion [So89, 
pp.559-600] where it is shown that Heim's solution is not without problems of its own. 
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and a more generally adequate treatment of presuppositions of open sentences, will be 
presented.8  
5.4 Projection from Propositional Complements 
Dli omits Karttunen's 1974 account of how presuppositions triggered within proposi-
tional complements are projected. Karttunen divides lexical items taking a propositional 
complement into three classes: verbs of saying (e.g. say, announce), verbs of proposi-
tional attitude (e.g. believe, want), and others. The 'others' class includes various 
presupposition triggers, such as factive verbs, as well as an assortment of predicates 
which Karttunen takes to be holes, such as modals and internal negation. On Kart-
tunen's account, the simplest cases are the first and the third: presuppositions triggered 
within the complement of a verb of saying do not impose any constraint on the context 
of utterance, whilst for members of the third class all presuppositions triggered within 
the complement must be satisfied. Thus John says that the king of France is bald' should 
be acceptable in any context, and John knows that the king of France is bald' should 
only be acceptable in contexts where there is a (unique) king of France. For a sentence 
with propositional attitude verb as matrix, Karttunen argues that it is the beliefs of 
the subject of the sentence which are crucial: for a context or to admit the sentence, 
the beliefs of the subject in that context must satisfy all the presuppositions of the 
propositional complement. So John hopes that the king of France is bald' should only be 
admitted in contexts where it is satisfied that John believes there to be a king of France. 
In favour of this analysis is the fact that for instance the discourse Although France is 
not a monarchy, John believes that there is a reigning French king. He hopes that the King 
of France is bald', although contrived, is felicitous. 
Assuming that neither verbs of saying nor verbs of propositional attitude induce any 
new presuppositions, and omitting members of the other class apart from factives, the 
following are essentially Karttunen's acceptability conditions: 
8The particular problem of universal presuppositions from existential sentences does not occur in 
some other recent dynamic systems, such as those of Chierchia [Ch:MS], van Eijck [Ei93, E194, Ei95] 
and Kralmer [Krah93, Krah94, Krah:MS], or in my own earlier [Bea92]. I regret that I have been unable 
to include a full discussion of these proposals. 
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Definition D16 (Karttunen '74 Attitudes) 
saying-verb(x, S) 
cr I:> attitude-verb(x, S) 	if { 0 I o = believes(x, q)} L' S 
I> factive-verb(x, S) if o = S 
For dynamic semantics of attitude verbs embodying such admittance conditions, the 
reader might consult Heim's [Hei92]. Note, however, that the semantics presented there 
involves essentially a stipulation of Karttunesque admittance conditions within the dèf-
initions of the context change potentials associated with attitude verbs. It is not the 
case that Heim claims motivation of these admittance conditions independently of pre-
suppositional phenomena, through any 'deep' understanding of the concepts associated 
with such verbs. Zeevat [Ze92], however, does give a dynamic semantics for believe' in 
which Karttunen type admittance conditions arise quite naturally. 
5.5 Anaphoricity 
Over the last decade a number of authors, most notably van der Sandt [vdS89, vdS92] 
and Kripke [Krip:MS] (which unfortunately remains unpublished), have argued that 
there is a tight connection between presupposition and anaphora. Van der Sandt has 
pointed out that for every example of what might be called discrepant anaphora, by 
which I mean those cases where the anaphoric link is not naturally treated using stan-
dard binary quantifiers to interpret determiners and bound variables for pronouns, par-
allel cases of discrepant presupposition can be found. In the following four triples, the 
(a) examples exemplify discourse anaphora, donkey anaphora, bathroom sentences and 
modal subordination, respectively. In each case, a corresponding example is given, as 
(b), in which a presupposition is triggered (by the adverb 'still') in the same structural 
position as the anaphor occurred, but in which this presupposition is satisfied.9 The 
'Although I have defined formal notions of presupposition satisfaction, I have not said what it means 
as a description of a text to say that in the text a certain (elementary) presupposition is satisfied. In-
deed, such terminology is commonplace in recent presupposition literature, but I do not know of any 
pre-theoretic analysis of satisfaction. Perhaps a direct test for satisfaction could be developed. To start 
the ball rolling, I propose the following method of determining whether an elementary presupposition 
P in a text segment T uttered in a context C is satisfied (where the presence of an elementary presup-
position must be determined by standard embedding tests applied to the clause containing the putative 
elementary presupposition): 
If the dialogue consisting of 
I don't know whether P 
I see. Well, T 
is felicitous in context C, then the elementary presupposition P is satis-
fied in the text T in this context. 
For example, set T = 'If Mary is vigilant, then she knows that someone ate a biscuit', and P = 'A biscuit 
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third member, (c), completes the circle, showing that the argument of the presupposition 
trigger can itself be pronominalised with no change of meaning. 
	
E113 a. 	A farmer owns a donkey. He beats it. 
b. 	Wanda used to beat Pedro. She still beats him. 
C. 	Wanda used to beat Pedro. She still does. 
E114 a. 	If a farmer owns a donkey then he beats it. [Geach] 
b. 	If Wanda used to beat Pedro then she still beats him. 
C. 	If Wanda used to beat Pedro then she still does. 
E115 a. 	Either there is no bathroom in this house or it's in a funny place. [Partee] 
b. 	Either Wanda never beat Pedro, or she still beats him. 
C. 	Either Wanda never beat Pedro, or she still does. 
E116 a. 	A wolf might come to the door. It might eat you. 
b. 	Perhaps Wanda used to beat Pedro, and perhaps she still beats him. 
C. 	Perhaps Wanda used to beat Pedro, and perhaps she still does. 
The parallel is compelling, and furthermore similar examples are easily constructed 
involving all standard presupposition types. But evidence for the anaphoricity of pre-
suppositions goes beyond cases, like those above, where the presupposition is satisfied 
because it is in some sense anaphoric on a textual antecedent. The reverse of the coin 
is that, for at least some types of presupposition trigger, if a textual antecedent is not 
present the presupposition cannot be satisfied. Kripke observes that a common analysis 
of 'too' would make the presupposition of sentence E117, below, the proposition that 
somebody other than Sam is having supper in New York tonight. However, this propo-
sition seems uncontroversial, so the standard account provides no explanation of why 
the sentence, uttered in isolation, is infelicitous. 
was eaten'. I find it hard to imagine a context in which the following dialogue would be felicitous: 
I don't know whether a biscuit was eaten. 
I see. Well, if Mary is vigilant, then she 
knows that someone ate a biscuit. 
On the other hand set T = If John ate a biscuit, then Mary knows that someone did', and P = 'A biscuit 
was eaten'. The dialogue 
I don't know whether a biscuit was eaten. 
I see. Well, if John ate a biscuit, then Mary 
knows that someone did. 
is, if still rather strained, more acceptable than the previous one, especially if B's reply is followed by 
'Perhaps she can help you.' Similarly, applying the test to the (c) example in E113 we obtain a felicitous 
text, and so conclude that the presupposition is satisfied: 
I don't know whether Wanda beats Pedro. 
I see. Well, Wanda used to beat Pedro. She 
still does. 
I leave it to the reader to apply the test to the remaining (b) and (c) examples. 
Dynamic Semantics 	 95 
E117 Tonight Sam is having supper in New York, too. [Krip:MS] 
Notably, E117 is felicitous when it follows a sentence saying of somebody other than 
Sam that he is having dinner in New York tonight, e.g. Saul is having dinner in New 
York tonight...'. It might be argued that E117 places a requirement on its local context 
that there is a salient having-supper-in-NY-tonight event. Although one could imagine 
introducing event discourse markers, and some ontology of events, into the framework we 
have sketched so far, less effort will be required if we restrict ourselves to an alternative 
suggestion in [Hei90]. This is the hypothesis that E117 is felicitous in contexts where 
there is a discourse entity of which it is locally satisfied that the entity is having supper 
in New York tonight.'° Adapting from Heim somewhat, we might give the following 
sketch of an admittance condition for a sentence of the form 'S too', where the word 
'too' is assumed to be co-indexed with some focussed NP11: 
Definition D17 (Heimian 'too') 
o 	' S too2 if c 	5, and there is some index j such that S[i/j] is satisfied in o 
(where S [i/i] represents the sentence S with all instances of NPs 
indexed i replaced by x) 
E117 would be indexed 'Tonight Sam2 is having supper in New York, too2 ', and would 
only be admitted in contexts where for some j, 'Tonight x3 is having supper in New York' 
was satisfied. 12  We would thus expect E117 only to be admitted in a restricted range of 
contexts, but 'If Saul is having supper in New York tonight, then Sam is having supper in 
New York, too.' to carry no presupposition at alL13  
10To back up the suggestion that the presence of a discourse marker is essential to the felicity of 'too', 
observe that of the following two discourses (adapted from a well known pronominalisation example due 
to Partee) A is odd, but B is felicitous. 
I have ten marbles and you have one. Only nine of mine are transparent. Your marble is opaque too. 
I have ten marbles and you have one. One of mine is not transparent. Your marble is opaque too. 
11Kripke does not limit his consideration to cases where an NP is in focus, and, of course, a fuller 
analysis than that given here would allow non-NPs to be focussed constituents as well. 
121n order for definition D17 fully to meet Kripke's objections, an additional constraint on Heimian 
contexts would be required, roughly that they contain only information introduced in the immediately 
previous discourse. Otherwise an instance of 'too' might be predicted to be satisfied by material that 
was not introduced in the preceding text. 
13Kripke makes the provocative claim that the presupposition of a discourse like 'If Herb comes to the 
party the boss will come too' is that Herb and the boss are distinct individuals. This is interesting, and 
perhaps it is right in the pragmatic sense of presupposition, in as much as it would be usual for the 
speaker to be assuming distinctness. But I do not think that this is a presupposition which is conven-
tionally associated with 'too', and I am not sure it is helpful to call it a presupposition at all. Consider 
firstly the following dialogue segment: 
If Clark is at the party then is Lois in Washington? 
No. If Clark is at the party then Lois is in New York too. 
Dynamic Semantics 	 96 
For which presupposition triggers is an anaphoric analysis appropriate? Van der 
Sandt gives a straightforward answer: all presupposition triggers are anaphors. Perhaps 
it can be imagined how analyses like that for 'too' above could be given for other 
presupposition types. For instance, to make factives anaphoric, one might introduce 
discourse markers for propositions and facts, a development which would anyway be 
essential to treat propositional anaphora within texts (c.f. [As93]). One could then 
make acceptability of a factive verb with propositional complement 0 conditional on 
the presence of a factual discourse marker (perhaps a discourse marker identifying a 
proposition satisfied in the local context) with interpretation related to , in some yet to 
be specified manner. The addition of discourse markers for uttered propositions would 
yield a fine grained notion of information. An information state would record in much 
greater detail exactly what statements had been used to update it than is found in the 
dynamic systems discussed above. For instance, Stalnaker's notion of an information 
state as a set of worlds can only distinguish between asserted statements up to classical 
equivalence, and Heimian contexts go only a little further. Van der Sandt's approach 
to providing an anaphoric account of presupposition does not, however, involve refining 
Stalnaker's sets of worlds or Heim's contexts. Instead van der Sandt utilises a rather 
different sort of dynamic system, Kamp's DRT [Kam8l, KRe93], with which I will 
assume the reader's familiarity. 
Van der Sandt is not the only one to have provided an account of presupposition 
in DRT, but his is the most developed account, and others, such as Kamp and Ross-
deutscher's [KRo94, Ros94] are closely related. Accordingly, when discussing the rele-
vance of the dynamics of DRT interpretation to presupposition, I will concentrate on 
In the B sentence, the antecedent of the conditional acts as an anaphoric antecedent for the presupposi-
tion in the consequent, and we arrive at a presupposition to the effect that if Clark is at the party then 
Clark is in New York. And indeed, there does seem to be an assumption associated with the sentence 
that Clark, and hence the party, is in New York. This presupposition can be removed by adding extra 
information to the antecedent, as in 'If the party is in New York and Clark is at the party, then Lois is in 
New York too.', but it cannot be canceled simply by adding contradictory information. The following 
dialogue segment is infelicitous if it occurs discourse initially (when there is no other possible antecedent 
for the 'too'): 
If Clark is at the party then is Lois in Washington? 
? No. If Clark is at the party then Lois is in New York too, although the party is in Seattle. 
However, the claimed distinctness presupposition behaves differently, and can be canceled simply by 
denying its truth later. The following discourse is felicitous: 
I never see Clark Kent and Superman together, so if Clark Kent is at the party, then Superman isn't. 
If Clark is at the party, then Superman is definitely there too, since Clark is Superman! 
I would favour a Gricean explanation of the distinctness implication, whereby each clause of a sentence 
or discourse is normally required to be informative. A sentence X Ys too' will only be informative if 
in its local context X is not established to Y. But if the presupposition that some salient entity Ys is 
satisfied by X itself, then clearly 'X Ys too' does not add any new information to that context. Note that 
on this basis van der Sandt's DRT-based theory, which incorporates such an informativeness constraint 
as a condition on DRS well-formedness, could account for Kripke's distinctness effect without any need 
to specify distinctness in the lexical entry for 'too'. 
Dynamic Semantics 	 97 
van der Sandt's account. Note that in this chapter I will only be discussing the part 
of van der Sandt's account which takes advantage of the inherent dynamism of stan-
dard DRT, and it is only in the next chapter that I will discuss the considerable further 
developments that van der Sandt has made in the form of a theory of accommodation. 
Discourse Representation Structures provide a very fine grained notion of informa-
tion state, one which is ideal for an anaphoric account of presupposition, since so much 
of the original surface structure of utterances is recorded. But crucially, although van 
der Sandt's model operates under the motto presupposition is anaphora, it does not 
treat presuppositions as anaphors in the strict sense of requiring a textual antecedent. 
Rather, van der Sandt claims that a presupposition trigger is anaphoric at the level of 
discourse representation. The heart of the theory involves a structural relation between 
the position at which a presupposition trigger is represented in a DRS, and the point 
at which its antecedent is represented. The antecedent must, be represented somewhere 
along the anaphoric accessibility path from the representation of the trigger, this condi-
tion being exactly the same requirement as is placed on anaphoric pronouns and their 
antecedents in standard DRT. The treatment of E118 should illustrate. 
E118 Fred is escaping, but Mary doesn't realise that somebody is escaping. 
Initially a DRS like the following, in which the presence of a presupposition is indi-






realises(m, 	 ) 
escaping(y) 
The global DRS is accessible from within the negation. The marker x can be resolved 
with the marker f, and in this case both the universe of the presupposition (now f) is 
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accessible in the global universe, and the condition in the presupposition is accessible 
as a global condition. Thus the presupposition has an antecedent. The double-lined 
presupposition box, which plays no further role in DRS construction, and does not 
enter into the model theoretic interpretation of the completed DRS structure, is simply 






Note that it would make little difference to the treatment of E118 if the word 'some-
body' had been replaced by 'he'. Van der Sandt thus provides an interesting twist to 
the DRT treatment of noun phrase semantics, since in his extended DRT an indefi-
nite can (when embedded in a presuppositional environment) behave to some extent 
anaphorically. 
This model of presupposition resolution, as will be seen shortly, is just one part of 
van der Sandt's theory of presupposition. Let us explore the relation between van der 
Sandt's resolution model and the other dynamic theories considered in this section, a job 
done much more thoroughly by Zeevat [Ze92]. The dynamics of van der Sandt's model is 
not stated in terms of update functions as in Heim's work. Although some effort has been 
devoted to providing a more declarative statement of the model (see [vdS92, SG91]), 
it remains explicitly procedural. For instance, it is important that the anaphors and 
presuppositions of a sentence are dealt with only after processing of previous discourse 
is complete. The dynamics can be said to reside in at least three aspects of the theory: 
the (extended) DRS construction algorithm, the standardly dynamic DRT semantics of 
implication and quantifiers, and the statement of anaphoric accessibility conditions. 
The notion of accessibility is implicitly directional, in that it is invariably defined 
using an anti-symmetric relation, and reflects Karttunen's conditions on context incre-
mentation. We might restate accessibility conditions in a way that brings this out. Say 
that a DRS a is a pair (ao, al), with ao a set of discourse markers and al a set of condi-
tions. Define var(a) as the set of markers mentioned in the conditions a, and take the 
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context o of any sub-DRS to be a set of discourse markers: this should be thought of as 
the set of markers external to a DRS which are accessible from within it. The markers 
of a DRS a in a context a are completely accessible, written a >- a, if var(a) E a0 U a. 
Then the following two rules state whether the variables in the sub-DRSs of negations 
and implications are accessible: 
a>- a-4/3 if a>-a and aUa0 >-/3 
a>- -'a if a>- a 
These rules, which must be extended to allow for van der Sandt's notion of acces-
sibility of DRS conditions as well as DRS markers, are obviously close to Karttunen's 
admissibility conditions, as given above (definition Dli). Differences arise with conjunc-
tion and disjunction, however. Regarding disjunction, it is fair to say that Karttunen's, 
Heim's and van der Sandt's theories all have problems. The problems with Karttunen 
and Heim's account are analogous to those facing multivalent accounts of presupposition 
- see the discussion in Chapter 3. The difficulties with disjunction in van der Sandt's 
model will be discussed in the following chapter, after the main component of van der 
Sandt's theory, the accommodation mechanism, has been introduced. The absence of 
any conjunction operation between DRSs in standard DRT makes comparison on this 
count difficult, but at least in the case of sentence sequencing, the fact that sentences 
are processed in a definite order will have the effect that the context of one sentence 
includes information from previous sentences, which is just what is given in Karttunen's 
admittance rule for conjunction (again in Dli). In other cases there will be a difference 
in predictions. Van der Sandt's model, unlike the Karttunen or Heim theories, does not 
seem to predict any difference in acceptability between the following two examples: 
E119 If John has children and John's children are at home, he's elsewhere. 
E120? If John's children are at home and John has children, he's elsewhere. 
To deal with this in van der Sandt's theory, one would presumably have to replace 
the set of conditions in a DRS with a sequence of conditions, and make one condition 
accessible from another within the same DRS only if the first preceded the second in 
the sequence. To make such an adjustment, of course, would increase even further the 
similarity between van der Sandt's model and the other dynamic accounts which have 
been discussed. 
Anaphoricity is generally understood as a structural relation, whether the structures 
involved are texts, syntactic trees, or DRSs. But it must be pointed out that whilst such 
structures place some constraints on which items can stand in the relation, it would be 
wrong to suppose that this was the end of the story. The following examples all concern 
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counterfactual conditionals, although I think the points I will make could be addressed 
to any intensional predicate which creates a local context that might be inconsistent 
with the global context: 
E121 Mary owns a donkey. If she had been a farmer, she would have beaten it. 
Mary owns a donkey. If she had not owned any animals, she would have beaten it. 
Mary owns a donkey. If she had owned a mule instead, John would have owned a 
donkey too. 
The first of these, E121, shows that in principle a pronoun in the consequent of a 
counterfactual conditional can stand in an anaphoric relation to an object introduced 
outside of the conditional. In DRT terms, one would have to say that the global DRS 
is accessible from the consequent DRS of a counterfactual conditional just as it is from 
the consequent box of a non-counterfactual conditional. But E122, which I take to 
be infelicitous, shows that one cannot arbitrarily resolve pronouns in the consequent 
of a counterfactual to relevant objects in the global box. There seems to be some 
extra non-structural condition: perhaps, given an appropriate theory of the semantics 
of counterfactual conditionals, one could say that not only must the antecedent to a 
pronoun be on the accessibility path, it must also correspond to an object which exists 
(in an intuitive sense which I will not attempt to clarify) in the local DRS. But in 
stating such a constraint, we would be complicating our notion of anaphoricity, placing 
semantic preconditions on when an anaphoric link could hold. In other words, we 
would be providing pronouns, the paragons of anaphoricity, with something like semantic 
presuppositions. 14  Similarly, in E123 it seems that regarding the structural relationship 
between 'Mary owns a donkey' and 'owned a donkey too', anaphora should be licensed. 
Van der Sandt's model, as it now stands, would certainly predict simple resolution of the 
presupposition. But this is clearly wrong. E123 is infelicitous, and this shows us that 
conceiving of the anaphoricity of 'too' purely structurally, whilst a good approximation 
in many cases, does not work in general. It is at least arguable that the Heim-style 'too' 
given above, which involves semantic constraints on the local context, should fare better 
in such cases, but such a claim remains vacuous in the absence of a CCP semantics for 
counterfactual conditionals. Heim actually discusses such a semantics in [Hei92], but I 
will not attempt to combine it with the above analysis of 'too' here. 
14 Gender and number requirements can also be seen as semantic presuppositions, but there is at 




"...ordinary conversation does not always proceed in the ideal orderly fash-
ion described earlier. People do make leaps and short cuts by using sentences 
whose presuppositions are not satisfied in the conversational context.. . . But 
I think we can maintain that a sentence is always taken to be an increment 
to a context that satisfies its presuppositions. If the current conversational 
context does not suffice, the listener is entitled and expected to extend it as 
required. He must determine for himself what context he is supposed to be 
in on the basis of what is said and, if he is willing to go along with it, make 
the same tacit extension that his interlocutor appears to have made." [Kar74, 
P. 191] 
The process Karttunen here describes, whereby a "tacit extension" is made to the 
discourse context to allow for update with otherwise unfulfilled presuppositions, is what 
Lewis later called accommodation [Le79] 1  Theories which utilise a mechanism of ac-
commodation, are not classical static theories of meaning, but rather theories about the 
dynamics of the interpretation process. Yet theories of accommodation could reasonably 
be said to involve a dynamic pragmatics, in that accommodation is not usually thought 
of in compositional terms, but as an extra process operating in addition to the normal 
composition of meanings. 
In this chapter I will describe the contributions of Heim and van der Sandt to the 
theory of accommodation, and will detail van der Sandt's recent theory of presupposition 
and accommodation in DRT, this being by far the most comprehensive and fully specified 
1Stalnaker [St72, p. 398] expresses similar sentiments to those in the above Karttunen quotation, 
commenting that presuppositions "need not be true", and that in some cases a "Minor revision might 
bring our debate in line with new presuppositions." Interestingly, in the same paragraph Stalnaker 
talks of certain things being "accommodated" in the light of new presuppositions, although what he is 
describing here is not how we change our assumptions (the Lewisian notion of "accommodation"), but 
how after we have changed our assumptions we may reinterpret earlier observations. 
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current theory of presuppositional accommodation. A large part of the chapter will be 
taken up with discussion of van der Sandt's model, with a number of sections devoted 
to its empirical inadequacies, but also some discussion of the strengths it has above 
competing theories of presupposition. In the penultimate section of this chapter I will 
attempt some synthesis of different approaches to presupposition, showing that a wide 
range of superficially quite different theories of presupposition can be recast in terms 
of accommodation. Finally, I will briefly comment on the relevance of Langendoen and 
Savin's notion of projection to an accommodational theory of presupposition. 
6.1 Helm and van der Sandt 
Two questions are central to understanding the characteristics an accommodation-based 
theory of presupposition might have: 
Given that the interpretation of a discourse involves not one linguistic context, but 
a series of contexts corresponding to different parts of the interpretation process 
and different parts of the discourse's meaning, in which context should accommo-
dation occur? 
Given some decision as to the context in which accommodation occurs, exactly 
how should a hearer determine what the new context is supposed to be? 
Heim, in [Hei83a], was the first author to recognise the significance of the first ques-
tion, noting that quite different effects could result according to which point in the 
interpretation of a sentence accommodation occurs. In the Heim/Karttunen account 
one can distinguish two types of context. There is the global context which represents 
the information agents have after complete interpretation of some sequence of sentences 
of text, but there are also local contexts, the contexts against which sub-parts of a 
sentence are evaluated. 
Under definition D14 above, updating a context o with a conditional 'If A then B' will 
involve local contexts o+A and u+A+B (to be read left-associatively) which are involved 
during the calculation of the update. Suppose that B contains some presupposition which 
is unsatisfied in the context u+A, so that o does not admit the conditional. In that case 
accommodation must occur, adjusting one of the contexts involved in the calculation so 
that A is admitted in its local context of evaluation. This might take the form of adding 
some sentence P directly to the local context in which B is to be evaluated, so that the 
final result of updating with the context would not be a\ (a + A \ (a + A + B)), but 
o\(a + A \ (a- + A + P + B)): this would be called local accommodation. On the other 
hand, an agent might backtrack right back to the initial context, add a sentence Q to the 
global context, and then start the update again. This is termed global accommodation, 
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and the result of updating would be a + Q \ ((a + Q + A \ (a + Q + A + B)). There is 
at least one other possibility. The agent might just backtrack as far as the evaluation of 
the antecedent, and add some extra information, say a proposition R, into the context in 
which the antecedent is evaluated, producing a result like a\(a+ R+A \(a+ R+A+ B)). 
Since this last option involves accommodation into a context intermediate between the 
global context and the context in which the problematic presuppositional construction is 
actually evaluated, it can be termed intermediate accommodation. Clearly the Heimian 
view on accommodation is highly procedural, and the exact options which are available 
for accommodation will be dependent on the details of how updating actually occurs, 
such processing details not being fully specified by the CCP alone. 
The Heimian answer to question (1), then, is that accommodation might take place 
at any time during the interpretation process such as to ensure later local satisfaction 
of presuppositions. Put another way, accommodation might potentially take place in 
any of the discourse contexts used in the calculation of a sentence's CCP. Unfortunately, 
Heim has given no indication of how question (2) should be answered.2 The first theory 
of accommodation which provides a fully explicit answer to both questions is that of van 
der Sandt [vdS92], and having described one part of that theory in the previous section, 
I will now present the theory in full. As mentioned, in van der Sandt's theory Heimian 
contexts are replaced by explicit discourse representations. Consequently, whereas for 
Heim accommodation must consist in augmenting a set of world-sequence pairs, van 
der Sandtian accommodation is simply addition of discourse referents and conditions to 
a DRS. This difference could be minimised if the CCP model were presented in terms 
of Heimian filecards (c.f. [Hei82., Hei83b]), so that accommodation would consist of 
either creating new filecards, or adding conditions to existing ones. Regarding question 
(1), van der Sandt's theory shares the flexibility of Heim's. If a presupposition lacks 
an antecedent in a DRS, van der Sandt allows accommodation to take place in any 
discourse context that is accessible from the site of the trigger. Thus once again we can 
talk of local accommodation, meaning accommodation in the DRS where the trigger is 
represented, global accommodation meaning addition of material in the global DRS, and 
'Witness the following quote from [Hei83a]: "Suppose [a sentence] S is uttered in a context a which 
doesn't admit it.. . . simply amend the context a to a richer context a', one which admits S and is 
otherwise like a, and then proceed to compute a' [updated with] S instead of a [updated with ] S." 
Here she does not specify the relation between a and a', except to say that a' is richer than a, and 
strong enough to admit S. Her later comparison with Gazdar's theory, a comparison to which we will 
turn shortly, does seem to suggest that she considers accommodation to consist in adding exactly the 
proposition that Gazdar would have labeled the potential presupposition, but, as Heim (p.c.) has pointed 
out, she nowhere says this explicitly. It seems I was mistaken in assuming, in an earlier version of this 
work [Bea93b], that Helm was committed to a structural account of accommodation, a term which will be 
explained shortly. Zeevat [Ze92] has also assumed that Heimian accommodation consists in adding the 
proposition signalled as presupposed by the trigger. On the other hand, Geurts [Geu95] supposes that 
the most natural explicitation of Heim's theory would involve accommodation of the logically weakest 
proposition needed to guarantee local satisfaction. 
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intermediate accommodation meaning addition of material in any DRS intermediate on 
the accessibility path between the global DRS and the site of the trigger. 
Van der Sandt's answer to question (2), the question of what is accommodated, 
is as simple as it could be: if a trigger has an antecedentless presupposition, then 
accommodation essentially consists of transferring the discourse markers and conditions 
of the presupposition from the trigger site to the accommodation site. An example 
will demonstrate the power of the accommodation mechanism. At the same time, the 
example should illustrate an analogy that might be drawn between van der Sandt's 
theory and a transformational account of syntax, with van der Sandt's equivalent of 
move-cr being an operation on DRSs. 
E124 If Mary chose the Chateau Neuf, then she realises it's a good wine. 
Assuming, just so that we can concentrate on the treatment of the factive 'realises', that 
'Mary' and 'the Chateau Neuf' and 'it' are simply represented as discourse markers, we 





realises(m, 	 ) good-wine(c) 
To produce a DRS in which there is no antecedentless presupposition, a transforma-
tion must take place whereby a, the presupposition [good-wine(c)]3, is moved to one 
of the three sites accessible from the site of the trigger, producing the following three 
representations: 
Global Accommodation (Gloss: 'CN is good, and if Mary orders it then she realises 
it's good.') 
3When giving DRSs in the running text, I use a linear notation, whereby [a,bJ [p(a,b),q(a)J represents 
a DRS which introduces markers a and b, and has conditions p(a,b) and q(a). 





Intermediate Accommodation (Gloss:'if CN is good and Mary orders it, then she 












realises(m, 	 ) good-wine(c) 
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Given all these forms of accommodation, and, in van der Sandt's theory, addi-
tional options when resolution is possible, how are we to decide which treatment is 
preferred? Heim offered only one heuristic: "I suggest that the global option is strongly 
preferred, but the local option is also available in certain circumstances that make it 
unavoidable." [Hei83a, p.120] Van der Sandt provides much more detail. He offers a 
number of constraints that any solution must obey, and also suggests a group of prefer-
ences between alternative solutions that satisfy those constraints, including a preference 
for global over local accommodation.4 The following versions of the preferences and 
constraints are at some points revised, but I think capture van der Sandt's intentions5: 
41n earlier versions of van der Sandt's theory the preferences between solutions were stated less 
explicitly, as side effects of a general algorithm for treating presuppositions. This algorithm, which 
he termed the "anaphoric loop" consisted of the following steps: on encountering a presupposition, 
firstly check each DRS along the accessibility path from the trigger, moving successively outwards, and 
attempting to resolve the presupposition, and if after reaching the top box no resolution site has been 
found, check each box in the reverse direction (i.e. from the top box to the trigger site) attempting to 
accommodate. Thus resolution is attempted first, and only if that fails is accommodation attempted. 
51n particular, the presentation of constraints here differs considerably from, for instance, the pre-
sentation in [vdS92]. Firstly van der Sandt gives two consistency constraints, but these should both be 
subsumed under the one constraint given here. Secondly, van der Sandt's formulations of informativity 
and consistency constraints seem to involve a notion of local entailment of sub-DRSs, although I am 
not aware of such a notion ever having been formalised. Thus his equivalent of my local informativity 
(given as (iii)a on p.167) is "Resolving [a DRS] K0 to [produce a new DRS] K' does not give rise to 
a structure in which . . . some subordinate DRS is entailed by the DRSs which are superordinate to it". 
Whilst he does not formalise what it is for a DRS to be entailed by the DRSs which are superordinate to 
it, the formalisation of local informativity given here, in terms of the standard notion of DRS embedding 
and a simple syntactic operation on DRSs, hopefully ties up that loose end, and is in the spirit of the 
definitions used in van der Sandt's formalisation of the notion of acceptability in his earlier non-DRT 
work. 
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Definition D18 (Absolute Constraints on van der Sandtian Solutions) 
Trapping. If a presupposition containing a discourse marker d is triggered in an 
environment where d is bound, the presupposition will be resolved or accommodated 
at a site from where the relevant binding occurrence of d is accessible. 
Global Informativity. If some DRS K is incremented with information from a new 
sentence, such that after solution of all presuppositions the new DRS is K', then 
KK' 
Local Informativity. No sub-DRS is redundant. Formally, if K is the complete 
DRS structure and K' is an arbitrarily deeply embedded sub-DRS, K' is redundant 
if and only ifVM,f (M,f = K -* M,f = K[K'/T]). Here K[K'/T] is a DRS 
like K except for having the instance of K' replaced by an instance of an empty 
DRS, and = denotes the DRT notion of embedding. 
Consistency. No sub-DRS is inconsistent. Formally, if K is the complete DRS 
structure and K' is an arbitrarily deeply embedded sub-DRS, K' is locally incon-
sistent if and only if VM, f (M,  f = K -p M, f = K[K'/±]). Here K[K'/±] is 
a DRS like K except for having the instance of K' replaced by an instance of an 
inconsistent DRS. 
Definition D19 (Preferences Between van der Sandtian Solutions) 
Resolution is preferred to accommodation. 
One resolution is preferred to another if the first is more local (i.e. closer to the 
site of the trigger). 
One accommodation is preferred to another if the first is more global (i.e. further 
from the site of the trigger). 
I will illustrate these constraints with some examples. Firstly, trapping: 
E125 Nobody regrets leaving school. 









The presupposition cannot be accommodated globally because the discourse marker 
x would become unbound. The next most preferred accommodation site is in the an-
tecedent box. This produces the final structure, the meaning of which can be glossed as 







Next, application of the informativity constraint. This is exemplified by E126: 
E126 If Jane is married then her husband is on holiday. 
Global accommodation of the presupposition that Jane has a husband (triggered by her 
husband') would produce the following DRS: 
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x 
husband- of(j ,x) 
= 
married(j) 	on-holiday(x) 
But, on the assumption that models are constrained by meaning postulates in such 
a way that if somebody has a husband then they are married, this DRS breaks the 
informativity constraint: replacing the DRS in the antecedent of the conditional, [] [mar-
ried(j)], by the empty DRS [][] would not alter the range of models in which the global 
DRS could be embedded. Thus, once again, intermediate accommodation is preferred, 





The next two examples, which I will not discuss in detail, illustrate the consistency 
and global informativity constraints, respectively: 
E127 Either Jane is a spinster, or else her husband is on holiday. 
E128 Jim is Fred's friend, and Fred is married. He is married too. 
The reader should verify that for E127, the consistency constraint prevents global 
accommodation of the presupposition that Jane is married, forcing local accommodation, 
and that for E128 the global informativity constraint prevents resolution of the variable 
associated with she' to the discourse marker for Fred.' 
6Note that in van der Sandt's system pronouns are treated in the same way as standard presupposition 
triggers, except that the presupposed DRS associated with a pronoun (something like [x] []) is assumed 
to contain insufficient conditions to support accommodation. 
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Like the combined Gazdar-Karttunen theory described earlier, or Soames' similar 
synthesis of Gazdar's and Karttunen's work, van der Sandt's DRT-based model of pre-
supposition gets right the cases which Gazdar's theory handles well (i.e. where presup-
positions are either explicitly denied, or appear to be out-competed by implicatures) and 
the cases which Karttunen's theories handle well (typically where a presupposition is 
entailed in its local context). However, none of the cancellation accounts discussed, none 
of the various theories proposed singly or in joint work by Karttunen, and neither the 
above combined Gazdar-Karttunen theory nor Soames own combined model provides 
an adequate account either of presupposed open propositions and their interaction with 
quantifiers, or of Kripkean cases of anaphoric presupposition. Van der Sandt's model 
treats both of these phenomena. It is on this basis that I would claim that the most 
successful fully formalised  model of presupposition to date is van der Sandt's, whose 
theory, with a judicious mixture of resolution and accommodation, successfully handles 
a wide range of problems from the literature and more besides  
However, there remain considerable problems for van der Sandt's theory. Some of 
these difficulties seem to me to be of such a general nature as to be relevant to any theory 
of accommodation, but firstly I will discuss a few problems which seem particular to van 
der Sandt's formalisation. 
6.2 The Cancellationist Heritage 
Many cases where the various Karttunen-derived models would predict no substantive 
presupposition, because the presuppositional requirements of the trigger are entailed 
in their local context, are, as has been discussed, problematic for cancellation theories. 
Van der Sandt's DRT based model does not filter out entailed presuppositions, but pre-
suppositions which have an anaphoric antecedent. Van der Sandt is able to show that 
in the standard cases where local entailment plays a role in the theories of Karttunen, 
'What it is for a model to be fully formalised is a matter of judgement. None the less, it is clear that 
van der Sandt's model goes further than most of its competitors. For instance, perhaps Seuren's model 
will in principle yield comparable coverage, but at least one central component of the theory, i.e. backward 
suppletion, Seuren's equivalent of accommodation, remains unformalised to my knowledge (but see the 
developments in Chapter 11 of this thesis). Heim, though presenting an account with many superficial 
similarities to van der Sandt, has likewise not offered a detailed formal model of accommodation. One 
could transport a van der Sandtian view of accommodation into Helm's model (as indeed Zeevat has done 
[Ze921) or into Seuren's, but then one produces, not surprisingly, a model with very similar descriptive 
coverage to van der Sandt's account. Or take the accounts of Burton-Roberts and Link. Both have 
offered promising starting points, but push much of the work over to an as yet unformalised pragmatic 
component. Another justification for calling van der Sandt's account "fully formalised" is that it has 
reached a stage where it can be implemented in an NLP system see van der Sandt and Geurts' [SG91] 
and Bos' [Bo94]. 
8For the "more besides" see especially §6.7 below on anaphora from accommodated presuppositions. 
Also see Saebo's [Sa94] development of van der Sandt's model which involves applying the model to data 
not usually thought of as presuppositional. 
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Karttunen and Peters, and Heim, his model predicts that there is a suitable anaphoric 
antecedent (or else one can be unproblematically constructed), and thus that no presup-
positions are globally accommodated. However, the cancellationist history of van der 
Sandt's model shows itself in the treatment of the following examples: 
E129 Either John didn't solve the problem or else Mary realises that the problem's been 
solved. 
E130 Unless John didn't solve the problem, Mary realises that the problem's been solved. 
E131 Either Mary's autobiography hasn't appeared yet, or else John must be very proud 
that Mary has had a book published. 
E132 Unless Mary's autobiography hasn't appeared yet, John must be very proud that Mary 
has had a book published. 
I do not think that E129 and E130 presuppose that the problem has been solved, or 
that E131 and E132 presuppose that Mary has had a book published.9 In a Karttunen 
derived satisfaction model one might explain that the local context in which the second 
disjunct of, for instance, E131 is evaluated is one in which the negation of the first dis-
junct has been added. Since the negation of 'Mary's autobiography hasn't appeared yet' 
presumably entails (given appropriate meaning postulates on autobiographies, books, 
etc.) that Mary has had a book published, no substantive presupposition is predicted. 
However, given the DRT notion of accessibility, the negation of the first disjunct is not 
anaphorically accessible from within the second disjunct, so anaphoric resolution is ruled 
out. Van der Sandt will then predict that the preferred reading is one involving global 
accommodation of the presupposition, yielding a DRS having interpretation correspond- 
ing to 'Mary has had a book published and either her autobiography hasn't appeared yet or 
else John must be very proud that Mary has had a book published.' The same comments 
apply mutandis mutandi to E129. Further, if unless is analysed in DRT simply as setting 
up a two box structure, with one box for the unless clause, and one for the matrix, then 
we will similarly not expect the negation of the unless clause to be anaphorically acces-
sible from within the matrix, and van der Sandt's model will make the same erroneous 
prediction of preferred global accommodation. 
911owever, E129 and E130 are certainly compatible with the problem having been solved, and with 
suitable stress perhaps this inference will be made. But I do not think the inference can arise from the 
presupposition of the factive realises alone. Similar comments apply to E129 and E130. See [Bea94b] for 
discussion of such issues. It is not essential to my arguments that there is no presuppositional reading, 
but only that the non-presuppositional reading is available, which I take to be uncontroversial. 
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6.3 Accommodation of Unbound Presuppositions 
A relatively minor problem with van der Sandt's model, but still one that requires 
attention, involves the fact that unbound presuppositions can become accommodated 
into quantificational contexts. Consider the following two peculiar examples: 
E133?l don't know whether the Pope has measles. But every Catholic realises that the Pope 
has measles. 
E134? I don't know whether the Pope has measles. But every protestant who realises that 
the Pope has measles is converting. 
I will represent the main condition introduced by the first sentence in these examples 
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Global accommodation of the condition has-measles(p) would render the condition 
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This DRS is then predicted to be the final meaning of the sentence. Its truth 
conditions may be glossed as follows: l don't know whether the Pope has measles, but 
if he does then every Catholic realises it.' Now, whilst this is a perfectly good meaning 
for a discourse to have, it is not the meaning of the first example above, and there is 
no explanation of why the sentence is odd.10 This problem could perhaps be solved by 
adding an extra constraint on accommodation: call it releasing, since it is approximately 
the reverse of trapping. Whereas trapping prevents bound presuppositions leaving the 
quantificational context of the binder, releasing would prevent presuppositions not free 
in a certain variable from being accommodated in a quantification over that variable. 
6.4 The Partial Match 
Another problem with van der Sandt's theory, but again one which I suppose will be 
solved as the theory matures, is that anaphoric resolution is underconstrained. If what 
is known about a discourse referent does not conflict with known information about a 
presupposed referent, then resolution can occur, identifying the two referents, and adding 
information about the previously introduced referent. This is what van der Sandt has 
called a partial match. Furthermore, if such a resolution is available, it is preferred to 
any accommodation involving the addition of completely new referents. But this results 
in rather bizarre predictions. In the following, each of the (a) sentences is predicted to 
have the same meaning as the (b) sentences", at least on the preferred interpretation: 
'Olt might at first seem that the misanalysis is connected with the fact that I have represented the 
universal quantification using a conditional DRS, as in early DRT. But this is not relevant. Using a 
more recent version of DRT would still yield an interpretation glossed as above. 
"For example, in E136(a), the presupposition that there is a purple farmer-eating donkey on the loose 
is triggered in the scope of a universal. In the restrictor DRS of the quantifier there is a marker for a 
donkey, and since being a donkey is compatible with being a purple farmer-eating donkey on the loose, 
anaphoric resolution will take place as the preferred option, adding to the restrictor the extra material 
necessary so that the presupposition has an adequate antecedent. 
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E135 a. 	Every farmer who owns a donkey realises that a farmer has been injured. 
b. 	Every injured farmer who owns a donkey realises that a farmer has been injured. 
E136 a. 	Every farmer who owns a donkey realises that a purple farmer-eating donkey is 
on the loose. 
b. 	Every farmer who owns a purple farmer-eating donkey which is on the loose 
realises that a purple farmer-eating donkey is on the loose. 
E137 a. 	If a farmer owns a donkey, he realises that a farmer has been injured. 
b. 	If an injured farmer owns a donkey, he realises that a farmer has been injured. 
E138 a. 	If a farmer owns a donkey, he realises that a purple farmer-eating donkey is on 
the loose. 
b. 	If a farmer owns a purple farmer-eating donkey which is on the loose, he realises 
that a purple farmer-eating donkey is on the loose. 
Let us reconsider the McCawley conditional E99, and its variant E108: 
E99' If Nixon invites Angela Davis to the Whitehouse, then Nixon will regret having invited 
a black militant to his residence. 
E108' If Nixon invites Angela Davis to the Whitehouse and regrets having invited a black 
militant to his residence, then he will organise a cover-up. 
For both of these, the preferred reading on van der Sandt's theory will presumably 
involve a partial match of the black militant with one of the earlier discourse entities. 
Nixon may be pragmatically ruled out as the antecedent on a number of grounds, such 
as common knowledge that he is not a black militant and is not the sort of person to 
invite himself to the Whitehouse. In that case, the model will predict just the anaphoric 
connection for which Gazdar argued. But the predictions will be none the less bizarre, 
producing DRSs that may be squibbed as follows: 
E99' If Nixon invites Davis and Davis is a black militant, then Nixon will regret having 
invited a black militant. 
E108' If Nixon invites Davis, Davis is a black militant, and Nixon regrets having invited a 
black militant, then he will organise a cover-up. 
Under this claimed interpretation, the speaker is not committed as to whether Davis 
is a black militant, but if it turned out that she was not, both E99 and E108 would be 
validated (regardless of Nixon's mental state). This cannot be right. What is worse, 
we will see shortly that even if the partial match can be prevented in these cases, the 
remaining interpretations predicted by van der Sandt's model are also inappropriate. 
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6.5 Intermediate Accommodation 
The following examples from [Bea94a] are clearly infelicitous. A small group of cor-
respondents were asked to rate eighteen discourses on a five point scale from 'weird' 
upwards. All informants judged both of these examples weird (with various extra com-
ments, like "I think I'm missing something."): 
E139 How many team members and cheerleaders will drive to the match? 
* Few of the 15 team members and none of the 5 cheerleaders can drive, but every 
team member will come to the match in her car. So expect about 4 cars. 
E140 How many of your employees with company cars had problems with their car radiators 
last year? 
Although few of the sales staff had any problems with their cars last year, all of the 
management discovered that their car radiators had sprung a leak. * 
However, most of the management didn't have a single problem with their car radiator 
the whole year: they are generally quite conscientious about car maintenance. 
What is wrong with these discourses? It seems that the only reading available for 
the bold sentences is the one corresponding to local accommodation. Thus in the first 
case, every team member must have a car, and in the second case every member of the 
management must have had problems with their car radiators (the presupposition being 
triggered by the factive verb discover'). In each case, this contradicts information else-
where in the discourse. Van der Sandt's prediction that a presupposition in the scope of 
a quantifier can trigger domain restriction is falsified by the oddity of the above exam-
ples, since on the domain restriction (or rather, intermediate accommodation) reading 
there would be no contradiction. Furthermore, it is not open for the defender of van 
der Sandt's model to claim that some extraneous fact about the discourse would mean 
that intermediate accommodation would result in an incoherent discourse, as is shown 
by the following two variant examples: 
E141 How many team members and cheerleaders will drive to the match? 
Few of the 15 team members and none of the 5 cheerleaders can drive, but every 
team member who owns a car will come to the match in her car. So 
expect about 4 cars. 
E142 How many of your employees had problems with their car radiators last year? 
Although few of the sales staff had any problems with their cars last year, all of the 
management whose car radiators sprang a leak discovered that their 
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car radiators had sprung a leak. However, most of the management didn't 
have a single problem with their car radiator the whole year: they are generally quite 
conscientious about car maintenance. 
In these examples, the crucial sentences from the earlier examples are replaced by 
new sentences which have exactly the meanings that the earlier sentences would have 
been predicted to have on van der Sandt's intermediate accommodation reading. Thus 
'every team member will come to the match in her car' is replaced by 'every team member 
who owns a car will come to the match in her car.' Both discourses are clearly felicitous 
(although only the first was included in the survey). For variety, I also tried versions 
with an extraposed relative clause as a domain restrictor, like the following: 
E143 How many team members and cheerleaders will drive to the match? 
Few of the 15 team members and none of the 5 cheerleaders can drive, but every 
team member will come to the match in her car, if she owns one. So 
expect about 4 cars. 
Although informants uniformly rated this example better than E139, some still 
thought it was "a bit odd", which was only one point above "weird" on the scale that 
the informants were given. I had more success on the few informants I tested verbally: 
stress and rhythm appear to be critical. It might be that this extraposed relative con-
struction is just more typical of spoken than written discourse, the sort of after-thought 
that is quite common in everyday speech, but not normal in the world of white-out fluid 
and delete keys. But the point remains that the sentence 'Every team member will come 
to the match in her car' does not have van der Sandt's intermediate accommodation 
reading in the context set up in E139, and that the felicity of sentences with precisely 
that meaning shows there to be no independent reason for the reading to be blocked. 
Similar comments apply to intermediate accommodation into the antecedent of a 
conditional. Consider the following two examples: 
E144 If the problem was easy, I know that somebody solved it. 
E145 What do I know about the problem? 
Well, if it was difficult, it's probably still unsolved. 
?If it was difficult, then it was Morton who solved it. 
Thats all I know. 
Regarding E144, an implicature is triggered that the speaker does not know whether 
the problem was solved, and this prevents global accommodation. Van der Sandt's the-
ory would then allow for an intermediate accommodation reading whereby the sentence 
q p1noAt Sioaqq spug iop UA 'pUisUoD ijqns oq uva uo!Jdo aiq4 ssjun 
si 2uilaaj Aui put, 'uoiiodo opeuiqjqojd ' 	si uoipommooa 	p3mJouJ 
DeII!PeJ JaH IP JI!M .JD e sicnq OLIM UWOM icJA 6'T 
:upoJ 
UOqpOUIUIOOOI 	tpUIJUt U S)O OSp qoqi 's:vlg JO On2olgue J1 UO OJ!Uflb aqj 
jo uoijujappuoa jo siseq aq4 uo padxa p1notA am 4vqm A1ospaid si siiq4puy upou 
ail olul uogepomuioaae aonpoid oq alqe 40U si jeuoi j!puooe jo 4uanbasuoa 0q4 u 
uo!!SoddnsOJd 'u 	qsUA PIUOM oouonbsuo JqsnJdw 	(DejJ!peJ ia 
Ilas flL.S JeD e sAnq DeII!PeJ e SUMO OM uewoM e ;i 	) 2uipeai u qons ipun OZU!S 
(T!do4 Spvailt, 4øU si s.iuo oTtp3 alamaj jo ps alq4 oiq& s4xa4 ut jou qgeal p) 
utpo uopomui000 	pouuou! ou si ajaT44 4ijj jqsniqduq z.toiid v 2uiaq 
Stfl ojdsop 'jjs o (oq 11!mio) sq i 	snq oqm uutuolA Sue jvq4  
Iduxi oq sums 8J7Tg punoqun 2uiuiooaq x p 31sii 	ur pooq 
! UWOM e, dM 34 Aq poflpOJu! X auios iOj 	II!peJ e SUMO x, jo uotpommoo 
'IllpD e sq XxeW 	 Ajqo 	 LT Ut INM 
DeII!PeJ 1@4 IlDs II4 'JeD e sicnq UWOM e J SIFTH 
DeII!PeJ J@H Ilas IL4S 'JeD e sicnq /eLA1 JI L'T 
:so1duxxo jo iivd 2uiAtojjoj aq4 iopsuoD -palvlai Sjjvoi~uvuias  
uoq sv papre2ai axe 510 UOD pue sJJi4unb j,d(I Ut ioj 'uspdins Ajpiq si sq 
'poopuJ -sajdurexa Ivuoiltn1pluenb o4 podsi T141m iailiva poqat STh\& sv soouous 
puoiTpuoo o4 pdsoi iqjyA uosnpuoD aTues aq4 JOSIDO1d poqi 9AeT4 at srrqj 
moul i Ile seij 
4! PI°5 OLM UO4JOLAJ SM 4! U44 'PAIOS SM pue 4flDyp SM 4! JJ 
pAIosun Ills IcqeqoAd S4! '4IflDY!P SM 4! J! '1PM 
wqoJd a4l 4noqe MOU)J I OP 41M 9T7T 
:sno4ToTIJ ST iqoiiqA,, 'OSiflOOStp 2uyAojjoj aiq4 sm SHU OUIS 
arnpod PIflOM UO!4P0Wm0DW qDns JOJ 'UpO1 St14 aAeq 40U SOOp icp1)p 41 
q4 at pwpouxmoaa ST (unbosuoo aiq4 Ut pa i922i i4 ST tptq) uxjqoid alq4 pAJO5 
poquxos 4,eiq4 uot4TsoddnSold aT44 aiaiqAt 2uipe@.i e sq amaquas p1q4 @qq 4,elqq spp 
-aid uoTpotx uoo aipouuaut 2uyAojje iqoeoidde ue 19fTa oq piai iq4jAk 1A1JInuTS 
,pAIOS SM 41 394 MOU)1 I PUe PAIOS SM 4! U344 Asea SM wqoid ap A :uo4poTrnuoo 
- 
	1oo1 04 puodsaiioo 04 Smos VVTS Jo u!pai oqrssod Ajuo alq4 'JOAOM0H 
SM 4! 444 mOul J U93 'PAIOS SM 4! pue ASea S8M wqoJd a44 fl, se atues alqq SUOU1 
LIT 	 UOi 
Accommodation 	 118 
better off without it. The same applies to Heim's theory. 12 
6.6 Structural Accommodation and Conditional Presup-
positions 
I have taken as a defining characteristic of a theory of presupposition that a function 
from simple sentences to their elementary presuppositions is given. But this has left 
open how presuppositional inferences connected with complex sentences are explained. 
In canceling and filtering theories, complex sentences have presuppositions which are 
121 cannot deny that there are cases where domain restriction readings like those discussed above 
occur. My father recently made the following comment to me: 'Everybody takes their pram into the 
supermarket. 
What did he mean? For a start, it seems to be a statement about pram-owners, so that domain 
restriction has occurred, even though, as I recall, nothing in the previous discourse had explicitly made 
the set of pram-owning people salient. But specifying the meaning precisely is difficult. Presumably 
he meant, roughly, that on occasions when people with a pram faced a choice as to whether to take 
their pram into the supermarket or not, they took it in. (We were standing outside a supermarket 
at the time, but it is not entirely clear whether the supermarket' referred just to this supermarket, or 
to supermarkets more generally.) Or, to put it another way, he meant that everybody, when finding 
themselves in a certain type of circumstance follows a certain course of action: the type of circumstance is 
possession of a pram that might be taken into the supermarket', and the course of action is 'taking the pram 
into the supermarket'. So the sentence might be understood as containing an implicit generic, and given 
an initial LF something like: every(x,person(x) ,gen(c, c is a circumstance where x considers taking x's 
pram into the supermarket, c is a circumstance where x takes x's pram into the supermarket)). Under 
this interpretation, the trigger their pram' is understood as occurring in the restrictor of an implicit 
generic. Accommodation that x has a pram might occur not in the restrictor of the initial universal, 
but in the restrictor of the generic. But this would then not be a case of intermediate accommodation, 
but of local accommodation in the restrictor of an implicit operator. 
Whether or not such an analysis seems far-fetched, it should be borne in mind that some explanation 
must be found for the fact (and I take it to be so) that the claimed intermediate accommodation readings 
have only been found to occur in sentences that have a distinctly generic flavour. For instance, examples 
like Every German woman drives her car to work.' are sometimes given by van der Sandt. The intermediate 
accommodation reading appears to me to get distinctly less clear when the genericity is removed. For 
example, consider 'Between 9:00 and 9:30 yesterday, every German woman drove her car to work.' With 
this variant, I find a clear implication that every German woman has a car, although this implication 
would not be there on the intermediate accommodation reading. This is not to say that the sentence 
could not be used in a context where German car owners, or car owning women, were already salient, 
so that domain restriction would be licensed by the previous context independently of the presence of 
the presupposition trigger. 
Perhaps some will contend that this latter example ('Between 9:00 and 9:30 yesterday, every German 
woman drove her car to work') also has an intermediate accommodation reading. Then I would have to 
accept the need for intermediate accommodation. But I would suggest that it is constrained in such a 
way that it is only applied when the quantificational domain of a statement is in some sense unclear. 
For instance, in the discourse 'Ten women work at the company. Every woman drives her car to work', the 
domain is explicit, and intermediate accommodation (to produce 'Every woman who works for the company 
and has a car') seems to be difficult or impossible. We could postulate that quantificational statements 
are always anaphoric on some set which is assumed to be salient, but that when this set has not been 
introduced explicitly, the hearer must globally accommodate a referent for the set. Then the intermediate 
accommodation readings would be explained without recourse to intermediate accommodation, but only 
in terms of global accommodation. Further, such readings would be blocked whenever the domain of a 
quantificational statement was clearly linked to an explicit antecedent. 
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simply a subset of the elementary presuppositions, whilst in multivalent and dynamic 
semantic theories complex sentences have presuppositions which need not come from 
this set. We may say that in the cancellation and filtering theories the possible presup-
positions of complex sentences are structurally predictable from the set of elementary 
presuppositions, whilst in a theory employing multivalent or dynamic semantics this 
need not be so. In an accommodation theory, an explanation of presupposition related 
inferences may be given without any direct definition of what the presuppositions of 
complex sentences are. This is the case in van der Sandt's recent theory, where accom-
modation cuts and pastes the elementary presuppositions into the logical form itself, 
until a logical form is produced containing no further presuppositions. Although we 
cannot say that the possible presuppositions of complex sentences are structurally pre-
dictable, since complex sentences are given no presuppositions, we may still say that van 
der Sandt has employed a structural notion of accommodation: what is accommodated 
is strictly drawn from amongst the elementary presuppositions. 13 
The problem that I see for a purely structural account of accommodation is as fol-
lows: it is not possible to predict on structural grounds alone exactly what should be 
accommodated. In general, the exact accommodated material can only be calculated 
with reference to the way in which world knowledge and plausibility criteria interact 
with the meaning of a given sentence. Consider the following Charles-and-Di example: 
E150 If Charles turns up, then everybody will be amazed that both Charles and Diana are 
here. 
Here the relevant presupposition trigger is the factive amazed, and the elementary 
presupposition is that both Charles and Diana are here. However, in a situation where 
it is known that Charles and Diana generally try to avoid each other, there is a clear 
tendency to come to the conclusion that Diana is already here but that Charles is 
not (although he may turn up).14 Furthermore, accommodating non-globally does not 
help. Accommodating that both Charles and Diana are here in the antecedent of the 
conditional would yield a meaning like'If Charles turns up and both Charles and Diana 
are here, then everyone will be amazed that both Charles and Diana are here'. This was the 
most charitable version of accommodation into the antecedent which I could manage, 
and yet it is clear that it does not yield a sentence corresponding to the meaning of 
E150. Accommodating into the consequent yields a somewhat more plausible meaning, 
3It could be argued that, however, that partial match cases involve a sort of non-structural ac-
commodation, since identity statements are added to the DRS which are not part of the elementary 
presuppositions themselves. 
14  If the word both' in the example is stressed, then this conclusion seems more likely regardless of 
our knowledge about Charles and Diana. However, I have nothing to say about the role of intonation, 
and my remarks concern an utterance with no sharp focal stress. 
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something like: 'If Charles turns up then both Charles and Diana are here and everyone will 
be amazed (by that).' I think there are occasions of use of E150 where this meaning would 
be reasonable. However, the implication that Diana is here would remain unexplained. I 
would not wish to claim that no structural account of accommodation could lead to the 
correct result, but certainly no existing such account does, and van der Sandt's theory 
would require apparently ad hoc modifications. 
The most glaring weak point of a structural account of accommodation concerns the 
fact that there is no way for it to produce conditional presuppositions, which I have 
argued are appropriate in many cases.15 Let us consider one such case: 
E151 If Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X, he will be bothered by the fact that his weight 
is higher than it would be on Earth. 
The 'fact that' construction in this case triggers the presupposition that Spiff's weight 
is higher than it would be on Earth, and this is further re-enforced by the presence 
of the factive 'bothered by'. Structural accounts of accommodation suggest that this 
proposition should be globally accommodated. However, this result is simply wrong: it 
is not normal to conclude from E151 that Spiff's weight is higher than it would be on 
Earth. Indeed, it seems natural for this sentence to be uttered under conditions where 
Spiff is hanging about in space, and completely weightless. It is difficult to argue against 
a conditional presupposition, that if Spiff lands on X his weight will be higher than on 
Earth. Can non-global accommodation save the structural account? Accommodation 
into the antecedent produces something like 'If Spaceman Spiff's weight is higher than it 
would be on Earth and he lands on Planet X, he will be bothered by the fact that his weight 
is higher than it would be on Earth.' I do not think this is a possible meaning of E151. 
Accommodation into the consequent appears to improve on this, yielding (after char-
itable adjustment of tense) 'If Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X, his weight will be higher 
than it would be on Earth and he will be bothered by the fact that his weight is higher than 
it would be on Earth.' This provides a reasonable meaning for E151, and suggests that 
if only some way could be found of removing the two incorrect readings, the structural 
account might be saved. Now recall the way in which cancellation models were shown 
to sometimes produce an analogue of a conditional presupposition for the McCawley 
type examples, but could not in general produce such readings (in §4.8, p.80). Much the 
same holds regarding a structural account of accommodation: it can sometimes produce 
151t is ironic, and worrying, that the occurrence of such readings in the CCP account without an 
accommodation mechanism continues to be taken as one of the most serious objections to Karttunen-
derived models (see e.g. Geurts [Geu95]), and the non-occurrence of such readings in other accounts 
continues to be taken by Karttun-ists (such as myself) to be a serious failing of those theories. It is 
obviously too soon to say whether the arguments in this thesis will advance the debate any further, or 
merely leave the combatants as deeply entrenched as ever. 
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conditional readings, but it is easy to find cases where it cannot. Slight variations on 
E151 produce examples where the structural account produces multiple incorrect (or, 
at the very least, non-preferred) readings, and completely fails to yield the preferred 
reading: 
E152 It is unlikely that if Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X, he will be bothered by the fact 
that his weight is higher than it would be on Earth. 
E153 If Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X and is bothered by the fact that his weight is 
higher than it would be on Earth, he won't stay long. 
The preferred readings of these sentences still involve the same conditional impli-
cation that if he lands on Planet X, Spiff's weight will be higher than it is on Earth. 
It is clear (given the treatment of and) that the Karttunen, Karttunen and Peters and 
CCP models will make this prediction for E153, and quite natural assumptions about 
the semantics of the 'it is unlikely' construction would lead to these theories making the 
same predictions for E152. But in these cases the structural accommodation account no 
longer yields the right reading after accommodation into the consequent of the condi-
tional. Such accommodation is not even available as an option for E153, and in the case 
of E152 would yield 'It is unlikely that if Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X, his weight will 
be higher than it is on Earth and he will be bothered by it', which does not imply that if 
he lands on Planet X, Spiff's weight will be higher than it is on Earth. On the contrary, 
one might expect from this gloss that if Spiff lands on Planet X his weight probably will 
not be higher than it is on Earth, which is clearly inappropriate. 
Example E151 has essentially the same form as the McCawley example E99, a form 
which I earlier glossed as 'If A then Be'.  This being so, it should be clear to the 
reader how my remarks could be transferred from the Spiff examples to the Nixon/Davis 
examples, which means that even if van der Sandt's incorrect partial match reading for 
the Nixon/Davis cases could be avoided, accommodation could still not produce the 
right results. 
It might seem to the reader that the problems I am citing with regard to structural 
notions of presupposition are rather academic in nature, involving sentences fax from 
the run of everyday conversation. But perhaps the greatest problem with structural 
accommodation concerns a phenomena which is quite obviously commonplace. This is 
the phenomenon of bridging whereby a new discourse entity is linked indirectly (i.e. not 
by identity) to an old one. Consider the following: 
E154 Jane sat in the car. She adjusted the rearview mirror. 
E155 If I go to a wedding then the rabbi will get drunk. 
Accommodation 	 122 
E156 An old woman hit me. The knuckle-duster cut deep. 
E157 Whenever you remove the head stratifier from a hyperspace drive unit, remember to 
hold your nose. 
In these examples, it seems that the rearview mirror is connected to the car, the rabbi 
is connected to the wedding, the knuckle-duster (U.S.: 'brass knuckles') is connected to 
the hitting event, or the old woman or both, and the head stratifier is connected to the 
hyperspace drive unit. But what enables us to make these connections? Perhaps it could 
be claimed that 'rearview mirror' is an intrinsically relational noun with an argument place 
for a car, and that the NP 'the rearview mirror' thus contains the content necessary to 
make the connection to the car Jane sat in. However, I am not sure that we would wish 
to analyse 'rabbi' as a relational noun with an argument place for religious ceremonies, 
or 'knuckle-duster' as having an argument place for an old woman. Furthermore, in the 
last example, it seems that all that is required to understand that hyperspace drive 
units have head stratifiers is competence in English and a little common sense, and not 
competence in hyperspace drive maintenance or a working knowledge of the concepts 
involved. In all these cases, accommodation might allow us to fill in the missing !links.  
For instance, we might accommodate that a certain knuckle duster is being worn by a 
certain old woman, or we might accommodate more general rules, say that hyperspace 
drive units have (/can have) head stratifiers. But we cannot expect the accommodated 
material to be provided by our knowledge of grammar alone.16 
6.7 Anaphora from Accommodated Material 
Now, to provide at least a modicum of balance, Twill turn to one aspect of van der Sandt's 
model which I consider a particular strength. The following two counter-examples to 
DRT constraints on accessibility of anaphoric antecedents date back to over a decade 
before DRT was introduced, from Karttunen's influential work on discourse reference 
[Kar76] (which was only published some years after its first presentation): 
E158 Bill didn't realise that he had a dime. It was in his pocket. 
16 How crucial to van der Sandt's model is it that accommodation is a structural operation? I think 
the correct answer, and perhaps the answer van der Sandt would give, is that such structurality is not 
essential, it is merely a simplifying assumption. There has been some work which, though building on 
van der Sandt's ideas, drops the assumption that the accommodated material is wholly derived from 
the trigger. Lorenz [Lo92] has developed an account of presuppositions in the temporal domain which 
uses default world knowledge to generate the accommodated material, and Bos, Buitelaar and Mineur 
[BBM95] have developed an account of bridging descriptions. I find myself very much in sympathy 
with this direction of research: I think it shows that the gap between the van der Sandtian account of 
accommodation and the non-structural account which will be proposed in this thesis may itself, in due 
course, be bridged. 
Accommodation 	 123 
E159 John knew that Mary had a car, but he had never seen it. 
In the first example, not only is a dime' embedded within an intensional context, 
but that context is itself embedded under a negation. In standard DRT, either of these 
embeddings would normally be sufficient to guarantee anaphoric inaccessibility. Since 
a car' in the second example is embedded within an intensional context, standard DRT 
incorrectly predicts it to be inaccessible. However, van der Sandt predicts that in both 
these cases global accommodation occurs. For instance the final DRS for E158 would 
be something like the following: 
I 	 b x z 	 I 








Here global accommodation of a DRS of the form [x] [dime(x) ,had(b,x)] creates an 
anaphorically accessible dime to which the pronoun in the second sentence can refer. 
Such patterns of anaphoric reference can be demonstrated with a wide range of 
presuppositional constructions embedded in environments that would otherwise block 
anaphoric reference. Perhaps most significant of these presuppositional constructions are 
definite descriptions. For instance, in the following discourse, van der Sandt's theory 
predicts that the presupposition associated with 'the tallest mountain in the world' is 
globally accommodated, and hence correctly licenses subsequent anaphoric reference: 
E160 John believes that he can see the tallest mountain in the world. But in fact it is 
completely obscured by mist. 
What is most notable about this last case is that it shows that given a theory like 
van der Sandt's, a rather ad hoc stipulation in standard DRT, the promotion of proper 
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names and definites, can be dispensed with. This stipulation, that referents introduced 
by proper names and definite descriptions are automatically promoted to a position in 
the global DRS regardless of how deeply embedded they arose, was originally motivated 
only by the need to account for the special anaphoric accessibility of names and defi-
nites. But in van der Sandt's account, the separately motivated theory of presupposition 
takes care of promotion (under the name of accommodation), and it is only necessary 
to make the relatively uncontroversial assumption that both definites and names are 
presuppositional. 
6.8 Alternative Accommodation Strategies 
Cancellation and filtering might be said to bring the woodsman's axe and hacksaw into 
the linguistic operation theatre, allowing grisly brute force amputations of unwanted 
chunks of meaning. By comparison, accommodation is the modern surgeon's toolkit, 
which in the right hands can enable precision repair of linguistic contexts or major 
transplants of lexical material across logical forms. As I will attempt to show, accom-
modation provides one of the great unifying themes of modern presupposition theory, 
since many theories of presupposition which were not originally proposed as accommo-
dation theories can be thought of in terms of accommodation. 
6.8.1 From Amputation to Accommodation 
In a sense cancellation is the inverse of global accommodation. Heim [Hei83a], after 
suggesting her enhancement of the CCP model with an account of accommodation, 
makes the following observation: 
Note that by stipulating a ceteris paribus preference for global over local 
accommodation, we recapture the effect of [Gazdar's] assumption that pre-
supposition cancellation occurs only under the threat of inconsistency. 
I find this stunning. With one short remark buried in a terse paper Heim offers a 
simple synthesis between the two antitheses of 1970's presupposition theory, namely the 
Karttunen 1974 derived model which her paper uses as its base, and Gazdar's cancella-
tion account. Perhaps implicit in Heim's remark is the idea that global accommodation 
of an elementary presupposition may be identified with what was termed projection in 
earlier models. In this case whenever accommodation is not global, we have the effect 
of cancellation. Looked at this way, a preference for global over local accommodation 
becomes a preference for projection over cancellation, and given an appropriate stipu-
lation of the circumstances in which this preference can be overridden (e.g. in order to 
avoid inconsistency), the effects of a cancellation theory can be mimicked. In a stroke 
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this shows a way to eliminate the bulk of existing counter-examples to the CCP model, 
in particular examples where a presupposition associated with an embedded trigger is 
eliminated by explicit denial. Further, and in common with van der Sandt's cancella-
tion account, Heim's remark introduces a way of thinking about Gazdar's theory that 
preserves his insight that default reasoning is involved in the processing of presupposi-
tions, whilst restoring the intuition that, in some sense, presuppositions are to do with 
what come first, with definedness conditions on the input rather than preferences on 
the output. Note that in [vdS88] van der Sandt is explicit in identifying his cancel-
lation analysis as involving an accommodation-like mechanism, although this was not 
the case in his theory's first incarnation [vdS82]. Also note that for Heim's analogy 
between cancellation and accommodation theories to really drive home it is important 
that in the cancellation account it is assumed that presuppositions are also part of the 
asserted content, which, as elaborated above, is a reasonable assumption. Entailment of 
presuppositions is what produces the effect of local accommodation in cases where the 
presupposition is globally canceled. 
6.8.2 The Transformation from Russell to van der Sandt 
Now let us consider a very different type of theory, the neo-Russellian account discussed 
earlier. Recall that the essential idea of this theory was that alternative presuppositional 
readings are obtained only as a result of variations in logical scope, or, put another way, 
as a result of variations in logical form. Strangely, these scopal variations are mirrored 
by the alternative accommodation readings in van der Sandt's theory, save that Russell's 
logical forms happened to be expressed in FOPL, whereas van der Sandt's are expressed 
in the language of DRT. Russell gave few hints as to how his logical forms should 
be derived, and I see no obvious reason why a Russellian theory of scopal variation 
should not be developed where scope bearing operators are initially interpreted in situ 
to produce a first logical form, and are then moved about to produce the final logical form 
in a manner reminiscent of the semantic move-a operations of van der Sandt's theory. 
Thus we see that the transformation from Russell to van der Sandt is surprisingly small. 
For instance, the neo-Russellian and van der Sandt accounts allow essentially the same 
two readings for sentences like the following: 
E39' Pooh doesn't realise that Eeyore is sad. 
The neo-Russellian narrow scope negation reading is given by the formula [x - 
sad (e)] (-irealises(p, x)). Corresponding to this is the following van der Sandtian global 
accommodation reading: 




On the other hand the neo-Russellian wide-scope negation reading, -( [sad(e)](realises(p, x)) ), 




But this is not to deny that van der Sandt's theory incorporates important inno-
vations. Firstly, lack of anaphoricity was mentioned earlier as being problematic in a 
purely Russellian account (2.5, p.30), but van der Sandt's account includes not only 
an accommodation component, but also an anaphoric resolution component completely 
alien to the Russellian picture of definites. Secondly, van der Sandt not only allows 
for presuppositional elements to take different scopes, he also provides an account of 
which scopes are to be preferred, and this is again something absent from the Russel-
lian account. Thirdly, and specifically as a result of being situated in DRT, van der 
Sandt's model allows for extra possibilities which would not be available to Russell. For 
instance, a presupposition a triggered in the consequent of a conditional may, in van 
der Sandt's theory, eventually make its way to the antecedent of the conditional. Such 
a transformation would make no sense on the Russellian picture, since an element in 
the antecedent of a conditional could classically not bind material in the consequent. 




I suggested that intermediate accommodation into the antecedent of a conditional or 
restrictor produced problematic results, so that van der Sandt's theory might actually 
improve its descriptive coverage by sticking to purely Russellian scopes. 
6.8.3 Accommodation as a Journey through Mental Space 
Fauconnier [Fa85] presents a representationalist theory in which meanings are rendered 
in a structured collection of interconnected mental spaces. Mental spaces are akin to 
Kamp's DRS boxes (or, perhaps even more aptly, Seuren's discourse domains). A few 
remarks should clarify the similarity with DRT: - 
Like DRS boxes, mental spaces can be seen as partial models in which a set of 
discourse entities bear certain properties and relations to each other, but in which 
the extensions of many other properties and relations are left undecided. 
Like DRS boxes, mental spaces are arranged hierarchically, with some boxes be-
ing seen as subordinate to others. Properties of objects in subordinate daughter 
spaces may be inherited from their parent spaces. However, the links between en-
tities in different spaces are not sustained by variable binding, but by a Lewisian 
counterpart relation. The inter-space links between entities are analogous to the 
connections between discourse markers in later versions of DRT [KRe93] where ob-
jects in intensional contexts are linked to objects outside by anchoring functions, 
these determining which objects are counterparts of which others. 
Unlike Kamp, Fauconnier does not follow the Montagovian method of fragments. 
He does not provide a fully formalised method of constructing mental spaces for 
all the strings produced by a generative grammar. 
Unlike in DRT, no semantic interpretation or Tarski truth definition is given for 
mental spaces, and no notion of logical consequence between mental spaces is 
defined. 
Fauconnier considers a wide range of syntactic constructions and complications of 
the interpretation process which have so far eluded DRT. For instance, he discusses 
the special semantic environment set up by descriptions of pictures or the painting 
of pictures (sentences like 'In this picture, Kamp and Fauconnier have been painted 
as the same person') and cases of perspective shift, more commonly dealt with in 
literary theory than in generative linguistics. 
In order to see what Fauconnier's theory of presupposition [Fa85, pp.86-871 would 
look like in a van der Sandtian setting, let us assume that a space is just a DRT box (i.e. 
a set of discourse markers and a set of conditions), and assume a DRT-like notion of 
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accessibility. Let us say that a proposition is supported in a space if it is a consequence 
of the conditions in that space, and that a proposition is accessible from a space if 
it is a consequence of propositions in accessible (i.e. superordinate) spaces, and let 
us assume a standard logical definition of consistency of a space, meaning consistency 
of the set of conditions in that space.17 In certain cases (generally non-intensional 
contexts) Fauconnier also employs a notion of compatibility, meaning consistency of 
the set of conditions either in the space or accessible from it. Fauconnier's theory of 
presupposition can be described as a theory of presupposition flotation, whereby locally 
triggered presuppositions float up through as many spaces as they can without creating 
inconsistency.18 I would characterise the theory as follows: 
Presuppositions must be supported in the local space of the trigger. 
If a presupposition is accessible, then nothing further need be done. 
Otherwise, the presupposition is accommodated into successively more global 
spaces along the accessibility path, until reaching the highest space where ac-
commodation does not create inconsistency at the accommodation site, or incom-
patibility of any (non-intensional) subordinate space. 19 
It is readily seen that, at least in the van der Sandtian form that I have presented it, 
Fauconnier's model will make predictions comparable to some of the other models that 
have been discussed in this chapter. The first clause means that in a sense Fauconnier 
always locally accommodates, whatever else he does. This produces the effect that 
in a cancellation account would be derived by assuming presuppositions to be part of 
the asserted content .20 The second clause provides for something like van der Sandt's 
anaphoric resolution of presuppositions. In most cases this will presumably yield filtering 
17 The relation supports corresponds to Fauconnier's satisfaction, but I refrain from using this term 
here since I have tended to use it elsewhere with a slightly different meaning. Fauconnier's satisfaction 
of a proposition means that the propositions in the local context entail the proposition, whereas my use 
means roughly that all the accessible conditions taken together entail the proposition. For exegetical 
purposes, I have also been rather cavalier with Fauconnier's notion of accessibility of a proposition. I 
have assumed that propositions in all superordinate spaces are accessible, but Fauconnier is interested in 
a wide variety of intensional contexts such that (consequences of) propositions holding in parent spaces 
cannot in general be expected to hold locally. The approximation will suffice at least for treatment of 
logical connectives (provided counterfactuality is not involved). 
18 The flotation metaphor is used by Fauconnier himself. Coincidentally, the same metaphor is chosen 
by Geurts [Geu95] when discussing van der Sandt's accommodation theory. 
191 take the incompatibility requirement from Fauconnier's discussion of conflicting presuppositions in 
disjunctions [Fa85, p.92]. 
201n a section entitled "Presupposition Transfer" [Fa85, pp.105-108], Fauconnier also discusses cases 
where a presupposition need not be supported in the local space of its trigger. For example, he discusses 
the sentence Hey, In this painting Gudule is beautiful again.' He allows that that the sentence may be 
interpreted in a context where Gudule in reality was once beautiful, but is no longer, without committing 
the speaker to a proposition like In the painting Gudule was once beautiful.' 
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of entailed presuppositions as in Karttunen's '73 model. The third clause meanwhile will 
prevent global accommodation in case that would produce inconsistency, thus giving the 
effect of a cancellation theory in cases of presupposition denial. 
There is one important respect in which the version of Fauconnier's theory above 
makes different predictions from van der Sandt's. Under Fauconnier's accommodation 
strategy as a presupposition floats upwards, it leaves a shadow behind (i.e. a copy of the 
presupposition) in every space through which it passes. But van der Sandt's strategy 
depicts presuppositions as bubbling up without leaving any trace of their journey. In 
fact Zeevat has compared an accommodation strategy just like Fauconnier's to van der 
Sandt's, although Zeevat attributes what I call Fauconnier's strategy to Heim. Distin-
guishing the two strategies Zeevat says [Ze92, p.396]: "The one remaining difference [i.e. 
between his version of van der Sandt's theory and his version of Heim's theory] is the 
question whether we should add the presupposition everywhere between the position of 
the trigger and the highest position where it can be accommodated, or whether we can 
be satisfied with adding it just once at that position." So which is the right strategy? 
Zeevat comes to an interesting conclusion: both are right, but for different classes of 
presupposition trigger. The two classes Zeevat delimits are what he calls anaphoric and 
lexical presuppositions. The anaphoric (or resolution) triggers are those "whose primary 
function is - like anaphora - to collect entities from the environment in order to say 
new things about them." [Ze92, p.397] This class, which presumably at least includes 
definite noun phrases, and discourse particles like too and again, is the one for which 
Zeevat supposes the van der Sandtian strategy to be appropriate. The following data 
back up his point: 
	
E161 a. 	Bill called Mary a Republican. And it is clear from Mary's diary that John insulted 
her too. 
b. 	It is clear from Mary's diary that Bill insulted her. 
E162 a. 	Bill called Mary a Republican. And it is clear from Mary's diary that Bill thinks 
that John insulted her too. 
b. 	It is clear from Mary's diary that Bill insulted her. 
C. 	It is clear from Mary's diary that Bill thinks he insulted her. 
In Zeevat's terms, the too in E161(a) and E162(a) is used because the speaker is 
collecting up a property which he takes to already be realised in the context, the property 
of insulting Mary, and saying something new about the extension of that property. I 
would say that on hearing either E161(a) or E162(a) a hearer would normally conclude 
that the speaker thinks that Bill insulted Mary, presumably in the act of calling her a 
Republican. So it would seem that 'Bill insulted Mary' - or the proposition that the 
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event of Bill calling Mary a Republican is identical to an event of Bill insulting Mary 
- is globally accommodated. But (and I hope readers can convince themselves of this) 
I do not think that on the basis of E161(a) a hearer would conclude that the speaker 
believes E161(b). This is just what would be predicted on van der Sandt's strategy, 
since the local context to the trigger, the mental space set aside for what is clear in 
Mary's diary, would not need to contain the presupposition. Similarly, I do not think 
a hearer of E162(a) would normally infer that the speaker believes either of E162(b) 
or El 62(c), although these propositions are certainly compatible with what the speaker 
has said. Thus the presupposition arguably skips over both the space assigned to what 
Bill thinks in Mary's diary, and the space assigned to what is clear in Mary's diary, just 
as van der Sandt predicts. On the other hand, on Fauconnier's strategy both E162(b) 
and E162(c) would be inferred. 
The lexical triggers are those where the presupposition is a condition on the ap-
plication of a concept, so that the presupposition must hold in any context where the 
trigger is applied if the application of the concept is to be meaningful. Factive verbs 
are presumably in this class. From the definition of lexical triggers, we can see that 
the presupposition should be expected to hold not only at the highest accommodation 
site, but also locally. Zeevat goes further in requiring lexical presuppositions to hold 
Fauconnier fashion in all the intermediary contexts, but the following examples perhaps 
provide some support for this analysis: 
	
E163 a. 	Bill called Mary a Republican. And it is clear from Mary's diary that she realised 
that he had insulted her. 
b. 	It is clear from Mary's diary that Bill insulted her. 
E164 a. 	Bill called Mary a Republican. And it is clear from Mary's diary that Bill thinks 
she realised that he had insulted her. 
b. 	It is clear from Mary's diary that Bill insulted her. 
C. 	It is clear from Mary's diary that Bill thinks he insulted her. 
That E163(b) follows from E163(a) seems indisputable. E164(a) is obviously a more 
complicated case, and requires considerably more effort to comprehend. But my feeling is 
that bothE164(b) and E164(c) do follow from it, in accordance with Zeevat's prediction 
that the Fauconnier (or Heim) algorithm is appropriate in this case.21  
21 Cases like E164 constitute counterexamples not only to van der Sandt's theory, but to any theory 
where accommodation occurs at only one site. As discussed above, all the cancellation and filtering 
theories can be thought of as falling into this class. The problem will typically occur whenever a lexical 
presupposition is embedded under an operator which is itself embedded in an intensional context. For 
instance, 'Fred thinks Mary doesn't know that she won' involves the lexical presupposition trigger 'know' 
Accommodation 	 131 
Whilst I have adduced some support for Zeevat's distinction and his choice of ac-
commodation strategies, the data is not clear cut, and there is clearly room for more 
research on the issue. 22  My aim was not in fact to argue for the distinction per Se, but 
to demonstrate that a rather promising vista is opened up when we start comparing 
different theories in terms of the alternative accommodation strategies they manifest. 
In turn this suggests that we should strive for a better technical understanding of what 
accommodation is, and that is one of the main goals of this thesis.23  
6.9 Accommodation and Projection 
What is the relationship between accommodation and projection? As mentioned in 
sec:fata, one could view projection as global accommodation. However, in a theory 
like Heim's or van der Sandt's, presuppositions play an important role in determining 
meaning even if there is no global accommodation. Contemporary presupposition theo-
rists are concerned not merely with whether a presupposition is projected, but also with 
what happens to the presupposition if it is not projected. Furthermore, it need not be 
assumed that what is accommodated corresponds directly to an elementary presuppo-
sition, and neither Heim's account, nor that to be developed in the second part of this 
thesis, require such a correspondence. In van der Sandt's account, resolution of presup-
positions with a partially matching antecedent is accompanied by some accommodation 
of information, but the conditions added, which include equality conditions to bind the 
presupposition to its antecedent, need not be strictly part of the elementary presuppo-
sition. If it is not elementary presuppositions which are accommodated, but something 
else, then it is hard to see how we could determine when it is appropriate to say that 
an elementary presupposition has been projected. Perhaps it should be recognised that 
Langendoen and Savin's the projection problem, as usually conceived, has outlived its 
usefulness? 
embedded under a negation operator itself embedded under thinks. The example suggests not only 
that Mary won, which is predicted by cancellation theories, but also that Fred thinks she won, which is 
not predicted by these accounts. 
22 For this reason, I will follow the bulk of the presupposition literature in not distinguishing between 
Zeevat's two classes of presupposition in the main body of this thesis. But I do believe that the theory 
to be developed would be compatible with making such a distinction, or indeed further distinctions 
amongst presuppositional constructions. Goldberg et al [GKS:MS] motivate a division between what 
they term external and internal presuppositions, the idea being that external presuppositions hold in 
the model, but internal presuppositions need only be satisfied in the discourse context. At least at a 
schematic level, it seems natural to equate their term external with Zeevat's lexical, and their internal 
with Zeevat's resolution, although I will not pursue this line any further here. 
23 Other theories of presupposition that compare with van der Sandt's in much the way as Fauconnier's 
are those of Dinsmore [Di8lb, Di921, and Schiebe [Schi79]. Like the theories of van der Sandt and 
Fauconnier, these accounts are explicitly procedural, and explicitly representational. Note that although 
Schiebe talks of worlds of evaluation, one of his uses of the term world is akin to Fauconnier's term mental 
space. 
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The Assertion: What Comes 
First in Dynamic Semantics 
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Chapter 7 
Two Birds and One Stone 
7.1 Aim 
Two apparently disparate aspects of natural language meaning, presupposition and epis-
temic modality, can be tackled using a single, suitably dynamic, theory of information. 
The current chapter has two main objectives. Firstly it should serve as an introduction 
to the treatment of presupposition within a dynamic framework, and thus to the more 
ambitious developments in the remainder of the thesis. Secondly the chapter is intended 
to show that the underlying assumptions behind the Context Change model of presup-
position, which was developed in the seventies and early eighties and is thus one of the 
first instances of a dynamic theory of natural language meaning, can be independently 
motivated through a consideration of epistemic modality. 
In the remainder of the thesis I will focus on two types of presuppositional construc-
tion, definites, which I take to include not only definite descriptions, but also pronouns 
and proper names, and factives. I will take as paradigmatic examples like the following, 
containing the attitude verb 'realise' which is factive and is said to presuppose the truth 
of its propositional complement: 
E165 Anna realises that Bertha is hiding. 
Whilst I will occasionally mention presuppositional constructions other than definites 
and factives', the formal theory as such will be limited to just these two. I will not take 
1  Karttunen [Kar7l] distinguished between two classes of factive verbs, full factives and semifactives. 
He suggested that whilst both assertions and denials of sentences with matrix factives require the truth 
of the factive complement, the two subclasses differ in their behaviour when embedded in hypothetical 
contexts such as conditionals. Supposedly, whereas a full factive which is embedded in a hypothetical 
context such as the antecedent of a conditional still requires the truth of the factive complement, this is 
not the case for a semifactive. However, Stalnaker [St74, pp.207-210] argued convincingly that the source 
of the differences Karttunen had observed does not reflect an important taxonomic division, and instead 
suggested a pragmatic explanation for the original data. Stalnaker's point of view seems to have won the 
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the raw data to consist of sentences and their presuppositions, and then present a theory 
which predicts for each sentence its presuppositions. In a sense I will not specifically 
be addressing the Projection Problem for Presuppositions. Instead, I will consider that 
old and familiar projection problem of which presupposition is but a tiny part, namely 
the problem of predicting the meanings of complex sentences in terms of the meanings 
of their parts, or the problem of compositionality as it is best known. 
I will attempt to follow a long standing tradition of philosophers and semanticists. 
The data will consist of implications between sentences of natural language, and to 
account for the data I will define logics which yield these implications as entailments 
between formulae, combined with a general way of translating from natural language 
into the logic. An obvious advantage of using implications as the raw data is that it 
makes perfect sense to talk of a complex discourse having a particular sentence as an 
implication, whereas, as I have said, there is no test for presuppositions which applies to 
multiple sentence texts. In summary, the projection problem for presuppositions forms 
just one part of a much larger projection problem, and not a very clearly defined part. 
I will address the larger, better defined problem, but in the process the sub-problem, 
whatever the details of its definition, should be coverered. 
So, what are the special demands that presuppositional constructions place on a 
compositional theory of meaning? I will now present some simple, illustrative data, 
more complicated cases being considered later in the thesis. Firstly, utterances of either 
E165 or its negation E166 would tend to imply that Bertha was hiding: 
E166 Anna does not realise that Bertha is hiding. 
It is this characteristic behaviour of presuppositions under negation which most 
clearly marks them out as different from ordinary entailments. For example an utterance 
of E167 would also lead to the conclusion that Bertha was hiding, but this would not be 
the case with an utterance of E168. So E167 is said to entail but not presuppose that 
Bertha is hiding. 
day, for later work rarely mentions the distinction. For instance a cursory inspection of the authoritative 
collection in [O&D79] revealed only one mention of semifactives, that being in a passage in Gazdar's 
article [Gaz79b, pp.86-871 where he agrees with Stalnaker that Karttunen's distinction is "otiose", 
and provides a formalisation of Stalnajcer's argument (the same passage is found in [Gaz79a, pp.153-
154] modulo minor, mostly typographical alterations and a unit decrement of example numbering). 
Accordingly, I will not distinguish between subclasses of factive verbs. But the reader should be aware 
that the major part of this thesis will not be concerned with explaining the differences that Karttunen 
observed, and the compositional grammar to be developed will not predict any such differences. Only 
in Chapter 11 will it be shown formally how the approach developed in the thesis could be adapted 
so as to account fully for the defeasibility of presuppositional inferences, this defeasibility lying at the 
heart of the Stalnaker/Gazdar account of Karttunen's observations. Note further that the observational 
differences between classes of factive verbs pointed out by Karttunen concerned first-person uses, and 
to my knowledge have not been observed in third-person uses. Since the examples I will consider are 
uniformly third person, there is reason to think that Karttunen's observations do not bear on the data 
to be discussed. 
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E167 Bertha is hiding in the attic. 
E168 Bertha is not hiding in the attic. 
An utterance of E169, in which a presuppositional construction is embedded in the 
antecedent of a conditional, would implicate that Bertha was hiding.2 Similar predictions 
seem warranted for embedding under the modality 'might', as seen in E170, and for 
iterative embedding of presuppositional constructions as in E171. 
E169 If Anna realises that Bertha is hiding, then she will find her. 
E170 Anna might realise that Bertha is hiding. 
E171 Bertha regrets that Anna realises that she is hiding. 
However, complex sentences do not uniformly preserve the presuppositions of their 
parts. For instance, an utterance of E172 would not implicate that Bertha was in the 
attic, in spite of the occurrence of 'Bertha is in the attic' as the complement of a factive 
verb. Similarly, neither E173 nor E174 seems to implicate that Bertha is hiding at all, 
although they both involve a factive verb with complement 'Bertha is hiding'. 
E172 If Bertha is not in the kitchen, then Anna realises that Bertha is in the attic. 
E173 If Bertha is hiding, then Anna realises that Bertha is hiding. 
E174 Perhaps Bertha is hiding and Anna realises that Bertha is hiding. 
In the remainder of the chapter I will weave backwards and forwards between the 
topics of presupposition and epistemic modality. Beginning with presupposition, in §7.2 
I focus on a problematic methodological issue concerning the Context Change model. In 
§7.3 I jump to the semantics of epistemic modality, presenting some data and suggesting 
informally how a dynamic semantics could improve over more traditional static accounts 
of modality. A formal presentation of a dynamic system appropriate to the treatment 
of the data in §7.3 is given in §7.4. In §7.5, it is shown that a minor extension to this 
system provides us with an account of presupposition, and we see how the account fares 
with the data presented above. 
2Note that the verb 'realise' which is being used in some of these examples is one Karttunen classed 
as semifactive. It has been pointed out to me by Gerald Gazdar that differences between factives and 
semifactives can surface under the types of embedding being considered here, for instance in conditionals. 
Thus to be sure of the generality of the inference patterns found in these examples one should consider 
variants with full factives. The reader should verify that substituting' be glad' (which Karttunen classed 
as a full factive) for 'realise' does not affect the relevant presuppositionally derived inferences (or, in some 
cases, absence of them) in any of the examples considered. 
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7.2 Descriptive versus Explanatory Adequacy 
One objection to Karttunen's account was that the CCPs of complex sentences are de-
fined arbitrarily and with no independent motivation. In early formulations the mean-
ings of lexical items included separate specifications of truth conditions and heritage 
conditions, where by heritage conditions, I mean the rules which say how presupposi-
tions will be projected. 
Consider the [Kar74] definition for the conditional discussed in §5.1, in which the 
truth conditions are as for material implication and the heritage conditions are given 
by: " Context Xsatisfies-the-presuppositions-of 'If A then B' just in case (i) X satisfies-
the-presuppositions-of A, and (ii) X [augmented with] A satisfies-the-presuppositions-of 
B." Since the truth conditions are specified independently of the heritage conditions, it 
would be possible to imagine a child mistakenly learning the correct truth conditions 
of the conditional but the wrong heritage conditions.3 This does not seem plausible, 
and we would clearly prefer a theory in which the heritage conditions were not specified 
separately, but somehow derived from the truth conditions and other general principles. 
Heim [Hei83a] attempted to rescue Karttunen's approach by showing how truth 
conditions could generally be derived from appropriate specifications of Context Change 
Potential. On this basis she claimed that the CCP model had at least the explanatory 
adequacy of its competitors, such as Gazdar's theory. However Mats Rooth (as cited 
in [Hei90]) and Scott Soames [So89] have noted that whilst the correct truth conditions 
derive from the CCPs for connectives that Heim specifies, this would also be the case for 
a number of other specifications of the CCP, and some of these alternative specifications 
would give incorrect heritage conditions. So we could still imagine a child learning 
CCPs for some connectives that gave the correct truth conditions but incorrect heritage 
conditions. On this basis, Heim (e.g. in [11690]) has been forced to retract her claim. 
I believe that the CCP model can be saved from the quagmire of non-explanatory 
ignominy. But of course it is impossible to justify this without some definition of what 
it is for a theory to be an explanation for some phenomenon, and previous authors 
on presupposition have tended to take this notion for granted without actually saying 
what it is. Neither will I attempt a definition here. But I will assume that at least one 
factor determining explanatoriness is independent motivation: if phenomenon X and 
phenomenon Y are detected through independent observations, then a model motivated 
by phenomenon X alone can be seen as having some explanatory power with regard to 
phenomenon Y if it predicts Y without substantive addition. Those who are not prepared 
to accept that this is what is intended by explanatory might simply substitute the phrase 
independently motivated whenever they encounter explanatory in the remainder of this 
3This is similar to the argument in [Hei83a]. 
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thesis. 
The key observation is that the recent work of Frank Veltman [Ve91] on the semantics 
of epistemic modal operators relies on a strikingly similar underlying notion of context 
change to that utilised by Heim. And indeed this is hardly surprising given that both 
have taken inspiration from the same philosophical well-springs, for instance from the 
work of Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis. 
I will borrow from Veltman's work to show how the context sensitivity of words like 
might' and must' motivates a dynamic semantics. None of the alternative CCPs for 
connectives that have been suggested by Rooth and Soames would be compatible with 
this semantics, and it is hard to imagine how a relevantly different dynamic semantics 
could still get the facts right about the meanings of the epistemic modalities. 
I will then show how a simple extension to the logic developed in §7.3 - in fact the 
addition of a single unary operator - produces a system with all the presupposition 
inheritance properties we would expect of a CCP model. In the process, the connection 
between presupposition and the epistemic modalities, and also the logic of presupposition 
itself, will become transparent. 
7.3 Hide and Seek with Epistemic Modalities 
Imagine the following situation, which is very like an example considered by Veltman 
in [Ve86]. The difference is that he had misplaced his marbles, whereas I have lost a 
number of women. 
Anna is seeking Bertha, Clothilde and Daisy, and for our benefit she is recording 
her thoughts on a small portable cassette recorder. 
Anna has searched almost everywhere, and she knows that the only remaining 
hiding places are the cupboard (which is not in the attic) and the attic (which is 
not in the cupboard.) 
Only one person fits in the cupboard. 
Anna, having heard some noises, knows that somebody is in the cupboard. 
Let us consider what we would expect to find on Anna's tape, restricting our atten-
tion to discourses involving interesting mixtures of connectives and epistemic modalities, 
as they might occur when Anna tells us what she has found out. Firstly, look at the fol-
lowing two examples involving conjunctions, which I take to include sentence sequencing 
as well as the particle 'and', the word 'perhaps', which I take to mark epistemic possi-
bility, and 'must' which seems to act as a sort of epistemic necessity operator: 
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E175 Perhaps it is Bertha in the cupboard and . . . it is Clothilde in the cupboard. Got you! 
So Bertha must be in the attic. 
It is Clothilde in the cupboard and . .. perhaps it is Bertha in the cupboard. So Bertha 
must be in the attic. 
It is quite plausible that we might find E175, but by contrast it is hard to imagine an 
occurrence of the discourse in E176. The reason for this is clear. As Anna learns about 
where everybody is hiding, she gradually eliminates possibilities. So what is possible 
at one point may not be possible after the addition of new information. However, the 
reverse does not hold. So long as Anna has not been in anyway deluded, and provided 
she is suitably cautious in her reasoning process and does not make any unwarranted 
eliminations of possibilities, then the addition of new information can never increase the 
number of open possibilities. 
The only significant difference between examples E175 and E176 seems to be in the 
ordering of conjuncts, and this will motivate the definition of an asymmetric conjunction. 
We will also need to define epistemic operators that are sensitive to the local context of 
interpretation. Thus the meaning of a sentence 'A and B', or a sequence of sentences 'A. 
B.', will be expressed as an update with A followed by an update with B. An occurrence 
of 'perhaps A' at a particular point in a discourse will mean that at that point in the 
discourse the possibility of A remains, and we will take 'must A' to mean that at the 
phrase's point of occurrence, the possibility of A being false has been excluded. 
Next, consider a case involving a conditional: 
Daisy might be in the cupboard. So if Daisy is not in the cupboard, then she might 
be in the cupboard. 
We could not account for this data by interpreting the conditional as material im-
plication, and taking 'perhaps' and 'must' to be standard, say S5, modal possibility and 
necessity operators using the same modal accessibility relation. Under such static as-
sumptions the consequents of conditionals would be evaluated with respect to the same 
context (i.e. the same possible world) as the conditionals as a whole. The intuitively 
invalid argument in E177 would be valid in the standard picture, since if it was pos-
sible that Daisy was in the cupboard, then any conditional with an expression of this 
possibility in the consequent would be true.4 
41 mention S5 merely as an example. In fact, the data given here are not predicted by any of the 
logics in the standard modal hierarchy, such as K, T or S4. The difference between examples E175 and 
E176 is one of ordering. Depending on translation, this may be ordering of conjuncts or ordering of 
premises in an argument. Either way, the logics K-S5 do not predict a difference, since in these logics 
permutation of conjunctions and permutation of premises both preserve argument validity or invalidity. 
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E178 Clothilde is in the attic. Now although Bertha might be hiding in the cupboard, and 
might be hiding in the attic, I conclude that if Daisy is not hiding in the cupboard 
then Bertha must be hiding there, and if Daisy is hiding in the cupboard then Bertha 
must be hiding in the attic. 
By contrast E178 is a valid argument, but would appear invalid on the standard 
picture. Standardly, E178 would come to imply that: 
L There are accessible worlds where Bertha is in the cupboard, 
There are accessible worlds where Bertha is in the attic, 
Daisy is in the attic implies that Bertha is in the cupboard in all accessible worlds, 
Daisy is in the cupboard implies that Bertha is in the attic in all accessible worlds. 
Suppose that Daisy was in the cupboard. Then (iv) could only be true if Bertha 
was in the cupboard in all accessible worlds, which contradicts (ii). On the other hand, 
suppose that Daisy was not in the cupboard. Then (iii) could only be true if Bertha was 
in the attic in all accessible worlds, which contradicts (i). The relevant cases being thus 
exhausted, the discourse as a whole would appear logically inconsistent. However, this 
is at odds with our intuitions, for it seems that E178, although somewhat convoluted, 
is a perfectly reasonable thing for Anna to say. 
Such examples support an analysis of the conditional as an assertion of the conse-
quent under the assumption of the antecedent: this will be stated more formally below. 
Thus, concerning the conditional in E178, the assumption that Daisy was in the cup-
board, would exclude the possibility that she was not there, and the conditional would 
not be supported by the given assumptions. In E178 whilst Anna is still open to the 
possibility that Bertha is in the cupboard, under the additional assumption that Daisy is 
in the cupboard she is prepared to assert that Bertha is not in the cupboard. Similarly, 
As fax as E177 is concerned, standard translation into modal logic would produce a valid argument. 
This is easily seen: translate E177 as having premise 0 and conclusion 0 -+ . This form is classically 
valid, and remains valid in the all modal logics which are generated from K by addition of axioms. In 
these logics it is irrelevant to the validity of this inference that the q formula is modalised (she might 
be in the cupboard'). Note also that Hintikka's proposal [Hi62] to translate all sentences as intrinsically 
epistemic by embedding them under a belief operator has no direct bearing on the issue since it does 
not introduce any order sensitivity into the logic (two arguments which, like E175 and E176, differ only 
by permutation are not distinguished) and does not affect the validity of the argument in E177 (since in 
Hintikka's S4 Bç1 = B( - ) regardless of whether q'  is itself a modal statement). Note that Hintikka's 
motivation for assuming embedding under an extra belief operator arose from Moore's paradox, which 
concerns the oddity of utterances of discourses like The cat is on the mat. I don't believe that the cat 
is on the mat.' Clearly the oddity of such a discourse must be linked to the oddity of The cat is on 
the mat. It might not be on the mat.', which is analogous to the first sentence of E176 (in the special 
context assumed). However, Moore's paradox does not involve making distinctions between permuted 
variants like the first sentences of E175 and E176, and thus the literature on Moore's paradox impinges 
only indirectly on the data analysed here. For recent discussion of Moore's paradox, see e.g. Blok's 
dissertation [Blo93, p.125-128]. 
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whilst she is open to the possibility that Bertha is in the attic, under the assumption 
that Daisy is in the attic it would have to be the case - since she would have no other 
open possibilities - that Bertha is in the cupboard. 
I will not discuss the meaning of negation in detail. Suffice it to say that we must 
define a negation consistent with our picture of an agent gradually eliminating possibili-
ties. It must predict that in a case like E179, when we hear Anna telling us the negation 
of Daisy is in the cupboard', we need no longer consider alternatives where Daisy is 
in the cupboard. And, considering examples like E180 - I leave the reader to invent 
some more, or search for counter-examples, according to taste - it should predict that 
epistemic possibility and necessity behave as logical duals. 
E179? Daisy is not in the cupboard. Perhaps Daisy is in the cupboard. 
E180 Daisy might not be in the cupboard. So it's not the case that Daisy must be in the 
cupboard. 
7.4 Update Logic (UL) 
To meet the requirements of the data presented above, I will define a logic along the lines 
of one presented by Veltman [Ve86]. The significant difference will be syntactic, in that 
I will allow arbitrarily deep embeddings of the epistemic modalities whereas Veltman 
prefers to keep his modalities near the surface. 
For the moment I will restrict myself to a propositional language defined over some 
set of atomic formulae, such as the proposition that Bertha is in the cupboard and the 
proposition that she is in the attic. I will let P stand for the set of atomic propositions. 
Unlike in the Tarskian scheme, where semantics concerns itself with determining 
the truth or falsity of propositions, the main concern of Update Logic is the potential 
of a proposition to change an agent's information state. An information state will be 
identified with the range of open possibilities an agent has with regard to her knowledge 
of reality. Each open possibility, or possible world, will provide a complete picture 
of reality. To this end a proposition will be identified with a set of possible worlds, 
intuitively the set of worlds in which the proposition is true, and an information state 
will be a set of possible worlds. 
Definition D20 (Models for UL) A model of UL is a pair (W, F) where W is a set 
of possible worlds and F is an interpretation function mapping propositional constants 
to sets of worlds. 
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Definition D21 (Information in UL) An information state (context) in UL is a sub-
set of W. Thus the minimal information state is W itself, which will also be written 
7=, and the maximal information state is the empty set of worlds, also written [. Non-
maximal information states will be called consistent. 
Definition D22 (Syntax of UL) The sentences of an Update Logic restricted to the 
propositions in 7 are formed in the usual way from the atomic formulae in 7, the unary 
operators NOT, MIGHT, MUST and the binary connectives AND and IMPLIES. We will 
use p, q as metavariables over atomic formulae, and 0, 'çl' as metavariables over arbitrary 
sentences of UL. 
The above definitions seem to assume worlds as ontological primitives. However, 
Veitman's system has a more syntactic flavour, in that worlds are not basic but identified 
with sets of atomic formulae. To see how a set of atomic formulae can be equated with 
a possible world think of the atomic formulae in the set as those which are true in that 
world, and those not in the set as false in that world. Later, when we work through 
some examples, it will be useful to view worlds in this syntactic light, and the following 
definition gives a method of constructing the appropriate models: 
Definition D23 (Term Models for UL) A term model for UL over the atomic for-
mulae P is a pair (W, F) where W is the powerset of P and F is a function such that 
ifpEl' and wEW then wEF(p) iffpEw. 
Now we are in a position to define the semantics of UL. The meaning of an expression 
of UL, written 101 will be defined as a relation, written in infix notation, between two 
information states, intuitively an input and an output state. In general we should think 
of this relation as holding between a given pair of states just in case when we are in the 
first state the new information could leave us in the second state: 
Definition D24 (Update) If crqJi- then T is said to be an update of a with 0. 
In fact, in the following definition all UL formulae will denote relations which are 
total functions on the domain of information states, and I have diverged superficially 
from Veltman by specifying the semantics relationally rather than functionally: this will 
become important later. Another notational point: iteration of update relations will be 
allowed, such that çbT/jV will mean that both 0iOJT and TbV hold .5 
5Note that although this is a common convention of iteration, for instance being used in statements 
like "x > y > z", it is not the only convention used in logic. For example, "o V b V x" although 
ambiguous, would never be used to mean "(0 V ) A ( V k)". 
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Definition D25 (Semantics of UL) For all models M and information states a, r, 
the relation 	(sub- and super-scripts omitted where unambiguous) is given recursively 
by: 
 0i[Patomic]IT if T{wEaIweF(p)} 
 U 	AND b]T if 3V aq]vbJft 
 cTNOTT if 3V aq]v A r=a\v 
 01RO IMPLIES 	r if oNOT (0 AND ( NOT 	))Jjr 
 aE{MIGHTr if 3Va[qv A 
(vL-r=a) A 
 aI[MUSTqT if 3vaq]1v A 
(v = a —* r = a) A 
(v :Aa -+ T = ±) 
Let us consider the clauses of definition D25 individually: 
Atomic Formulae The base case of the recursion says that to update an infor-
mation state with an atomic formulae, you must remove all those worlds in that 
state which are incompatible with the new proposition, and what remains is the 
outgoing state. 
Conjunction The meaning of a conjunction is defined as a relational composition 
between the meanings of the conjuncts. This definition corresponds to the informal 
analysis above suggesting that to update with a conjunction, you should update 
with the first conjunct, and then with the second. 
Negation This is defined in terms of a set complement operation. We find those 
worlds in the input state which are compatible with the negated proposition, and 
the output state is what remains after removing these worlds from the input. 
Implication Implication is defined using a standard equivalence, and it is the fact 
that a dynamic conjunction is used within that equivalence that gives the impli-
cation its dynamic flavour. In particular, the consequent is only evaluated in the 
context set up by a previous assertion of the antecedent. 
Epistemic Possibility There are two cases to be considered in the definition of 
the MIGHT-operator, which corresponds to Veltman's "might" operator. Either the 
propositional complement of the MIGHT corresponds to one of the open possibilities 
in the incoming information state (which is established by attempting to update 
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with the argument and checking that the result is not the absurd state) in which 
case the outgoing state is identified with the incoming one, or else the complement 
is already falsified by the incoming state, in which case the result is absurdity. 
(6) Epistemic Necessity Again there are two relevant cases. Either adding the com-
plementary proposition would not remove any worlds from the incoming state, in 
which case the complementary proposition "must" hold in the input state and the 
outgoing state is again identified with the incoming one, or else the complement 
would remove some worlds. In this case the complement is not yet established, it 
is clearly false that the complement "must" be true in the incoming state, and the 
final result is absurdity. 
There are several notions of entailment that can be appropriate to a dynamic logic 
like UL, and for discussion the reader is referred to [Ve91]. The definition below says that 
a sequence of UL premises entails a conclusion just in case the relational composition 
of the meanings of the premises has in its range only fixed points of the conclusion. In 
other words, once we have updated any information state with all the premises, updating 
with the conclusion would add no new information. 
Definition D26 (Entailment in UL) 
if V0,0, . . . , 
0`0112]1 ... 	-4 
The following clause gives a derivative notion of entailment against a particular 
background of assumptions: 
Definition D27 (Contextual Entailment in UL) If a is an information state, then: 
/) if 
a171521 ... bjo - a'çbjJo 
Examples 
We will now consider some simple-minded translations of examples E175 - E180 above. 
We will confine ourselves to an update language restricted to the six atomic formulae 
be, cc, dc, ba, ca and da, which concern who is hiding where. For instance bc is the propo-
sition that Bertha is hiding in the Cupboard, and da is the proposition that Daisy is 
hiding in the Attic. In the translations below I have ignored the presuppositional com-
ponent of the it-clefts in some of the examples, and have also ignored the propositional 
content of Got you!'. Further, I have treated discourses of the form A. So B.' and 'A. 
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I conclude that B.' as consisting of two parts, an assertion of the content of A, and a 
meta-level assertion that A entails B in the context o of the given assumptions. In 
the following discussion, the context u will correspond to the hide-and-seek situation 
described at the beginning of §7.3. 
Firstly the cases motivating the asymmetric definition of conjunction: 
	
E175 a. 	Perhaps it is Bertha in the cupboard and . . . it is Clothilde in the cupboard. Got 
you! So Bertha must be in the attic. 
b. 	MIGHTbc AND cc, (MIGHTbc AND cc 	MUSTba) 
E176 a. ?It is Clothilde in the cupboard and ... perhaps it is Bertha in the cupboard. So 
Bertha must be in the attic. 
b. 	ccAND MIGHTbc, (CCAND MIGHTbc = MUSTba) 
In explaining the contrast between these two examples (and also for the discussion 
of the remaining examples), we will need to consider what would happen to our infor-
mation state as we heard them playing on Anna's cassette recorder. It will be helpful to 
construct the relevant information states using the term model over the above six atomic 
formulae. A world will be a subset Of the six atomic propositions, and an information 
state will be a set of such worlds. 
However, since we already know that one person cannot be in two places at once, and 
that each person is in at least one place, our initial information state need not contain 
surreal possible worlds like { ba, bc, Ca, cc}, which would depict Bertha and Clothilde as 
being in both, the cupboard and the attic, and Daisy as being nowhere. Furthermore 
we know that only one person fits in the cupboard, so we can eliminate possible worlds 
like { bc, cc, dc}, which would paint a picture of a very crowded cupboard indeed. And 
one more piece of information: somebody is in the cupboard. The only three possible 
worlds compatible with all this information are wl = { ba, ca, dc}, w2 = {ba, cc, da} and 
1113 = {bc, ca, dal, and if we initially have just this information, our information state 
will be {w1, W2,  W3}. 
Now consider the effect of updating this information with the formulae in E175b. 
The reader should verify that the only possible sequence of information states starting 
with {wi, w2, w31 is: 
E175 c. 	{w1, W2, w3}E{MIGHTbc{wi, w2,  w3}cc]I{w2}MusTba{w2} 
On the other hand, the only possible sequence of states resulting from an update 
with the formulae in E176b, and starting from the same initial state is: 
E176 c. {w, W2, w3}cc{w2}MIGHTbcLMusTba]1± 
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Thus the oddity of E176 arises because updating a state which does not allow for the 
possibility of ba with the proposition MIGHTba yields a contradictory information state. 
Regarding the conditionals in E177 and E178, we see that the contextual entailment 
in the first is not valid, since in the context of {w, W2,  W3}, 
I[( NOT dc) IMPLIES MIGHTdc is not a fixed point, but the contextual entailment in the 
second is valid since {wl, w31 is a fixed point of: 
I[ (( NOT dc) IMPLIES MUSTbc) AND (dcIMPLIEs MUST ba)]1 
E177 a. ?Daisy might be in the cupboard. So if Daisy is not in the cupboard, then she 
might be in the cupboard. 
	
b. 	MIGHTdc, (MIGHTdc 	(NOT dc) IMPLIES MIGHTdc) 
C. 	{wi, w2, w3}MIGHTdc{wi, w2, w3 } 
1( NOT  dc) IMPLIES MIGHTdc]1{wi} 
E178 a. 	Clothilde is in the attic. Now although Bertha might be hiding in the cupboard, 
and might be hiding in the attic, I conclude that if Daisy is not hiding in the 
cupboard then Bertha must be hiding there, and if Daisy is hiding in the cupboard 
then Bertha must be hiding in the attic. 
b. 	ca, (ca AND MIGHTbC AND MIGHTba = 
((NOT dc) IMPLIES MUSTbc) AND (dc IMPLIES MUSTba)) 
C . 	{W1, w2, w3}ca{w1, w31(MIGH'rbc) AND MIGHTbaflwi, w3 } 
[(( NOT dc) IMPLIES MUSTbc) AND (dc IMPLIES MUST ba){wi, W31 
We have already considered some examples involving negation, so it should by now 
be clear to the reader why E179 is anomalous. The statement that Daisy is not in the 
cupboard' removes any alternatives in which Daisy was in the cupboard, and the following 
assertion that there still remains the possibility of Daisy being in the cupboard leads to 
absurdity. 
E179 a. ?Daisy is not in the cupboard. Perhaps Daisy is in the cupboard. 
(NOT dc) AND MIGHTdc 
{w1, w2, W31 I[ NOT dc{w2, W31MIGHTdC± 
However, E180 adds something new to the discussion, since it involves a negation 
outscoping an epistemic modality: 
E180 a. 	Daisy might not be in the cupboard. So it's not the case that Daisy must be in 
the cupboard. 
b. 	MIGHT NOT dc, (MIGHT NOT dc 	NOT MUSTdc) 
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C. 	{w, W2,  W3} MIGHT NOT dc{wi, w2, w31 NOT MUSTdcflw1, 'wa, w} 
That E180 is consistent follows from the fact that the first and second sentences of 
E180 translate into equivalent formulae of UL. This, of course, is just one example of a 
more general equivalence, namely that MIGHT and MUST are logical duals: 
Fact F3 For any formula q and information states a , 
aMUSTT if aI[  NOT  (MIGHT(  NOT  ))]1T 
Proof: From the definitions of NOT and MIGHT it can be seen that: 
crE{MIGHT(NOTr if 	val[cb}v A 
(v 	a -* r = a) A 
Using the definition of NOT once more we obtain: 
a NOT (MIGHT( NOT q))Jft if 	vaE[qv A 
(va—r=±) A 
(v = a -* r = a) 
But this is just the definition of MUST. 
To understand how examples like E180 constrain the definition of negation, we need 
only consider alternative possible definitions which would be consistent with the classical 
picture of negation, but not preserve the logical duality of the dynamic modal operators. 
For instance, we could have defined negation by: 
Definition D28 (Pointwise Negation) 
01I[cb]1r if r={wEaI{w}} 
This negation is pointwise in that it looks at the individual worlds in the incoming 
state, and checks which ones are incompatible with the negated proposition. Using such 
a negation would not have affected examples E175 - E179, since it is easily verified that 
it is equivalent with the earlier negation provided the negated proposition contains no 
epistemic modalities. But the entailment in E180 would not have held, since the con-
clusion would no longer be a fixed point in the context set up by the premise, as is seen 
from the following sequence of updates: 
{w1, W2,  W3 } MIGHTj dc {W1, W2,  W3 } MUSTdc {w2, w3}. In fact we would have the un-
likely equivalence: OMIGHTO =_ OMUSTOj4. The original definition of negation, in 
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which the negated proposition is evaluated with respect to the entire incoming context 
rather than just its parts, is clearly preferable. 
7.5 A Presupposition Operator 
The dynamic account above leads to a straightforward characterisation of the CCP 
notion of presupposition. A context can only be updated with a sentence if the presup-
positions of the sentence are already satisfied in the context. More formally: 
Definition D29 (Satisfaction) A context a satisfies a formula 0 if = 	(or equiv- 
alently 	ja.) 
Definition D30 (Admission) A context a admits (can be updated with) a formula 0 
if there is a context r such that aNT. 
Definition D31 (Presupposition) A formula 0 presupposes a formula 0 if for 
all contexts a, if a admits q  then a satisfies 
In these terms, the formulae of UL carry no non-trivial presuppositions, since every 
context can be updated with any formula of UL. This is because the meanings of UL 
formulae define the equivalent of total functions on the domain of contexts. However, I 
will now extend UL with a single unary operator which allows us to restrict the incoming 
contexts for which an update is defined. In the resulting Partial Update Logic (PUL), 
some formulae will define the equivalent of partial functions on the domain of contexts. 
Definition D32 (Models for PUL) As for UL. 
Definition D33 (Information in PUL) As for UL. 
Definition D34 (Syntax of PUL) As for UL but with an additional unary operator, 
8, "the presupposition operator". 
Definition D35 (Semantics of PUL) As for UL but with the following additional 
clause: 
aI[8  r if r = a A a q Jj a 
Definition D36 (Entailment and Contextual entailment in PUL) As for UL. 
The presupposition operator 0 is reminiscent of the modal operator MUST defined 
previously. Given any formula 0 which itself contains no presuppositions, both 00 and 
MUST4 have the same fixed points as 0. That is, for all states a, if aqJJa then a8a 
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and a{MUSTq]jo-. However, the two operators differ with respect to the non-fixed points 
	
of 0 - 	that is the states a such that there is a state r 	a for which aI[r.  The 
presupposition operator will not define a transition for such points. That is, if a is a 
non-fixed point of 0 then a does not admit 0. On the other hand, the necessity operator 
does define a transition for the non-fixed points: for any state a which is not a fixed 
point of q, we have that aMUST}JL. So the 8-operator is importantly different from 
the MUST-operator in that all contexts admit MUST, whereas no consistent context for 
which updating with MUSTO would yield an absurd state admits 80. 
I will now show how the presupposition operator can be used to reproduce the CCP 
treatment of presupposition as it concerns the examples from §7.1. Consider E165a 
together with the suggested translation in E165b: 
E165 a. 	Anna realises that Bertha is hiding. 
b. 	ôbih AND cb&bih 
C. 	ôbih AND cbabih = bih 
I have assumed two atomic formulae in this translation, bih, the proposition that 
'Bertha Is Hiding', and cb_&bih, the proposition that Anna' has 'Come-to-Believe' that 
'Bertha is Hiding'. The translation is given as a conjunction of the presupposition that 
Bertha is hiding together with the assertion that Anna has come to believe this. I have 
used a similar translation scheme for E166: 
E166 a. 	Anna does not realise that Bertha is hiding. 
b. 	NOT (8bih AND cba.bih) 
C. 	NOT (DbihAND cbabih) = bih 
In these translations I have been intentionally naive with respect to the lexical se-
mantics of realises', and I would not wish to defend a general strategy of dividing the 
meaning of a mentalistic factive verb into one presupposed proposition and one asserted 
proposition about someone's mental state. The same strategy seems particularly prob-
lematic in the case of the verb 'regret', a verb so intrinsically intensional that it is almost 
impossible to isolate a purely mental component for it in ordinary English. The best 
I could manage was the strange circumlocution 'negative vibes arising from belief.' But 
for the moment it will be helpful to assume this division of meaning, as it will make 
the logical behaviour of presuppositions transparent. In the next chapter I will offer an 
approach to the lexical semantics of factives which is more abstract, and does not rest 
upon this assumption. 
Crucially, both the entailments in E165c and E166c are valid in Partial Update Logic. 
If a formula presupposes (in the technical sense of definition D31) that Bertha is hiding, 
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then (i) the formula entails that Bertha is hiding, and (ii) the negation of the formula 
entails that Bertha is hiding. In fact a negated formula always carries precisely the same 
presuppositions (i.e. the set of propositions which are presupposed in the above technical 
sense) as its positive counterpart. Thus PUL preserves the characteristic behaviour of 
presuppositions under negation. 
Since an understanding of this behaviour is essential to the remainder of the thesis, I 
will go though the entailments in E165c and E166c in detail. Given a PUL term model 
restricted to the two propositions bih and cb_a_bih, information states will be subsets of 
the following four worlds: 
A = {bih, cb_a_bih} 
B = {bih} 
C = {cb_a_bih} 
D=O 
Firstly let us consider the denotation of the first sub-formula in E165b, 8bih. From 
definition D25, the meaning of bih is given by: 
ojbih'r if 'r={w En I bihw} 
Definition D35 allows us to calculate from this the denotation of i9bih: 
aabih]1r if r = a and c4bih}jo if r = a and Vw E a bih E w 
This relation is equivalent to a set of pairs of states, where each state is expressed 
in terms of the four worlds A - D: 
j0bih 	J(JA, B}, {A, B}), ({A}, {A}), ({B}, {B}), (L,J)} 
Utilising definition D25 again, we can calculate the denotation of the whole formula: 
alJabihAND cbabihr if 	v a8bihvcbabihr 
if VwEa bih Ew and 
r = {w e a I cbabih E w} 
Again this can be written as an equivalent set of pairs: 
3bihAND cbabih 	{({A, B}, {A}), ({Al, {A}), ({B}, ), (, j)} 
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It can be easily verified that the formula entails both bih and cb_a_bih, since both 
of the possible output states (i.e. the right-hand members of the pairs in 11) {A} and 
are fixed points of bih and cba_bih. Similarly we can calculate the denotation of the 
formula in E166b: 
o NOT (Dbih AND cbaJih)r if 3v cr8bihAND cbabihv and r = o\v 
Expressing this as a set of pairs, in 13 below, shows that the only information states 
that can result from updating with E166b are {B} and I: 
j{ôbihAND cb_a_bih 	{({A, B}, {B}), ({A},±'), ({B}, {B}), (j, .j} 
These two output states are once again fixed points of bih, so the entailment that bih 
is preserved. Indeed, all the possible input states (i.e. the left-hand members of the pairs 
in 13) are also fixed points of bih, which shows that the formula in E166b presupposes 
bih as well as entailing it. The same holds for E165b - all the possible inputs of the 
formula are fixed points of bih. However, E166b differs from E165b in that the output 
states of E166b are not fixed points of cba_bih, but of NOT cba.bih. Thus E166a) is 
seen to presuppose that Bertha is hiding, and assert that Anna has not come to believe 
this. 
Before proceeding to the remaining examples, a comment is in order about the 
translations in E165b and E166b. Both of these translations involved an asymmetric 
conjunction, and derivation of the correct presuppositional behaviour depended crucially 
on the ordering of the conjuncts. This seems unnatural, for it is not obvious why there. 
should be any preferred ordering of these conjuncts which essentially derive from the 
lexical semantics of a single verb rather than from any surface ordering of lexical items. 
However, it is quite possible to introduce a second, static conjunction into PUL: 
Definition D37 (Static Conjunction) 
OrEo &r if Dp,vp and crbv and r=vflp 
If the dynamic conjunctions in E165b and E166b were replaced with this static 
conjunction, the same presuppositional behaviour would result, and the ordering of the 
conjuncts would be irrelevant. With this additional connective, a sensible strategy might 
be to translate surface occurrences of 'and', 'but' and sentence sequencing in terms of 
the dynamic conjunction, and to make all other conjunctions static. My reasons for not 
pursuing this strategy here are pedagogical - one type of conjunction is enough for 
current purposes. 
Let us now consider some more examples from §7.1. The entailments in E169c, E170c 
and E171c) show that in PUL if a formula contains a presupposed proposition embedded 
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within the antecedent of a conditional, or within an operator of epistemic possibility, or 
within another presuppositional construction, then the formula as a whole will entail the 
presupposed proposition. Thus the PUL analysis correctly predicts that all the three 
examples entail that Bertha is hiding. 
In the translations, awfb is the proposition that 'Anna Will Find Bertha', and 
NVB_B_(a_bih&cb_a_bih is the proposition that 'Bertha' has 'Negative Vibes' arising from 
her 'Belief' that Anna realises that Bertha is hiding: 
	
E169 a. 	If Anna realises that Bertha is hiding, then she will find her. 
b. 	(8bih AND cb_a_bih) IMPLIES awfb 
C. 	(8bih AND cb_a.bih) IMPLIES awfb 1= bih 
E170 a. 	Anna might realise that Bertha is hiding. 
b. 	MIGHT(Ôbih AND cba..bih) 
C. 	MIGHT(8bihAND cbabih) = bih 
E171 a. 	Bertha regrets that Anna realises that she is hiding. 
b. 	a(abih AND cb&bih) AND NVB_B_(8_bih&cb_a_bih) 
C. 	U(8bih AND cbabih) AND NVB_B_(a_bih&cba_bih) = bih AND cb_a_bih 
As a final illustration of PUL, we consider two examples where an embedded pre-
supposition is not projected. Example E172 shows the standard weak predictions of 
the CCP model with respect to presuppositions embedded in the consequent of a con-
ditional. As shown in E172c, the conditional in E172a does not entail that Bertha is in 
the attic. We only have the weaker entailment shown in E172d, that if Bertha is not in 
the kitchen then she is in the attic. Note that whilst this behaviour seems appropriate 
for the conditional in E172a, similar CCP predictions for other conditionals have often 
been criticised. In a later chapter it will be shown how this aspect of the CCP model 
can be defended. 
E172 a. 	If Bertha is not in the kitchen, then Anna realises that Bertha is in the attic. 
b. 	(NOT bc) IMPLIES (aba AND cb.a...ba) 
C. 	(NOT bc) IMPLIES (aba AND cbaba) 	ba 
d. 	(NOT bc) IMPLIES (aba AND cbaba) = (NOT bc) IMPLIES ba 
Any PUL information state will admit E174b, so that the sentence as a whole carries 
no presupposition. The reason should by now be familiar. The second clause is evaluated 
in the context set up by previous evaluation of the first clause. Since updating with the 
sub-formula bih results in a context containing only worlds in which Bertha is hiding, and 
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since the sub-formula corresponding to the second clause, 09bih AND cb_a_bih is defined 
on all such contexts, the whole formula will be admitted by any incoming context. And 
if a formula is admitted by any context, then it has no presuppositions. 
	
E174 a. 	Perhaps Bertha is hiding and Anna realises that Bertha is hiding. 
b. 	MIGHT(bih AND 8bihAND cb&bih) 
C. 	MIGHT(bih AND 0bih AND cb_a_bih) bih 
The N-bird Problem 
The main aim of this chapter was to provide sufficient introduction to dynamic semantics 
for the reader to appreciate how that approach may be applied to presupposition and 
to other phenomena. Secondarily, I hope to have shown that, in principle, the theory 
of interpretation underlying the CCP model of presupposition can be independently 
motivated in terms of extraneous semantic phenomena. I have considered only one of 
these phenomena, namely the behaviour of epistemic modality. However, the treatment 
of epistemic modality is far from being the only non-presuppositional motivation for 
a dynamic semantics. A far better established motivation is the treatment of donkey 
and discourse anaphora, and in the following chapters I make some attempt at the 
harder "3-bird" problem, combining a treatment of presupposition and modality with 
a Groenendijk & Stokhof-style treatment of anaphora. An account of presupposition 
along the lines I have sketched also has potential for a dynamic treatment of focus, as 
shown in [Krif92]. But the search must continue for the semanticist's stone, that single 
theory of information with which we could knock any arbitrary collection of problems 
in the theory of Natural Language meaning straight out of the sky. 
Chapter 8 
A Bit Like English 
8.1 Introduction 
The system (ABLE) to be described in this chapter and the next, which will form the 
basis of the fragment to be defined in Chapter sec:lgr, brings together ideas from many 
sources. The account of presupposition, is a further development of that in [Bea92], 
which is based on the earlier work of Heim [Hei83a] and Karttunen (e.g. [Kar73]); the 
theory of anaphora descends from that of Kamp [Kam8l], Heim [Hei82], Groenendijk 
and Stokhof [GS91a] and Dekker [Dek92]; the dynamic approach to quantification is 
based on the work of Dekker [Dek92], Chierchia [Ch92] and Groenendijk and Stokhof 
[GS91a, GS91b]; and the account of epistemic modality, which extends Veitman's [Ve91] 
might operator as incorporated in UL and PUL systems of Chapter 7 to the predicate 
level, arose from collaboration with those of the above who are Amsterdam colleagues.' 
I will follow Muskens [Mus90] in preferring classical type theory over Montague's 
variant IL as a formalism appropriate to the embedding of dynamic semantics in an 
otherwise Montagovian theory of meaning. IL is a designer logic. Montague's aim 
was to build a formalism that reflected his Fregean view of meaning, and intertwined 
ideas from modal logic and type theory so as to reflect that view. Thus the underlying 
formalism Montague created is inextricably tied to the application Montague had in 
mind. For that very reason, any attempt to model a qualitatively different account of 
meaning using IL is fraught with problems. More particularly, in the last decade or so, 
much effort has gone into theories of meaning which are partial and/or dynamic, but 
the theory of meaning Montague had in mind was both total and static. 
For this reason, it has been generally recognised that IL was not handed down on 
stone tablets, and is open to modification or replacement. Thus Muskens [Mus90] has 
introduced a variant of type theory to model partiality, and Groenendijk and Stokhof 
'Thus Dekker, Groenendijk, Stokhof and Veltman. 
153 
A Bit Like English 	 154 
[GS91b] have utilised a variant of IL developed by Janssen in order to model dynamics. 
However, I think it is clear that whilst some alternative to IL is required, the needless 
multiplication of semantic formalisms is to be avoided. Fortunately, one does not have 
to look far in order to find an existing formalism adequate to my purposes: classical 
type theory, apart from having a much cleaner logic than IL, is well suited to modeling 
the dynamics of natural language. 
To be more precise, the advantage of classical type theory over IL in the remainder of 
this thesis is as follows. I will want to reason formally about information and information 
states, and possible worlds will be involved in the specification of these states. However, 
in IL it is difficult to reason explicitly about possible worlds, since intensional objects 
are cloaked by special syntactic restrictions which prevent the use of objects of type s 
(i.e. possible worlds). In type theory, there is no restriction as to which types can be 
represented syntactically by constants and variables, and the full apparatus of functional 
abstraction and application is available over all types. Thus, in type theory, it is possible 
to be explicit about possible worlds (and other aspects of information states) where in 
IL one would have to use ad hoc and round-about trickery. 
This chapter will be taken up with an initial definition of the semantics for a lan-
guage A Bit Like English, or ABLE. ABLE is a first order language in the tradition of 
DPL, EDPL and KPL.2 That is to say, it is a dynamic logic based around a language 
sufficiently close to English that those with imagination and faith can easily believe that 
formulae are compositionally derivable from the English sentences they are supposed to 
represent. 
Definition D38 (Syntax of ABLE) Given a set of predicates Pconsisting of unary 
predicates 'P', binary predicates P2 and attitude predicates pa,  a language 'CABLE is 
given by recursion over the following set of rewrite rules, where all brackets are optional: 
2These abbreviations are for, respectively, the Dynamic Predicate Logic of Groenendijk and Stokhof 
[GS91a], the Eliminative Dynamic Predicate Logic of Dekker [Dek93], and finally my Kinematic Predi-
cate Logic [Bea92]. 
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dm = 1121... 
det ===> SOME I THE I EVERY I NO I MOST I FEW I EXACTLY-ONE 
form = P1.dm IP2.dm.dm I padm (form) 
(dm isdm) I (det.dm.form.form)  I 
(form AND form) I (form OR form) I (form IMPLIES form) 
(NOT form) I (MIGHT form) I (MUST form) 
In the following sections of this chapter I will firstly discuss some general and meta-
theoretical considerations, before tackling the various basic components of ABLE one 
at a time. In Chapter 9 it will be shown how this basic apparatus can be applied to the 
study of presupposition and epistemic modality. Those who lack imagination or faith 
will hopefully be appeased by Chapter 10, where it will be shown how ABLE can be 
utilised in the definition of a compositional grammar fragment. 
8.2 	Some, Metatheory 
Throughout Chapters 8-10, classical type theory will play much the same role as IL 
does in PTQ: it will be the vehicle for the formal expression of meaning. In Chapters 
8 and 9 it will be used to specify the semantics of ABLE, and in Chapter 10 it will be 
used to specify the semantics of a fragment of English. The motivation for having used 
type theory to give the semantics of ABLE will be made clear in Chapter 10. 
Definition D39 (Three Sorted Type Theory) Ty3 is a three sorted type theory along 
the lines of Gallin's Ty23 /Ga1751, which itself is a reformulation of Russell's Theory of 
Types, having the normal apparatus of abstraction, function application, existential and 
universal quantification over objects of every type, and standard truth functional connec-
tives, as well as a number of distinguished constants to be introduced in the remainder 
of the thesis. The symbol ". ", which will be used left-associatively, will denote function 
application. 
The types are given by the category TYPE in the following recursion, in which d, e, w 
and t are, respectively, the types of discourse referents, individuals, possible worlds and 
truth values: 
BASIC == dlelwlt 
TYPE = BASIC I (TYPE, TYPE) 
'Also see [GS84] for an application of Ty2, and yet another motivating discussion. 
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Definition D40 (Models) A Model M for Ty3 is a tuple (W, E, 11.11) where W and E 
are non-empty. Each type a is associated with a domain Va, with Vw = W, Vd = IN 
(the natural numbers), Ve = E, V, = {true, false} and domains for the complex types 
being built up recursively from the basic domains such that for all types a and 3, the 
domain 	is the set of functions from Dc. to Vp. The interpretation function 11.11 is 
a mapping from constants of type a to elements of the domain D, with the distinguished 
constants T and I. of type t mapped onto true and false respectively, and any discourse 
marker i (where i must be in IN) mapped to i. 
Rather than independently defining models for ABLE, I will simply let Ty3 models 
also be ABLE models. Using Ty3 models for such a simple language might be felt to be 
overkill, but will be formally adequate. 
ABLE formulae are to be interpreted dynamically, as functions from information 
states to information states. Following Stalnaker [St79] and Veltman [Ve91], factual 
information will be encoded in terms of shrinking sets of possible worlds. At a given point 
in a conversation the information state of a participant will be partially characterised 
by a set of worlds, intuitively those worlds which are compatible with everything that 
has been established up until that point. 
A conversational participant must do a certain amount of bookkeeping in order to 
keep track of what is being talking about. For current purposes it will be assumed 
that what is being talked about - the topics of conversation - are individuals or 
groups of individuals, and not, for instance, properties or propositions. Further, as the 
reader might have expected, it will be assumed that each participant keeps track of 
the conversation using a set of discourse markers. On encountering a new discourse 
topic, for instance introduced by an indefinite noun phrase, a conversational participant 
assigns a discourse marker to that topic. 
I will take a discourse referent or topic to be a public entity, something shared by all 
the conversational participants.4 By contrast I will treat discourse markers as personal 
record-keeping devices private to each conversational participant. In fact, discourse 
markers, as the reader may have gathered from the above definition of Ty3 models, will 
simply be natural numbers. Thus the privacy of discourse markers amounts only to the 
absence of any assumption that different participants use the same markers. 
The relationship between discourse markers and the objects in the model is medi-
ated by what I will call an extended sequence, a simple development of the notion of 
a sequence employed by Heim: where no ambiguity is introduced I will used the terms 
sequence and extended sequence interchangeably. A Heimian sequence is a partial func- 
4The reader is also referred to Dekker's thesis [Dek93] and, developing these ideas further, recent 
work of Groenendijk, Stokhof and Veltman [GSV95, GSV:MS], for some indication of how a system like 
the one here presented lends itself to an account of discourse referents as public objects. 
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tion from discourse markers to objects.' An extended sequence is just a total function 
from discourse markers to sets of objects, and this set will be referred to as the sequence 
valuation of the discourse marker by the sequence. 
Definition D41 (Extended Sequences) Any object of type (d, (e,  t)) is an extended 
sequence, and the type of such an object will be abbreviated as a. 
The sequence valuation of an unused marker is the empty set, and other markers are 
mapped onto singleton or larger sets according to whether they represent one or many 
objects. Strictly I should not talk of sets of objects, since the standard interpretation of 
type theory would make these entities functions from individuals to truth values rather 
than sets, but I find that some things are best understood in terms of functions, and 
some in terms of sets. So I will continue to talk about sets of this or that, but when I 
do so I will usually mean not sets of this or that but rather the characteristic function 
corresponding to a set of this or that, that is a function from the domain of this or that 
into the domain of truth values. There will be similar latitude in my use of the word 
relation: commonly what I will refer to as relations between this and that will be coded 
up in type theory as functions from this into functions from that to truth values. 
Extended sequences can be equated with the states of Groenendijk and Stokhof's 
Dynamic Montague Grammar (DMG) [GS91b] or Muskens' Logic of Change (LoC) 
[Mus9O], since in these systems the only function of an information state is to keep 
track of the values of discourse markers. A first difference to note is that in DMG and 
LoC, states are total assignment functions, whereas here extended sequences are to be 
interpreted as partial assignment functions (i.e. a marker being mapped onto the empty 
set is interpreted as equivalent to the marker not being in the domain of the function) 
albeit encoded in a space of total functions. A second significant difference is that in 
both DMG and LoC states rather than discourse markers are ontologically primary: 
there is a basic domain of states in the models (type s), and discourse markers are 
interpreted as functions from states to individuals (type (s, e), although in DMG this is 
the intensional type corresponding to a discourse marker, and its extension simply has 
type e). 
The motivation for states being basic in DMG and LoC does not appear to be 
philosophical but technical, and stems from consideration of anaphora to objects of types 
other than that of individuals, although neither DMG nor LoC provides any treatment 
51n Heim's work there is some variation as to whether partial or total assignments are used. In [Hei82] 
and [Hei83a] she uses total assignments, but with a distinguished referent to indicate which entities are 
already in the domain of discourse, whilst in [Hei83b] she uses partial assignment functions. Dekker 
[Dek93] recognised that using partial assignments could be of technical benefit in defining logics which 
deal both with anaphora and modality, and so my use of partial assignments could be traced to his work 
as much as to Heim's. 
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of non-individual-typed anaphora. If discourse markers are basic, then, in order to keep 
track of information about high-typed objects in a completely general way, the notion of 
a state has to be complicated so as to provide mappings from discourse markers to the 
high-typed domains. Indeed, if we really want the potential to keep track of arbitrarily 
typed objects, then there will be no single type of state up to the job, since the type 
hierarchy is infinite but individual types are finite. 
The solution suggested by Janssen [Ja84], which is to assume a basic type of states, 
and make discourse markers do the work, is quite general. In order to keep track of 
objects of some type a, simply use discourse markers having (intensional) type (s, a). 
That such an elegant sleight of the mathematical hand should yield an immediate and 
general solution to the problem seems to good to be true, and, indeed, it is. A number 
of technical difficulties arise, most of which can be solved using some relatively simple 
constraints on the structure of the space of information states, but the most serious of 
which requires rather unappetising (although not unreasonable) restrictions to be placed 
on the typed models. The problem is that in a standard (generalised) model for type 
theory (or Montague's IL or Janssen's DIL) there will not in general be enough states to 
store information about arbitrarily typed domains. A simple example is the domain of 
objects of type (s, (s, t)): in a non-trivial model, the cardinality of this domain must be 
greater than the cardinality of the domain of states, s (as can be seen from a standard 
diagonalisation argument). Thus for any discourse marker d of type (s, (s, (s, t))), there 
will always be an object S of type (s, (s, t)) such that there is no state s having the prop-
erty d(s) = S. Clearly this is undesirable, since the whole point of discourse markers is 
that they can stand for any given object in the relevant domain. The solution offered by 
Janssen [Ja90] involves the construction of canonical models. Although there is a sense 
in which discourse markers will still not be able to take arbitrary values, this becomes 
irrelevant for most purposes, since for any assignment of a value to a discourse marker 
expressible in the langiliage, there will always be an appropriate state in a canonical 
model. 
But is such a mathematically general approach really motivated for the analysis 
of natural language? I know of no argument to the effect that there are anaphoric 
expressions in natural language of arbitrary type, and neither Janssen nor Muskens have 
provided evidence for this assumption. I can conceive of only a handful of relevant types, 
and any claim for the existence of anaphora other than to individuals, properties or 
propositions stands in need of defence. Yet even if the number of anaphoric domains was 
thus limited, some might still prefer Janssen's approach, since otherwise an information 
state combining separate mappings of discourse markers into even three distinct domains 
would have a somewhat messy type. 
[T] 2XVPE[V = DO 	 (i) 
TdN aluln4sol 2uiuuaw 
joq axenbs iq4lA popu 
q sA&j jp& sqDeijsqeepquivj jo gdoos alq4 4nq 'sJojJiu13nb jo odoos atp ooxmop o 
sojoiq punoi asn IllAk j S41n2iqure jo oso uj (ji v ) XE uom IIIIA OVO XE oousuf ioj 
jvqq os 'soAtpouuoo odoosno o4 uw1vi axe E Pue  A s1omunb CSj, oq 	°°N puU 
-op oq mou IlyA soouonbos popuoxo qnoqv 2uplljv4.iqj susuoo paqstnuisTp omo 
POAIOAU! oi (uiglqq jo sos io) sJnptATpuT jo 
ioqo s@dSq ou ipq& ui uoiuuoJui 3ljOiqdtuv p 4unoxm ut,  puopp ol lalq!suas UOAO 
puu 'ojqtssod ! )IUN  [ '.iaq4oue io A 	ouj IflPP4PUi  jo sqdS4 juaiajj!p 4snf jg axe 
so!uo 1osd put,  suo!sodoJd 'soqiodoid :oIouo  padS4 ,e jo uodmnss ou Sluom 
-moo si oioq saiaoaT41 ipns Ut ODUIS 'paploAe Ajuouxuxoo ST uoisonb OJOT[M a7ql sopoot 
iodoid U!  'puq iotO aTI4 uo Z2uoleJJ 	InP!A!PU! OIfl pouioouoo UOmJOJ 
-Ui Dijoildvue aiq4 4,eqq auinsse Ajdmts 4ou Sqm uotp 'po)oAU!  si uo!sodoJd io 1iodoid 
OUOEUOUI AJSnOiAoid v jo OJOJiOO IeUP!A!PU! oq 'UOfljOSOi oiioiqdvut,  jo julod aiql It,  
'J! pUI 	0I0fl00 IUP!A!PU! -'!°T O SUO!!SOdOJd pule soiodoid 2uijtjai ioj poi!nboJ 
oq jq2iTu uo!iodo uiqns adS4 omos uoqdrnn qons asSleut,  o4 xopto uj (i 
o) uo!isodoid o(JI! oçj, o) dA  o4 otioqdu oq uo II, dM oip put,  'pup v o 
Di.iotIdtaut,  oq uo ouo, dN  oq snqj jutmouoid i11oid 'sosiqd-unou Aq popom 
oq uo ioqdu Iuoiisodoid  pue vioiqdtuvdA leioiqdt>ue punt oslt, 4nq 'ioqdu in 
-piAlput SJUO ou lqsil2ua Uijvq4 pvjaip si anssi silqj 2uip.10ai uoiop!suoo ltuTj y 
pup 	JAjj U! st,  'sjopom od4 uo uoo!Jsoi 
ge io 'oioi ouop si s (ioAoqJ io) Sioalq4 adS4 ut popoouo Si oinpnis 
si uoisonb A1uo oij pu 'oinonis jo ios uiioo oq snm sows p oods oq o 
(soiqiuo o4 s1oJ1m moij uorpunj oms ail o4 2uipuodsaiioa sos IJOAOS  snT44 put,  
'sos juoa9 j9.u% ,eijxa oq pjnoo oJot oous 'uisp4diotuosi ue oq 4ou poou oouo1munbo siq 
qnoq) sotiuo p  upmop juvAalai aT44 o4 siojiux p umop aiI4 mog oods juopunj 
aiI4 o4 jualvAinba oinpnis sq oo'eds os aqj 'spJoM Joqo uj ijuo qq4 ouo iojim 
aTI4 soj qoq& os t,  oq snm oiou 'JnpiAipui Put:' iojxm oslflooslp iJOAO JO 'II°M 
oJnpnqs jiqJ9T..T a-qj si jmjm,puy oinpni.s jq2ji oip OA4 o4 oods os oq4 ooioj o 
iopio Ui posn oq o4 OATT soinsod 1toods 'aAoqe pouoiuom sy -a94ueien2 qons ou 
Si ajalq4 oisq oq o4 pamnsge axe sos J!  'souo lueAalai alq4 oquo sJOjim OsmOosip 
jo su!ddm  Sjeq!qie ioj Akolle o4 sos qnouo suuoo sos p adS4 juopunj oq 
994ueien2 IlliA japoTu padSl v p uo!!ujJop  AJu!p.To oq 'osq oq ol pauinssT an,  
s1op1m osinosp J! sO1OTIM S[flp!A!pU! 04 OOUoJOOJ OJoqdU Ui posoioul iuo oi 
OM oloqM oso a-qj lop!suoD  odio 	 oq iopun ssom aq4 dooMs ol SOAJOS 
A1oim onb!uqoo SUO5SUf :poAomoi oq 	OU OUUO SSOU!Jfl qons 'JOAOAt0II 
691 
A Bit Like English 	 160 
domain(,(d,)) = AfaADd [Xe f.D.x] 
= ) fO.Ag, [VDd domain(,(d,t) ) .g.D 
g.D = f.D] 
This meaning postulate, and those that follow, should be thought of as constraints 
which Ty3 models should obey if they are to suit the purpose of defining a semantics 
for ABLE. Note that whereas meaning postulates are Ty3 formulae, and Ty3validity of 
these formulae constrains Ty3models, other definitions (which are labelled Dxy rather 
than MPxy) are not Ty3formulae (although they may contain Ty3formulae). A model 
which obeys all the meaning postulates to be given I will call a suitable model. Thus 
in any suitable model ® is interpreted as the empty sequence, that is the function 
mapping every discourse marker onto the empty set of individuals, and domain(0.(d)) 
is a function from any sequence onto the set discourse markers in its domain. Thus we 
have that domain.® = ,\Dd [I]. The constant 	can be thought of as a binary 
relation: using infix notation, f g can be read as "f is an extension of g", meaning 
that for all discourse markers in the domain of sequence g, the two sequences give the 
same interpretation, but f may also assign values to some additional discourse markers. 
Since infix form often makes binary relations more perspicuous, I will adopt the 
following convention: if + is a binary operation of type (a, (a, t)), where a is any type 
except t, and if A and B are of type a, then A + B will be used to mean +.A.B. 
Furthermore, iteration will be allowed, such that if C is also of type a then +.A.B A 
+.B.0 may be abbreviated as A + B + C. Sometimes the notation A{+}B{+}C will 
be used to show that + is being treated as an infix operator. For the truth-functional 
connectives in Ty3, as for the ABLE connectives, the standard notational conventions 
will be assumed, which is the reason for the exceptive clause saying that a cannot be t. 
Information states are defined as mappings from possible worlds onto sets of extended 
sequences. Ignoring for a moment the differences between my definition of an extended 
sequence and other authors' definitions of sequences, assignments or partial assignments, 
there remains only a superficial difference between making information states into sets 
of pairs of worlds and sequences as in Heim's work, or into functions from worlds to 
sets of extended sequences as here, or into functions from worlds to total assignments as 
in van Eijck and Ceparello's [EC92]. The additional slight variation on Heim's original 
notion of a context is of course just a by-product of the use of functional type theory as 
a meta-language. In fact I will sometimes prefer to talk of a pair of a world w and an 
extended sequence f being contained in some state I, rather than saying that I maps w 
to a set containing f, and I will sometimes talk of one such pair being an extension of 
another, meaning that each pair involves the same possible world, but that the sequence 
in one pair is an extension of the sequence in the other pair. 
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Definition D42 (Information States in ABLE) Any object of type 
(w, (o, t)) is an information state, and the type of such objects will be abbreviated as t. 
It might be of mathematical interest to explore the structure of the space of ABLE 
information states in detail, but I refrain from doing so here since my intention is to 
provide only as much formal theory as is necessary for the applications which are to 
follow.6 However, I will introduce some constants which make ABLE information easier 
to manipulate: 
Meaning Postulate MP2 
 = 	,\IAJAwAf, [I.w.f A J.w.f] 
 U(,(,)) =AIAJAwwAf,[I.w.f V J.w.f] 
 \<,<,>> = 	)It AJt Aww Afa [I.w.f A -J.w.f] 
 = )J)J [VwVf J.w.f - I.w.f] 
 T, = 	Aw\f,. [f = c] 
 11, =AwwAf,[I] 
 w-set(,(,t)) = 	AI)w 	[3fa I.w.f] 
p-domain(,(d,)) = AI,\Dd 	 A domain(a,(d,t)) .f.D] 
t-domain(, (d,t)) = AIADd [VwVfI.w . f - domain(, (d,t)) . f.D] 
The interpretation of the first four constants, for which infix notation will be used, 
should be obvious: thinking of states as sets of world-sequence pairs, fl, U, \ and E are 
just the standard set-theoretic operators. The constants T and j.  represent respectively 
the zero information state, which may be thought of as the established common ground 
at the beginning of a conversation, and the absurd information state, which is reached 
whenever an information state is updated with contradictory propositions. The function 
w-set associates with each information state a set of possible worlds, intuitively those 
worlds which are compatible with all the information up to that point in the discourse. 
Thus (w-set.T) is the set of all possible worlds, and (w-set.) is the empty set of worlds 
for there are no possible worlds that are compatible with contradictory information. 
The constants p-domain(,(d,)) and t-domain( ,(d, )) are analogues of dornain(,(d,t)), 
which was introduced above. Given a state I, p-domain.I denotes the set of discourse 
markers which are at least partially defined in I. If D is a discourse marker, then 
p-domain.I.D will hold just in case there is some world associated with a sequence which 
has D in its domain. The total domain of I, the set of discourse markers which have a 
6But the reader may wish to refer to Dekker's discussion in [Dek93], where the algebra of a closely 
related state space, that of Dekker's EDPL, is examined more fully. 
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value in every world-sequence pair in I, is given by t-domain.I. This thesis will mostly 
concern itself with totally-defined discourse markers, so that regarding most information 
states which arise in examples, the partial and total domains will be identical. However, 
the possibility of partially defined discourse markers do arise. 
Following Heim, I will call the denotation of an ABLE formula a context change 
potential: 
Definition D43 (Context Change Potentials) Any object of type (t, (t, t)) is a con-
text change potential (CCP), and the type of such objects will be abbreviated as n. 
ABLE formulae are thus relations between information states, and have denotations 
of the form AIAJ [pt]. Such expressions have the by now obvious interpretation that Al 
is an abstraction over possible input states, and AJ over possible outputs. If an ABLE 
formula has denotation F and it holds for some I and J that I{F}J, we say that in 
state I the formula provides an update to state J. In fact it will hold that no ABLE 
formula denotes more than one update from a given input state, but it will be argued 
that expressions of natural language should be thought of as having such relational 
meanings, for the ambiguity and underspecificity of natural language often means that 
there is more than one way in which a given expression could be used to update an 
information state. 
In effect this non-determinism will be built into the translation from natural lan-
guage into ABLE formulae, so that ABLE could be viewed as, in that favourite phrase 
of the last few decades "a disambiguated language of logical form". However, this thesis 
has certain Montagovian pretensions: a type logic is used here, as for Montague, in or-
der to make the business of defining a compositional semantics easier, and not because 
type theory is claimed to bear any special relationship to any language of mental rep-
resentation. Similarly, the disambiguated LFs of ABLE are not intended to be thought 
of as mental representations (although, equally, none of the formal developments here 
preclude ABLE being thought of in this way). The motivation for putting the non-
determinism into the translation function, or more properly the translation relation, is 
methodological. Keeping ABLE denotations deterministic permits the definition of a 
relatively clean logic over the ABLE language, and thus facilitates the process of turn-
ing what I think is the semanticist's primary source of data, namely natural language 
entailments, into intuitions about how natural language expressions must be translated. 
So we now turn to the problem of defining a notion of entailment for a language which 
claims to describe not facts about the world, but information change in agents. Consider 
a notion of entailment discussed by Veltman in [Ve9 1]: 
A formula entails another if after updating any state with the first, updating 
with the second adds no new information. 
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In ABLE, as in Heim's File Change Semantics and Dekker's Eliminative Dynamic Pred-
icate Logic, there are two ways in which information can grow. Firstly extra constraints 
can be learnt concerning the interpretation of predicates and whatever discourse markers 
are in use, and secondly new discourse markers may be added. It seems that it is the 
first type of information and not the second which is relevant to our intuitive notion, of 
natural language entailment, as is shown in the following example discourse:7  
	
E181 a. 	There are three frogs, and exactly two are in the water. 
b. 	Therefore one of the frogs is out of the water. 
C. 	Obviously, it is not swimming. 
The argument from a to b is valid, since in any world in which the first is true the 
second will also be true. However, b also introduces a new discourse referent. This is 
shown by considering a followed directly by c, a strange discourse indeed. It is clear 
that a does not by itself license the pronoun in c. However, the full discourse of a+b+c 
is quite natural. Thus b augments the context set up by a even though b is entailed 
by a, and more generally we must conclude that an entailed sentence can introduce 
certain types of new information.8 A suitably modified version of Veitman's entailment, 
which is essentially that used by Groenendijk and Stokhof in [GS91a] and by Dekker in 
[Dek92], is thus: 
A formula entails another if after updating with the first, updating with the 
second adds no new information except for the possible introduction of new 
discourse referents. 
The formalisation of this notion hinges on the possibility of differentiating between 
different types of information. The following postulate defines a notion of closure with 
respect to anaphoric potential. The anaphoric closure of a CCP F, written .1. F, is a 
purely eliminative CCP: it may remove some of the states in the input, but it will not 
introduce any new discourse markers. Given states I and J, and a CCP F, the formula 
I{ j. F}J will be true if and only if some state K can be obtained by updating I with 
F, and the output, J, is that subset of the world-sequence pairs in the input, I, which 
have extensions in K: 
Meaning Postulate MP3 
= )FvAI)Jt ; [BK,, I{F}K A 
7This discourse is reminiscent of Partee's marble examples. 
81t does not matter to the current discussion whether the argument from a to c is sound. Even if 
it is not sound, it remains the case that (1) anaphora between premises and conclusions in arguments 
is possible, and (2) a notion of consequence which fails to take anaphoric information into account is 
inadequate for modeling argument in natural language. 
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J = Awf, [I.w.f A Dg, g f A K.w.g]] 
Such a notion of closure does not make sense for arbitrary CCPs. For instance, if 
a CCP were to denote a downdate (a loss of information), such that the w-set of the 
output could be a strict superset of the w-set of the input, then the anaphoric closure 
of the CCP would not preserve this property: the anaphoric closure of a CCP always 
denotes an update, whereby the output w-set is a (not necessarily strict) subset of the 
input w-set. Thus, to be sure that the notion of anaphoric closure is appropriate to 
ABLE CCPs, in Appendix A the following fact will be proved: 
Fact F4 (Eliminativity) For any ABLE formula, 0, and states I and J, Iq J if and 
only if J contains only extensions of world-sequence pairs in I. 
If updating a context with the closure of some CCP would have no effect, then the 
context will be said to satisfy the CCP: 
Meaning Postulate MP4 
satisfies (t,(t)) 	AI.XF [I{ F}I] 
Infix notation will be used for relations between states and CCPs, producing formulae 
like I satisfies F. It is now simple to define a binary relation entails which holds between 
two CCPs just in case any update with the first produces a state which satisfies the 
second, and in terms of this constant to define an entailment relation holding directly 
between ABLE formulae, as opposed to their denotations. 
Meaning Postulate MP5 
entails( , ( , )) = AF.)F [VIVJ 
I{F}J -* J satisfies F'] 
Definition D44 (Entailment in ABLE) 
IabIe b if {4] { entails} 	is valid on 
the class of suitable models. 
This thesis is largely concerned with the entailments of presupposing formulae, and it 
is to the notion of presupposition that we now turn. The denotations of ABLE formulae 
are functions from input states to sets of output states, and there may be some input 
states which are mapped onto the empty set of output states. For such inputs, the ABLE 
formula provides no update. Those states for which an ABLE formula does provide an 
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update will be said to admit the formula, and in terms of this property presupposition is 
defined. One ABLE formula presupposes another when the only states from which the 
first formula provides an update are those in which the second is satisfied: 
Meaning Postulate MP6 
admits(, )) = AI.\F 	I{F}J] 
presupposes(,, (,,t)) = \F)F' [VI,, I admits F - I satisfies F'] 
Definition D45 (Presupposition) An ABLE formula 0 presupposes an ABLE for- 
mula i/i if and only if presupposes(,r (,,. t)) . 	. 	is true in every suitable model. 
The ABLE notions of presupposition and entailment are logically independent, in the 
sense that not all presuppositions of a formula are entailments, and not all entailments 
are presuppositions. However, for the class of non-modal formulae (i.e. the sub-language 
of ABLE not involving MIGHT), the presuppositions of a formula will form a strict subset 
of the entailments: this is shown in appendix A. 
To finish this section I will introduce one last meta-theoretic notion, consistency. 
MP7 says that a state I is consistent-with a CCP F just in case it is possible to update 
I with F and not end up in the absurd information state. A consistent formula is just 
one for which there is some state which it is consistent-with. 
Meaning Postulate MP7 
consistent-with ( ,( , )) = AIAF [2J I{F}J A -i(J = I)] 
consistent 	= AF,,- [I consistent-with (,(t,t))  .I.F] 
Definition D46 (Consistency) An ABLE formula 0 is consistent if and only if 
consistent (,,t) 	is true in every suitable model. An ABLE formula 0 is consistent 
with an information state I if and only if consistent-with(,(,)) . ]ç]J .1 is true in every 
suitable model. 
Having now introduced all the major types of objects to be used, sequences, states 
and so forth, the presentation can be simplified by ceasing to decorate every variable 
and constant with its type, and instead using a simple set of typing conventions: these 
are given in Table 8.1. For all the symbols given in the table, it will be assumed that 
the same symbol with subscripted numbers or superscripted dashes is of the same type. 
The following sections will be concerned with providing a semantics for ABLE formu-
lae. But this semantics will be given only indirectly, via an embedding into the language 
of Ty3, the embedding function being denoted . For instance, the embedding rule for 
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Symbol Type Interpretation 
d d discourse markers 
D d variables over discourse markers 
a, b, c e individual constants 
X )  y, z e variables over individuals 
Al  B, C 
=_(e,t)  
group constants 
X, Y, Z E variables over groups 
W w variables over worlds 
f, g, h 01 
= (d, (e, t))  
variables over extended sequences 
I, J, K t 
= (w, (0" t))  
variables over information states 
F 7r 
= (b, (L, t)) 
variables over the denotations 
of ABLE formulae (CCPs) 
P p 
=_(d,ir)  
variables over dynamic properties 
Q (p, (p, ir)) variables over dynamic 
Generalised quantifiers 
Table 8.1: Types of Meta-variables 
an ABLE expression Expo might be given as follows: IExp0}J = f(Exp1],.. . , EXP,J. 
Here the expression on the right hand side is not itself an expression of Ty3, but re- 
cursive replacement of the expressions 	 ExpJ according to the definition 
of 	will eventually yield a Ty3formula. For any ABLE formula 0 I will refer to the 
corresponding Ty3formula 	as the semantics of 0. 
8.3 Predication and Identity 
What will be presented in this section is not so much a theory of predication as a place 
for such a theory to go. ABLE predicates will be interpreted directly as higher order 
constants of Ty3, mapping arguments onto CCPs, and without additional constraints 
on Ty3models these CCPs do not reflect any intuitive notion of the information which 
is given by a predication. 
It will be assumed that for every unary ABLE predicate there is a corresponding 
identically named Ty3 constant which has the type of a function mapping the denota-
tion of an ABLE discourse marker to the denotation of an ABLE formula. Constants 
of this type will be called dynamic unary predicates. ABLE discourse markers corre-
spond directly to Ty3 discourse markers, that is to say objects of type d, and ABLE 
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formulae denote CCPs, which have the type ir, so dynamic unary predicates have the 
type (d, ir). The symbol P1 will be used as a metavariable over ABLE unary predicates 
and the corresponding Ty3dynamic unary predicate constants. Similarly, every binary 
ABLE predicate (metavariable 12)  will correspond to a dynamic binary predicate of type 
(d, (d, ir)), and every ABLE attitude predicate (metavariable P)  will correspond to a 
dynamic attitude predicate of type (d, (ir, 7r)) 	a function from discourse markers to a 
function from the denotation of an ABLE formula to the denotation of an ABLE for-
mula. The clauses for the semantics of ABLE predications are thus trivial, and given 
by the following schema: 
Definition D47 (Semantics of Predication in ABLE) 
P1.i = P1.i 
P2.i.j = P2.i.j 
ftpaj.oj = pa j  
It is arguable that such a minimalist approach to the interpretation of predications 
leaves a bit too much unsaid, for ABLE predicates are intended in the first place to 
correspond to the predicates of natural language, and there are many functions in the 
denotation spaces of the dynamic predicate constants which have no intuitive interpreta-
tion in terms of natural language. As things stand, it is possible for an ABLE predication 
to denote, for example, an information downdate, or the introduction of every prime 
numbered discourse marker into the context, or perhaps some sort of complement oper-
ation leaving only worlds in the w-set of the output which were not in the w-set of the 
input. To exclude such possibilities I will put some constraints on the denotations of 
dynamic predicates, although the job of creating particular entries within the remaining 
denotation space I see as the role of the lexical semanticist, and I will do no more in 
that respect than give a couple of examples. 
The following set of meaning postulates radically restricts the behaviour of ABLE 
predications by relating the dynamic predicate constants to objects of lower, static types 
such as might be found in a more conventional Montague grammar. The traditional, 
Fregean intension of a one place predicate is, of course, a function from worlds to a 
function from individuals to truth values, which in the current framework would be an 
object of type (w, (e, t)). Similarly, the Fregean intension of a two-place predicate can 
be correlated with a Ty3 object of type (w, (e, (e, t))). Given that ABLE concerns not 
only individuals (type e) but also groups of individuals (type ), it will come as no 
surprise that in the first of the following clauses dynamic unary predicate constants are 
related to objects of type (w, (, t)), whilst in the second clause dynamic binary predicate 
constants are related to objects of type (w, (e, (e, t))). 1 will call objects of these types 
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static unary predicates and static binary predicates, respectively. 
The first postulate says that for every dynamic unary predicate constant there must 
be some static unary predicate, such that whenever the CCP obtained by application of 
the constant to a discourse marker provides an update from some input state, the input 
state must have the discourse marker in its domain, in which case the output state can 
be calculated in terms of the static predicate.9 In particular, the output must be the 
set of world-sequence pairs in the input such that the extension of the static predicate 
at the world includes the sequence valuation of the discourse marker. 
The second postulate follows the first closely, and presumably requires no further 
explanation. The third postulate concerns dynamic attitude predicates, but it does does 
not simply relate them to Fregean intensions of attitude verbs, the reason being that it is 
difficult to find a single such postulate appropriate to the needs of both factive and non-
factivê attitude verbs. Instead, for any given formula which serves as the propositional 
complement of a dynamic attitude predicate, the combination of the dynamic attitude 
predicate and the denotation of the formula is related to a static unary predicate. In 
effect the translations of complete verb phrases involving attitude verbs, like 'realises 
that she is surrounded' and 'doubts that Shakespeare will ever write another best-seller', are 
constrained to behave like intransitive verbs. Note the use in the following postulates 
of the type r, which is simply an abbreviation for (e, t): 
'Note that the formula in the postulate is not strictly a formula of Ty3but a schema over such 
formulae, since F' is not a constant of Ty3but a metavariable over dynamic unary predicate constants. 
Similar comments apply to other meaning postulates. 
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Meaning Postulate MP8 
If P' is a dynamic unary predicate constant then: 
VIVJVD I{P'.D}J 
t-domain.I.D A 
J = AwAf [I.w.f A V.w.(f.D)] 
If P2 is a dynamic binary predicate constant then: 
V(w,(E,( E,t))) 	VIVJVDVD' I{P2 .D.D'}J -* 
t-domain.I.D A t-domain.I.D' A 
J = AwAf [I.w.f A V.w.(f.D).(f.D')] 
If  pa is a dynamic attitude predicate constant, and F of type ir is the denotation of 
some ABLE formula, then: 
V(w,(,t)) 	VTv'JVD I{pa.D.F}J - 
t-domain.I.D A 
J = AwAf [I.w.f A V.w.(f.D)] 
On the basis of these postulates some general characteristics of unary and binary 
ABLE predications can be given. If an ABLE formula q is of the form P1.i or P2.i.j 
then the following will hold: 
Partiality There may be some states from which q  does not produce an update. For 
instance 0 will only provide an update from states which have the discourse mark-
ers in 0 in their domain. That is to say: 
I 	I admits ) 
Determinism q is functional, so that for every input state there is at most one possible 
output state. Formally: 
(1101 -p -'( KI{q]JK A -(K = J))) 
Distributivity An update with q'  can be calculated pointwise on the individual world-
sequence pairs in the input, a property which is discussed in [GS90]. Thus if 
((w, f)) denotes the singleton information state having only one sequence-world 
pair in it, namely the pair consisting of w and f, then for any states I and J: 
Icb}1J --4 J = AwAf [Kw'f I.w'.f' A ((w', f))cb]1K A K.w.f] 
Eliminativity If Içb J then J contains only a subset of the world-sequence pairs in 
I. This property, which, like distributivity, is discussed in [GS90], excludes the 
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possibility of 0 being a downdate, and also excludes the possibility of 0 introducing 
new discourse markers. If I and J are states then: 
IfçlJ iffVwVf J.w.f - I.w.f 
Relevance Only the discourse markers mentioned in 0 are relevant to the calculation 
of an update with 5. More formally, if I - k denoted a state differing from I only 
by the sequences in I being shrunk so as not to give a value to k, then we would 
have for any states I, J and K: 
(IqJ A (I - k) K) -4 J = )twAf[I.w.f A 3g f g A K.w.g] 
Alpha-invariance The names of the discourse markers in 0 do not matter, except 
to the extent that they determine sequence valuations. Let us say that 0[i/k] 
denotes the formula obtained by substituting k for i in 0, and that I[ilk] denotes 
the information state obtained by swapping the values given to i and k in every 
sequence in I. Then if k is not mentioned in 0 and is not in the domain of the 
state I we would have that for any states I and J: 
IJ 	I[i/k]cb[i/k]J[i/k] 
These six properties could, of course, have been stated as meaning postulates in the 
first place, and would have replaced the above postulate MP8. However, I have not 
attempted any proof that this alternative would yield precisely the same denotation 
space for the dynamic predicate constants. 
To illustrate the working of ABLE predication, I will firstly consider the definition 
of ABLE predicates MALEU, FEMALEU, ANIMATEU, NEUTERU, SINGULARU and PLURALU. 
We begin with a simple theory about the meaning of the predicates, expressed in terms 
of simple static predicates: 
Meaning Postulate MP9 
VwVx male( ,(€ , )) .w.x -p -'female(W,(€,)) .W.X 
VwVx female(,(€,)) .w.x -* -'male(,(€,)) .w.x 
VwVx -'(neuter(,(,)) .w.x) -+ (rnale( ,,( , )) .w.x V female(,(,))  .w.x) 
VwVx male( ,(€ , )) .w.x -* animate(W ,(E ,T))..w.x 
VwVx female(, 	.w.x -* animate(,,,(,,,-)) .w.x 
VX singular(r).X -* x (X.x A Vy (X.y - x = 
VX plural(E ,T).X - 	xy (X.x A X.y A -i(x = y)) 
I take it that these postulates do not require much explanation, save for noting that 
I allow objects to be both neuter and sexed. This might be appropriate in the case of 
A Bit Like English 	 171 
animals, for instance, since we can refer to an animal as 'it' even though it has a sex. 10 
In the following postulate, dynamic unary predicates are defined in terms of the static 
predicates introduced above. Note that the first postulate defines distributive predicates, 
so that a group of individuals can only be animate if all the members of the group are 
animate. It would, however, make no sense for the predicates SINGULARU  and PLURALU 
to be distributive. 
Meaning Postulate MP10 
If P' is one of the dynamic unary predicate constants MALEU, FEMALEU, NEUTERU and 
ANIMATEu then: 
P1 = .XD\IAJ [t-domain.I.D A 
J = ,\wAf [I.w.f A VX (f.D.x —p P(W ,( f ,T)).w.x)]] 
If P1 is either of the dynamic unary predicate constants SINGULARU  and PLURALU  then: 
P1 = ADAIAJ [t-domain.I.D A 
J = ..\wAf [I.w.f A P(r,T).(f.D)]] 
Identity, although not introduced as one of the predication clauses syntactically, 
behaves as a two place predicate, and would obey a version of postulate MP8, above. The 
following semantic clause makes an ABLE identity statement i is j provide an update 
only if both discourse markers are in the domain of the input state, in which case the 
output is the set of world-sequence pairs from the input such that the sequence valuation 
of the two discourse markers is identical. Note that identity is effectively a collective 
predicate, since the condition for identity of two groups is not that every member of the 
first group is equal to every member of the second, but that the two groups consist of 
the same set of individuals. 
100f course, in many languages it would be completely inappropriate to conflate sex and grammatical 
gender. For such a language it would be more sensible to class the discourse markers themselves as having 
gender, number and so on, so that the number and sex of the discourse referents could be irrelevant 
for the purposes of the grammar. There are several ways in which ABLE could be extended so as to 
allow for this possibility, for instance by using predicates like female(d,t) to provide a permanent sortal 
structure on the domain of discourse markers, or by using predicates like female(,,, (d, t)> to make the 
sortal categorisation of discourse markers contingent; in this case an information state could be updated 
with the fact that a given discourse marker fell into a particular grammatical category. And of course, 
mixed strategies are also possible, whereby gender and number of markers is related to sex and number 
of referents, but this relation is not one-to-one. I will not pursue any of these possibilities any further 
here since for the fragment of English with which I will be concerned, there is a systematic relation 
between grammatical and semantic categorisations. 
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Definition D48 (Semantics of Identity in ABLE) 
)JAJ [t-domain.I.i A t-dornain.I.j A 
J = AwAf [I.w.f A f.i = f.j}] 
So far we have only seen ABLE predicates which provide an update on a context 
whenever the context has the predicated discourse markers in its domain. However, a 
predicate may involve more complex presuppositions. Presuppositions may be stated 
as meaning postulates explicitly stating what formulae must be satisfied by the input 
state of a predication in order for the predication to provide an update. For instance 
the following postulate would restrict the predicate WALK' so that it could only apply 
to markers the values of which were already established to be animate entities: 
VIVD (2J I{wALKU.D}J) 	I satisfies (ANIMATEU.D) 
Here a selectional restriction on a predicate is encoded as a presupposition., I will 
not argue the point as to whether all such selectional restrictions may appropriately 
be considered presuppositional, although, from a technical perspective, it is attractive 
that we have this option. As indicated earlier, I will concentrate on the presuppositions 
of factive verbs like those found in all the presuppositional examples considered in the 
previous chapter of this thesis, verbs like 'realise' and 'regret'. These may be understood 
as two place verbs which place selectional restrictions on both arguments: the subject 
argument must be animate (a restriction which will be ignored), and the object must be 
a proposition which is satisfied in the local context. To ensure that the corresponding 
ABLE predicates REGRET" and REALISE' have appropriate presuppositional properties, 
it is simply stipulated that they have the property of factivity, defined below:" 
Definition D49 (Factivity) A dynamic attitude predicate denoted by the constant ATTa 
is factive if 
Vfl/DVF I admits ATTa.D.F 
t-domain.I.D A IsatisfiesF 
Meaning Postulate MP11 The dynamic attitude predicate constants 
REGRETa and REALISEa  are factive. 
In what follows, it will often be useful to ignore presupposition altogether. For 
this purpose a class of distributive, and almost presupposition-free predicates is now 
introduced: 
11As discussed earlier in footnote 1, I do not divide between factive and semifactive verbs, the evidence 
which originally motivated Karttunen to make such a distinction being best explained in terms of 
conversational implicature than in terms of a bifurcation of lexical semantics. 
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Definition D50 (Simple Predicates) 
A dynamic unary predicate denoted by the constant pU  is simple if there is a constant 
P of type (w, (e, t)) such that: 
VIVJVD J{puD}J 
(t-domain.I.DA 
J = AwAf [I.w.f A Vx (f.D.x -p P.w.x)]) 
A dynamic binary predicate denoted by the constant pb  is simple if ther is a constant 
P of type (w, (e, (e, t))) such that: 
VIVJVDVD' I{Pb.D.Df}J 
(t-domain.I.D A t-domain.I.D'A 
J = )wAf [I.w.f A 
VxVy ((f.D.x A f.D'.y) -* P.w.x.y)]) 
The reason for calling the simple predicates almost presupposition free is that there 
remains a presupposition that the predicated discourse markers are in the domain of the 
input. However, if this condition is met in some input state, then it is clear that the 
definition of a simple predicate defines what the output is, so a predication involving a 
simple predicate is guaranteed to provide an update. Note that on the above definition, 
all the predicates MALEU, FEMALEU, ANIMATEU and NEUTERU  are simple. 
8.4 Connectives 
The definitions of the connectives given below are natural generalisations of those pre-
sented in the first part of this thesis, and furthermore differ little from the definitions 
found in [Dek92] and [Bea92], which in turn are close to those of [Hei83a]. 
Conjunction is defined as relational composition, and negation is defined as a set 
complement operation, although the anaphoric closure of the negated formula is taken 
so as to avoid problems which would be caused by the introduction of discourse markers 
in the negated formula. Implication is defined using the same standard equivalence as 
in Chapter 7, and disjunction is also defined using a standard equivalence. 
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Definition D51 (Semantics of Connectives in ABLE) 
[OANDOJ = AL\J [2K Içb]KbJ] 
[NoTq5J = )\IAJ[3KIqJjKA 
J = I\K] 
	
IMPLIES 	= f[ NOT (qAND NOT)] 
0011 	= IINOT(NOTAND NOT1')] 
8.5 Determiners 
The treatment of determiners to be given is related to earlier dynamic accounts such 
as Heim's [Hei82, Hei83b], Chierchia's [Ch92] or Groenendijk and Stokhof's [GS91a, 
GS91b]. I hope I will be able to demonstrate that within a dynamic setting an analysis 
of determiners is possible which begins to parallel that of Barwise and Cooper [BC81] 
in its uniformity, and yet encompasses a much broader view of meaning than is found 
in their by now standard account of Generalised quantifiers. 
Historically we could attribute to Russell the first serious attempt at a uniform 
analysis of determiners [Ru05]. But although the tradition of quantificational analysis 
extending from his work has fared well in the treatment of relatively exotic determiners, 
it has faced much criticism closer to home, in particular regarding the treatment of the 
humblest determiners of all, the' and 'a'. The two best known philosophical challenges 
to the uniform quantificational analysis of determiners, namely that of Strawson [St50] 
with respect to definites, and that of Geach [Gea62] with respect to the interaction of 
indefinites and definites, have both been met with non-quantificational solutions in the 
work of Heim and Kamp [Kam8l] in the early eighties. It is not until Groenendijk and 
Stokhof's [GS91a], building on the work of Barwise [Ba87] and Rooth [Roo87], that the 
possibility of bringing indefinites back into the quantificational fold - given a suitably 
broad conception of quantification - became readily apparent. Chierchia [Ch92] showed 
a way to extend the approach developed by Groenendijk and Stokhof in [GS91a] and 
[GS91b] to a wider range of determiners, and this dissertation is intended to further 
this line of development, attempting to bring out the similarities between the dynamic 
analyses not only of indefinites and paradigmatically quantificational determiners, but 
also of definites. 




The semantics of the ABLE determiner SOME will follow the standard dynamic analysis, 
which holds that the meaning of an indefinite resides in its ability to introduce a new 
referent into the discourse context. When an indefinite is used in a conversation the 
speaker may or may not intend to refer to a particular object which he or she has in mind. 
But regardless of whether the indefinite is being used specifically or non-specifically, it 
will not generally be the case that the other conversational participants are able to 
pinpoint a particular object to which the indefinite refers, and thus each participant's 
information state must leave the reference of the indefinite phrase underspecified. In fact, 
given that in this chapter an information state is being conceived of only as a model of the 
common ground, and that other aspects of a participant's knowledge are being ignored, 
even the speaker's information state must leave the reference of an indefinite noun-phrase 
underspecified. The process of updating an information state so as to incorporate an 
underspecified referent begins with the assignment of a completely underspecified value 
to a previously unused discourse marker, which is defined in terms of the constants add 
and +: 
Meaning Postulate MP12 
11 
add = ADfAg 3x g 	
D'=D — x=y A 
AD'Ay [(D' = D) ,' f.D'.y]] 
+ = AD\IAJ [-'p-domain.I.D A 
J = AwAf [g I.w.g A g{add.D}f]] 
A Ty3-formula f{add.i}g says that sequences f and g agree on the values they assign 
to all discourse markers apart from i, and that g maps ito a set containing one, arbitrary 
object. The constant + is defined in terms of add, and says something similar at the 
level of information states instead of sequences. A formula I{+.i}J, "J is an arbitrary 
extension of I with a value for i", means that i is not in the domain of state I, and that 
any pair of a world and a sequence in J differs from some pair in I only by the sequence 
being extended with some arbitrary valuation for i. 
In ABLE, determiner clauses are of the form det. dm.form.forrn. I will call the dis-
course marker at the head of such a clause the determined marker, and, following stan-
dard conventions, I will call the first subformula the restrictor and the second the scope. 
The interpretation of a formula SOME.i4. can be thought of procedurally as an instruc-
tion to perform the following sequence of modifications to an input state: arbitrarily 
extend the input with a value for the determined marker, then add firstly the informa-
tion in the restrictor, and secondly the information in the scope. This is captured by 
the following definition: 
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Definition D52 (Semantics of SOME: first version) 
[SOME.i./)J 	= AIAJ [1iin 1es 1{ +.i}11  I{q']1 Tres  IIb]1 J] 
In E182 a simple example of an indefinite sentence and its ABLE translation is 
given. The translation defines (the relational equivalent of) a partial function from input 
states which give no valuation for the determined marker 1, to output states containing 
only world-sequence pairs which are defined on 1 and map it onto an individual from 
the domain which is a walking woman in the given world. The output pairs are thus 
extensions of elements of that subset of the input pairs involving a world where there is 
a walking woman. 
E182 a. 	A woman is walking. 
b. 	SOME. 1.(WOMANU.1).(WALKU.1) 
8.5.2 Definites 
In [Bea92] I analysed definite descriptions in a similar way to [Hei83a]. It was assumed 
that a definite description presupposed the existence of an object which satisfied the 
description. However, the analysis I will present for the ABLE determiner THE will be 
closer to the treatment given in Heim's thesis [Hei82]. The difference is as follows: in her 
thesis Heim argues not that a definite presupposes the existence of an object satisfying 
the description, but that it presupposes there to be a salient discourse marker whose 
value satisfies the description. Thus a formula THE.j.(WOMANU.j).(WALKU.j)  will provide 
an update only from those contexts in which the determined marker is established to 
refer to a woman. 
The analysis has the advantage, as will be seen later, that it can yield a uniform 
treatment of various sorts of definite noun phrase the semantics of proper names and 
pronouns will all be defined in terms of the semantics of THE. On the other hand, there 
are many uses of definite descriptions for which the analysis given here will be inade-
quate, for instance when the referent has been introduced but the fact that it satisfies 
the given description has to be be inferred, or when the referent has not been explicitly 
introduced but only implicitly made salient by its relevance to other topics of conversa-
tion. I believe, in agreement with views expressed by Heim, that such uses of definites 
should be dealt with by supplementing the theory with an account of accornrnodatiort 
the process whereby a context which does not satisfy the presuppositions of a sentence 
is adjusted so as to allow update with that sentence. In Chapter 10 I will show how 
such a mechanism may be formalised. 
The following definition restricts input states from which a formula 
THE.i.0.0JJ provides an update to those which both have the determined marker in their 
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domain and support the proposition in the restrictor. If these conditions are met then 
the output state is simply the input updated sequentially with the restrictor and the 
scope. 
Definition D53 (Semantics of THE) 
THE.i.çb.' 	= ,\IAJ [t-domain.I.i A I satisfies 	A 
K 
Examples E183—E185, which provide an inane continuation to E182, illustrate the effects 
of the above definition: 
	
E183 a. 	The woman is talking. 
b. 	THE. 1 .(WOMANU.1).(WALKINGU.1) 
E184 a. 	Butch is barking. 
b. 	THE. 2.(NAMEDBUTCHu.2).(BARKu.2) 
E185 a. 	She regrets that he is barking. 
b. 	THE. 1.(FEMALEU.1  AND  SINGULARU.1).  
(REGRET a  .1. (THE.2. (MALEU.2  AND  SINGULARU.2) . (BARK .2))) 
The scene was set, the reader will recall, by the introduction of a walking woman, 
for whom a corresponding ABLE discourse marker 1 was introduced. Such a context 
can be updated with E183b, which provides an update from any input state in which 1 
is determined to be a woman, to that subset of input world-sequence pairs in which the 
referent of 1 is talking. Occurrences of discourse markers outside of the syntactic scope 
of the quantificational determiner that introduced them, as in E183b, will sometimes be 
referred to as being unquantified. E184b does not provide an update from all possible 
outputs of the conjunction of E182b and E183b, but only from those in which the 
unquantified marker 2 is totally defined, and only takes butch values. Supposing this 
condition — which will be turned to in a moment — is met, E184 adds the information 
that 2 is barking, and thus provides an appropriate input to E185b, which is only defined 
on contexts in which 1 is female, 2 is a barking male. Of course, this input will only be 
fully appropriate on the assumption that being named Butch entails masculinity. 
Meaning Postulate MP13 
NAMEDBUTCHu  is simple 
VwVx named- butch(,(€,)).w.x —+ ma 	W.X 
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Failing the existence of such a postulate, accommodation would be needed, enabling 
the addition of the information that 2 was male as and when this was presupposed. 
Accommodation should also provide the answer to the problem of satisfying the presup-
position of E184, that the discourse marker 2 corresponded to Butch. However, as will 
be seen in Chapter 9, even without describing a general mechanism of accommodation, 
presupposing formulae like E184b can still play an interesting role in the logic of ABLE 
To end this section on definites, here are some obvious abbreviations for ABLE 
formulae: 
SHE.i. 	= THE.i. (SINGULARU  .i AND FEMALEU.j) , 
HE.i.0 = THE.j.(SINGULARU.j AND  MALEU.i).q5 
IT.i4 = THE.i.(SINGULARU.i AND  NEUTERU.j). 
THEY.i.q = THE.j.(PLURALU.i).q 
8.5.3 Dynamic Generalised Quantifiers 
According to the standard Generalised quantifier analysis of [BC81], the quantificational 
determiners of natural language correspond to binary quantifier relations, a binary quan-
tifier relation being able to combine with some set to produce a Generalised quantifier, 
which is a property of sets. With which sets should the quantifier relations combine? 
The restrictor and scope of the quantifier appear to be properties of individuals, so 
that the sets are simply the sets of individuals in the extensions of the properties. But 
here the classic problem of donkey anaphora arises, as discussed by Geach in [Gea62]. 
Consider the following examples: 




(soME.j. (DONKEYU.j) . (owNsb.i.j)) 
E187 a. 	Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
b. 	EVERY.i. 
(FARMERU.j AND SOME.j. (DONKEYU.j) . (owNsb.i.j).) 
(IT.j.(BEATs".i.j)) 
The Generalised quantifier analysis for E186 will be familiar: the quantifier relation 
corresponding to every must hold between the set of farmers and the set of donkey 
owners. Equally familiar will be the difficulties that the analysis faces with E187. The 
denotation of the restrictor is obvious - it is just the property of being a farmer who 
owns a donkey. But the scope does not seem to denote an absolute property: the 
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property of being a beater of it must be relativised to some interpretation for the pronoun 
it. 
This problem concerns the internal dynamism (cf. [GS91a]) of quantificational con-
structions, by which is meant the fact that the dynamic effects of updating with the 
restrictor of a quantifier help determine the context of evaluation for the scope. To be-
gin with I will present an analysis which makes quantifiers internally dynamic, but makes 
them externally static. The final ABLE semantics, however, will make quantifiers both 
internally and externally dynamic, thus both allowing for internal anaphoric links within 
the quantificational construction, and allowing whole quantificational constructions to 
introduce discourse markers so that they may support later anaphoric reference. 
To introduce internally dynamic quantifiers, it will be helpful to consider a restricted 
set of worlds: in this way the relevant information states become more easily visualisible. 
In figure 8.1 the characteristics of eight individuals (a - h) in four different worlds (Wi 
- W4) are pictured. It should be clear that in world W2, for instance, one farmer 
who owns three donkeys beats only one of them, whilst the two other farmers own one 
donkey each, and in each case beat it. Note that I am also assuming the predicates 
FARMERU, DONKEYU, OWNS& and BEATSb  to be simple (i.e. both presupposition free and 
distributive) in the sense of §8.3 above, thus allowing the denotation of a predication 
involving one of these to be calculated in terms of underlying lower typed predicates like 
farmer(w,(e,t)): it is the denotation of these lower typed predicates which is pictured in 
figure 8.1. 
Suppose that we wish to update the information state which has only these four 
worlds in its w-set, and which has no discourse markers in its domain, with the formula 
in E187b, the ABLE representation of the classic donkey sentence. We begin the analysis 
of the universal in the same way as for an indefinite, calculating the effect of introducing 
the determined marker i into the input context, and then updating with the restrictor 
followed by the scope. Let us call the information state in which the discourse marker 
i has been initialised mit, the state reached after updating with the restrictor res, and 
the state reached after updating with the scope-sco. 
Given that, for the moment, it is being assumed that the complete quantificational 
construction introduces no discourse markers, the output state must contain a subset of 
the world-sequence pairs in the input, namely all those world-sequence pairs which are 
compatible with the information in the quantificational formula. To discern whether a 
given world-sequence pair from the input should be in the output, it is necessary to look 
at the extensions of that pair in the contexts res and sco, and check what values the 
determined discourse marker takes in these extensions. 
Let us represent sequences in such a way that, for example, a sequence in which the 
discourse marker i is mapped onto the single individual a, and the discourse marker j 
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Figure 8.1: Some Worlds 
is mapped onto the group containing b and c becomes: (i 	{a}, j '-p {b, c}). Thus the 
example input state, which contains no information about discourse markers, simply 
consists of the following set of pairs: 
The four worlds pictured in fig.8.1 do not vary with respect to the denotation of 
the underlying predicates farmer, donkey and owns: in each world there are five ways 
in which i and j can be mapped respectively onto a farmer and a donkey which that 
farmer owns. This means that update of the input state with the restrictor introduces 
only five different sequences, so that res consists of each of the four worlds paired with 
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each of the five sequences: 
Wi (i 	{a},jF—{d}) 
Wi (i {a},ji--{e}) 
Wi (i 	{a},j i- {f}) 
Wi (i {b},j '- {g}) 
Wi (i 	{c},j i-+ {h}) 
W2 (i I_* {a},j i-.+ {d}) 
W2 (i 	{a},j—*{e}) 
For a given world-sequence pair wf from the input and a given res, let us call the 
set of sequences which extend f, and are paired with w in res, the restrictor sequence 
set of wf. Formally the restrictor sequence set will be given by the expression: Ah [h 
f A res.w.h]. A similar expression can be used to determine the scope sequence set of 
a given world-sequence pair from the input. 
The state sco, which includes not only information about farmer-donkey ownership, 
but also about cruelty to animals, associates different sets of sequences with each world: 
Wi (iF—*{a},jF—{d}) 
Wi (i 	{a},j 	-* {e}) 
Wi (i { al, j i-* {f}) 
Wi (i I_* {b},j i-+ {g}) 
Wi (i '+ {c},j '- 	{h}) 
W2 (i—{a},j—{d}) 
W2 (i '+ {b},j '-* {g}) 
W2 (i 	{c},j i- {h}) 
W3 (i {a},j - {d}) 
W3 (i—{ al, j—*{e}) 
W3 (i I* {a},j i- 	{f}) 
Here Wi is the only world which is paired with the same sequences as in res, all three 
farmers being hideously cruel in this world. By contrast, each of W2 and W3 remain 
paired with only three of the original five sequences, whilst the utopian W4 is no longer 
even in the w-set of sco: there are no beatings in W4. 
One way to define internally dynamic quantifiers would be to preserve in the output 
those world-sequence pairs from the input for which the restrictor sequence set and 
scope sequence set are satisfied by the given quantifier relation. Thus, in the current 
example concerning the quantifier every, only the pair W1() would be in the output, 
since this is the only pair for which every extension in resis also in sco. However, as is 
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shown in [Roo87], this sequence counting approach will not work in general. Consider 
the following simple variation on E187: 
E188 a. 	Most farmers who own a donkey beat it. 
b. 	MOST.i. 
FARMERU.j AND (soME.j. (DONKEYU.j) . (owNs".i.j)). 
(IT.j.(BEATsb.i.j)) 
Intuitively this sentence should be true only in worlds Wi and W2, since in both of 
the other worlds less than half of the farmers are malign. However, counting sequences 
would leave not only Wi and W2 in the output, but also W3. In this world, one farmer 
happens to own and beat three donkeys whilst the other two farmers do not beat their 
single donkeys, which means that three out of the five sequences from res are preserved 
in sco, and, 3/5 being more than half, this in turn means that the quantifier relation 
most is satisfied. The conclusion to be drawn is that the quantification involves counting 
farmers and not sequences. 
It is easy to calculate the relevant set of individuals from a given restrictor sequence 
set or scope sequence set. Suppose that for some pair wf the restrictor sequence set is 
Gres, and the determined marker is i. Then the set of values of i in res extensions of wf 
will be: )x [h Gres .h A h.i.x], and similarly for the scopal values. 
In the example we have been looking at, each of the four world-sequence pairs in 
the input will yield the same set of values for the determined marker in the restrictor, 
namely the set: {a, b, c}. The scopal values will of course differ. The input pairs W1() 
and W2() yield values {a, b, c}, whilst W3() yields the set {a}, and W4() yields the 
empty set. Clearly using these sets will be an improvement in the case of E188, since 
it will only hold for the pairs W1() and W2() that over half the members from the 
restrictor extensions are still in the scope extensions. 
There are other consequences of the decision to count individuals rather than se-
quences, to which we will come shortly. Firstly let us see what the upshot of the above 
discussion is in terms of a general semantics for internally dynamic quantificational de-
terminers. In the definition below, mit, res and sco are assumed to be variables of type 
t, and have the same interpretation as in the above discussion. The output state J is 
obtained by calculating for each wf in the input state the corresponding restrictor and 
scope sequence sets (Gres and G50, which are each of type (o, t)), then calculating from 
these the sets of values taken by the determined marker in the restrictor and the scope 
(these sets being given by Xres and 	each of type E = (e, t)), and finally checking 
whether the relevant underlying quantifier relation holds between two sets. The defini-
tion we arrive at is essentially the same as that of [Ch92], although tailored to ABLE's 
needs: 
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Definition D54 (Non-existential Determiners - First Version) 
If V is one of EVERY, MOST, FEW or NO, and V' is a corresponding quantifier relation 
of type ((e, t), ((e, t), t)), then: 
I[V.i.q5. 	= AIAJ 
I Dinit3res3sco 
I{ +.i}initç/ re41J sco A 
J =AwAf 
Gres G50 3X es X 0 
I.w.f A 
I Gres = Ah [h >- f A res.w.h] 
G50 = A [h f A sco.w.h] 
Xres = ) x [h Gres.h A h.i.x] 
I 	= Ax [h G8 0.h A h.i.x] 
V.Xres.Xsco 
The following postulate ensures that the underlying quantifier relations have appro-
priate denotations. The definitions for EVERY' and NO' should be clear. I have made 
the simplifying assumption that MOST' means more than half, and FEW' means less than 
half. The definition for MOST' says that two sets of individuals X and Y stand in the 
relation MOST' if and only if there is no function with domain Y\X (i.e. the set con-
taining only members of Y that are not in X) and range X fl Y: this implies that the 
cardinality of X fl Y is greater than the cardinality of X \ Y, and thus that more than 
half of the elements of X are in Y. The definition for FEW' runs along similar lines. 
Meaning Postulate MP14 
EVERY' = ) XAY Ix (X.x —* Yx)] 
NO' = AX\Y [-ax (X.x A Y.x)] 
MOST' = AX.\Y [-F< , > 
Vx ((X.x A Yx) —* 2y (X.y A -iY.y A F.y = x))] 
FEW' = AX)\Y [F<e ,e> 
Vx ((X.x A -iY.x) —p y (X.y A Y.y A F.y = x))] 
Before going on to consider externally dynamic quantifiers, we will briefly consider 
how the account given so far bears on the problem of weak and strong readings for 
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case-quantification analysis, in Kamp's DRT and in Heim's FCS is the reading where 
every donkey owning farmer beats every donkey he owns. This is strong in the sense that 
it entails the so-called weak reading, where every donkey owning farmer beats at least 
one of the donkeys he owns. There is, to the best of my knowledge, as yet no conclusive 
evidence as to which reading is appropriate for E187, or whether, indeed, both readings 
are present. However, intuitions are clearer with regard to donkey sentences involving 
right downward monotone quantifiers such as 'no': 
E189 a. 	No farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
b. 	NO.i. 
(FARMERU .i AND SOME.j. (DONKEYU.j) . (owr sb.i.j)). 
(IT.j. (BEATs'.i.j)) 
Regarding this example it is difficult to justify the existence of a weak reading - the 
reading where no farmer beats all of his donkeys although some farmers may beat some 
of their donkeys. It seems that the existence of a single example of a farmer owning a 
donkey but not beating it would be enough to falsify the statement in E189. 
In general the definition in D54 yields existential readings. Thus E187 comes to 
have the weak reading where every donkey-owning farmer beats at least one donkey, 
and E189 comes to have the strong reading (which as I have indicated seems to be the 
only plausible one) where no farmer beats any of his or her donkeys. However, both 
[Ch92] and [Kan93] indicate that it is best to allow for the possibility of right upward 
monotone quantifiers having both strong and weak readings. To this end I note that we 
at least have the option of making the upward monotone quantifiers ambiguous, simply 
by introducing two new ABLE quantifiers EVERY* and MOSTI. I leave it to the reader 
to verify that the following definitions would introduce strong right upward monotone 
determiners: 
Definition D55 (Strong upward monotone determiners) 
[EVERY* 	= tINO.i..(NOT 1')]j 
IIMOST* 	= FEW.i.q.(NOT4O)} 
One final point about the limits of the current strategy for defining internally dy-
namic quantifiers: as discussed by Chierchia, the strategy is only appropriate for conser-
vative quantifiers. This property holds of a quantifier, roughly speaking, if in calculating 
the truth of a quantificational statement, it is only necessary to consider how many of 
the individuals satisfying the restrictor also satisfy the scope, and it is irrelevant whether 
individuals not satisfying the restrictor satisfy the scope. Thus in evaluating whether 
it is true that 'every girl is hiding', it is irrelevant whether boys and other non-girls are 
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hiding. It seems possible to maintain that this property holds for all English determin-
ers: the only putative exception with which I am familiar is the word 'only'. However, 
it is quite plausible that only' is not a determiner at all, since, from the point of view of 
a naive syntactician, it has a quite different distribution than would be expected. For 
instance, 'only' can modify not only nouns, but also noun-phrases, as in 'only me', as 
well as commonly occurring outside of noun-phrases. On the other hand, even if 'only' 
is not a determiner, this does not excuse us from the task of giving it a semantics. But 
my feeling is that this job belongs within a more general theory of the dynamics of 
focus-sensitive constructions (see, for instance, [Krif92]) and not here. 
We now move on to the external dynamics of quantifiers. Consider the following 
examples: 
E190 a. Most farmers own a donkey. 
b. MOST.i. (FARMERU.j). 
(soME.j. (DONKEY' .j). (owNb.i.j)) 
	
E191 a. 	They ride to the pub. 
b. THEY.j.(RIDETOPUBU.j) 
E192 a. 	Most of the donkeys are alcoholic. 
b. 	MOST.k. (THE.j.(DONKEYU.j AND  PLURALU.j).(OFb.i.j)) 
(ALcoHoLIcu.k) 
The fact that E190a—E192a constitute a coherent discourse shows that it is a sim-
plification to assume that quantificational determiners have no anaphoric potential. It 
seems that E190a introduces at least two new topics of conversation: the set of donkey 
owners, and the set of donkeys that people own. In fact, there may well be other new 
topics, such as the set of all farmers and the set of all donkeys, but I will ignore these, 
although it seems plausible that the approach that will be described could be extended 
appropriately. 
To make matters more tangible, the desired dynamic effects of E190b can be rela-
tivised to the example input state used earlier, consisting of the four worlds from fig.8. 1 
paired with empty sequences. Given this input, the following update would leave (in 
each world) i mapped to the set of all farmers, and j mapped to the set of donkeys 
owned by farmers: 
I
' 
W2 	0 E190b { Wi (i i* la, b,c},j 
i Id, e,f,g,h}) 
W } 3 () 	 W2 (i 	{a,b,c},j '-* {d,e,f,g,h}, 
W4 oJ 
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In the earlier definition of internally dynamic quantifiers, D54, extensions of a given 
input pair compatible with both the restrictor and scope were collected in the scope 
sequence set. Let us say that some input pair wf has a scope sequence set G807 and that 
wf would have been in the output state according to the earlier definition of internally 
dynamic quantifiers, D54. Then the output of an externally dynamic quantifier might 
be expected to contain the pair consisting of w together with the sequence g defined as 
follows: 
g = AD.\x [h G 0.h A h.D.x] 
This formula defines g as a function which maps each discourse marker onto the set of all 
values which it is assigned by the member sequences of the scope sequence set: we can 
call this the scope sequence union. However, although this approach would lead to an 
acceptable definition for E190b above, it would not be appropriate for right downward 
monotone quantifiers. For instance, the input world-sequence pairs which satisfy a 
quantification with the determiner 'few' may sometimes be associated with empty scope 
sequence sets since, on standard assumptions, there being few farmers who own a donkey 
is compatible with there being none at all. Thus calculating output sequences from 
scope sequence sets alone will sometimes yield only empty output sequences, and so fail 
to preserve the anaphoric information present in the input state. 
One strategy for avoiding this problem would be to use different definitions for 
the semantics of upward and downward right monotone quantifiers. However, a single 
definition for both upward and downward monotone quantifiers is possible, provided 
the output sequence corresponding to a given input pair is calculated in terms of a 
combination of the input sequence and the scope sequence set. For a given input pair 
wf, having a scope set G 0, the relevant output sequence associated with w will be 
calculated using the following formula: 
I f.D.x V 
g = 	
DAx Hh G 0.h A h.D.x] 
This makes the output sequence map each discourse marker onto the set of values which 
it is assigned either by the initial sequence f, or by member sequences of the scope 
sequence set. The problem is thus avoided, since if the scope sequence set is empty, 
the output sequence will be the same as the input, and if the scope sequence set is 
nonempty, then the output sequence will just be the scope sequence union, as before. 
We thus finally arrive at a semantics for non-existential determiners which incorporates 
both internal and external dynamism: 
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Definition D56 (Non-existential Determiners - Second Version) 
If V is one of EVERY, MOST, FEW or NO, and V' is a corresponding quantifier relation 
of type ( (e, t), ((e, t), t)), then: 
= \IAJ 
I linit3resDsco 
I{ +.i}initfr1J re4b]1 sco A 
J = AwAg 
fGres G50 DXm. 3X.r. 
I I.w.f A 
Gre. = Ah [h >- f A res.w.h] A 
G. = Ah [h >- f A sco.w.h] A 
Xres = Ax [h Gres.h A h.i.x] A 
X 0 = Ax [h G 0 .h A h.i.x] A 
V'.Xres sco A 
f.D.x V 
g ADAx 
h G 0 .h A h.D.x 
In the recent semantic literature, indefinites have typically been distinguished from 
other quantificational determiners by virtue of their anaphoric potential. Having given, 
in D56, a definition that forms externally dynamic ABLE determiners from arbitrary 
quantifier relations, an obvious question arises: is the same definition appropriate for 
indefinites? Consideration of the following two classic examples shows that although 
extending D56 to include indefinites opens up a promising vista, it is not tenable: 
E193 a. ?There is a doctor in London. He is Welsh. 
	
b. 	SOME.i. (DOCTORU .i) . (INLONDONU.j) 
AND HE.j.(WELSHU.j) 
E194 a. 	If a farmer owns a donkey then he beats it. 
b. 	SOME.i. (FARMERU.j) . (soME.j. (DONKEYU  .j) (owNsb.i.j)) 
IMPLIES HE.i.(IT.j.BEAT&'.i.j) 
It has been argued, in [Ev77], that E193a is odd or incoherent, and that this oddity 
arises from the fact that the first sentence does not uniquely pick out a single individual 
to which the singular pronoun in the second sentence can refer. The judgement that 
the discourse is incoherent is not clear cut: there is at least one reading of E193a on 
which it is coherent, namely the so-called specific reading, as would be more obvious if 
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the noun phrase 'a doctor' were replaced with 'a certain doctor'. However, let us assume 
for the moment that E193a is indeed incoherent, and consequently that explaining this 
incoherence would be a desirable goal for a semantic theory. Extending D56 to include 
the determiner SOME, and translating E193a in the obvious way as E193b, would imme-
diately satisfy this desideratum. The translation of the first sentence would no longer 
introduce a discourse marker which ranged over alternative individual doctors in each 
world, but instead would introduce a marker assigned to the set of all London doctors 
in each world. Since an ABLE formula HE.i.0 carries the presupposition that i is es-
tablished to be both male and singular, presupposition failure would follow unless the 
input state guaranteed that there was only one London doctor, and that this individual 
was male. 
Regarding E193a, then, the extension of D56 to indefinites would have acceptable, 
or even desirable results. However, the same strategy would have significant effects for 
the treatment of quantificational donkey sentences, and disastrous effects for the treat-
ment of conditional donkey sentences like E194a. In the case of quantificational donkey 
sentences like the prototypical E187a, the important consequence would be the introduc-
tion of a presupposition that every farmer had at most one donkey. But the translation 
of E194a would carry a far stronger uniqueness presupposition, namely that there was 
only one farmer, and that that this farmer had only one donkey. In effect Lewis's insight 
that the donkey conditional can be seen in terms of case-quantification would have been 
lost, since under such an analysis there could only be one case. Furthermore, it does 
not seem that an alternative semantics for the pronouns in E194a could save the anal-
ysis of indefinites. The translation of 'a farmer owns a donkey' would introduce markers 
corresponding to the complete set of farmers and the complete set of donkeys owned 
by farmers, and it would not preserve information about which farmers owned which 
donkeys. Clearly extensive further modifications would be needed in order to provide a 
compositional semantics for the conditional which entailed only that farmers beat their 
own donkeys. 
Thus it seems that it would be wiser to stick with the original semantics for indefinites 
given in D52 than to use the same semantics as for the non-existential determiners. 
However, it remains somewhat disconcerting that D52 bears so little resemblance to D56, 
and I think it reasonable to wonder whether the ABLE determiner SOME, as defined in 
D52, in any sense qualifies as a quantifier. I will now show that D52 can be reformulated 
in more obviously quantificational terms, and this reformulation will have the advantage 
that it is also appropriate to other related quantifiers like EXACTLY-ONE.12. 
121n natural languages, quantifiers are sometimes not lexicalised, but still expressible. Exactly one 
may be such a quantifier. In common with much recent literature on generalised quantifiers (see e.g. 
Keenan's. [Kee92]), it is assumed here that we require logical analysis of both lexicalised and non-
lexicalised quantifiers, and that an analysis which is mathematically uniform across both classes is 
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In terms of internal dynamics, the following definition for the existential quantifiers 
SOME and EXACTLY-ONE is identical to D57, which defined the semantics of EVERY, 
MOST, FEW and NO. However, the external dynamics is quite different. Instead of 
collecting together members of the scope sequence set to produce group referents, as in 
D56, the following definition puts all members of relevant scope sequence sets directly 
into output world-sequence pairs: 
Definition D57 (Existential Determiners: second version) 
If V is SOME or EXACTLY-ONE, and V' is a corresponding quantifier relation 
of type ((e, t), ((e, t), t), then: 
= AIAJ 
I linit3re,93sco 
If +.i}initfç5] re4 sco A 
J = AwAg 
f Gre8 	Xres X80 
I I.w.f A 
I 	Ah [h > f A res.w.h] 
G 0 = Ah [h f A sco.w.h] 
I Xr = Ax [2h Gres.h A h.i.x] 
I X. = Ax [Bh 	A h.i.x] 
V'.Xres.Xsco A 
Gsco  
I leave it to the reader to verify that the new definition is equivalent to D52 with 
regard to the determiner SOME. We can now say in precisely what sense the definition for 
SOME is quantificational: the output of a formula SOME.i.q' is determined in terms of an 
underlying quantifier relation. In particular, the set of input pairs of which extensions 
survive in the output of such a formula can be determined by checking whether the 
relation SOME' holds between the set of values taken by i after update with the restrictor 
and the set of values taken by i after update with the scope. It remains only to specify 
the quantifier relations relevant to the determiners SOME and EXACTLY-ONE: 
Meaning Postulate MP15 
SOME' = AXAY [x (X.x A Yx)] 
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8.6 PUL and ABLE 
It will now be demonstrated that ABLE preserves the intuitions of the propositional 
system, PUL, introduced in the previous chapter. Although it would be possible to 
define a direct embedding of PUL in ABLE, this would be messy, and instead I will 
introduce a slight variant of ABLE, ABLE+8.13 This variant is just ABLE but with 
the addition of atomic propositions and a 5 operator: 
Definition D58 (ABLE+0) 	• ABLE+S has the same syntax as ABLE, but with 
two additional classes of formulae, firstly a set of atomic formulae, 7', and secondly 
formulae of the form Sform.14 
For every p E 7, there is a corresponding Ty3 constant p of type (w, t). 
[p1] = AL\J [J = \wAf [I.w.f A p.w]] 
][91] = AIAJ [I= J A I satisfies ] 
Remaining semantic clauses and definition of entailment, which will be written 
=ABLE+5' are as for ABLE. 
It can now be shown that regarding the intersection of the PUL and ABLE+8 
languages, PUL and ABLE+8 entailment are identical. The proof will be sketchy in 
places, but then the result only concerns the internal consistency of this thesis, and 
is presumably not of general interest. Note that in this section a will not be used as 
an abbreviation for the type of ABLE extended sequences, but as a variable over PUL 
information states. 
Lemma Li 
If p E 7', then VI I admits [p1].  That is to say, the atomic formulae have no 
presuppositions. 
If p E 7', then . [p1] 	p1]. That is, atomic formulae do not introduce new 
discourse markers. 
13 The 8-operator could be defined in ABLE in terms of any factive predicate. E.g. 8q5 could be 
equated with a disjunction REALISE" .i.q5 V -REALISE" .i.q5 for some designated discourse marker 
i. Regarding PUL's atomic propositions one could, for instance, set a requirement on the language of 
ABLE that for every ABLE proposition letter P there was a distinct ABLE unary predicate denoted by 
the same symbol, and embed PUL into ABLE by mapping each PUL formula P onto the ABLE formula 
Pi. This is the option I have in mind in describing a direct embedding as "messy". 
'4A 8-operator suffucient for the purposes of embedding PUL is definable in ABLE. If F is a factive 
attitude predicate, and d is some discourse marker, then 0q5 could be an abbreviation for F.d.çb V -F.d.4. 
However, I see no natural way to define atomic propositions within ABLE, which is why I opt for 
extending the language. 
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If 0 is a formula of PUL and of ABLE+D, then 	= 	. That is, the PUL 
fragment of ABLE+5 does not introduce discourse markers. 
If 0 is a formula of PUL and of ABLE+5, then for states I, I', J, J' such that 
w-set.I = w-set.I' and w-set.J = w-set.J', it holds that: 
IçbJ iffI'j[q5J' 
Proofs of (1) and () follow directly from the ABLE+8 semantics for atomic propo-
sitions above and the definitions of admits and j,.  Proof of (3) follows by inspection of 
the semantic clauses in the PUL fragment of ABLE+a, and verification that, in each 
case, if the subformulae introduces no discourse markers, then neither does the compound 
formula. (4) follows from (3) and another induction over formulae of ABLE+8. 
Definition D59 (Information Injection) It is simple to define a mapping from PUL 
models to ABLE models: we simply identify the set of worlds, W,in a PUL model with 
the domain V in the ABLE (Ty3) model, and the PUL interpretation function with the 
ABLE (Ty3) interpretation function. This allows the definition of an injective mapping, 
+, from PUL information states to ABLE information states. In the following, the 
variable w of type (w, t) stands for a PUL information state: 
= )twAf [w.w A f = @1 
Lemma L2 Semantic Correspondence For any formula 0 in the PUL fragment of 
ABLE+a, and any two PUL information states w1, W2, 
W1]pULQ2 if W1+IABLE+8W 
Proof: An induction over formula complexity. I will consider only a few cases: 
Conjunction It must be shown that if the result holds for 0 and 0, then: 
wj.  [ç AND 1]IPULW2 if wj q5 AND ABLE+2 
This follows trivially from the fact that in both systems conjunction is defined as 
relational composition. 
Negation The semantic clauses for PUL and ABLE+a run as follows: 
oI[ NOT  pULr  if 3v UPULV  A r = 
NOT 	ABLE+8 = )IAJ [K I I HABLE+0K A 
J = I\K] 
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By lemma Li, we are only interested in 4 for which t 14111L.18 = 	ABLE+8 Thus 
we can ignore the closure operation in the ABLE+0 semantics. It remains only to 
show that for any three PUL information states a-, v and -r, 	= r if a+\v+ = 
T+' which is clear from the definitions of + and \(t,(,)). 
Epistemic Possibility Here are the definitions: 
UEMIGHT PUL T if 
E[MIGHT ]JABLE+ 




(-'(K=k) —* J=I) A 
(K=± -+ J=k) 
It suffices that + maps the PUL absurd information state onto the ABLE absurd 
information state. 
The following fact sums up the close relation between the logics of PUL and ABLE+8: 
Fact F5 If 0 and 0 are formulae of PUL involving no atomic presuppositions except 
for those in 2, then: 
IHPUL 0 if 0 IABLE+a 
Proof: It must be shown that for formulae not introducing discourse markers, the two 
notions of entailment are equivalent. For single premise arguments, the PUL notion of 
entailment (defn. D26) may be written: 
kPULb if Vw0,w1 
WoI[flpULW1 -* W1b]pULW1 
In ABLE+ô, (collapsing the two parts of the definition from earlier in this chapter) 
entailment is defined as: 
ABLE+& I' if VIVJ 
1I]ABLE+8 
— J satisfies I]ABLE+ 
From lemma L1.4, we know that if I' and J' have an empty domain, and w-set.I = 
w-set.I' and w-set.J = w-set.J', then: 
IE[ABLE+aJ if I[ABLE+3J 
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It follows that in considering ABLE+3 we only need to consider states with an empty 
domain, so that the above definition is equivalent to: 
IABLE+8 ' if Vw0Vw0 
(')l+ satisfies IRL'I]ABLE+a 
Given lemma L2, we have that for sentences of PUL: 
WoE[pULW1 if WABLE+Wt 
Thus it is only necessary to prove that: 
w1[1'pULw1 if wsatisfiesE{'ABLE+ 
The definition of satisfaction given above in this chapter is: 
satisfies = ,\IAF [I{ I F}I] 
From lemma L1.2 and another application of the semantic correspondence lemma, the 
result follows. 
Chapter 9 
Presupposition and Modality in 
ABLE 
In this chapter the dynamic framework developed so far will be adapted to allow for 
an adequate treatment of presupposition and epistemic modality. I will begin, in §9.1, 
by detailing the projection behaviour of presuppositions in the system as so far defined, 
showing some advantages of the approach, but also revealing a problem in the interaction 
between presupposition and quantification. The problem is one familiar from Heim's 
development of the CCP model, as found in her 1983 paper [Hei83a]. §9.2 will be spent 
ignoring the problem, and instead concentrating on the semantics of epistemic modality. 
It will be shown that essentially the same definition of the might operator as was given 
for the system UL, in Chapter 7, is also appropriate for ABLE, and that this definition 
leads immediately to a satisfying treatment of modal identity. However, it will also be 
shown that difficulties occur when quantifiers outscope the might operator, and this will 
motivate some tinkering with definitions from Chapter 8. Having dealt appropriately 
with the semantics of epistemic modality, we will return, in §9.3, to presupposition, 
only to find that the earlier problems concerning the interaction of presupposition and 
quantification have miraculously vanished. 
9.1 Presupposition projection in ABLE 
It will now be shown that, regarding the projection of presuppositions, the system de-
veloped in Chapter 8 is comparable with Heim's 1983 account'. It will also be shown, in 
§9.1.2, that the ABLE treatment of proper names and definites, combined with ABLE's 
'That is to say, the system is comparable with the more formally developed aspects of Heim's 1983 
account, since including Heim's informal description of a mechanism of accommodation would lead 
to a quite different set of predictions. In Chapter 10, I will consider ways in which the process of 
accommodation might be formalised. 
194 
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presupposition projection properties, lead to DRT-like anaphoric accessibility. 
9.1.1 Projection from connectives 
With regard to the connectives, ABLE manifests much the same presupposition pro-
jection behaviour as PUL, or any other CCP account. This is most obviously seen by 
considering ABLE translations of the simple examples from Chapter 7, for which the 
following abbreviations will be useful: 
BERTHA.D.0 = THE.D.(NAMEDBERTHAU.D).cb 
ANNA.D.ç = THE.D.(NAMEDANNAu.D).  
bih 	= BERTHA. 7.(HIDINGU.7) 
We begin with simple cases of presuppositions embedded under negations or in the 
antecedents of conditionals: 
	
E195 a. 	Bertha is hiding 
b. bih 
a. 	Anna realises that Bertha is hiding 
b. 	ANNA. 3.(REALIsEsa.3.  bih) 
a. 	Anna does not realise that Bertha is hiding. 
b. 	NOT (ANNA.3. (REALISESa .3. bih)) 
E169' a. 	If Anna realises that Bertha is hiding, then she will find her. 
b. 	(ANNA. 3. (REALISESa .3. bih)) IMPLIES (FINDb.3.7) 
It is easily shown that all of E165b, E166b and E169b presuppose (and also entail) 
E195b. Indeed, these are just instances of the following general property: 
Fact F6 If 0 presupposes 0, then NOT 0, 4 AND  x and 0 IMPLIES x all presuppose çb. 
Proof: Simple. Firstly show by inspection of the clause for NOT (AND, IMPLIES) that 
if I admits NOT 4 (etc.) then I admits q.  Thus the set of contexts which admit 0 is a 
superset of those which admit NOT 0 (etc.), and if all contexts which admit q  satisfy il' 
(the condition for 0 to presuppose v'), then it must be the case that all contexts which 
admit NOT q5 (etc.) satisfy st'. 
Next a case of one presuppositional construction embedded within another: 
E171 a. 	Bertha regrets that Anna realises that she is hiding. 
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b. 	BERTHA.7. (REGRETSa .7. (ANNA.3. (REALIsEsa.3. bih)) 
E171b presupposes E195b, and once again this is an instance of a more general 
principle: 
Fact F7 If 0 presupposes b, and 0 presupposes x then 0 presupposes X. 
Proof: The result follows directly from the definitions of presupposition and satisfaction. 
If 0 presupposes 0 then every context which admits 0 must satisfy 0, but ,b can only be 
satisfied in contexts which admit it, and all these contexts satisfy x Thus every context 
which admits 0 satisfies X. 
What really marks the CCP model out from other theories is the occurrence of 
Conditionalised presuppositions, as in the following case: 
E172 a. 	If Bertha is not in the kitchen, then Anna realises that Bertha is in the attic. 
b. 	NOT (BERTHA.7. (INKITcHENu,7)) IMPLIES 
(ANNA. 3. (REALIsEsa.3. (INATTIcu.7)) 
C. 	NOT (BERTHA.7.(IN-KITCHEN'.7)) IMPLIES 
(IN-ArrIC' .7) 
As might be expected, E172b presupposes the conditional E172c, i.e. that if Bertha is 
not in the kitchen, then she's in the attic. Conditionalised presuppositions are probably 
the single most controversial aspect of the CCP model, and the paradigmatically CCP 
behaviour of ABLE in this respect, as witnessed by the following fact, will be explored 
in more detail in Chapter 10. 
Fact F8 If çb presupposes /, then X AND 0 and x IMPLIES 0 each presuppose x IMPLIES 
Proof.-It suffices to show that under the assumption that I admits (x AND ) 
(or I admits (x IMPLIES q)) it follows that I satisfies TX IMPLIES çbJ. Here is the reasoning 
for the conjunctive case, that for implication being similar: 
I admits (x AND 0) assumption 
J I~Xj J A J admits defns. of AND, admits 
J 1x J A J satisfies ass., defn. of >> 
J Ij J J. 	J defn of satisfies 
J iIIx J NOT defn. of NOT 
IE{XAND NOTL defn. of AND 
I NOT (XAND NOT,b)]1I defn. of NOT 
I[y IMPLIES /ijI defn. of IMPLIES 
I satisfies [{x IMPLIES 01 defn. of satisfies 
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9.1.2 The Projection of Proper Names 
The projection of presuppositions from embedded contexts, combined with the fact that 
proper names presuppose the presence of an appropriately named discourse marker, 
leads to proper names having very special anaphoric properties. Consider the following 
example: 
E196 a. 	If Butch is happy, then he is barking. He is happy. Therefore he is barking. 
b. 	THE. 2. (NAMEDBUTCHU.2) . (IIppyu.2) IMPLIES 
THE. 2. (MALEU.2 AND SINGULARU.2) . (BARK. 2) 
C. 	THE.2.(MALEU.2 AND SINGULAR.2).(HAPPYu.2) 
THE.2. (MALEU.2 AND SINGULARU.2) . (BARK.2) 
E196b,E196c =able  E196d 
On its most obvious reading, that in which all the pronouns refer to Butch, E196a is 
an intuitively valid argument involving one application of modus ponens. Correspond- 
ingly, the ABLE entailment in E196e holds 	that is to say, the translations of the first 
two sentences (i.e. E196b,c) entail the translation of the third (i.e. E196d). Yet E196b 
carries the same presupposition as E184b ('Butch is barking'), namely that 2 is estab-
lished to refer to an individual named Butch. So even without specifying ways in which 
contexts satisfying the presuppositions of a formula may be generated, the formula can 
still appear in the premises of arguments. This is because the notion of entailment given 
in D44 does not depend on the premises being defined on all contexts, but only says 
that for all suitable contexts which satisfy the presuppositions of the premises, updating, 
with the premises yields a state which satisfies the consequent. 
It may surprise some readers that the ABLE translations of E196 can sustain the 
anaphoric linkage between the proper name Butch, which occurs within the antecedent of 
a conditional, and later pronouns beyond the scope of the conditional. In effect, ABLE 
manifests accessibility conditions for proper names and other definites reminiscent of 
Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory. The fact that a presuppositional analysis 
for proper-names can account for their distinctive anaphoric properties is discussed in 
[Ze91], but this awkward detail of Kamp's work had generally been ignored in earlier 
reformulations of DRT, such as [GS91b] and [Mus90]. 
Looked at from a slightly different angle, the projection behaviour of definites in 
ABLE tells us something about the relationship between DRT and File Change Seman-
tics. The special mechanism for dealing with accessibility of names appears to be one 
of the few ways in which DRT and FCS differ significantly. Yet the ABLE analysis of 
definites, which I have shown lads to DRT-like anaphoric accessibility conditions, is 
basically that found in the original manifestation of FCS, namely Heim's thesis. Thus 
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FCS contains the core of an idea that not only reproduces, but also explains the special 
behaviour of definites and names in DRT. One can imagine adding an ABLE-like notion 
of entailment to FCS, something along the lines of "one sentence entails another if after 
updating a file set with the file change potential (FCP) of the first, updating with the 
FCP of the second has no effect". It remains a matter of speculation whether such a 
line of research could lead to a more concrete demonstration that DRT-like behaviour 
of definites can be derived within FCS. 
9.1.3 Quantificational Projection: A Problem 
The following example shows that a problem which appeared in Heim's 1983 paper (and 
discussed in §5.3) has resurfaced: 
E197 a. 	A man discovered that he owned a priceless Modigliani. 
b. SOME.j.(MANU.j).(DISCOVERa.j.(OApMU.j)) 
E198 a. 	Every man owned a priceless Modigliani. 
b. EVERY.j.(MANU.j).(OAPMU.j) 
After updating with the restrictor of E197b, a state would be reached in which i 
was known to be a man. Assuming that the dynamic attitude predicate DISCOVER' is 
constrained to be factive, this state could only be updated with the scope of E197b if the 
formula OAPMU.j  was satisfied. However, this formula would only be satisfied if all the 
values of i were already established to correspond to priceless Modigliani owners. Thus 
a state could only be updated with E197b if in that state every man was established to 
be a priceless Modigliani owner. Thus E197b presupposes E198b. The problem is that 
E197a certainly does not presuppose (or entail) E198a. 
Heim's account also predicts overly strong, universal presuppositions from existential 
sentences, and for essentially the same reason: quantified markers represent arbitrary 
objects. Thus at the point where the factive verb in E197b is reached, the discourse 
marker plays the role of an arbitrary man, and updating can only continue if it is 
established that any arbitrary man satisfies the factive's presupposition. The provisional 
semantics for ABLE's determiner's presented in Chapter 8 is uniform in this respect, so 
that the semantics for all the quantificational determiners is based on the same approach 
as for indefinites, which can be summed up as "add an arbitrary object, and check 
what effect updating with the restrictor and scope will have". Thus the occurrence 
of universal presuppositions is not restricted to indefinites alone, as is shown by the 
following examples: 
E199 a. 	Every woman regrets that she is married 
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b. 	EVERY.i. (WOMANU.j) . (REGRET° . (MARRIEDU.j)) 
E200 a. 	No woman regrets that she is married 
b. NO.i.(WOMANu.j).(REGRETa.j.(MARRIEDU.j)) 
E201 a. 	Every woman who regrets that she is married is sane 
b. 	EVERY.i. (WOMANU .i AND REGRETa (MARRIEDU i)) . (SANEU.j) 
E202 a. 	Every woman is married 
b. 	EVERY. j.  (WO  MANU.j).(MARRIEDU.j) 
According to the Chapter 8 semantics, each of E199b, E200b and E201b presuppose 
E202b. This may be defensible for E199a, though I will later argue that even in this case 
the universal presupposition is inappropriate, it seems harder to justify the presence of 
such a strong presupposition for E200a and E201a. Intuitively, E200a is true just in case 
there are no married women who regret being married, and E202a is true just in case 
every married woman who regrets being married is sane. Such truth conditions are, of 
course, compatible with the existence of unmarried women. 
The following fact summarises the problem with the arbitrary object analysis of 
quantification, showing that, as things stand, whenever a presupposing construction is 
bound within the scope of a quantifier, a universal presupposition arises: 
Fact F9 If 4 >> 	, V is any quantificational determiner (i.e. not THE), and true 
of type ir is interpreted as the trivial CCP AIAJ[I = J], then under the temporary 
definitions D57 and D56 the following hold: 
V.i.ç>> EVERY.i.true., and 
V.i.x.4>> EVERY.i.x. 
Sketch of proof for (1): inspection of definitions D57 and D56 shows that 
if I admits V.i.cb.x then 3J I{ +i}J A J admits , and thus that 3J If +d}J A 
J satisfies 	By the definition of satisfaction it follows that (+i) o 	(where ° is 
relational composition) is satisfied in I, and thus that (+i) o true o 1,01 is satisfied in I, 
from which the result follows by the semantics of EVERY. The reasoning is similar for 
(2). 
The above problem motivates an alteration to the semantics of quantification, but, 
as will be seen in the next section, such a change can to some extent be motivated by 
independent considerations. 
Presupposition and Modality in ABLE 
9.2 Epistemic modality 
9.2.1 Modal Identity Problems 
In this section I will provide a semantics for the unary ABLE operator MIGHT, extending 
the development of Veltman's [Ve91] account of epistemic modality in the first part 
of this thesis, which concerned a propositional language, to the first-order language of 
ABLE. In fact the PUL definition D25 requires little modification, except for adjustment 
to the Ty3 format of ABLE semantic clauses: 
Definition D60 (Epistemic Modalities in ABLE) 
	
IIMIGHT 	= AIAJ 3K IçbK A 
(-i(K=±) -* J=I) A 
(K=± -* J=k) 
I{MUST 	= I{ NOT (MIGHT( NOT q))] 
This definition for MIGHT, which clearly preserves the intuitions behind the operator 
in Veltman's original work and in the UL/PUL systems from Chapter 7 of this thesis, is 
essentially that used by Dekker in [Dek92, Dek93]. In discussing the general properties 
of these operators, it is helpful to introduce Veltman's notion of a test. Tests are a 
special class of formulae which have, in terms of ABLE, the following property: 
Definition D61 (Tests) A formula 4 is a test if and only if: 
V1VJII[cb]IJ—*(J=I v JL) 
This means that updating with a test is either uninformative, the output state being 
the same as the input state, or over-informative, the output being the absurd state. It is 
now possible to get a formal grasp on the interpretation of ABLE's epistemic modalities: 
Fact FlU The MIGHT-operator defines a consistency test. Thus for any non-absurd state 
I which admits an ABLE formula 0: 
MIGHTq is a test. 
IMIGHTçbI if I consistent-with 
S. IMIGHTq51J± if -ii consistent-with 
Proof of (1): Simply observe that if a pair I, J are in the denotation of MIGHTq5, then by 
the definition of MIGHT there must be some state K for which IçbjJK holds, and since 
K either is or is not the absurd state, at least one of the two conditional antecedents 
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in the definition must be met, from which it follows that at least one of the consequents 
holds, namely that J = I or J = I, but this is the condition for test-hood. 
Proof of (2) and (3). The condition for IMIGHTI is that updating with 0 does not 
lead to the absurd state, and this is also the condition for consistency of 0 with I. On 
the other hand, the condition for IMIGHTq]± is that updating with 0 does lead to the 
absurd state, and this is both necessary and sufficient for consistency to fail. 
The following lemma helps to clarify the interpretation of the MUST-operator: 
Lemma L3 For any state I which admits a formula q: 
I satisfies 	if -iI consistent-with NOT q 
Proof: By the definition of satisfaction, I satisfies çb iffII, and by the definition of 
negation this holds if Ift NOT q4J, which in turn, by the definition of consistency, holds 
if -u consistent-with NOT 01. 
Fact Fli The MUST-operator defines a test for satisfaction. Thus for any non-absurd 
state I which admits an ABLE formula çb: 
MUSTO is a test. 
IMUSTq5]]I if I satisfies 4J] 
IMUSTI if -'I satisfies [0 
Proof of (1): Since for any q, MIGHTO is a test, it follows that MIGHT( NOT ) is also 
a test, and so if a pair I, J is in the denotation of MIGHT( NOT), then J = I or 
J = I. From the semantics of negation it follows that if IMIGHT( NOT q)]I then 
If[ NOT (MIGHT( NOT q))]JJ, and if IMIGHT( NOT q)LL then I[ NOT (MIGHT( NOT cb))1JI, 
and since this is exhaustive, the result follows. 
Proof of (2): 
I satisfiesçb if -'(I consistent-with [NOT ) lemma L3 
if 	IMIGHT( NOTI 	 defn. of consistency 
if INOT(MIGHT( NOT c))]1I 	defn. of negation 
Proof of (3): Similar to (2). 
I will not discuss the MUST operator in detail here, but the reader is invited to 
verify that it behaves appropriately with respect to the hide-and-seek examples from 
Chapter 7. Even without examining the applications of the MUST operator, it is at least 
comforting that the dual of a consistency test should be a test for satisfaction. On the 
basis of this interpretation, one could think of MUST as corresponding not to the English 
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modal 'must', but as one of the sentential operators which could be called argument 
connectives, for example 'so' or 'therefore'. It is also comforting that the definitions 
of the modalities preserve the standard CCP presupposition inheritance properties of 
modals: 
Fact F12 If q presupposes b, then (1) MIGHTq and (2) MUSTO also presuppose 0. 
Proof: From the definition of MIGHT it can be seen that I admits MIGHT4 only if 
I admits 0, from which the first result follows by the definition of presupposition. The 
same result for MUST follows from the proof of (1), the duality of the modalities; and the 
inheritance properties of NOT (Fact F6). 
To see that in general this projection behaviour is appropriate 	counter-examples 
being discussed in Chapter 10 - recall the following example from Chapter 7, which 
was argued to presuppose that Bertha is hiding: 
E170 Anna might realise that Bertha is hiding. 
Although there remain some problems, to which we will turn shortly, the account 
of epistemic possibility already has significant applications. In particular, some intu-
itive results arise when epistemic uses of the English modals 'possible' and 'perhaps' are 
translated using the MIGHT operator, as will now be shown with reference to examples 
E203—E206: 
	
E203 a. 	It is possible there is a happy farmer, but, then again, it is possible that there 
are no happy farmers. 
b. 	MIGHT. (SOME.j.(FARMERU.j).(HAPPYU.j)) A 
MIGHT. (NO.i. (FARMERU.j) . (FIppyU.i)) 
E204 a. 	No farmer is happy. 
b. NO.j.(FARMERU.j).(HAPPYU.j)) 
E205 a. 	Perhaps the spy is the president. 
b. 	MIGHT. (THE. i. (SPYu  .i) . (THE.j. (PRESIDENTU.j) . (i = j))) 
E206 a. 	The spy is not the president. 
b. 	THE. i.(SPYU.i).(THE.j.(PRESIDENTU.j).(NOT (i = 
If my proposal for research into depression amongst farmers were to include E203a, 
and if, having obtained funding and done the relevant fieldwork, I were later to produce 
a report including E204a, I think I would feel justified in taking a certain pride in 
the fruitfulness of my research. In spite of an initial dearth of data, I would have 
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made an important discovery about the distribution of agriculture-related emotional 
disorders. On the other hand, if my research proposal were to include E204a, and 
my final conclusions included E203a, I think DARPA would be justified in questioning 
whether I deserved further funding. For, quite apart from the limited military potential 
of my results, it would seem that my proposals tended to be rather unreliable. The 
conclusion that some farmer might be happy is simply inconsistent with the previous 
assertion that no farmer is happy. 
The contrast between E203a followed by E204a on the one hand, and the E204a 
followed by E203a on the other, is mirrored by the fact that the ABLE formula 
E203b AND E204b is consistent, whereas the formula E204b AND E203b is not. This 
would hold if definition D60 was used just as it will with the final definition for the seman-
tics of MIGHT to be given below. The predictions with regard to examples E205 and E206 
are similarly sensible on either definition. In particular, the formula E205b AND E206b 
is consistent, but swapping the order of the two conjuncts would yield an inconsistent 
formula. The success of ABLE in dealing with this last pair of examples shows that 
a serious problem with another recent attempt to combine DPL and update seman-
tics, namely the Dynamic Modal Predicate Logic (DMPL) of van Eijck and Cepparello 
[EC92], has been circumvented. In DMPL it would make little sense to give a definition 
like D60. The reasons are technical: the DMPL notions of entailment and negation re-
quire that DMPL formulae can be calculated pointwise over assignment functions (recall 
the property of distributivity introduced in §8.3). However, D60 cannot be calculated 
pointwise over assignment functions (sequences) as consistency of a formula is evaluated 
with respect to the full set of world-sequence pairs in the input. To give a flavour of 
the DMPL semantics for epistemic possibility, it must be translated into ABLE terms. 
This is not difficult given the technical proximity of DMPL to ABLE: 
Definition D62 (Epistemic Possibility: DMPL version) 
I{MIGHT011 = AI.\J [K I I [çb]K A 
J = .AwAf [I.w.f A w' K.w'.f]] 
This definition can be seen as being in terms of equivalence classes of world-sequence 
pairs in the input: each class contains only pairs involving the same sequence. Given 
some input state I, the (anaphorically closed) output of MIGHTq5 will be the union of all 
the equivalence classes for which at least one world-sequence pair would survive in an 
update with 0. Put another way, a given world-sequence pair in the input will survive 
just in case there is some relevant world where the values that the sequence gives to 
discourse markers are consistent with çb. Unfortunately the use of a definition like D62 
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means that in DMPL the following entailment is valid2: 
±y(x=y) 1= x = y 
Thus if the above examples were to be translated into DMPL with 'the spy' as x and 
'the president' as y, then the validity of the pattern above would mean that learning that 
the spy might be the president would be equivalent to learning that the spy was the 
president. Furthermore, there is no obvious alternative translation which would solve 
the problem. For instance, translating the definite descriptions as constants would not 
help, since in DMPL updating with MIGHT(a = b) for separate constants a and b always 
yields absurdity. Besides this, the problem is not restricted to definite descriptions but 
applies also to pronominals: 
	
E207 a. 	The first lady is not spying 
b. 	THE.j. (FLU.j) . ( NOT SPYING'.j) 
E208 a. 	I can see a woman in the Whitehouse 
b. SOME.i. (WOMANU.j) . (ISEEINWtL i) 
E209 a. 	She might be spying. 
b. 	SHE. j.  MIGHT  (SPYINGU.j) 
E210 a. 	However, she might be the first lady. 
b. 	SHE. i.(THE.j.(FLU.j).  MIGHT  (i  is j)) 
This discourse consisting of E207a—E210a seems perfectly consistent, and, indeed, 
the formula (E207b AND E208 AND E209 AND E210) is consistent in ABLE. Yet 
there is a single discourse referent which might be spying, and also might be the first 
lady, even though the first lady is apparently above suspicion. Thus the sub-formula 
MIGHT(SPyINGU.j) in E209b should not - as would be the case in DMPL 	remove 
sequences which map i onto the first lady, even though such sequences considered in 
isolation lead to values which are inconsistent with the assertion of spyhood. 
It should be realised that identity problems like those found in DMPL are not al-
together new, and not essentially dynamic in nature: many static systems of modal 
predicate logic have comparable properties. Indeed Kripke has argued persuasively 
[Krip:MS] that identity is a non-contingent property, so that if two things are identical 
then they are necessarily so. Given the logical duality of necessity and possibility, it 
immediately follows that things which might not be identical are not identical, and thus 
2Note that in DMPL, as in DPL or ABLE, quantifiers take non-standard scope, so that a quantifier 
in the premise of an argument is able to bind a variable in the conclusion. 
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that things which might be identical are identical. However, it is clear that Kripke's ar-
guments (which anyway have remained controversial) could not be applied in defence of 
the properties of DMPL, for those arguments concern metaphysical contingency within 
total logics, and do not extend into the epistemic realm.3  
In summary, whilst DMPL could well be an interesting object of logical investiga-
tion, it lacks any intuitive interpretation. In most respects the K> operator behaves 
comparably to Veitman's MIGHT: learning what is the case restricts what merely might 
be. However, with regard to questions of identity the K> behaves not as a Veitmanesque 
epistemic modality but as a Kripkean metaphysical modality: learning that things might 
be identical determines that they are identical. The reason is technical. An epistemic 
operator must be sensitive to all aspects of a referent's identity, but DMPL's entailment 
(and also negation) is not compatible with such a sensitive operator. On the other hand, 
the entailment used in ABLE or in Dekker's EDPL (from which much of the inspiration 
for ABLE derives), is compatible with the definition of an identity-sensitive operator. 
Finally, and without going into details, I should point out the sequence semantics for 
DPL introduced by Vermeulen [Ver93] provides yet another route to an identity-sensitive 
modality, but, as with DMPL and ABLE, would also be technically compatible with a 
DMPL-style insensitive operator. 
9.2.2 The dynamics of quantifying-in. 
Unfortunately, the definition of MIGHT given in D60, does not interact appropriately 
with quantificational determiners. For example, it is clear that E21 la and E212a express 
quite different propositions, but the formula E211b differs from E212b only in terms of 
its anaphoric potential. That is to say, E211b and E212b are satisfied by exactly the 
same set of states. 
E211 a. 	Most politicians might be spying. 
3Kripke's main argument, which I again must stress is applied within a metaphysical rather than 
an epistemic setting, involves consideration of which pairs of objects could falsify the open formula 
O(x = y) -* x = y. Substituting distinct values for x and y into the implication would falsify the 
antecedent, whereas substituting one value for both x and y would validate the consequent. But, if the 
formula is not falsifiable, then = is not metaphysically contingent. Within an epistemic setting, the 
argument loses its force, for although it is impossible to simultaneously locate a pair of objects in the 
world which would obviously falsify the implication, it seems that the objects of thought and discourse, 
which may not even have a location in the exterior world, behave differently. There is manifestly no 
contradiction in positing that the objects referred to by two different descriptions, perhaps even in 
different languages, are in fact identical, nor is there necessarily any certainty about the question of 
whether a person seen in one guise is the same person as was separately seen in another guise. This is 
why it is consistent, albeit unwise in the wrong company, to assert that the spy might be the president', 
and still allow that they may later be discovered to be different. So even if data like that discussed 
here is reminiscent of data discussed in the philosophical literature, it is even so distinct data, since 
it concerns epistemic and not metaphysical modality, and the Kripkean arguments would seem to be 
irrelevant to a defence of the DMPL account of quantifying-in. 
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b. 	MOST. i. (POLITICIAN'. i) (MIGHT (SpyINGU.j)) 
E212 a. 	Some politician might be spying. 
b. 	SOME. i. (POLITICIANU .i) (MIGHT (SpyINGU.j)) 
The definition for the semantics of ABLE's quantificational determiners is based 
on the principle of adding a discourse marker which in different sequences takes each 
single object as its value, and then checking what new information about the possible 
value of the marker is obtained by updating with the restrictor and scope. Thus the 
privileged marker stands proxy for the entire set of objects onto which it is mapped by 
different sequences associated with the various intermediate information states involved 
in updating with a quantificational formula. However, the interpretation of discourse 
markers outside of the scope of their introductory quantifier is quite different. An 
unquantified marker may also have several alternative valuations, but the interpretation 
is essentially disjunctive rather than conjunctive. Rather than standing proxy for the 
entire set of objects which it can take as values, an unquantified marker is understood 
as standing for just one of the alternative values: the presence of alternative values 
represents not multiplicity but underspecificity. 
This difference in interpretation becomes crucial when quantifying into a modal 
context. MIGHT must check separately for consistency of its argument with regard to 
each of the alternative values for the quantified markers. Thus in E211b and E212b, 
where i is a quantified discourse marker, the effect of updating with MIGHT (SPYINGU.j) 
should be to remove all those sequences which map i onto an object which is known not 
to be spying. However, the same sub-formula should have a quite different effect when 
it occurs in E209b, above. 
In order to define a notion of epistemic possibility which preserves the positive traits 
of that given in D60, and also gives a sensible account of the behaviour of quantified 
markers which distinguishes appropriately between E211b and E212b, the semantics of 
ABLE quantification will be altered. Note, however, that this is not the only way to 
proceed: in an earlier version of this chapter (appearing as [Bea93a]), a special mecha-
nism was added for keeping track of quantified markers, and the semantics of MIGHT was 
altered so as to interact differently with quantified and unquantified markers. Here I 
will formulate things more along the lines taken by my colleagues, Groenendijk, Stokhof 
and Veltman, in recent talks [GSV95]. The motivation, however, differs somewhat from 
theirs, in that my reason for following their formulation is not simply that it eliminates 
the above-mentioned problem with epistemic modality, but that it will also lead to an 
elegant solution of some longstanding problems in the treatment of presupposition. 
As I have said, under the semantics above, a quantified marker at some point in 
a formula stands proxy for the entire set of individuals which are compatible with the 
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formula up to that point. So,. although the semantics of MIGHT is only appropriate 
when multiplicity of interpretations represents underspecificity of reference, this is not 
the case with a quantified marker. The solution is to alter the semantics of quantification 
so that rather than considering all the different possible values of the quantified marker 
simultaneously, they are considered one at a time. By evaluating the restrictor and 
scope of a quantification separately for each value of the quantified marker, operators 
in the restrictor and scope become insensitive to the multiplicity of different values. To 
this end, a special way of interpreting a formula is defined. Given an ABLE formula, 0, 
and a discourse marker, d, 10l d  will define that relation between information states such 
that after splitting up the first state with respect to each different value of the marker 
d, and updating each of the resulting states using the normal interpretation 	the 
outputs can be recombined to yield the second state. Nd  is defined using a constant 
distribute, where distribute.F.d will be referred to as the distributive re-interpretation of 
the CCP F with respect to the marker d. 
In the definition below, distribute is defined in two stages. Firstly a function unfold 
is given, where unfold.F.d defines a relation between two information states holding just 
in case there is a value of d such that after restricting the input to sequences which give 
that valuation, updating with F yields the output. Here, the process of restricting an 
information state with respect to values taken by some discourse marker is easily defined: 
if I is a state and d is a marker, then the restriction of i with respect to the value X 
for d is given by ,\w)f[I.w.f A f.d = X]. The constant distribute is then defined such 
that a formula distribute.F.d denotes a CCP having as inputs only states which admit 
unfold.F.d, and having as output the union of the outputs of 11011d.  Here, given an input 
I, the union of the outputs of a CCP F is just AwAf []K I{F}K A K.w.f]. 
Meaning Postulate MP16 
unfold = AF.\DAIAJ [X (AwAf [I.w.f A f.d = X]){F}J] 
distribute = AFAD)JAJ [I admits (unfold.F.D) A 
J = AwAf [K I{unfold.F.D}K A K.w.f]] 
Definition D63 (Distributive Interpretation of ABLE Formulae) 
]1d 	= distribute. I[Ol .d 
The definition allows for a relatively conservative alteration to the quantifiers. It 
can be seen from the following two properties that the use of 	in place of {0]  will 
only have an effect in a very restricted range of circumstances: 
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Fact F13 If 0 does not contain the discourse marker d then Nd = c11 
Sketch of proof: ABLE predicates have the property of relevance (cf. §8.3), which is easily 
shown (by induction over formula complexity) to be preserved by all ABLE's operators. 
Thus we need only consider states I, J which do not have d in their domain. For such 
states it is clear that I1J J 	(Note that the definition of [d  is compatible 
with the input state only giving d the value Ax [I].) 
Fact F14 If I admits N and 0 does not contain any occurrences of the epistemic modal- 
ity, MIGHT, then I0J 	IQJJdJ 
Sketch of proof: ABLE predicates have the property of distributivity (cf. §8.3), and this 
can be shown (another induction) to be preserved by ABLE's connectives and determin-
ers. Thus we need only consider singleton states (those with only one world-sequence 
pair), and for these the result is trivial, since distributing over a single world-sequence, 
pair has no effect. 
Having given a definition of 	d' amending the semantics of quantifiers is easy. 
Where before the passage from input to output was mediated by a sequence of updates 
I{+.i}init/re4sco, we simply replace the occurrences of [1J by [], to get the new 
definitions, given blow for completeness: 
Definition D64 (Non-existential Determiners - Final Version) 
If V is one of EVERY, MOST, FEW or NO, and V' is a corresponding quantifier relation 
of type ((e, t), ((e, t), t)), then: 
= AIAJ. 
I 
If 	 A 
J = AwAg 
F f 3Grer 3G,,r0 3X,,s 3Xs,o  
I.w.f A 
Gres = Ah [h >— f A res.w.h] A 
= Ah [h >— f A sco.w.h] A 
Xres 	Ax [h Gres.h A h.i.x] A 
X 0 = Ax [h G0.h A h.i.x] A 
V'.Xres sco A 
g = ADAx f.D.x V  
h G0.h A h.D.x 
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Definition D65 (Existential Determiners: final version) 
If V is SOME or EXACTLY-ONE, and V' is a corresponding quantifier relation 
of type ((e, t), ((e, t), t)), then: 
= AIAJ 
F 2initressco 
I{ 	 A 
J = AwAg 
f3G,es 2G 0 3X,es X 0 
I 
I.w.f A 
Gres = Ah [h >- f A res.w.h] A 
G. = Ah [h >- f A sco.w.h] A 
Xres = Ax [h Gres.h A h.i.x] A 
X. = Ax [h G80.h A h.i.x] A 
V'.Xres .X co A 
G0.g 
What is the reason for the definedness condition, I admits (unfold.F.D) in postulate 
MP16? It is easy to see that with no such condition some rather strange effects would 
arise. For instance, if the formula F was the denotation of a simple predication P(d) 
for some discourse marker d' not in the domain of the input, then unfold.F.D would 
have no outputs, and the effect of taking the 'union of the outputs would be to produce 
the absurd state. Whereas, for such an input, P(d) would not define an output, 
P(d')]Jd would define an update to the absurd state. Thus undefinedness would cease to 
propagate through formulae involving distributive updates, leading to a rather strange 
inconsistency, and consequently strange logic. So some definedness condition is needed. 
However, it would be possible to use a stronger definedness condition, say insisting 
not just that there is at least one value of the distributed marker for which there is an 
update, but requiring that for every value an update was defined. Such a condition would 
still be sensible as far as the interaction of quantification and modality was concerned, 
but would lead to different predictions regarding the projection of presuppositions from 
quantified contexts. In fact, such a strong definedness condition would yield the same 
predictions for presupposition projection as were obtained with the earlier definitions 
of quantification in Chapter 8. However, in the next section it will be shown that 
whereas the earlier definitions of quantification give the same undesirable presupposition 
projection effects as plagued the system in [Hei83a], the new definitions provide quite 
attractive projection properties. 
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9.3 Presupposition in ABLE revisited 
Fact F9, which says that universal presuppositions arise from the Chapter 8 definitions 
of quantification, would fail under the amended definitions. To see this it suffices to give 
a counter-example, so constructing an information state which admits E197b but does 
not satisfy E198b will be adequate: 
E197 a. 	A man discovered that he owned a priceless Modigliani. 
b. SOME.j.(MANu.j).(DISCOVERa.j.(OApM .j)) 
E198 a. 	Every man owned a priceless Modigliani. 
b. EVERY.j.(MANU.j).(OAPMU.j) 
Let us assume MANU  and OAPMU  to be simple, and DISCOVERa  to be factive. Here is 
a definition of an appropriate information state in a simplified model: 
The state I contains the single world sequence pair w, () 
The domain De consists of only two individuals, a and b 
w is a man's world (i.e. both a and b are men) 
In w, a owns a priceless Modigliani and has discovered that he owns it, whilst b does 
not own a priceless Modigliani. Note that ownership of a priceless Modigliani is 
assumed to be a basic property, so that the object corresponding to the Modigliani 
can be ignored. 
That I does not satisfy E198b should be clear, since in I there is a man who does 
not own a priceless Modigliani. Inspection of the semantics for existential determiners 
D65 shows that the condition for I to admit E197b is that there exist states J, K, L 
such that: 
I{+.j}JMANU.jIKDISCOVERa.j.(OApMu.j)]J.L 
It is easy to find the appropriate values for J and K. J must consist of two world 
sequence pairs mapping i onto a and b, respectively. Furthermore, since both a and b 
are men, we should expect the update with MANu.j]j,  not to remove any world-sequence 
pairs from J: since MAN' is simple, J must admit MANU.iJI, and F14 means that we 
can ignore the fact that MANU.j  is evaluated distributively with respect to i. Thus: 
J = K = {w: (i 	a),w: (i 	b)} 
Presupposition and Modality in ABLE 	 211 
By the definition of distributive update D63, L is calculated by taking the union of 
all the states M (provided that there is at least one state M) such that: 
K{unfoldjDIscovERa.i.(oApMu.i) .i IM 
Since of the two values for i, only a corresponds to an individual satisfying the factive 
presupposition of DISCOVERa.,  there will only be one appropriate M: 
M = {w: (i I_* a)} 
The existence of this single value for M is enough to guarantee that E197b is admitted 
in I, as required. Further, it can be seen that L will take the same value, i.e. the singleton 
set containing the pair of w and a sequence mapping i onto the individual a, and, by 
inspection of the semantics for SOME, that this will also be the output of the whole 
formula E197b. 
So given that Fact F9 is no longer appropriate, what are the presuppositions of 
quantificational formulae involving a bound presuppositional expression? The following 
fact shows that under the new semantics for quantifiers, although the universal pre-
suppositions associated with the Chapter 8 definitions have gone, there remain at least 
existential constraints: 
Fact F15 If 0 >> 0 , V is any quantificational determiner (i.e. not THE), and true of 
type ir is interpreted as the trivial CCP )J)J [I = J], then under the final definitions 
D64 and D65: 
D.i.O.X >> SOME.i.true., and 
D-i-X-0 >> SOME.i.X.'b 
Sketch of proof for (1): From D64 and D65, V.i.qS.x is admitted by any state for which: 
initres sco I{ +.i}initftqres{.sco 
Given the assumption that 0 presupposes 0, it follows that a necessary condition for the 
formula to be admitted by I is that there is some state mit such that: 
I{+.i}init A mit admits cJl. 
From the definition of distributive update, it follows that: 
mit admits q}J if mit admits (unfold. 
Using the definition of unfold gives us: 
mit admits [01 if 3X ((AwAf [init.w.f A f.d = X]) admits q}J) 
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But by assumption q presupposes 0, so: 
init admits q if 2X ((AwAf [init.w.f A f.d = X]) satisfies 	) 
Thus for I to admit V.i.cb.x, it must be the case that there is some individual in a 
singleton set X such that if I is extended with the marker i, and is then restricted by 
removing all the world sequence pairs where i is not mapped onto X, the resulting state 
satisfies b. This existential requirement is enough to force the required condition, that 
SOME.i.true.' is satisfied. in the input, but I omit the remaining details. The proof of 
(2) would be similar. 
So whilst E197b does not presuppose E198b, it does presuppose E213b: 
	
E213 a. 	Some man owned a priceless Modigliani. 
b. SOME.j.(MANU.j).(OAPMu.j) 
Similar results are obtained for the other quantificational examples considered earlier, 
and it will now be argued that these results are not only reasonable, but represent an 
advance over previous analyses. Firstly a case with a presupposition in the restrictor of 
a quantifier: 
E201 a. 	Every woman who regrets that she is married is sane 
b. 	EVERY. i. (WOMANU.j AND REGRETa .. (MARRIEDU.j) ) . (SANE') 
E214 a. Some woman is married 
b. 	EVERY.i. (WOMANU.j) . (MARRIED .i) 
As pointed out earlier, the prediction of a universal presupposition for E201 is quite 
clearly inappropriate. On the current analysis, E201b presupposes E214b, and this ex-
istential presupposition is certainly to be preferred. Although there can be no question 
that analyses  which predict a universal presupposition for this case are inappropriate, 
there must remain a question as to whether the existential analysis is correct. I think 
it quite possible to defend a view that such sentences should have no presuppositions, 
but only implicate that there are some individuals which satisfy the restrictor condi-
tions, and thus implicate that there are some individuals which satisfy the restrictor's 
presuppositions. It could be that variations on the definition of distributive update used 
within the semantics of quantifiers would lead to such results, but in this thesis I will 
not attempt any further development along these lines.' 
4e.g. Heim's [Hei83a] without her suggested addition of a mechanism for accommodation. 
5Yet another option would be to produce a defeasible presupposition, along the lines to be sketched 
for the propositional case in Chapter 11. 
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Much more controversial are cases where a presupposition occurs in the scope of a 
quantificational construction. Unfortunately, there is, to my knowledge, no intellectually 
rigorous analysis of such sentences in the existing presuppositional literature, and most 
authors have been happy to advocate whatever claims about the data pose fewest prob-
lems for their own theory. There is thus no consensus concerning the presuppositions of 
the following examples, the first being repeated from above: 
E199' a. 	Every woman regrets that she is married 
	
b. 	EVERY.i. (WOMANU .i) . (MARRIEDU i) 
E215 a. 	Every man discovered that he owned a priceless Modigliani 
b. 	EVERY.i. (MANU.j) . (DISCOVERa .i. (OAPM i)) 
I find the lack of consensus surprising, since there is no reason why standard presup-
positional tests should not be applied in order to resolve the issue. I will only consider 
one such test, embedding under negation. 
Firstly consider E216a below, which I consider to be true: there are women who 
do not regret that they are married. Given that not every woman is married, we have 
a situation (the real world) where E216a is true, but it is false that every woman is 
married. It is clear that this contradicts any claim that E216a entails that every woman 
is married. Now although the negation in E216a is syntactically realised within the 
subject NP, there is good reason to analyse it as semantically having scope over the 
whole sentence.6 Thus, it seem reasonable to accept that E216a functions semantically 
as the negation of E199a, and thence that E199a does not presuppose that every woman 
is married. 
E216 a. 	Not every woman regrets that she is married. 
b. 	NOT (EVERY.i. (WOMANU.j) . (REGRETSa.j. (MARRIEDU i))) 
Now consider E217a, which I take to be a slightly strange thing to say unless there is 
previous reason to think that there have been some discoveries of Modigliani ownership. 
I think it indisputable that the sentence could be true in worlds where some, but not 
61 would offer two arguments that negations like that in E216a function semantically as sentential 
operators. Firstly, an argument from truth conditions: Not every chameleon has a crest' is intuitively 
true if and only%if it is not the case that Every chameleon has a crest.' Secondly, from licensing of 
negative polarity items (NPI's): Not every chameleon has any friends', containing the NPI any', is 
notably more felicitous than Every chameleon has any friends', suggesting that in the first of these the 
'not' has semantic scope including the object NP. In my [Bea94a] another embedding test, embedding 
in the antecedent of a conditional, is also applied to determine the presuppositions of sentences with 
elementary presuppositions bound by universal quantifiers. This is shown to lead to the same conclusions 
as reached here. One advantage of the conditional embedding is that the syntactic form more obviously 
correlates with the semantic interpretation, the semantic scope of the conditional not being at issue. 
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all, men had discovered that they owned Modigliani's. This is sufficient to show that 
E215 does not presuppose universal Modigliani ownership. 
	
E217 a. 	Not every man discovered that he owned a priceless Modigliani. 
b. 	NOT (EVERY.j.(MANU.j).(DISCOVERa.j.(OAPMU.j))) 
These observations are completely in line with the predictions obtained within ABLE: 
none of the above four examples (E199a, E215a, E216a, E216a) carry universal presup-
positions. However, this is not the end of the story. My intuition is that, knowing that 
not all women are married, E199a is a slightly strange thing to say, and, given that 
not every man owns a Modigliani, E215 is an even stranger thing to say. However, 
even knowing that not all women are married, E200 does not seem in the least odd. 
My intuition is that it is simply false, since there are married women who regret being 
married: 
E200 a. 	No woman regrets that she is married 
b. NO.j.(WOMANU.j).(REGRETa.j.(MARRIEDU.j)) 
Similarly, E218 is quite compatible with there being some non-Modigliani owners7: 
E218 a. 	No man discovered that he owned a priceless Modigliani 
b. NO.j.(MANU.j).(DISCOVERa.j.(OApMU.j)) 
In ABLE these contrasts are explained straightforwardly. Although none of the 
above regretful-wife examples are predicted to presuppose that every woman is married, 
E199 is predicted to entail that every woman is married, although this is not the case 
with E216 or E200. Likewise, none of the Modigliani-discovery examples are predicted 
to presuppose that every man owns a Modigliani, although E215 is predicted to entail 
this proposition. Thus, what seems to me rather a strong contrast between occasions 
in which every' and no' are appropriate8, is explained not in terms of any difference in 
presupposition, but in terms of entailments. 
It may seem that the contrasts are too vague to merit the sharp semantic division 
which ABLE predicts. However, I believe that the apparent blurriness of the contrasts 
is explained solely by the failure to specify the context of utterance in sufficient detail, 
7Some would doubtless go further, and say that E218 is compatible with their being no Modigliani 
owners. As mentioned above, I think this is a tenable viewpoint, although I will not attempt to adjust 
ABLE's semantics accordingly. Note also that although there may be effects with this type of example 
related to Karttunen's division of verbs into factives and semifactives (as indicated to me by Gerald 
Gazdar) the conclusions I draw are made on the basis of examples with both types of verbs (a factive 
in E200 and a semifactive in E218), and therefore should be safe. 
8Hans Kamp drew attention to this contrast at a recent DYANA workshop in Amsterdam 
Presupposition and Modality in ABLE 	 215 
which means that regarding the above examples it is not a priori clear exactly which 
sets of individuals are being talked about. The contrasts become much stronger when 
more of the preceding context of utterance is given: 
E219 Ten girls were playing hide-and-seek. 
E220 Every girl discovered that she could hide in the attic. 
E221 No girl discovered that she could hide in the attic. 
Suppose that Clothilde, one of the ten girls mentioned in E219 is too fat to fit through 
the trap-door to the attic, and thus cannot possibly hide there. The discourse consisting 
of E219 followed by E220 is not appropriate: it simply contradicts the assumption about 
Clothilde's breadth. On the other hand, E219 followed by E221 could conceivably be 
true under the assumptions about Clothilde. The contrast is very sharp. Once again, 
it will be explained quite readily in ABLE, since E220 will entail that every girl could 
hide in the attic, but E221 will not entail this. 
However, this contrast is not predicted by either Heim or van der Sandt's accom-
modation based theories of presupposition, as described in Chapter 6. In both of these 
theories, presuppositions bound in either the scope of a quantificational construction 
are able to trigger restriction of the quantificational domain through the mechanism of 
intermediate accommodation. But, as was shown in 6.5, intermediate accommodation 
produces incorrect predictions, and the problems discussed there resurface in the case 
of the above discourses. 
Let us see how van der Sandt's account fares with E220. Assume that previous 
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On parsing E221, and assuming resolution of she' to the locally quantified marker, 









Global accommodation of the presupposition is not possible because of van der 
Sandt's trapping constraint, which prevents markers in presuppositions from becom-
ing unbound in the accommodation process. So the preferred option will be the next 
most global form of accommodation, intermediate accommodation of the presupposition 
in the restrictor of the quantifier9: 
91 am not positive whether van der Sandt would wish to term this an instance of resolution or 
accommodation, but resolution of the presupposition would produce identical results so the choice is not 
relevant to current concerns. 












discovered(x, 	 ) 
could-hide-in-attic(x) 
This DRS would be true (embeddable) in a model just in case Clothilde could not 
hide in the attic, ten girls of whom Clothilde was one were playing, and every one of 
those girls who could hide in the attic had discovered that she could. But this set of 
requirements is consistent. Therefore no anomaly is predicted for the discourse ending 
in E220 (and similarly for the discourse ending in E221). I take it that Heim's earlier but 
less explicitly formulated account of accommodation would produce similar results.10 
These examples show that presuppositions in the scope of a uantification do not 
automatically trigger domain restriction, and that any theory of accommodation which 
says they do, is wrong. Given this, and given that some women are single, does it 
then follow that it is never correct to say 'Every woman regrets that she is married.' 
? No, it does not. Rather, the contexts in which this can be appropriately uttered 
are those in which marriage and the set of married women are already salient, and 
the previous salience of the set of married women licences domain restriction, as is 
argued in detail in [Bea94b]. I will not attempt to describe formally a mechanism 
whereby previous context could trigger domain restriction, but it is clear that the basic 
apparatus is present in ABLE to allow such a development. In particular, the fact that 
10However, the reasoning producing those results in Heim's account might be different. Global accom-
modation that every girl in the given set could hide in the attic would be possible in Heim's account, 
except that in this case it would produce inconsistency and presumably be ruled out. Likewise, purely 
local accommodation would be ruled out, also on pain of producing inconsistency. But intermediate 
accommodation would remain a feasible option, and presumably yield similar results to van der Sandt's 
model if it was clear exactly what material to accommodate, this not being explicitly stated in Heim's 
papers. 
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plural referents can be generated means that it would be straightforward to add a clause 
to the semantics of quantificational determiners to allow quantification to be restricted 
to a set demarcated by some existing plural referent. Neither would this be an ad hoc 
addition to the system: it is uncontroversial that some mechanism of quantificational 
domain restriction is present in natural language, and that domain restriction is heavily 
dependent on previous context". 
In conclusion, ABLE offers a semantic solution to many problems that arise when 
quantifiers and presuppositions interact, and a solution that is to some extent indepen-
dently motivated by a consideration of the semantics of epistemic modality. However, 
there remain many outstanding problems of both an empirical and technical nature. 
I have indicated that I have doubts about whether even a prediction of an existential 
presupposition is appropriate in the above cases. But I will finish this section by noting 
yet another potential problem. The reader may like to verify that in the above cases 
where a presupposition is bound by a quantifier, ABLE predicts not only an existential 
presupposition, but a presupposition that there is at least one rigid designator that has 
the presupposed property. Thus for E200 to be admitted, there would have to be an el-
ement of the domain of individuals such that in every world in the input that individual 
was married. This technical artefact has little obvious empirical support, and it is clear 
to me that further work is required12. 
11Further discussion of these issues is found both in [Bea94b] and in von Fintel's recent dissertation 
[vF94]. 
12 In fact the slight differences in the version of this work presented in [Bea93a] mean that the system 
given there does not suffer from the rigid-designator problem, so clearly we should not give up hope! 
Chapter 10 
Lets Get Real ! 
The language ABLE is all very well as a means for developing intuitions about the 
dynamics of determiners, presuppositions and so forth, but ABLE is only a bit like 
English. The aim of this chapter is to develop a more realistic model of the process 
of natural language interpretation, in particular providing answers to the following two 
questions: 
How can the meaning of English sentences be derived compositionally? 
How does world knowledge constrain utterance interpretation? 
10.1 Kinematic Montague Grammar 
In Chapter 7 and Chapter 9, ABLE was set up as an independent language, which 
merely happened to have its semantics defined in terms of another formal language, 
namely Ty3. The choice of type theory as a meta-language certainly did not enhance 
readability, a fact of which the reader is presumably painfully aware, and it is probably 
of little consolation that using type theory in this way did not enhance writability either. 
But now we come to the pay-off. 
The pay-off is that it is straightforward to embed ABLE in Ty3, as a mere sub-
language, and then use the apparatus of type theory to relate expressions of ABLE to 
the meanings of expressions of English. I say straightforward, but what I really mean 
is that Montague did the hard work, by showing how (a modified form of) type theory 
can be used to specify the semantics of natural language. 
10.1.1 ABLE in Ty3  
In this section it will be shown how to define Ty3 constants AND, NOT, IMPLIES, 
THE, EVERY, NO, MOST, FEW, EXACTLY-ONE, IS, MIGHT and MUST: the embedding of 
219 
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ABLE into Ty3 enriched with these constants will then be unproblematic. Consider the 
definitions for the semantics of the ABLE connectives, given originally in Chapter 8: 
= AIAJ [K IKb]1J] 
I[NOTq5]1 = 
J = I\K] 
[0 IMPLIES 01 = NOT (0 AND NOT 0)J1 
These definitions can be used as the basis of three Ty3 constants AND, NOT, 
and IMPLIES, of types (ir, (ir, 7r)), (ir, ir) and (ir, (7r, 7r)), respectively, where AND and 
IMPLIES will be used in infix form. In the following postulate q and 0 are taken to be 
Ty3 variables of type ir: 
Meaning Postulate MP17 
AND 	= )çbA'ibAIAJ [RK I{q}K{b}J] 
NOT 	= )qAIAJ [K I{ çb}K A 
J = I\K] 
IMPLIES = AAb [NOT (q AND NOT')] 
The general recipe for producing an appropriate Ty3 constant from an ABLE se-
mantic clause runs as follows: firstly wipe out all the semantic bracket (but replacing 
formulae HD  with distribute. q5.D), and then remove the argument expressions one at a 
time from left to right in the definiend'urn, adding them from right to left together with 
a preceding lambda at the beginning of the definiens. Rather than giving the by now 
obvious definitions for the remaining constants, the reader is referred to appendix B. 
Given the enrichment of Ty3 with these constants, it can be seen that any sentence 
of ABLE is also a sentence of Ty3. Furthermore, since the postulates restricting the 
interpretation of the Ty3 constants are based on the same definitions as for the original 
ABLE semantics, it is clear that for any formula, 0, in the ABLE fragment of Ty3, 
the embedding function 	will map 0 onto a Ty3formula which is Ty3-equivalent to 0. 
That is, if 	= , then 0 =TY3 
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10.1.2 Indexed English in Ty3  
It will now be shown how indexed trees of English can be given a direct interpretation 
in type theory. Trees may be represented as bracketed strings, such that E222b is a tree 
for the indexed English discourse in E222a: 
	
E222 a. 	Al woman realises John2 owns a3 donkey. She1 is angry. 
b. 	((((a 1) woman) (realises ((John 2) (owns ((a 3) donkey)))))o) 




Note that E222b is the tree not for a sentence of indexed English, but for a discourse, 
the o representing a sentence sequencing operator. If words of English are defined to be 
constants of the right types, and if some simple notation conventions are used, such trees 
become formulae of type theory. We will now see how such constants can be defined, 
and, moreover, in a way which yields intuitively reasonable meanings - at least intuitive 
for those who accept that the meaning of E222a is given by the ABLE formula E222c. 
Firstly, let us say that simple nouns and intransitive verbs correspond directly to the 
dynamic unary predicate constants that were used for ABLE's semantics, which were 
constants of type (d, 7r): 
Meaning Postulate MP18 
woman = WOMANU 
donkey = DONKEYU 
is-angry = ISANGRYu 
Propositional verbs, of course, correspond to ABLE's dynamic attitude predicate 
constants, except that the ABLE attitudes combined firstly with the subject marker 
and then with the propositional argument, whereas it will be more natural here to 
assume that an attitudinal predicate combines firstly with a proposition to form a verb 
phrase. Thus an argument swap is required: 
Meaning Postulate MP19 
realises = AFAD [REALISESa.D.F] 
Lets Get Real ! 	 222 
In ABLE, determiners combined with a discourse marker and two propositions to 
form a proposition. Clearly a determiner of indexed English ought to combine with a 
discourse marker and two dynamic properties. Variables P and 7',  of type p = (d, it), 
will be used to range over dynamic properties, of which dynamic unary predicates are 
examples. 
Meaning Postulate MP20 
a = ADAP\P' [s0ME.D.(P.D).(P'.D)] 
the 	= ADAP,\P' [THE.D. (P.D) . (P'.D)] 
Noun phrases now correspond to Ty3 formulae of type (p, it), and variables Q and 
Q' will range over objects of this type. For instance a.1.woman is a formula of type 
(p, it). A transitive verb should combine with an noun phrase to form a verb phrase, 
so transitive verbs must have the type ((p, iv), p). This means that in order to define 
constants for transitive verbs in terms of ABLE's dynamic binary predicate constants, 
which have type (d, p), a little type raising is necessary: 
Meaning Postulate MP21 
owns = AQAD [Q.(owNsb.D)] 
The sequencing operator o is to be interpreted as conjunction: 
Meaning Postulate MP22 
0 = AND 
All that remains for the above example are pronouns and proper names. As with 
ABLE, these may be interpreted in terms of the determiner the: 
Meaning Postulate MP23 
john = AD [the.D.NAMED-JOHN] 
she = AD [the.D.(AD [SINGULARU.D  AND  FEMALEU.D]) 
Let us adopt the following notation conventions for Ty3: 
Reversability: If X is of type a and Y is of type (cr, /3) then (XY) = (YX) = YX 
Parsimony: For any Ty3 expressions X, Y and Z, if X(YZ) is a sentence of type 
theory, and (XY)Z is not, then XYZ will be understood as equivalent to X(YZ), 
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and vice versa if (XY)Z is a sentence of type theory but X(YZ) not. If neither 
or both of these bracketings are sentences of type theory, then the unbracketed 
string will not be understood as a sentence of type theory. 
Indexing: If X is of type d, a) and Y is of type d, then Xy = X.Y. 
Given the first of these conventions, E222b can be taken as a well-formed sentence 
of type theory. More importantly, given the above postulates, we have that E222b = 
E222c. Here is a small part of the proof, the rest being left up to the reader: 
a 	= ADAPAP' [s0ME.D.(P.D).(P'.D)] 
(a 3) = APAP' [s0ME.3.(P.3).(P'.3)] 
donkey = DONKEYU 
((a 3) donkey) 
= AP' [soME.3.(D0NKEYU.3).(Pf.3)] 
owns 	= AQAD [Q.(owNsb.D)} 
(owns ((a 3) donkey)) 
= 	AQAD [Q. (owNSb.D)]. 
(AP' [soME.3.(DoNKEY'.3).(P'.3)]) 
= AD [(AP' [SOME.3.(DONKEYU.3).(PF.3)]).(O\VNSb.D)] 
= AD [SOME.3.(DONKEYU.3).(OWNSb.D.3)] 
john 	= AD [the.D.  NAMED-  JOHNU] 
the = ADAPAP' [THE.D.(P.D).(P'.D)] 
john 	= ADAP' [THE. D. (NAMEDJOHNU.D) . (P'.D)] 
(john 2) = AP [THE.2.(NAMEDJOHNU.2).(P!.2)] 
((John 2) (owns ((a 3) donkey))) 
= AP [THE.2.(NAMEDJoHNU.2).(PI.2)].  
(AD [SOME. 3. (DONKEYU.3) . (OWNSb.D.3)]) 
= 	THE. 2.(NAMEDJOHNu.2). 
(SOME. 3. (DONKEYU  .3) . (OWNSb.2.3)) 
The last two of the above notation conventions allow even more English-like struc-
tures to be interpreted in type theory. The convention of parsimony means that brackets 
are only needed where they disambiguate, and the indexing convention allows indices to 
be subscripted. Given these conventions, 
"(al woman realises John2 owns a3 donkey o) she1 is-angry', for example, becomes a 
Ty3 formula. 
Next I will consider a classic example from the presupposition literature: 
E223 a. Somebody managed to succeed George V on the throne of England. 
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The infamous E223a appeared in an endnote to Karttunen and Peter's [KP79]. It 
will be recalled from part one of this thesis that the basis of Karttunen and Peters' 
extension to Montague Grammar is the division of meaning into two components, which 
for current purposes can be labelled as assertive and presuppositional, with rules of 
composition being separately specified for each component. 
The fact that assertions and presuppositions are specified independently means that 
the ordinary assertive meaning of an expression places no constraints on what the presup-
position might be, so that at first sight their approach appears to be of great generality. 
However, it is this very independence of assertion and presupposition which ultimately 
must force us to reject such an approach, for it makes it impossible to specify scope and 
binding relations between the assertion and presupposition. This is essentially what 
Karttunen and Peters observed with respect to E223a. They assume that the control 
verb manage' carries a presupposition (or conventional implicature) to the effect that 
the subject of the verb has difficulty in achieving whatever is specified by the verbs 
infinitival complement. Thus, for example, l managed to complete my thesis' should 
presuppose that I had difficulty in doing so. That manage' displays classically presup-
positional behaviour can be seen from the fact that the 'difficulty' inference tends to 
survive from certain embedded contexts. For instance l might manage to complete my 
thesis' still seems to suggest that I would find completion difficult. Karttunen and Pe-
ters argue that it is natural to infer from E223a that the person who succeeded George 
V had difficulty in doing so, and that it is the fact that the successor did not in fact 
have any difficulty succeeding which makes the sentence seem odd to those with a little 
historical knowledge. Thus it seems that it is presupposed that some individual had dif-
ficulty, and asserted of the same individual that he eventually succeeded, so that there 
must be some binding relation between the presupposition and the assertion. To repeat: 
such a binding relation cannot obtain in Karttunen and Peters' system, which yields 
a completely independent presupposition that somebody had difficulty George V, and 
assertion that somebody succeeded George V. As Karttunen and Peters observe, there 
are many people who would have found it difficult to succeed George V, so that the 
predicted presupposition is trivially satisfied, and no account of the example's oddity is 
provided'. 
In this thesis I have attempted to develop an integrated account of presuppositional 
and assertive aspects of meaning, indeed even arguing that much of the peculiar be-
haviour of presupposition can be predicted from the study of extraneous semantic phe-
nomena. Within such an integrated account, it is possible to describe binding relations 
between presuppositions and assertions, or vice versa. Let us consider a translation into 
1C.f. the discussion of Somebody curtsied' in §3.2, which was shown to be problematic for Karttunen 
and Peters in precisely the same way as the George V example discussed above. 
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type theory of (the relevant aspects of) E223a: 
E223 b. Somebody6 managed to succeed George-V5 
Of course, this does not look much like a formula of type theory, but if the right 
constants are defined, then, according to the above notational conventions, it will be. 
There is a minor problem in treating this example, in that ABLE does not contain 
the equivalent of control verbs, although there is no obvious reason why ABLE should 
not be extended in this respect. For the moment it will suffice to make the crass as-
sumption that control verbs are interpreted in terms of underlying dynamic attitude 
predicates. The following postulate restricts the denotation of an ABLE attitude predi-
cate MANAGED   such that MANAGEDa.D.F  can only provide an update if it is established 
that the proposition F 'is problematic for' the individual represented by D, in which 
case the output is calculated by simply updating with the proposition F. 
Meaning Postulate MP24 
V1VJVDVFI{MANAGEDa.D.F}J 4-4 
t-domain.I.D A I  satisfies  pRoBLEMATIcFoRa.D.F  A I{F}J 
The definition of the constants appearing in E223b is now straightforward. The noun 
phrase somebody, which has the same type as for a name or pronoun, is defined in terms 
of the ABLE determiner SOME and a unary predicate PERSON', such that somebody7 is 
equivalent to a7 person: 
Meaning Postulate MP25 
somebody = \P\D [SOME. D. (PERSONU.D) . (P.D)] 
The constants George- V, succeed and to do not require much thinking about, names 
and transitive verbs having been dealt with above, and to being assumed semantically 
trivial: 
Meaning Postulate MP26 
George-V = ADA?' [THE.D. (NAMEDGEORGEVU.D).  (P.D)] 
to = A7'[7'] 
succeed = AQAD [Q.(succEEDb.D)] 
Finally, managed of type (p, p) is defined in terms of the attitude predicate MANAGEDa, 
so that for any marker D and dynamic property 1', managed.D.P defines the same CCP 
as MANAGEDa.D.(P.D): 
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Meaning Postulate MP27 
managed = APXD [MANAGEDa.D.(P.D) 
Given these postulates, it is easily verified that the formulae in E223b and E223c 
denote the same CCP: 
E223 C. SOME.6. (PERSON' .6). (MANAGEDa  .6. 
(THE. 5. (NAMEDGEORGEVU.5) . (SUCCEED b.6.5))) 
ABLE formulae of this form were discussed in §9.3, and, on the basis of that dis-
cussion, it is clear that E223c will (only) be admitted by contexts in which at least one 
individual is established to find his succession to the throne problematic, and it will 
provide an update to a context where such an individual actually has succeeded George 
V2  
Whilst the above ad hoc translations of indexed English discourses into type theory 
serve for illustrative purposes, it is, at least on methodological grounds, more useful 
to specify general procedures for the interpretation process. This will make the theory 
easier to extend or attack, according to taste. Here, then, is an official definition of the 
syntax of the language of indexed, bracketed English (Indexed Bracklish): 
Definition D66 (Syntax of Indexed Bracklish) Given sets of names, nouns, in-
transitive, transitive and attitude verbs, occupying the categories Name, N, IV, TV, 
and AV respectively, and that the category i consists of the integers, the language of 
indexed bracklish is defined by the following rewrite rules: 
21n fact I have reservations about the basic analysis of 'managed' advocated by Karttunen and Peters, 
and have used more or less the same analysis simply in order to bring out the difference in the binding 
mechanisms of the two theories. The point that the Karttunen and Peters theory does not yield an 
adequate account of binding could have been made with the Modigliani ownership examples which I 
considered only, and I refrained from doing this only because they themselves do not consider these 
examples. My own preference would be for analysing the presuppositions of 'managed' not in terms of 
a simple proposition about the subject having had difficulty, but in terms of the hearer's expectations. 
However, I will not attempt to justify this here. 
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det 	= 	the I  lexactly one I every I no Imost Ifew 
PN = he lshe lit Ithey 
NP 	((det i) N) l(det' (N (who VP))) l(PNi) I(Name i) 
VP = IV I (TV NP) I (AV 8) 
S 	= 	(NP VP) I ((NP do (es)n't) VP) I (NP (might VP)) I (perhaps S) 
((if S) S) 1(8 and) S 
D 	= 	S I(D (oD)) 
Below I present a schema for defining constants for the terminal symbols of a language 
of Indexed Bracklish: all underlined expressions are to be understood as replaceable by 
constants representing elements of the relevant categories. 
Definition D67 (Schema for constants of Indexed Bracklish) 
n = Nu 
iv 	= IVU 
Lv = AQAD [Q(U)] 
av = AFAD [ATTITUDEa.D.F] 
det 	= ADAPAP' [r)E'r.D.(P.D).('P'.D)] 
name = ADA?' [THE.D. (NAMEDNAMEU  .D) ('P.D)] 
pronoun = ADA?' [THE.D.(c0NDITI0Ns ON Du)(P.D)] 
who = A'PAP'AD [P.D AND P'.D] 
might = APAD [MIGHT.(P.D)] 
perhaps = AF[MIGHT.F] 
and = AFAF' [F AND F'] 
o = AFAF' [F AND F'] 
if = AFAF' [F IMPLIES F'] 
do(es)n't 	= APAQ [NOT (Q.P)] 
The only definitions introduced which are not of types familiar from the earlier 
example derivations, are those for who, might, perhaps, don't and doesn't. The first of 
these, who, is defined as the conjunction of two properties. The reason for including both 
perhaps and might is one of convenience, in that the discussion of epistemic modality 
in §9.2 involves both examples where the subject noun phrase appears within the scope 
of a modality, and examples where the subject takes scope over the modality. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the sentential operator perhaps always takes wide scope, and 
this is reflected in the above definition. However, whereas the might' of English can 
appear in either scope configuration, I have assumed here that might is semantically 
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just a verb phrase modifier, so that the subject takes wide scope. The reader may like 
to verify that the indexed bracklish sentence (((most 1) politicians) (might be-spying)) 
(cf. E211) is given the meaning discussed in 9.2. In contrast, the constants don't and 
doesn't are both defined so as to take wide scope over the subject noun phrase in the 
interpretation of Indexed Bracklish. There is no fundamental reason why might should 
not be defined similarly, such that it also took wide scope. However, to extend the 
interpretation of Indexed Bracklish with a systematic way of accounting for such scope 
ambiguities, for instance using a type polymorphism approach as developed by Emms 
[Em90] or Hendriks [Hen89], would take us beyond the scope of this thesis. 
10.2 A Plea for Common Sense 
10.2.1 Mutual Ignorance 
What is the common ground? What, for example, is the common ground between you 
and me? To answer this question, you need to know something about my beliefs. But 
what do you know about my beliefs? Can you specify even one proposition which you 
are sure I believe in?3  
In short, no participant in a conversation knows what the. common ground is. This 
truism ought to be rather disturbing to those who would associate the information states 
of dynamic semantics with the common ground of the conversational participants, a 
conflation which I always found attractive. But if states are identified with the common 
ground, and nobody knows what the common ground is, then the states could not be 
states of anybody, and a state which is not a state of something or someone, is not of 
much use to anything or anyone. 
Of course, the intuition that information states be associated with some notion of 
common ground need not force us to accept that the relationship is one of identity. In 
what follows, I will try to show that once the proper relationship between information 
states and the common ground is established, the very intangibility and unknowability 
of the common ground can become a source of inspiration rather than despair. 
Consider the case of a doctoral thesis: it is doubtful that there is any determinate 
notion of a common ground between author and readers. Unless the examiners recom-
mend that every copy be burnt, the thesis will be remain for an indefinite number of 
years in a dusty university archive. There always remains the possibility that somebody 
will accidentally stumble across the thesis, and begin to read. But if the common ground 
is not only unknowable by the author, but arguably completely indeterminate, then the 
candidate, as with any author, is forced to make assumptions about the knowledge of 
3A tautology, perhaps? As it happens, I never accept tautologies, although I am quite partial to 
contradictions. You too? Well, then we certainly have a lot in common. 
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the eventual readers. These assumptions may even end up partially determining who 
the readership is. Thus, although the real common ground is indeterminate, an opera-
tional definition could be given: the common ground is (modulo rewrite requests of the 
examiners) whatever the candidate decides it will be. 
Unfortunately, this operational definition is of only limited assistance to the reader 
of a doctoral thesis, for, as has already been established, the reader knows nothing 
about the author with any certainty. But the operational definition does tell us about 
the nature of the problem facing the readers: the readers do not know what the author 
assumed about the common ground, but they know that if they had information cor-
responding to that assumed common ground, then they could safely update this state 
with the content of the thesis. In effect, readers are forced to reason abductively from 
the presuppositions of the text to calculate the assumptions of the writer. 
Those familiar with Stalnaker's work (e.g. [St74]) will recognise something like his 
theory of pragmatic presupposition in my description up to this point of the difficulties 
facing those writing and reading theses 	my operational definition of the common 
ground coincides with his definition of speaker's presuppositions. Now, however, I want to 
ask a question that will take us beyond Stalnaker's account. Given that the readers never 
know what information the author assumed them to have before they started reading, 
how can we represent the information that a reader has after reading an arbitrary initial 
chunk of thesis? 
In terms of KMG, the obvious answer would run as follows. The relevant aspect of a 
reader's information state at any point is an object of type t, such that at the beginning 
of the thesis the reader has information corresponding to the minimal state T, and later 
states are obtained by updating this state successively with the content of the thesis. 
Such an answer is clearly naive, for as soon as the reader reached a presupposition which 
had not been previously justified in the text, the rules of KMG would give no indication 
as to how to continue updating. Could the reader simply have started with a more 
informed state, and updated that? Yes, of course, but which one? Unfortunately, no 
single information state is appropriate, if the term information state is taken simply 
to mean the objects of type t introduced in the previous chapters. An example should 
clarify the point. 
Suppose that as a reader you do not know whether it was Montague or Kahlish, or 
perhaps even Carnap who first started using the term pragmatics to describe what is 
now commonly called indexical semantics. But you guess that the author of the thesis 
will know which it was, and furthermore is quite likely to take for granted that readers 
also know. Thus, as far as you know, the author may choose to use the presuppositional 
phrase the well-known fact that Carnap first used the term pragmatics' to refer to what 
we now call indexical semantics'. If you had simply assumed that the author's model 
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of the common ground involved Carnap having made the introduction, then you could 
safely update with a sentence containing this phrase. On the other hand, you know 
that the author may use the same phrase with KahIish' or Montague' substituted for 
Carnap'. If you happen to choose the right assumption you will have no problem, but 
t-typed information states leave no room for sitting on the fence. For if you simply 
choose to begin reading the thesis with a disjunctive state in which it is not established 
who actually was responsible, then as soon as you come across the use of one of the 
above presuppositional phrases you will be sunk: your information state will not satisfy 
the presupposition, and, at least according to the theory of the last few chapters, there 
will be no way to continue updating. 
Thus we are faced with a conundrum. If we interpret an information state realisti-
cally, in terms of the information the reader might conceivably have about the writer, 
then KMG will often fail to provide an update when it clearly should. On the other 
hand, interpreting information states as the assumed common ground of the writer is 
of no use in providing a realistic model of how a reader's information state develops, 
since a reader cannot know in advance what the writer has assumed. Conclusion? The 
notion of updating developed in this thesis so far is incorrect. Could the definition 
of an information state be preserved, but an alternative notion of update be used? If 
so, then the new notion will have to be defined with great caution, for I have gone to 
considerable lengths in this thesis to motivate a theory of information independently 
of presuppositional data. Thus, there is little leeway for making major changes to the 
relations between contexts defined by English sentences, without actually reformulating 
the definition of a context. Neither is it possible simply to weaken the constraints on 
the incoming context due to presuppositional constructions. For instance, it would not 
be appropriate to alter the definition of factivity such that the incoming context was 
only constrained to be consistent with the presupposition rather than to satisfy it, whilst 
making the output of a factive verb satisfy the presupposition. This would yield the right 
entailment patterns for unembedded factives, but would destroy projection properties: 
the negation of a factive would no longer entail the truth of the factive complement. 
10.2.2 Information Sets 
The Carnap/Kahlish/Montague story above is suggestive. Suppose that you maintained 
in parallel a number of t-typed states, such that in some Carnap redefined pragmatics, 
in others it was Kahlish or Montague, and perhaps in some it was not established that 
any of them redefined anything. Then you could try updating each state separately 
with the content of the thesis, and see which structures survived. That way, whatever 
assumptions the author had made concerning the redefinition of pragmatics, at least 
one state would satisfy the assumptions, and would thus produce an output. This idea 
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is easily formalised. If states are to be maintained in parallel, then updating must be 
framed in terms of sets of states, where each state in the set corresponds to a possibly 
correct model of the speaker's assumptions about the common ground: 
Definition D68 (Information Sets) An information set is any object of type (t, r), 
and variables 5, T will range over objects of this type. 
Now a new set-update operator, +, can be defined. This operator maps information 
sets onto functions from CCPs to information sets, and is thus of type (4,  T), (n, (t, T))). 
If S is an initial information set, then the set-update of S with a CCP q  is denoted by 
S + 0, which is simply the set of outputs obtained by updating (in the KMG sense) the 
elements of the set S with : 
Meaning Postulate MP28 
+ = ASAçbAI [J S.J A J{q}I] 
To make sense of information sets, it helps to relate them to familiar logical notions. 
The following postulate defines a constant supports. Support is an analogous notion to 
satisfaction, but defined at the level of information sets rather than states: 
Meaning Postulate MP29 
supports = ASAq5 [VI S.I -* I satisfies q5] 
In terms of supports, a notion of entailment can be defined. The following fact 
shows that defining q to entail 0 as "updating the minimal information set with 
yields an information set supporting ,b" just yields the earlier definition of entailment 
from Chapter 8. 
Fact F16 (Support-based Entailment) If 0 and 0 are eliminative CCPs, then: 
q5= 0 if (Al [T]+q)  supports b 
Proof: By the definition of supports and +, (Al [T] + ) supports 0 if every possible 
output of 0 satisfies 0, but this is just the definition of entailment in MP5. 
As it happens yet another standard dynamic notion of entailment in terms of infor-
mation sets reduces to the same old definition: 
4Naturally, what I am calling a minimal information set is in another sense maximal, in that it 
contains every possible information state. 
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Fact F17 (Another support-based Entailment) If q  and 0 are eliminative CCPs, 
then: 
çb=Li if VSVS'S+q=S'—S'supportsb 
Proof: The definition of + shows that update is distributive across the component 
states of an information set (i.e. if S is the union of S1,. . . , S,, then S + q is the union 
of S1 + ,. . . S + ) so that it suffices to consider singleton information sets. But for 
these the requirement VSVS' S + 4 = S' - S' supports 0 reduces to VIVI' If 0}1' - 
I' satisfies*, which again is just the earlier definition of entailment in MP55  
Since lifting the semantics up to the level of information sets has no effect on entail-
ment, it is clear that the presupposition projection properties established in Chapter 9 
will be maintained. The only difference is that whereas at the level of states, presup-
positions can cause undefinedness, at the level of information sets a CCP always yields 
an update. In fact, F16 combined with the fact that (non-modal) presuppositions of 
CCPs are also entailments, shows that updating the minimal information set with a 
CCP which presupposes some (non-modal) proposition will always yield a set which 
supports that proposition. 
Let us see how information sets help with a simple example, based on the earlier 
'who redefined pragmatics?' story. Firstly, here are some constants of indexed bracklish 
and some relevant states: 
All constants are defined using the schema in D67, carnap, montague and 
'pragmatics' as names, redefine= redefined as a TV, realised-that as a factive AV, 
and didn't using the same semantics as for doesn't. 
A satisfies(carnap1 redefined 'pragmatics'2) 
A satisfies (montague3 didn't redefine 'pragmatics'2) 
B satisfies (montague3 redefined 'pragmatics'2) 
B satisfies(carnapi didn't redefine 'pragmatics'2) 
C=AuB 
A{ montague3 didn't realise-that carnapi redefined 'pragmatics '2}A' 
5Both of these support based notions of entailment correspond to definitions proposed by Veltman 
[Ve91], who also observes that they collapse for distributive systems. 
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Neither B nor C admits the proposition rnontague3 didn't realise-that carnapi redefined 
'pragmatics '2. However, representing an information set containing iotas I, J,... as 
(I, J, ... ), we have the following update: 
(A, B, C) + montague3 didn't realise-that carnapi redefined 'pragmatics '2  (A') 
Thus an information state which does not support the proposition that Carnap 
redefined pragmatics can still be updated with a sentence in which the proposition 
is presupposed. More generally, by being realistic about what a hearer knows of the 
speaker's assumptions about the common ground, an obvious difficulty with the CCP 
model has been resolved. Once it is recognised that the states of ABLE and KMG 
semantics are not to be identified with the common ground, but are to be thought of as 
possible models of the common ground, the awkward fact that presuppositions can be 
informative becomes unproblematic. 
10.2.3 Information Orderings 
Information sets provide a model of an agent's uncertain knowledge of the common 
ground, but there is good reason to consider more sophisticated models. It is intuitively 
clear that not all assumptions that a writer/speaker might make are equally plausible. 
For instance, it is more plausible that Carnap redefined pragmatics than that Carnap's 
dog redefined pragmatics, and it seems reasonable that a reader's model of the writer's 
assumptions about the common ground should reflect this difference. But it is not 
appropriate merely to assume that some states are in the context and some not, since 
there is no obvious place to draw the line. If it is implausible that Carnap's dog redefined 
pragmatics, is it plausible that Carnap's grandmother redefined pragmatics? 
One can imagine various more structured notions of context than simple sets of states 
that might be used to encode the difference in plausibility of different assumptions. For 
example we might consider adding a type p of probabilities to the type theoretic setup, 
and defining a context to be a function of type (t, p) - something like a vague set. 
The more plausible states would be mapped onto higher probabilities. Such a notion of 
context would allow very fine-grained distinctions between states to be made: in fact, 
although the vague set analysis seems intuitive to me, I do not have applications in 
mind which would require quite such a fine grain. It will suffice if a context provides 
a measure of the relative plausibility of different states, such as to answer to questions 
like "is state I more plausible than state J". In other words, what is needed is some 
sort of ordering over states: 
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Definition D69 (Information Ordering) Any object 0 of type ir which has the prop-
erty of transitivity is an information ordering. An initial information ordering is addi-
tionally reflexive. 
Reflexivity: 	'c/I 	if 0}1 
Transitivity: VIVJVK (I{0}J A J{0}K) -* I{O}K 
An information ordering 0 is a set of pairs of states, such that if a pair of states 
I and J is in the ordering relation, represented as I{0}J, then both I and J could 
correspond to the generator's assumptions, and I is at least as plausible as J. Note that 
information orderings have the same type as CCPs, which are also relations between 
states. However, orderings and KMG CCPs are quite different slices of ir. For instance, 
whereas KMG CCPs are never transitive relations, orderings are by definition always 
transitive, and whilst the only pairs in the denotation of KMG CCPs are those in which 
the output is more informative than the input, there is no corresponding restriction on 
information orderings. 
The use of orderings to represent default information of various kinds is becom-
ing well-established, as in the work of Veltman [Ve91], although Veitman's expectation 
frames involve orderings over possible worlds rather than over t-typed states. It is clear 
that there must be many more states than there are worlds, and thus that information 
orderings provide a more fine-grained notion of preference than expectation frames. In-
deed, it is clear that any ordering over worlds can be expressed using an ordering over 
states, if we simply associate the sub-part of an information ordering containing only 
single-world states with the corresponding expectation frame. I will not make any at-
tempt to account for how preference orderings over states are formed, but simply take 
as given that the common sense of an agent provides him or her with such an order-
ing. It is clear that an underlying ordering over worlds could be used to induce a (very 
partial) ordering over states, and thus that mechanisms like those discussed by Veltman 
to provide orderings over worlds could be reinterpreted so as to generate information 
orderings. We could then add some additional general preference criteria, like specifying 
that if two states differ only by one having a larger domain of discourse markers than 
the other, then the smaller-domained state is a priori more plausible. 
Updating can be defined along similar lines to the information-set based definition, 
above, using a constant *, of type (ir, (ir, it)). The update operation proceeds by taking 
all pairs of states in the denotation of the initial ordering, and trying to update each 
element of the pair with the CCP. If both states can be successfully updated, then the 
resulting states are paired in the output ordering. Thus if one state is initially at least 
as plausible as another, and both states admit the CCP, then in the final ordering the 
output from the first state will be at least as plausible as the output from the second. 
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Meaning Postulate MP30 
* = AOAq5AI)J [I'J' I"{O}J' A I'{q}I A J'{}J] 
A reader who had forgotten or never knew who redefined pragmatics, and was taken 
in by my story, might now be surprised by the fact that it was Bar Hillel who first defined 
pragmatics to be indexical semantics. Yet even if you were surprised by this fact, or 
surprised that I knew it, the surprise does not mean that you had any difficulty updat-
ing with the previous sentence. This is what would be expected if the structures which 
you updated were like information orderings, and the mechanism of update was some-
thing like the * operation: even apparently unlikely alternatives should be represented 
somewhere in an information ordering, albeit rather low down. 
However, orderings need not contain every state, in the sense that for some states I 
it will neither be the case that 3J I{ 0}J nor that 3J J{0}I. In particular, an ordering 
produced by updating with a CCP will only contain states which are possible outputs 
of the CCP, and it need not even contain all of those. Thus, an information ordering 
registers two kinds of information. Firstly it says which states are possible models of 
the speaker's assumptions, and secondly it says what the preferences are amongst those 
states. Since an initial ordering is reflexive, which means that every state is at least as 
plausible as itself, it is clear that every state will be contained in an initial ordeiing. 
The set of states which a non-initial ordering registers as being possible models of the 
speaker's assumptions will be precisely those which the ordering says are at least as 
plausible as themselves: 
Meaning Postulate MP31 
contains = AOAI [I{0}I] 
The constant contains relates information orderings to information sets: if 0 is an 
information ordering, then contains .0 is an information set. Thus contains can be 
used to apply the above definition of support to information orderings: an ordering 0 
supports a CCP 0 if (contains .0) supports 0. Clearly this possibility combined with 
F16 and F17 shows that some natural notions of entailment in terms of information 
orderings would correspond to the original definition in terms of t-typed states. It is 
also clear that the potential informativeness of presuppositions is accounted for in just 
the same way as with information sets. But, as will be demonstrated shortly, there is 
more to the processing of presuppositions than can be naturally explained in terms of 
strict entailment, and this is where the additional structure of information orderings 
comes into play. 
In an information ordering, there are some optimal states, in the sense that they 
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are at least as plausible as all the other states which the ordering contains. Sometimes 
it will be the case that the optimal states are also minimal, by which I mean that all 
the non-preferred states are extensions of a preferred state. In this case, the set of 
propositions supported by the set of optimal states will be just the same as the set of 
propositions supported by the entire set of states which the ordering contains. However, 
it may also be the case that the optimal states are non-minimal. In that case, there will 
be propositions supported by the optimal states that are not supported by the ordering 
as a whole. If updating some ordering 0 with a CCP 0 leads to an ordering in which 
the set of optimal states supports another CCP 0, then I will say that relative to 0, 
implicates. The formal definitions of optimal and implicates are straightforward: 
Meaning Postulate MP32 
optimal = AOAI [contains.0.I A VJ [J{O}I - I{ 0}J] 
implicates = AOAqXb [( optimal. (O * q)) supportsi/] 
Let us consider a case where strict entailment seems too weak: 
E52 If I go to London, my sister will pick me up at the airport. 
As shown in §9.1, in ABLE (and the same clearly holds for KMG) presuppositions 
in the consequent of a conditional yield conditional presuppositions. Thus the CCP 
corresponding to E52 presupposes that if I go to London then I will have a sister. The 
occurrence of these weak, conditionalised presuppositions is one of the most strongly 
criticised aspects of the CCP model (see e. g. [Gaz79a]). It seems intuitively obvious 
that somebody hearing E52 would conclude not only that if the speaker were to go to 
London he would have a sister, but that the speaker actually has a sister. In terms 
of information orderings, this inference pattern might lead us to come to a certain 
conclusion about a hearer's typical information ordering. For the inference to go through, 
some states in which it was definitely established that the speaker had a sister would have 
to be more plausible than all states in which the existence of a sister was conditionalised 
on the speaker's journeying to London. Here, by saying that one state is more plausible 
than another, I mean that the first is at least as plausible as the second, but not vice 
versa. Relative to such an ordering, E52 would implicate that the speaker had a sister, 
since updating the ordering with E52 would lead to an ordering in which the optimal 
states all satisfied the existence of a sister. 
But why should it be the case that states in which the speaker has a sister are 
more plausible than certain states in which this proposition is conditionalised? This 
is a difficult question to answer completely, but I can imagine some potential lines of 
explanation. In the first place, note that although the CCP corresponding to E52 will 
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only conditionally presuppose the existence of a sister, it will unconditionally presuppose 
the presence of a discourse marker in the input state. The input state will admit the 
CCP just in case in the world-sequence pairs where the speaker goes to London, the 
discourse marker is constrained to be the speaker's sister. Suppose that the speaker's 
immediate family were generally assumed to correspond to rigid designators, and suppose 
further that there were a general principle to the effect that states where assumed 
discourse markers corresponded to rigid designators were more plausible than those 
where assumed markers are non-rigid. In that case, of all the states which contained 
a marker that corresponded to the speaker's sister in any world-sequence pair, those 
in which the marker corresponded to the speaker's sister in every world-sequence pair 
would be most plausible, and this would lead to the observed inference pattern. 
Whether or not the reader finds this convincing, it should be clear what I am aiming 
for: I would like to justify the particular inference pattern relevant to E52 in terms of 
more general principles. In fact, I think that the above markers-are-rigid line of reasoning 
is still not general enough, for there are many cases not involving the assumption of a 
new marker but where KMG's prediction of a conditional presupposition seems too 
weak. Consider the following example (repeated): 
E150 If Charles turns up, then everybody will be amazed that both Charles and Diana are 
here. 
Any state in which it is established that if Charles turns up then both Charles and 
Diana will be here would admit the above sentence. However, in a situation where it is 
known that Charles and Diana generally try to avoid each other, there is a clear tendency 
to come to a stronger conclusion on hearing E150, namely that Diana is already here6. 
For this result to be predicted, it would have to be the case that a state where Diana's 
presence is established is more plausible than every state where Diana's presence is 
conditional on Charles' arrival. The source of such orderings must be connected with 
the nature of explanation and justification, in particular the fact that if Charles and 
Diana habitually avoid each other, then Charles' arrival does not help explain Diana's 
presence. On the other hand, it is clear that Charles' arrival does help explain (or 
even entails) Charles' presence, so it is not surprising that E150 does not implicate that 
Charles is definitely here. 
When reading each of the following two examples, ask yourself whether there actually 
is any more hot water: 
E224 If Jane takes a bath, Bill will be annoyed that there is no more hot water. 
6c.f. footnote 14 concerning the role of intonation in this example, concerning which I will not 
present an analysis. 
Lets Get Real! 	 238 
E225 If Jane wants a bath, Bill will be annoyed that there is no more hot water. 
There is a clear contrast between these two examples. An utterance of E224 does 
not suggest that there actually is no more hot water, but only that if Jane takes a 
bath, there will be no more hot water. On the other hand, E225 suggests strongly to 
me that there is no more hot water. Put another way, E224 is compatible with the 
standard CCP prediction of a conditional reading, E225 has an interpretation (for me it 
is the favoured interpretation) which departs from that prediction. It is clear that there 
exist information orderings that would lead to precisely these predictions. Any ordering 
satisfying the following two conditions would suffice: 
At least one state in which it is established that there is no hot water is more 
plausible than all states in which it is not known whether there is hot water, but 
in which it is known that if Jane wants a bath then there will be no hot water. 
A state in which it is not known whether or not there is hot water but in which it 
is established that if Jane has a bath then there will be no more hot water must 
be at least as plausible as all states where it is definitely established that there is 
no hot water. 
The general question is, why would it be reasonable to expect information orderings 
to have such properties? My answer to this question is on the one hand both simple and 
obvious, and on the other hand both awkward to implement and incompatible with many 
contemporary theories of presupposition. Many linguists will surely find it unpalatable. 
The answer is: common sense. 
Let me expand on this. The contrast between E224 and E225 results from our ability 
to find a common-sensical explanation of the lack of hot water in terms of somebody 
having taken a bath, but in our inability to fully explain a lack of hot water in terms of 
somebody simply wanting a bath. The simple assumption that there is a finite amount 
of relevant hot water 	about a bathful 	is sufficient to allow justification of their 
being no more hot water in situations where Jane has just taken a bath. However, the 
same simple assumption would not suffice in the case of E225, and a number of other 
assumptions would be needed, such as the assumption that if Jane wants a bath then she 
will definitely take one. Thus it is the relative plausibility of assumptions not explicitly 
mentioned in the text of the example sentences that determines what is implicated. Here 
are four more examples (the first two of which were discussed in Part One of this thesis) 
which illustrate the same point: 
E99 If Nixon invites Angela Davis to the Whitehouse, then Nixon will regret having invited 
a black militant to his residence. 
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E151 If Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X, he will be bothered by the fact that his weight 
is higher than it would be on Earth. 
E226 If John has an exam today, Mary will notice that he is smoking more than usual. 
E227 If Jane goes into the cave without a light, she will be annoyed that she cannot see 
much. 
In all of these cases, the standard CCP prediction of a conditional presupposition 
seems unobjectionable. These predicted presuppositions are, respectively, that if Nixon 
invites Davis he will have invited a black militant, that if Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet 
X then his weight will be higher than it would be on Earth, that if John has an exam 
today then he is smoking more than usual, and that if Jane goes into the cave without 
a light then she will not be able to see much. I would argue that in all three cases, what 
makes the conditional presuppositions reasonable is the possibility of finding a deeper 
explanation. Thus, in the first case, the reason why the conditional presupposition 
makes sense is that it can be justified in terms of common sense physics. We suppose 
that Planet X is a planet, but we do not know whether Planet X is a big planet or 
a little planet. The simple assumption that Planet X is big (some readers may have 
more sophisticated views on the relationship between planets and their gravitational 
field strength) is sufficient to tell us that if Spiff lands on X then his weight will be 
higher than it would be on Earth. In the second case the deeper explanation is that 
Davis is a black militant. I take it that I am not terribly unusual in having constructed 
this explanation for myself when I first read the example E99 some years ago, although 
I had no previous knowledge of Angela Davis. I leave it to the reader to construct 
explanations for the implications of the other two examples. Of course, it might be that 
the reader deems E226 to implicate that John actually is smoking more than usual, or 
perhaps thinks E227 is most naturally uttered in a situation where Jane is known to be 
blind. Yet this would by no means be problematic. On the contrary, it would be grist 
to my mill, as it indicates something that is quite natural within the current account, 
namely that the reader's plausibility criteria differ somewhat from my own. 
The predictions of the model introduced here stand in sharp contrast to those of 
various theories that were discussed in Part 1 of this thesis. The accounts which have 
occupied centre-field in formal presupposition theory, be they multivalent, partial, fil-
trationalist, cancellationist, dynamic or accommodational, are generally conceived of as 
solving the presupposition projection problem without any reference to common sense 
reasoning, whereas I would argue that in principle a theory lacking common sense can-
not solve the projection problem. In particular, in Part 1 a number of the examples 
considered in this section were considered in detail, and it was shown that they are 
problematic for existing accounts (c.f. especially §3.3.3, §4.6, §6.4 and §6.6). Even if 
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some authors have been aware that interaction with common sense reasoning is needed 
in order to account for all the data of presupposition projection, this has generally not 
resulted in formal models. 
Here I would like to mention one prominent research group, namely that of Hobbs, 
which has provided formal models where common-sense reasoning helps determine pre-
suppositional inferences. The work of this group was not discussed in the first part 
of this thesis, partly because it is not usually presented as a theory of presupposition 
per se, but as a complete theory of interpretation. In a series of papers  (see e.g. the 
bibliography in [HSAM90]) Hobbs and colleagues have offered a view of interpretation 
as abduction, whereby grammar provides only limited absolute constraints on meaning, 
and a system of weighted abduction allows domain knowledge to supplement grammati-
cal information so as to determine a most plausible interpretation. Systems of abduction 
typically allow reasoning backwards from some formula to sets of formulae which deduc-
tively entail that formula, and also provide some way of selecting the most appropriate 
such set. Given some observation, an explanation (or set of alternative explanations) 
for that observation may be generated. In the case of Hobbs' model of interpretation, 
the observation is an utterance, and the explanation amounts to a theory of the relevant 
beliefs and intentions of the speaker. And this is just the idea behind the proposal 
presented in the latter half of the current chapter, albeit that my technical realisation 
of that idea is quite different from that of Hobbs. 
The goals of this thesis have been far more modest than those of Hobbs and his co-
workers, in that I have maintained a relatively conservative Frege-derived Montagovian 
line on the syntax-semantics interface, with compositional rules determining a semantic 
interpretation (or set of them) for each syntactic constituent in terms of the interpre-
tations of sub-constituents, and in that I have not attempted to provide a computer 
implementation. The novelty of the current proposal consists principally in two de-
partures from the Frege-Montague tradition. Firstly I have followed a recent trend in 
semantic theory by suggesting (in Chapters 7-9) that the traditional static view of what 
meanings are is inadequate, and I have proposed a dynamic alternative. Secondly, in 
this chapter, a model of the semantics-pragmatics interface has been proposed which 
allows both common-sense reasoning and semantic content to determine the informa-
tion which a hearer derives from a particular utterance. Thus I have not gone so far as 
Hobbs, in that common sense reasoning does not determine content in the model I have 
developed. But I have shown a way in which a mechanism operating very much in the 
spirit of Hobbs' proposals can be built on top of a compositional theory of meaning. 
Chapter 11 
Connections and Directions 
In this chapter I will attempt to forge some theoretical links between the model that has 
been developed in the second part of this thesis and some of the theories discussed in 
the first part. These links suggest directions that might be taken to tackle phenomena 
not so far incorporated in the model presented here, but also directions that might be 
taken to resolve problems which arise in other theories of presupposition. 
11.1 Multivalence 
The thesis, descending from the work of Frege and Strawson, that presupposition pro-
jection should be explained as inheritance of semantic undefinedness, seems to find an 
antithesis in the suggestion that presupposition projection arises from (pragmatically 
justified) principles of context change. However, Peters, in [Pe77], provided a synthe-
sis, observing that the presupposition inheritance properties derived in [Kar74] could 
be duplicated in a system with a trivalent semantics, and thus do not depend on the 
dynamicity of Karttunen's account. The connectives in Peter's trivalent system, which 
I will refer to as the Peters' connectives (but which Krahmer [Krah93] terms the Middle 
Kleene connectives), can be used to show the relationship between the dynamic logics 
developed in the current work and trivalent logics'. Having made such a connection, it 
becomes easier to see how insights might be transferred from a trivalent to a dynamic 
setting or vice versa. 	 11 
'The suggestion of drawing a formal connection between a PUL-like system and one based on Peters' 
semantics was first made to me by Marcus Kracht after a talk I gave in Amsterdam in 1992, and this 
resulted in the proof presented here. Willem Groeneveld, who was also at the talk, provided a proof of 
essentially the same property, and his proof runs along similar lines. 
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11.1.1 A Trivalent Semantics for the Non-epistemic Sub-language of 
PUL 
The Peters' connectives may be likened to the strong Kleene connectives, except that 
if the left-hand formula under a binary Peters' connective is undefined, then the whole 
formula is undefined: 
Definition D70 (The Peters' Connectives) The 3 valued interpretation of a corn- 
plexforrnula q relative to a world w, written 	is given by recursion over the following 
truth tables: 
	
t f* 	 t f * 
t t f * t t f * 
f f f f 	 f t 	t 
* * * * * * * * 
qVt f *  
t t t t 	 t I 
f 	t 	* ft 
* ** * 	 * * 
The intuition behind the presupposition operator 0 that has been utilised in this 
thesis is that a formula 90 only defines an update if 0 is true. A natural three valued 
analogue of this semantics would make 00 undefined whenever is not true, but true 
otherwise: 




The result proved in this section will concern two presentations of the semantics 
for the language of propositional logic with the addition of the unary 8-operator. This 
language will be referred to as PL+0. We assume models (W, F), where W is a set 
of worlds and F is an interpretation function mapping atomic formulae onto sets of 
worlds 2. The first presentation is the trivalent semantics given by the above truth 
tables, the meaning of a formula 0 in a world w being denoted by 	and atomic 
formulae 0 having interpretation given by 	= t if w E F(0), and f otherwise. We 
2Atomic formulae are thus effectively bivalent: every world is either in the extension of a given 
atomic formula, or it is not, and there is no third possibility. I will not consider the case where atomic 
formulae themselves have a fuzzy extension, whereby worlds could fall neither into the extension or the 
anti-extension, or could fall into both. 
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may then define trivalent entailment as the following relation between formulae in the 
language: 
Definition D72 (Entailment in the 3-valued system) 
1=3?' if VwEW ° =t==t 
The second presentation of the semantics is just the update semantics introduced 
in Chapter 7 (as it applies to the non-epistemic sublanguage of PUL), the update se-
mantics of a formula 0 being denoted c5L. For this language, the update notion of 
entailment from PUL adapted to the single premise case is easily show to be equivalent 
to the following (which says that all fixed points of the premise are fixed points of the 
conclusion): 
Definition D73 (Entailment in the Update System) 
if VurLo - 
It will now be shown that the trivalent and update notions of entailment define 
exactly the same logic (i.e. the same binary relation between formulae). Firstly, truth 
and falsity of a formula in a world will be defined for the trivalent and update systems, 
and an equivalence between these notions established. Truth in a world is analogous to 
the property of satisfaction in a set of worlds defined for PUL earlier. For truth of 0 in 
a world w in the trivalent system w 1=3 0 will be written, with w 	0 being used to 
indicate that this property is lacking, and w W3 4 for falsity of q  in w in the trivalent 
system. Similar notation is used for these notions in the update system. 
Definition D74 (Trivalent Truth in a World) 
W=3 0 if IIcb=t 
Definition D75 (Trivalent Falsity in a World) 
W3q? if I{c°=f 
Definition D76 (Update Truth in a World) 
w1=ucb if {w}I[q5]1{w} 
Definition D77 (Update Falsity in a World) 
wuq if {w}O 
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Lemma Li For all contexts w and propositions q: 
w=cb 	wI=3 and  w  W,, 0 	W3 
Proof: By induction over the complexity of 4. Note that since disjunc-
tion and implication may be defined in terms of conjunction and negation 
identically in both systems, it is only necessary to consider the clauses for 
atomic formulae, the presupposition operator, conjunction and negation. As 
examples, I give (A) the truth clause for the presupposition operator, and 
(B) the falsity clause for negation. 
We want to show that, on the assumption that the above properties hold 
for some 0, then for any w, w = 490 	w 1=3  0q5. Firstly from left to 
right. We assume w = 8, from which we obtain {w}E[8 {w} and, by 
the semantics of 8, {w}{w}, i.e. w =,, . By the inductive hypothesis, 
W 	4, and, by definition of 	and the truth table for 8, w 1=3 8q5. 
From right to left, w 1=3 8q5  gives us 	= t, and by inspection of the truth 
table IIq]° = t. The inductive hypothesis gives {w}{w}, from which 
{w}0{w} follows by update semantics of 8, and thence, by definition of 
I=, the result w 	8. 
We want to show that for any w, w 	-' 	w 1=3 -'q. From right 
to left, {w}h{w} gives us {w}O, by update semantics of -'. From 
this w Vl,, 0, and by the inductive hypothesis, w V13 q, Iç = f and thence 
E{-'41J=t. 
All these steps are reversible, so from left to right, we simply get from 
= t that w W3 0, using the inductive hypothesis derive w 
thence {w}O, and {w}h{w}. 
It must now be shown that the update notion of entailment is equivalent to a defi-
nition in terms of update truth and update falsity for this system: 
Lemma L2 0 1=u&iffVw[w1=u—*w1=u] 
Proof: From right to left definition of = gives us that Va °EI'L° - 
aE['Lo. It follows that this must hold for singleton sets of worlds a, i.e. 
Vw {w}{w} - {w}{w}. But now definition of update truth gives 
us the left hand side. 
The proof from left to right is more involved. Definition of update truth again 
gives us that (i) Vw {w}{w} - {w}{w}. Now, it may be shown 
that this system has a distributivity property: (2) Va [aLa  iffVw E 
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o {w} 	{w}} (the proof requires another induction over formula com- 
plexity). Now define Wk = {w I {w}cb{w}}. From the distributivity 
property it follows that (3) Vo c W ujojua, and it also follows that (4) 
Vo 	W0 	 1 and 3 give that (5) Wk c W1,. We now know that 
for any u, if its a subset of W, then it is a fixed point of both 0 and , and 
if its not a subset its not a fixed point of 0. It follows that all fixed points 
of 0 are fixed points of 0, which is the required result. 
Fact F18 The trivalent and dynamic entailment notions are extensionally equivalent for 
the language of PL+&: q ~=u 0 if 0 1=3 
Proof: 
By Lemma 2, q5 	b is equivalent to Vw[w = 	- w = sb]. This 
is equivalent to Vw[w = 	-* w 1=3 ] by Lemma 1. Now according to 
the definition of truth in the trivalent system this is in turn equivalent to 
Vw[I[ 	= t -+ 	= t], which is just the right-hand side of the definition 
of three valued entailment. 
This establishes the main result. Now it is easily shown that according to the def-
inition of presupposition given for PUL, and given the restriction to the non-epistemic 
sub-language, the presuppositions of a formula are all and only those formulae which 
are update entailed both by the formula and by its negation. Furthermore, a standard 
definition of presupposition in a trivalent logic would be entailment by both the for-
mula and its negation. But given that the notion of update entailment is extensionally 
equivalent to the notion of trivalent entailment for this system, it follows as a corollary 
that the notions of presupposition in the two systems are equivalent, which is essentially 
Peters' result. Another corollary is that for the sublanguage without the 8-operator, 
the logic is classical. This follows since, by assumption, atomic formulae have bivalent 
interpretations, and for all of the remaining connectives in the trivalent system, if their 
arguments are bivalent then they return the classical value. 
Clearly there is a tight correspondence between the dynamic systems which have 
been introduced in Part II of this thesis and trivalent logics. Although I doubt whether 
for the epistemic and first-order systems such a strong extensional equivalence could 
easily be demonstrated, the equivalence demonstrated here is highly suggestive of a 
general similarity between the traditional semantic approach to presupposition and the 
dynamic semantic approach. 
11.1.2 Assertion and Denial in Dynamic Logic 
The operators in the following table are Bochvar's assertion operator (A), Bochvar's 
(presupposition-canceling) external negation (p), and Seuren's presupposition-denying 
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negation (8): 
Definition D78 (Assertion and Denial Operators) 
0 Aq 	Sçb 
t t f f 
f 	t f 
* f t t 
Both the external negation and Seuren's negation can be defined in terms of the 
assertion operator and connectives from the Peters system above. Thus q5 	-AO and 
S 	 The following definition provides an appropriate dynamic interpretation 
for the assertion operator, and thus in the process enables the negation operators to be 
defined3: 
Definition D79 (Assertion in PUL) 
u[Açb]ft if T={wEuI{w}{w}} 
Fact F19 The trivalent and dynamic entailment notions are extensionally equivalent for 
the language of PL+a + A. 
Sketch of Proof: The proof requires us to check that the induction in 
lemma Li still goes through, and that the A-operator does not affect the 
distributivity property used in the proof of lemma L2. 
If an A-operator could be defined as an extension to ABLE, then it would be possible 
to augment the account given here with a Linkian floating-A type theory as described 
in §3, which would allow treatment of presupposition-denying negation without direct 
postulation of an ambiguous negation. Alternatively, it would be possible to define 
negation to be ambiguous between internal and external interpretations, or between 
internal and Seuren negation. 
11.1.3 Formalising Backward Suppletion 
As mentioned in Part One of this thesis (3.3), Seuren [Seu85] suggested that his triva-
lent logic (in fact Kleene's strong logic with the addition of Seuren's presupposition-
denying negation) should be augmented with an accommodation-like mechanism which 
3One could, of course, define the external negation and Seuren negation directly in the dynamic 
setting: 
aqr 	if r = {w E I 
oIJSçbr if T = {w E a I —av{w}Icbv}. 
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he termed backward suppletion, although some details of this mechanism have remained 
unformalised. It will now be shown that the approach to accommodation developed in 
this thesis could also be applied to a trivalent system like Seuren's.4 
Let us define an epistemic alternative, a view of what the speaker takes to be the 
common ground, to be a set of worlds. Then we may approximate the hearer's knowledge 
of the speaker's assumptions by a set of epistemic alternatives, that is, a set of sets of 
worlds. Suppose the speaker utters a sentence with meaning 0. Let us take it that the 
presuppositions of 0 reflect the speaker's assumptions about the common ground, so 
that if in some epistemic alternative there is a world for which 0 is undefined, then that 
alternative is not a good picture of the speaker's assumptions. On the other hand, if an 
alternative is compatible with the speaker's presuppositions, it can be updated simply 
by taking the intersection of the worlds in the alternative with the set of worlds for 
which 4 is true. 
Definition D80 (Updating an Information Set with a Trivalent Meaning) 
I+çb = {aPj'EI 
VwEa'çb* A 
a={wEa'I IIc°=t}} 
One can think of the above definition as comprising two principles, a principle of 
update, and a principle of accommodation. The principle of update says that (a) the 
information which the speaker takes to be established is modeled as a set of worlds, and 
(b) an appropriate assertive utterance should divide this set cleanly into two disjoint 
covering subsets, such that the utterance is true in all worlds in the first, and false in 
all worlds in the second. Just this view on how trivalent meanings should determine 
updates is espoused by Stalnaker in [5t79, pp.  325-326]. On his view, such a principle 
"connects semantic presupposition with pragmatic speaker presupposition", and he gives 
the following rationale: "The point of an assertion is to reduce the context set in a certain 
determinate way. But if some proposition is not true or false at some possible world, 
then it would be unclear whether that possible world is to be included in the reduced set 
or not." The second principle, the principle of accommodation, carries Stalnaker's view 
one stage further. It states that (a) the hearer's knowledge of what the speaker takes 
to be established is modeled as a set' of sets of worlds, and (b) an assertive utterance 
4llowever, I have my doubts as to whether the system to be described is true to Seuren's intentions, 
since the architecture of the semantics-pragmatics interface which I propose differs from that of Seuren. 
Seuren envisages quite general inferential mechanisms operating at a level of mental representation, and 
has used such devices to explain, for instance, instances of implicature denial. The divergence from this 
picture in the current work could be thought of as resulting from simplifications made so as to facilitate 
formalisation. 
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divides this set cleanly into two disjoint covering subsets, such that the utterance is 
appropriate in the sets of worlds in the first set, and inappropriate in the sets of worlds 
in the second. The two principles combine into a single principle of hearer's context 
incrementation: given an utterance, update those sets of worlds where it is appropriate, 
and discard those where it is not. 
A more sophisticated approach to modeling incrementation of a hearer's information 
states is to use information orderings like those discussed earlier. An ordering can 
be defined as a set of pairs of epistemic alternatives. Intuitively, a pair (0,, ,r) will 
be in the ordering just in case a is considered at least as plausible a model of the 
speaker's assumptions as T. Update proceeds by filtering out those pairs for which at 
least one of the alternatives is incompatible with the speaker's presuppositions, and 
otherwise updating both members of each pair with the new proposition, again simply 
by intersection with the set of worlds where the proposition is true: 
Definition D81 (Updating Information Orderings with Trivalent Meanings) 
O+q = {(a,T)I(a',r')eO 
VwE(a'Ur') J°* A 
a={wEa'I=t} A 
r={wEr'I IIc°=t}} 
One characteristic of the strong Kleene connectives is their tendency to yield con-
ditional presuppositions. For instance, the following example (reproduced from the 
previous chapter), is predicted (on a standard Strawsonian definition of presupposition) 
to presuppose that if I go to London then I have a sister: 
E52' If I go to London, my sister will pick me up at the airport. 
Now we can apply the same argumentation as used earlier to allow for the tendency 
to come to a stronger conclusion, namely that I have a sister. If it were the case that 
alternatives containing only worlds where I have a sister were higher in the plausibility 
ordering than states where it is not established whether I have one but it is established 
that in all the going-to-London worlds I have a sister, then the stronger inference would 
be predicted. Of course, whether the model actually does predict strengthening will 
depend on the particular common sense theory of the world underlying the information 
ordering. 
Note that the same argumentation need not produce strengthening of a non- 
presuppositional conditional as in 'If I go to London then I have a sister.' Provided that 
there are some alternatives which are more plausible than all those where I assume that 
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cancellation models. As a result, it could be argued that Soames' theory needs to be 
shored up with a pragmatic account of how weak presuppositions may be strengthened. 
The theory of accommodation presented in the last chapter provides a natural way of 
achieving this strengthening, and I will briefly show how the Local Satisfaction Preferred 
model may be combined with an account of global accommodation. 
11.2.1 Global Satisfaction Preferred 
A system will now be defined in which presuppositions are interpreted as providing 
global preferences, which is essentially the idea of cancellationist accounts. I will use 
the language of PL+a. 
Models are just as for PUL, pairs (W, F), where W is a set of worlds and F is an 
interpretation function mapping atomic formulae onto sets of worlds. It may be assumed 
that [j is an essentially classical valuation, mapping formulae onto the set of worlds 
where they would be classically true, and giving formulae 90 the same valuation as 4). 
An information state will just be a set of worlds, the update of an information state a 
with a formula 4), written a + 4), will just be given by a fl 	and a will be said to 
satisfy 4), written a = 4), if a is a fixed point of 4),  i.e. a + 4) = a7. If p is a pair of states 
(a, r), I will write j + 4) to mean (a + 4), r + 4)). 
The preferences of a formula 4),  written 1 4), will be defined in terms of an information 
ordering, which, as before, is a set of pairs of states (epistemic alternatives). Definition 
D82 below specifies the set of good orderings (GO) relative to some model. Firstly, the 
minimally constrained ordering 0, which is the set of pairs of any two non-absurd states, 
is a good ordering (the set of non-absurd states defined over a set of worlds W being 
written W*).  Secondly, an ordering w(4)),  which is one where there is a preference for 
states where 4) holds, is a good ordering. For a pair (a, r) to be in w(4)), it must be 
the case that if r satisfies 4), then a does too. Thirdly, the intersection of any two good 
orderings is also a good ordering. I will not explore the algebraic structure of the Good 
Orderings here. 
71n fact I will not here take advantage of the generality of this definition of satisfaction, and for 
current purposes could equally well have defined o 	as equivalent to o C  101 
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Definition D82 (Good Orderings) The set of good orderings is the smallest set GO 
such that (1) 0 is in GO, (2) for any çb, w() is in GO, and (3) for any 0 and 0' in 
GO, 0 fl 0' is in GO, where 0 and w(4) are defined by: 
W = 
0 = W* x W* 
w(q5) = {(ci,r)e0Ir—ci} 
It is natural to write o >o r for (ci, r) E 0, and ci > r to mean that a >o -r but 
T o a. Since any formula which is satisfied by the minimally informative state W is a 
tautology, and is thus also satisfied by every other state, it follows that every non-absurd 
state is at least as preferable as W in any ordering w(4). Indeed, this property holds 
for any good ordering 0: Va E W', a >0 W. 
For each formula 0 an associated set of preferences I 0 will now be recursively 
stipulated. Here the only clause which actually introduces preferences is that for pre-
suppositional formulae, a formula ao setting up a preference for states where q  holds. 
Atomic formulae carry the trivial preference ordering 0, which means that no state is 
strictly preferred to any other. The negation of a formula carries the same preferences 
as its argument, and the conjunction of two formulae carries a combination of the input 
preferences of the two conjuncts. Here two orderings are combined simply by taking 
their intersection. 
Definition D83 (GSP Orderings) 
To = 0 for atomic q 
= To 
I(A) = Inhi' 
= I- ( A-0) [=InI] 
I(c5 vb) = 1(-'cA-) [=InII 
= w() 
When defining a notion of entailment it will be important to consider the case of 
formulae containing explicitly denied presuppositions. So the set of preferred inputs for 
a formula 0, written 	will be defined as the set of the preferred inputs out of those 
that are actually consistent with 0. I write c() for the set of states which are consistent 
with 0, and a 	r to mean that T is not higher in the ordering 0 than a: 
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Definition D84 (Consistency, Non-Preference, and Preferred Inputs) 
c(cb) = {a I (a  + ) D O} 
U 540 T if r >o a -p a >o r 
= 	{a E c(q) I Yr E c(q) a o  'r} 
Now one formula q  can be defined to presuppositionally entail another ', written 
q5 ".-* , if and only if with respect to all of 's preferred inputs 4 contextually entails /': 
Definition D85 (Presuppositional Entailment) 
-'.*?I) 	if Vaefrq(a+) =I' 
A logician peering at this definition for the first time might perhaps be worried. 
What strange new fangled relation is -'-*, and why is it being described as a notion of 
logical consequence? I believe it could be termed a conservative notion of consequence 
in at least two senses. 
Firstly, for the sublanguage without the ô-operator, --+ is equivalent to the classical 
relation of consequence. This is so because none of the operators apart from ô introduce 
non-trivial preferences if their arguments have only trivial preferences, so that the set 
of preferred inputs for a consistent non-presuppositional formula is just the set of all 
states. In that case 0"-* holds if and only if the set of worlds in the extension of 0 is a 
subset of those in the extension of 0, which is just the condition for classical entailment. 
Inconsistent formulae have an empty set of preferred states, and will presuppositionally 
entail all other formulae, just as in classical propositional logic. 
Secondly, under this consequence relation all classical entailment patterns should 
remain valid for the full language of PL+8 with entailment defined by "-*. To see 
this, initially let us consider the conclusion. Observe that since the preference ordering 
associated with the conclusion is not involved in the definition of -'-*, and since the 
valuation of 90 is just that for 0, we may safely erase all occurrences of a on the right 
of an entailment. Now the premise. Suppose that some formula 0 has a sub-formula 
. Clearly replacing b by 490 will not affect the semantic interpretation of 0, and a 
fortiori will not affect the set of states with which 4 is consistent. Now suppose that çb 
is classical, i.e. does not contain any instances of the 8-operator. Then, as shown above, 
all its classical consequences will also be presuppositional entailments. Now modifying 
any number of sub-formulae by enclosing them in (any number of) a-operators can only 
restrict the set of preferred inputs to 0. It is easily seen that the set of entailments of 
the modified premise must be a strict superset of the entailments of the original premise. 
So, -'-* is a strictly weaker notion of consequence than classical entailment, in that more 
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formulae are presuppositionally entailed than classically entailed. 
Next we consider how the presuppositions of a formula may be defined using the 
ideas underlying presuppositional entailment. The following definition says that one 
formula presupposes another if and only if all preferred states of the first satisfy the 
second: 
Definition D86 (GSP Presupposition) 
>>cspt' if VaE frO  7?1' 
If 0 is consistent (i.e. c(q) D 0) then for any state a in 	a + q must be nonempty. 
Further, since + is defined in terms of intersection, and since the set of propositions 
which are satisfied in a fl r is just the union of those which are satisfied in a and 
those which are satisfied in r, it follows that the earlier definition of presuppositional 
entailment could be rewritten: 	if Vu E fto (a 1=0 or cfl = . Given that 
additionally 4)1 1=  0 holds if and only if 4) = , where = is the classical entailment 
notion (extension of consequent containing extension of premise), it follows that 
can here be expressed in terms of preferential presupposition and classical entailment: 
4) 	if 4) >>Gsp I' or  4) 
= 08 The following relatively weak properties of the 
system show that it is natural to think of 8-formulae as potential presuppositions in 
Gazdar's sense, for they emerge as presuppositions when nothing conflicts, and disappear 
otherwise: 
The presupposition operator yields presuppositions even when embedded: if 4) 
contains a subformula 0 and no other 8-formulae, and the conjunction of 4) and 
is consistent, then 4) >>Gsp b. 
Presuppositions persist if there is no conflict: if 4) >> L.' and x is a 
non-presuppositional formula such that the conjunction of 4), 0 and x is consistent, 
then 0 A X >>GSP 
Presuppositions disappear when conflicting material is added: if 4) >> 0, and 
although the conjunction of 4) and  x is consistent, that of 4), 0 and is inconsistent, 
then 4) A X kGSP '4) 
What this shows is that we have here the beginnings of a cancellationist account 
of presupposition. Of course, much would need to be shown before we could really 
be confident about this system, and much needs to be added (e.g. cancellation by 
8This provides another demonstration that --- is conservative with respect to classical entailment in 
the senses discussed above. 
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implicatures) before the system would be very potent as a theory of presupposition. But 
the system still manifests at least the most basic property of a cancellationist theory. 
That is, presuppositions project if there is no conflict and are canceled otherwise. Given 
that the developments in the current chapter are only intended to be proofs of concept, 
this provides sufficient foundation to move on to the next stage, of showing how a 
preference for global satisfaction can be replaced by a preference for local satisfaction. 
11.2.2 Local Satisfaction Preferred 
In the Global Satisfaction Preferred (GSP) system above, conjunction is symmetrical, 
its preferences not reflecting any ordering of the conjuncts. The only change now made 
to that system is an alteration of these preferences associated with conjunction9. In 
the following definition, whilst the presuppositions of the left conjunct become prefer-
ences of the whole conjunction, those of the right conjunct only impose a preference for 
satisfaction in a context which has been first augmented with the left conjunct: 
Definition D87 (Local Satisfaction Preference for Conjunction) 
(1) 	1 (q' AND ) = {(o,T) e1 0 1 (u+ q],r+ j[q]) El I'} 
It is easily checked that this operation does not introduce any non-good orderings10 . 
Let the relation of presupposition in the earlier PUL system be denoted by >>puL, and 
presupposition in the LSP system (>>Lsp)  be defined as for the GSP system excepting 
that the preferences associated with conjunction are altered . The following should now 
hold: 
1. When there is no inconsistency, PUL presuppositions are LSP presuppositions: if 
has just one presuppositional subformula, 0 >>pu. 0, and the conjunction of 
and 0 is consistent, then 0 >>Lsp . 
9The preferences associated with implication and disjunction are taken to be still defined in terms of 
the equivalences with conjunction and negation used above. Thus disjunction becomes asymmetric once 
conjunction is asymmetric. But in this system it might make sense to define the preferences for disjunc-
tion symmetrically, as the intersection of the preferences of the disjuncts. For now problematic cases of 
cancellation of presuppositions occurring in a disjunct need not be handled by defining disjunction so 
as to enforce local satisfaction, but can instead be handled by the cancellation mechanism. 
10Define the localisation of 0 to 4 as L(0,0) = {(oyr) E 0 I (o + 0,r + 0) E 0}. Now the above 
clause for conjunction may be written: I (0 and ) = I 0 fl L(I 0, ) 
To determine whether this produces only good orderings, we need to check that if 0 is a good ordering 
then L(O, q) is a good ordering. But if 0 is a good ordering then either 0 = 0, or 0 = w(x) for some x 
or 0 is an intersection of two other good orderings Oi and 02. The three cases break down as follows: 
IfO=Q then L(0,q5)=0 
If 0 = w(x) then L(0, *) = 	- x) 
If 0= 01 n02 then L(O,q5)= L(01,0)flL(02,q5) 
It follows that the preferences associated with the LSP system are still good orderings. 
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Non-PUL presuppositions are not LSP presuppositions: if 0 has just one presup-
positional subformula, and ç PUL 0, then q LSP 
Inconsistency with presuppositions causes cancellation: if 0 has just one presup-
positional subformula, Q >>LsP , and although the conjunction of 0 and x is 
consistent, that of 0, 0 and x is inconsistent, then 0 A 	LSP 'II. 
These results, which I hope with further study could be strengthened, show that 
the LSP system is PUL-like when there is no inconsistency, and thus typically produces 
weaker presuppositions than the cancellationist GSP model. However, under threat of 
inconsistency, LSP presuppositions vanish into thin air, in the manner of a cancellationist 
rather than a dynamic semantic account of presupposition". 
There are a number of modifications that it might be of interest to make to the 
LSP system, such as adding a treatment of implicatures, or replacing the notion of a 
context with a more constructive notion, such as a set of formulae. One possibility that 
might be quite significant would be replacing the classical interpretation of o + q with a 
dynamic interpretation. I can see no reason why such a system should not be extended 
to first-order: presupposed open propositions would then place preferences on their local 
contexts, but preferences which could be canceled. If I am right, then what would result 
would be a cancellationist model of presupposition which, unlike the models of Gazdar 
[Gaz79a], van der Sandt [vdS88], Mercer [Me87, Me921 and Soames [So82], would allow 
a treatment of the interaction of presupposition and quantification. I will not investigate 
this possibility here. Rather, I will consider another line of development, the addition 
of a mechanism of accommodation which can allow the weak presuppositions of the 
Soames-like LSP model to be strengthened. 
"One rather puzzling aspect of LSP concerns the fact that whilst the presuppositions of a formula 
may be canceled by explicitly denying them, denying the truth of the actual arguments of 8-operators 
can still leave non-trivial conditional presuppositions. For instance, let a be ( - (8() A x)) A -. 
The left-hand conjunct introduces a preference for states where q5 —* b holds. But this preference is not 
canceled by the conjunction with -v,b. So the formula still ends up presuppositionally entailing more 
than it would classically entail. In particular a presuppositionally entails -. 
An example may clarify. Consider the discourse 'If Mary closed her eyes then she did not realise that Bill 
was smiling. He wasn't.', which I find rather odd. If we take the two sentences to be conjoined, and we 
understand the realise' clause as (8(bill-is-smiling) A mary-realises-bill-is-smiling), then the discourse 
has the logical form of a, and LSP predicts that it entails that Mary did not close her eyes. Given 
the oddity of this discourse, I am not sure whether this result is problematic. But it does show that 
there may be cases where LSP predicts stronger presuppositions than GSP, for in this case LSP predicts 
a conditional presupposition, and GSP predicts no presupposition. I would note that, at least in this 
case, the inference could presumably be removed by stipulating, as is standard, that the conditional 
introduced an implicature that the truth of its antecedent was unresolved. Whether we could then 
produce a variant of LSP that did produce strictly weaker presuppositions than (some similar variant 
of) GSP, and whether this would be desirable, I cannot say. 
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11.2.3 Adding Common Sense to LSP 
This thesis is not about common sense. But it does provide a method for a theory of 
common sense reasoning to interact with a theory of presupposition, this being based 
on the assumption that whatever method is used to say that one theory is more in 
line with common sense than another, the output of that method can be encoded in 
an information ordering. It must now be determined how such a plausibility ordering 
may be combined with the LSP system, which involves its own ordering determined 
not by common sense but by a preference for satisfaction of conventionally stipulated 
presuppositions. This combination will take the form of a definition of presuppositional 
entailment which is sensitive to an external plausibility ordering, so that 0 -*o ?J) if 
is a presuppositional consequence of 0 relative to the ordering 0. 
One obvious possibility would be to take the intersection of the two orderings, and 
use that in the new definition of consequence. But I do not think this would give 
the right results empirically. Suppose that states are preferred where Mary does not 
own a rhinoceros, and I say A didn't realise that Mary owned a rhinoceros.' Taking the 
intersection of an ordering encoding a preference for states where Mary owns a rhinoceros 
with one where there is a preference for states where Mary does not own a rhinoceros 
will have a canceling effect. The set of maximal states in the resulting ordering would 
contain both states where Mary had a rhinoceros and states where she did not, and so 
there would be no net preference for states where Mary did own a rhinoceros. However, 
my strong impression is that even though it is prima facie unlikely that Mary owns a 
rhinoceros, if I say 1 didn't realise that Mary owned a rhinoceros' and do not explicitly 
mention any caveat, then I am committed to Mary's having a rhinoceros. Thus, when 
interpreting what someone has said, satisfaction of the presuppositional defaults could 
be said to have a higher priority than satisfaction of common sense preferences about 
how the world ought to be. 
We can model this by firstly finding the maximal states associated with the presup-
positions of the utterance, and then using the plausibility ordering to select amongst 
the resulting states. 
Definition D88 (Plausible Presuppositional Entailment) 
max(0,S) = {aeSIVrESor} 
0 0 if Vaemax(0,i''q5) (u+) = 
This defines a notion of entailment which allows for filtering of entailed presuppo-
sitions, cancellation of presuppositions that are explicitly denied, and strengthening of 
weak presuppositions such as those generated when a presupposition is located in the 
consequent of a conditional. 
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11.3 Local Accommodation 
11.4 Non-determinism and local accommodation 
Although PUL, ABLE and KMG each involve a relationally specified semantics, none of 
them take full advantage of that denotation space. In particular, in none of these systems 
is it possible for a formula to be non-deterministic, in the sense that for a given input 
there is more than one output. Yet I can conceive of a number of potential applications 
for such non-determinism. One such application was presented in the version of KMG 
appearing in [Bea93a], in which fully relational CCPs are used to model DRT style non-
deterministic pronoun resolution. On this basis a semantics is given for a fragment of 
unindexed English. In the system presented there, given an input state which has two 
discourse markers in its domain, both of which are established to correspond to singular 
females, update with the relational CCP corresponding to the unindexed sentence she is 
walking' could yield either of two output states, one in which the first discourse marker 
was asserted to be walking, and one in which the second was. This is an attractive 
approach to pronoun resolution, since the assumption that syntax somehow determines 
pre-indexed logical forms always struck me as unsatisfying. It is clear that syntax 
imposes strong constraints on coreference, but it is equally clear that syntax does not 
completely determine the issue. 
Non-determinism could also be used in the modeling of local and intermediate ac-
commodation. The trouble is that it is clearly inappropriate to allow arbitrary local 
accommodation, so the question is, how can it be constrained. One way of constraining 
it is by restricting what can be accommodated structurally, as in van der Sandt's model 
of accommodation. However, this account on the one hand is still too unconstrained 
(witness the inappropriate readings which intermediate accommodation was shown to 
generate in §6.5) and on the other hand is too constrained. For instance structural 
accounts fail to generate conditional presuppositions when appropriate (c.f. §6.6) and 
cannot possibly account for the phenomenon of bridging: 
E155' If I go to a wedding then the rabbi will get drunk 
This example has a reading where the rabbi is understood to be somehow related 
to the wedding mentioned in the antecedent, rather than being a globally salient rabbi. 
The nature of the conceptual bridge that can be built between a wedding and a rabbi 
is essentially non-structural, and relies on world-knowledge rather than any detail of 
the form of the sentence. Only a common-sense reasoning based approach like that 
developed in the previous section could account for the phenomenon of bridging. 
Most importantly, local accommodation supplies solutions to (amongst many others) 
the following traditional presuppositional riddles: 
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E228 The King of France is not bald because there is no King of France 
E229 Either the King of Buganda will open parliament or the President of Buganda will. 
In the first case, local accommodation of the existence of a King of France (and an 
appropriate discourse marker) within the scope of the first negation would allow for the 
fact that the sentence does not implicate that there is a King of France12. In the second 
case, local accommodation of the existence of a King of Buganda in the first disjunct 
and the existence of a President in the second would allow the sentence to be used in 
cases where it was not established whether Buganda was a monarchy or a republic. 
However, accepting that there is such a thing as local accommodation is only part of 
what is needed. I believe that local accommodation is a highly constrained process, and 
there is still no adequate theory of precisely what the constraints are. 
Let me indicate briefly how we might introduce a non-structural notion of local 
accommodation using a radical (in terms of traditional semantic theory rather than AT 
natural language systems) alteration to the simple PUL system from Chapter 7. Suppose 
that we replaced the PUL definition of a context as a set of worlds with a notion of a 
context as a pair of a set of worlds and a cost: the cost will be used to constrain local 
accommodation. For a context a-, let us say that ao is a set of worlds and o1 is a 
cost. The cost is supposed to represent the implausibility of a given accommodated 
piece of information, so that the more implausible the propositions that have to be 
accommodated, the higher the cost13. Let us then say that there is some relation of 
plausible extension between contexts, i-, which is determined by world knowledge, and 
which has at least the following properties: 
Ifai-*y, then y0 Ca0 
Plausible extension cannot cause a downdate 
Ifai-*r and ToCao, then Ti >al. 
Plausible extension increases the cost. 
If 	y then there isnov such that -*v,vo=To and v17r1 
Extending some initial state with any given proposition has only one cost. 
Va a }-* a 
Extending with a tautology (i.e. not at all) is free. 
12 But see [vdS:MS] for an alternative view of how this type of example should be treated. 
13c.f. Sperber and Wilson's [SW84] use of relevance, which they describe as a processing cost. The 
cost utilised above measures unexpectedness (of extra assumptions). I have sometimes surmised that this 
cost might be measured in millimetres, a cost of, e.g., 2 mm. corresponding to a surprisingness which 
would cause raising of the eyebrows by this amount. 
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Here are the first few clauses showing what the semantics might look like: 
01[Patomic]IT if -rl = al A To={wEooIwEF(p)} 
Uq5AND7-  if 3V uVI['i,b]T 
O1NOTT if avv' a"-*vv' 
A Ti = vç A To = 
aIMPLIEST if NOT(AND(NOT))]1T 
For atomic propositions the cost of the input is simply identified with the cost of 
the output, whilst conjunction and implication are defined in the normal way. The 
interesting clause is that for NOT q, which allows for plausible extension before update 
with 0. 
Normally, the fact that not accommodating anything is cheaper than accommodating 
something will mean that the cheapest update with a given formula is equivalent to the 
standard PUL update. However, in some circumstances, failure to accommodate would 
yield presupposition failure. Consider the following example: 
E230 Perhaps Bertha is hiding. However, if Anna discovers that Bertha is not hiding, then 
she will be upset. 
The input context to the second sentence will not satisfy the proposition that Bertha 
is not hiding, and thus updating can only proceed if extra information is accommodated 
into the antecedent of the conditional, a possibility which arises from the definition 
of implication in terms of the new negation. On quite reasonable assumptions about 
the nature of plausible extension, the cheapest update with the sentence will be one 
corresponding to the local accommodation into the antecedent of the proposition that 
Bertha is not hiding. 
This is a far from complete story, but it does suggest at least the possibility that 
the theory of meaning described in this paper could be extended with an account of 
local accommodation. Personally, I would be happier with an account that did not 
involve postulation of explicit costs and relied instead on a preference ordering mech-
anism like that invoked to describe global accommodation in Chapter 10. However, in 
the absence of any detailed proposal, I think it wise to keep an open mind, with there 
being clear potential for solutions using orderings, costs, or probabilities. Given recent 
formal convergence in the field of non-monotonic reasoning, it seems likely that a solu-
tion depending on any one of these might eventually be recast in terms of either of the 
others. 
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11.5 A Note on Presupposition Denial 
In making various connections in this chapter, my eye has been on one phenomenon 
in particular. This is the cancelibility of presuppositions when the trigger is embedded 
under a negation - what could be called the problem of presupposition denial. In 
the CCP systems introduced in Chapters 7-10 of this thesis, if a sentence (formula) 
carries some presupposition, then the negation of the sentence will carry that same 
presupposition. Yet numerous examples have been cited in the first part of this thesis 
for which this result seems inappropriate. One of the goals of this chapter has been 
to illustrate that there is no reason why insights from elsewhere in the presupposition 
literature should not be drawn into the kinematic model so as to resolve this difficulty. 
It is clear that, there is no shortage of solutions to the problem of presupposition denial, 
but rather an embarrassment of riches. 
Firstly there is the possibility of adding an extra presupposition-canceling negation. 
Then there are three approaches which are more general in their scope, applying not 
only to cases of canceled presuppositions embedded under negations, but also canceled 
presuppositions under other operators as well. These three are: introducing assertion 
operators (plus some pragmatic mechanism for determining when to use them), making 
presuppositions defeasible, and adding mechanisms of local and intermediate accom-
modation. The connection between the last two options has already been discussed 
in 6.8.1, and it is clear that the assertion operator approach is not that distant. All 
three have the effect that the constraint associated with a presupposition is not abso-
lute, whether what removes that constraint is co-assertion (in the terminology of [Li861), 
cancellation, or local accommodation. 
However, it is not clear to me that any of these yet provide the proper way to deal 
with cases of presupposition denial. The following data is drawn from [Bea92], but 
Horn [Horn89, Horn85] and Burton-Roberts [Bu89a] have both provided voluminous 
quantities of similar data: 
E231 John doesn't know that Bill is happy, since Bill is not happy. 
E232 John doesn't know that Bill is happy, he merely believes it. 
E233 John doesn't think that Bill is happy, he is totally convinced. 
E234 John doesn't believe that Bill is happy, he knows it. 
The various approaches outlined above provide a treatment of the first two of these 
examples, but not the last two. Indeed, the last two examples present a major problem 
for such approaches since if the negation is taken to map true onto false, then they 
are semantically inconsistent. I believe that an account which offers a treatment of the 
[6suH 's°s 'ns 'SJAJ:SpA 'I6SPA '8U1OH '6Ui0H] 
jo 1cUt> qDu-e4suT ioj 'uotu jo 4unoaae paiopisuoo Ajdoid le Ut aaelos 319as ;snui iopi oqj s 
uouUJdx pauoo aip 4pqtA o4 Re tojo o4 llq2isuTjuio ou OA4 j 	 on1g 04 aTU14 ipnm 
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matter, there are clear counterexamples to every existing theory of presupposition which 
is formally detailed enough to make definite predictions, and I am unable to see why 
Wilson felt that cancellation type accounts would differ; perhaps hindsight has obscured 
the point she was trying to make. In his presentation Gazdar chose to excise the final 
part of the above passage, that concerning the "coming from someone else" suggestion 
arising in cases of cancellation, but it is this part to which I wish to draw attention. 15 
It seems to me that Wilson is absolutely right that an adequate theory of cancellation 
is not merely one which allows presuppositions to be canceled, but one which indicates 
in what circumstances cancellation can occur. If a theory does not distinguish between 
assertive and non-assertive utterances, but certain types of cancellation are typically 
or entirely restricted to just one of those, then the theory is inadequate16. In this 
sense all of the extensions to the dynamic semantic model which I have proposed in this 
chapter would fail, in and of themselves, to produce an adequate theory. In principle any 
of the three extensions, introducing assertion operators, making local presuppositional 
constraints defeasible, and adding local accommodation, could produce a model in which 
denied presuppositions did not project, but this would not make sense of what it is to 
deny, would not explain or account for the distribution of such denials in discourse, and 
further would not account for the observation that what can be denied is not limited to 
presuppositions and assertions. 
I think it a promising start that from a technical point of view there are methods 
of extending the coverage of the dynamic semantic model such that cases of presuppo-
sition denial are treated at least as well as in presuppositional theories which take the 
possibility of such denial as their central datum (e.g. the cancellation theories). But it 
is clear that the revisions called upon in order to adequately treat the types of discourse 
in which denial occurs are of such a fundamental nature, including a move from mono-
logue to dialogue and a rejection of the simplifying assumption that discourse contexts 
are incremented monotonically, that it would be premature to champion any one of the 
extensions I have proposed, for it remains unclear which extension will fit in with the 
final picture most felicitously. 
15Prince [Pri78] also discusses the way in which presuppositions can appear to be suspended when 
they are attributed to someone other than the speaker. 
16 Whilst the cancellation theories I described in part I do not account for dialogue and do not account 
for variation in speech act type, it should be mentioned that Blok [B1o93] has proposed extensions in 
both these directions, and his model of presupposition denial might well answer Wilson's objection. 
Chapter 12 
Conclusion 
In [Gaz79a], Gazdar concludes of Karttunen's "plugs, holes and filters" account of pre-
supposition, the theory which formed the basis of the CCP model: 
The... theory. . . has had a long and distinguished career. First formulated 
in 1971, published in 1973, modified and reconceptualized in 1974, and for-
malised and reterminologized in 1975. But the theory as of 1978 is in poor 
shape, enmeshed in its own epicycles, beset by counterexamples and con-
stantly in need of "conversational implicatures" to unclog the filters and 
explain the leakage from its plugs. The time for euthanasia has arrived. 
Fifteen years later, the CCP model is alive and kicking, and although it has developed 
considerably from Karttunen's original proposals, it seems to me that many of the central 
ideas of the current account are already to be found in Karttunen's work. In this light, 
one could say that as of 1979 Karttunen's account of presupposition was not a theory 
five years past its prime, but one fifteen years ahead of its time. Much the same could 
be said of Karttunen's even earlier account of discourse referents [Kar76]. For it is only 
in the last few years that the technical methods have been developed with which to give 
adequate expression to the essentially dynamic model that Karttunen was advocating. 
The combination of Heim's work with the further developments in this thesis have 
provided solutions to many of the problems with Karttunen's account. Yet the resulting 
theory is by no means just an ad hoc collection of repairs. On the contrary, as I have gone 
to great lengths to demonstrate, the same analysis of internal sentence dynamics which 
is appropriate to the requirements of quantification, anaphora and epistemic modality, 
is also at the heart of the CCP theory. Some of the developments in this thesis will now 
be summarised, and, where relevant, these developments will be related to problems 
arising elsewhere in the presupposition literature as discussed in part one of this thesis. 
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12.1 Quantification, Anaphora and Modality 
In Chapter 8, a theory of quantification was been presented which accounts for both 
internal and external dynamic properties of generalised quantifiers, together with a 
theory of anaphora that exploits the properties of the quantifiers to yield a treatment 
of singular and plural donkey and discourse anaphora. 
A theory of epistemic modality was been described in Chapter 9 which accounts for 
some modal identity problems and for the logic of epistemic modality within quantified 
contexts in dynamic logics. 
12.2 Compositionality 
The KMG system described in the first half of Chapter 10 provides the first integration 
of dynamic accounts of quantification, anaphora, modality and presupposition into a 
compositional grammar fragment. Note that in the past the CCP type presuppositional 
meanings have only been stipulated for sentential expressions [Kar74], or for sentential 
expressions with free variables [Hei83a], so that KMG is the first system to demonstrate 
how such meanings may be derived from lexical meaning assignments in a Montagovian 
fashion. 
12.3 Presupposition and Quantification 
In Chapters 8 and 9 a solution was given for the projection problem for presuppositions 
arising within compound and quantified sentences, and it was argued that the results 
with respect to quantified sentences improve on those found in the existing literature. 
To begin with, as discussed in Chapter 4, none of the cancellation accounts (e.g. 
[Gaz79a, Me92, vdS88]) have offered any account of the interaction of presupposition 
and quantification, nor is it obvious how this might be done (but c.f. one possible 
direction for research mentioned in §11.2.1). Thus no comparison with these accounts 
is possible. 
With regard to theories which do account for this interaction, relevant examples are 
the following: 
E235 Somebody curtsied. 
E112 A fat man was pushing his bicycle. 
E200a No woman regrets that she is married 
E201a Every woman who regrets that she is married is sane 
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E134? I don't know whether the Pope has measles. But every protestant who realises that 
the Pope has measles is converting. 
E139 How many team members and cheerleaders will drive to the match? 
* Few of the 15 team members and none of the 5 cheerleaders can drive, but every 
team member will come to the match in her car. So expect about 4 cars. 
In §3.2, it was shown that for examples like E235 and E112 Karttunen and Peters' 
system [KP79] makes incorrect predictions because it does not allow for binding between 
presupposition and assertion. On the other hand, as discussed in §5.3, Heim's system 
[Hei83a] does allow for such binding, but mistakenly predicts a universal presupposition. 
Although she suggested avoiding this problem using a mechanism of accommodation, it 
has been shown [So89] that such a solution would be problematic. The developments 
in Chapter 9 yielded a system where binding is not only possible, but produces in-
tuitively reasonable results: these examples produce existential rather than universal 
presuppositions. 
As discussed further in Chapter 9, the Heimian system without accommodation 
also produces incorrect results for sentences like E201a and E200a. Once again the 
presuppositions she predicts are far too strong. In Chapter 9 it was shown how a 
modification to the Heimian semantics produces a system with intuitively reasonable 
existential presuppositions for these examples, and this modified system provided the 
basis of the KMG fragment. 
Van der Sandt's DRT based account [vdS92] was first discussed in Chapter 5 and 
more fully in Chapter 6. Unlike his earlier cancellation account, it does allow for a 
treatment of the interaction between presupposition and quantification, and indeed it 
behaves quite respectably. The presuppositional inferences predicted for all of E235, 
E112, E201a and E200a are uniformly weak. However, it was shown in §6.3 that the 
DRT accommodation model fails to predict the oddity of E134 due to the presence 
of an underconstrained mechanism of local accommodation. On the other hand this 
type of example should be no problem for KMG, which lacks such a mechanism. In 
the case of E139, it was shown in §6.5 that van der Sandt's model incorrectly predicts 
domain restriction to the set of car-owning team members, and does not predict any 
oddity for the example. KMG does not allow this type of accommodation, and will 
successfully predict incoherence of E139, this incoherence arising from a truth conditional 
inconsistency1. 
'See [Bea94a] for a more detailed discussion of data concerning presupposition and quantification. 
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12.4 Accommodation and Common Sense 
It was shown in Chapter 10 how global accommodation can be formalised within an 
account which is both dynamic and pragmatic, by using preference orderings over infor-
mation states, and has been demonstrated that this resolves both the general problem 
of how presuppositions can be informative, and one particular problem with the CCP 
model concerning the prediction of overly weak conditional presuppositions from com-
pound sentences. It was argued in §10.2 that all purely semantic theories of presupposi-
tion, and all theories of presupposition involving structural accounts of accommodation 
or cancellation make systematically incorrect predictions by failing to account for the 
importance of common sense in determining exactly what is accommodated (c.f. also 
§3.3.3, §4.8, §6.4 and §6.6). Here is some relevant data: 
E236 We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to commencement exercises. 
E52 If I go to London, my sister will pick me up at the airport. 
E224 If Jane takes a bath, Bill will be annoyed that there is no more hot water. 
E225 If Jane wants a bath, Bill will be annoyed that there is no more hot water. 
E237 If Jane takes a bath and Bill is annoyed that there is no more hot water, he won't let 
her have a towel. 
E99 If Nixon invites Angela Davis to the Whitehouse, then Nixon will regret having invited 
a black militant to his residence. 
E151 If Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X, he will be bothered by the fact that his weight 
is higher than it would be on Earth. 
Karttunen's example, [Kar74]), E236 demonstrates informativity of presuppositions. 
The model he proposed their provided no direct treatment of these cases, which he 
explained as being deviant, arising from imperfections in the functioning of natural 
discourse. Heim [Hei83a] did provide a line of explanation for these cases, by adding a 
mechanism of global accommodation to the CCP model. In this thesis it has been seen 
how this explanation may be further formalised. 
Example E52 is the type of case where a conditional presupposition is generated in 
the dynamic models of [Kar74] and [Hei83a], in multivalent accounts based on (e.g.) 
Kleene's strong logic and a conventional Strawsonian definition of presupposition, and 
also in the two dimensional model of Karttunen and Peters [KP79] and the hybrid ac-
count of Soames [So82]. This type of claimed presupposition, here that if I go to London 
then I have a sister, has been widely attacked. It is clear that an utterance E52 would 
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normally only occur in situations where the speaker actually has a sister, and that a 
hearer would be able to infer this even if unfamiliar with the speaker's family back-
ground. Karttunen and Peters' provided a pragmatic explanation for the strengthening 
of conditional presuppositions, but this justification has come under attack - see es-
pecially [Geu95] - and is anyway informal. I have offered a formal model of global 
accommodation whereby the form of an utterance places minimal semantic constraints 
on what must be accommodated, but does not determine what is accommodated: world 
knowledge and plausibility criteria determine this. It has been shown that this can yield 
the appropriate strengthening. Furthermore, the method is of sufficient generality that 
it can be applied not only to the dynamic semantic model presented in this thesis, but 
also, as shown in Chapter 11, to other models, such as those based on a multivalent 
semantics. 
The next two examples, E224 and E225, demonstrate why the interaction with world 
knowledge is so important. Hearers may come to quite different conclusions when en-
countering the two sentences. If knowing that there are many households where having 
a bath tends to exhaust available hot water supplies, a hearer may conclude from E224 
that the speaker is referring to such a household, and that if Jane takes a bath the hot 
water reservoir will indeed be emptied. But a hearer faced with the structurally similar 
example E225 will generally not be able to conclude that there is a general rule linking 
the antecedent of the conditional (Jane wants a bath') to the presupposition that there 
is no hot water. The most plausible explanation of why the speaker is able to take for 
granted that there is no hot water in the local context of the consequent of E225 is that 
he also takes it to be globally true that there is no hot water, and takes this to be an un-
controversial assumption. So in the case of E224 a hearer will tend not to conclude that 
there is a lack of hot water, but in the case of E225 the hearer will tend to conclude this. 
The global accommodation mechanism which I have proposed provides a way in which 
common sense knowledge of what is plausible, encoded as an information ordering, can 
interact with the CCP model of presupposition so as to yield just this difference. 
No model of presupposition which fails to detail the mechanism by which knowledge 
of plausibility can affect what is accommodated will be able to predict the contrast. 
Multivalent semantic theries (e.g. [vF75, Ha76, Seu85, Bu89a]) cannot predict the 
difference without an extra pragmatic component, and up until now there has been no 
serious attempt to formalise such a pragmatic component. Cancellation theories (e.g. 
[Gaz79a, vdS88, Me92]) and existing theories of structural accommodation (e.g. [vdS92, 
Ze92] fail on two counts. Firstly, there is what might be called the inconsistency problem: 
it is determined whether or not a presupposition is projected/globally accommodated 
using a consistency test. But I have argued that the difference between E224 and 
E225 concerns plausibility and not consistency. Both examples could consistently be 
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uttered when the speaker was assuming that there was an absence of hot water, so 
cancellation and structural accommodation theories will uniformly predict projection of 
this presupposition. 
Secondly, the cancellation theories and the structural accommodation theories do 
not allow for the fact that what is accommodated is in general not a simple yes-no 
proposition, but an explanation, a theory which incorporates the conventionally sig-
nalled presupposition as just one element. Information orderings provide many such 
alternative explanations, encoded abstractly in terms of CCP states. In cases such as 
E224, and also E237—E151, I have argued that the CCP model is right in predicting that 
a local constraint for presupposition satisfaction yields a global constraint that a condi-
tional holds, e.g. that if Spiff lands on our planet then his weight will be higher than on 
Earth in the case of E151. Further, I have shown how given that the form of the utter-
ance places such a constraint, the information ordering mechanism allows an appropriate 
explanation containing that conditional to be accommodated. Conditional presupposi-
tions are thus at the core of the explanations accommodated not only for E224, but 
also for the remaining examples E237—E151. But current cancellation and structural 
accommodation theories cannot in general generate conditional presuppositions. Thus, 
as was shown at length in §4.8 and §6.6, cancellation and structural accommodation 
theories not only predict overly strong presuppositions in cases like E224 and E237—
E151, because of the inconsistency problem (i.e. that in these models inconsistency is 
what causes cancellation or non-accommodation, and not implausibility), they also lack 
any method for producing appropriate presuppositions if the inconsistency problem was 
overcome. 
12.5 What Comes Last 
Having shown that the greater part of the CCP theory can be independently motivated 
in terms of extraneous semantic phenomena, what remains that is specific to a theory 
of presupposition is just that it really is a theory of presupposition. If you convert the 
intuitive idea that presuppositions come before other aspects of meaning into the techni-
cal claim that presuppositions are constraints on input contexts in dynamic semantics, 
what results, broadly, is the CCP model. Thus presupposition is what comes first in 
dynamic semantics. 
Appendix A 
Properties of ABLE 
The main facts demonstrated in this appendix are: 
All ABLE formulae are eliminative. Without this property the definitions of sat-
isfaction and entailment would not be appropriate. 
The non-modal presuppositions of an ABLE formula are also entailments. 
Definition D89 (Extension) A state I is an extension of a state J if: 
VwVf I.w.f - (g f - g A J.w.g) 
Definition D90 (Eliminativity) A CCP F is eliminative if for any states I and J, 
if I{F}J then J is an extension of I. 
Fact F20 All ABLE formulae are eliminative. 
Proof: An induction over ABLE formulae. The most difficult cases are the quantifica-
tional determiners, which I will leave until last. Firstly, the postulate on the denotation 
of ABLE predicates, MP8, forces the output to be a subset of the input, from which elirn-
inativity follows. Conjunction is defined as relational composition, and it is clear that if 
two CCPs are eliminative then their composition will be. Negation is defined such that 
the output is the input minus some other set, which means that once again the output 
must be a subset of the input. The output of a definite determiner, if defined, is the in-
put updated with the scope condition, so it suffices that, by the induction hypothesis, the 
scope condition will be eliminative. Since tests are eliminative, the output either being 
the input or the absurd state, facts D61 and Fil guarantee that the epistemic modalities 
are eliminative. 
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The definition of the semantics of existential determiners, D65, is of the following 
form. 
= AIAJ 
J = ,\w.Xg 
... I.w.f A ... A G80 = Ah [h >- f A sco.w.h] A 
AG, 0.g 
Thus we have that for existential determiners 72', if IV.i.0.01 J, then: 
VwVg [J.w.g - 	fscoG50   I.w.f A 
G 0 = Ah [h >- f A sco.w.h] A 
G 0 .g 
From this it follows that: 
VwVg [J.w.g -p  f I.w.f A 	f 
This is the required result. 
Similarly, it follows from definition D64 that if V is a non-existential determiner 
and IV.i.q.?/i]J, then: 
VwVg [J.w.g - 	fscoG 0 I.w.f A 
G80 = Ah [h >- f A sco.w.h] A 
g = ADAx f.D.x V 
h G 0.h A h.D.x 
Once again, it is straightforward to verify that g must be an extension of f, and the 
result follows. This completes the proof. 
Definition D91 (Singleton) 
((w, f)) = Aw'\g [w' = w A f = g] 
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Definition D92 (Distributivity) A CCP F is distributive if 
VJVJI{F}J 4-* J=AwAf[ 
gI.w.g A ((w,g)){F}((w,f))] 
Fact F21 The non-modal formulae of ABLE are distributive. 
Sketch of Proof: Another induction on (non-modal) formula complexity, starting with 
the fact that MP8 guarantees that ABLE predications are interpreted distributively. 
Definition D93 (Persistence) A CCP F is persistent if 
(I satisfies F Al; Jis an extension off) -* J satisfies F 
Fact F22 Non-modal ABLE formulae are persistent. 
Proof: ABLE predicates have the property of relevance, so that their denotation is only 
sensitive to the values the input state gives to the predicated markers. Thus if an ABLE 
predication is satisfied in a state, then adding new discourse markers to the state will 
produce another state in which the predication is satisfied. Since predications are dis-
tributive, it holds that if a predication F is satisfied in some state I, then it must be 
satisfied in every subset of I.It follows that ABLE predications are persistent. 
Inspection of the remaining semantic clauses show that they all preserve relevance, 
so that if any ABLE formula is satisfied in a state then adding new discourse markers 
will yield another state which satisfies the formula. Since all non-modal formulae are 
distributive, it follows that all non-modal formulae are persistent. 
Fact F23 If 0 is a non-modal formula and iJ' presupposes 0, then 
Proof: Since 0 is non-modal, it must be persistent, so that if it is satisfied in a state 
then it must be satisfied in any extension of the state. Since 1.' presupposes 0, it follows 
that every state that admits 0 satisfies 0. Since all ABLE formulae are eliminative, it 
follows that an output of 0 must be an extension of the input. Thus if an input of /' 
satisfies 0, then the output must also satisfy /. This yields the required result, since 
every output of 0 satisfying q is the condition for 0 = çb. 
Appendix B 
ABLE in Ty3  
The following postulate defines Ty3  constants for all the ABLE operators, as well as the 
pronominal abbreviations: 
Meaning Postulate MP33 
is = ADAD'\I)J [t-domain.I.D A t-domain.I.D' A 
J = AwAf [I.w.f A f.D = f.D']] 
AND = AFAF'\IAJ [K I{F}K{F'}J] 
NOT = AF.\L\J [K I{F}K A 
J = )w\f [I.w.f A -'(2g g f A K.w.g)]] 
IMPLIES = ) F)F'AIAJ [I'1" I{F}T'{F'}I" A J = Aw)f [I.w.f A 
Vg (g f A I'.w.g) - (h h g A I".w.h)]] 
OR = AFAF'\L\J [KK' I{F}K A I{F'}K' A J = AwAf 
[I.w.f A 3g g f A (K.w.g V K'.w.g)]] 
THE = AD)FAF')JXJ [t-dornain.I.D A If satisfies IF A 
K I{F}K{F}J] 
SHE = ADAF [THE.D.(SINGULARU.D AND FEMALEU.D).F] 
HE = )DAF [THE.D(SINGULARU.D AND MALEU.D).F} 
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IT = AD\F [THE.D.(SINGULARU.D AND NEUTERU.D).F1 
THEY = ADAF [THE.D.(PLURALU.D).F] 
MIGHT = AV(o, ) AFAIAJ [K I{F}K A 
J = AwAf [I.w.f A w'g K.w'.g A g v /]] 
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If V is one of EVERY, MOST, FEW or NO then: 
Lom ADAFAF'AIAJ 
initressco 
I I{+.D}init{F}res{F'}sco A 
J =AwAg 
f3G,,s 3Gsco Xres 
I.w.f A 
Gres = Ah [h >- f A res.w.h] A 
= Ah [h >— f A sco.w.h] A 
Xres = Ax [h Gres.h A h.d.x] A 
X 0 = Ax [h G0.h A h.d.x] A 
, .X res 	A 
[f.D.xv 
g = ADAx I 
[h  G 0.h A h.D.xj 
(13) 	If V is SOME or EXACTLY-ONE, then: 
ADAFAF'AIAJ 
3init3resDsco  
If +.D}init{F}res{F'}sco A 
J = AwAg 
fGres 	Xres X 0 
I.w.f A 
Gres  = Ah [h >- f A res.w.h] A 
= Ah [h >- f A sco.w.h] A 
Xres = Ax [h Gres.h A h.d.x] A 
X,0 = Ax [h G50.h A h.d.x] A 
V' .Xres 	A 
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